Turkey and International Society From a Critical Legal Perspective by Aral, Berdal




Presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the School of Law in the
University of Glasgow
September 1994
© Berdal Aral, 1994
ProQuest Number: 13834079
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13834079
Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346




TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER, 
AND TO MY FATHER
ABSTRACT
Contrary to the pretentions of liberal jurists, positive international law does not 
represent a ’scientific1 and 'universal' system of law. Instead, it is largely marked by 
ambiguity, fragmentation and legal lacunae. For instance, international law still lacks 
supranational mechanisms for resolving inter-state disputes. Furthermore, there is no 
agreed definition among states of what constitutes 'law' and how it should be applied. 
If this is the case, then, international jurists should seek to understand the subjective 
context in which a particular legal discourse takes place, instead of proposing 'correct' 
formulae on the basis of'objective' legal norms.
The deficiency of present international law is most visible in the sphere of the law of 
territory. Under international law, territory is still treated as an exclusive preserve of 
the state irrespective of the wishes of the 'people'. It will be argued that the state- 
centric nature of international law still persists despite the inclusion of other legal 
personalities and categories of rights into its ambit Since the autonomy of states is 
the starting point of international law, practical implementation of the right of 
'peoples' to self-determination or the international protection of human rights and 
minority rights are severely prejudiced.
This conceptual framework informs the mode of analysis pursued here to examine 
Turkish conceptions and practices of international law. By attempting to understand 
Turkey's international outlook from within, this study is intended to demonstrate, in 
the context of various test-cases, the need for the international legal discipline to 
open itself to other social disciplines, instead of confining itself to the parochial 
boundaries of law' as such.
The second chapter, following the Introduction, introduces the critical hermeneutical 
paradigm adopted in this study. It argues that the analysis of international law 
requires a multidimensional and multilayered understanding of legal pheneomenon 
and behaviour which does not proceed on the basis of a single theory, be it positivism, 
naturalism or postmodernism. Chapter three focuses on the theories of state and 
nationalism as explanatory frameworks for the international legal behaviour of 
individual states. This theoretical framework is then deployed for an exposition and 
explanation of Turkish conceptions of international society. It will be argued that the 
Turkish view of international society is largely shaped by Eurocentric assumptions 
and perspectives, while Turkish nationalism is deeply suspicious of the outside 
world, including the west
Chapter four focuses on the role played by Turkey's academic establishment in the 
dissemination of a particular view of international society and its legal framework. 
Having examined some prominent textbooks of international law and, to a far more 
limited degree, of international relations, this study concludes that they are largely 
modelled on western positivistic scholarship, and tend to ignore the 'progressive' 
dimensions of international law and politics.
The second section of this thesis draws on the practical implications of the conceptual 
analyses made previously. This is done through an investigation of Turkey's legal 
behaviour in the context of some disputes and questions with which it has been 
involved. Chapter five focuses on the Cyprus dispute over which Turkey and Greece 
hold contradictory views. This is also the case with the Aegean dispute which will be 
examined in Chapter six. Chapter seven focuses on the problems faced by the Turkish 
minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. In its turn, Chapter eight deals with the question of 
the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Chapter nine focuses on Turkey's voting pattern in 
the UN General Assembly with regard to some of the 'progressive' issues of 
international law, namely the principle of self-determination, human rights and the 
search for a new international economic order. The concluding chapter, on the basis 
of the preceding analyses, draws on the limits of positive international law in securing 
a peaceful and egalitarian international order. The same chapter also asserts that 
Turkey's largely anachronistic view of international law, and its failure to play an 
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This study is an inquiry into some of the problematic areas of international law, with 
special reference to sovereignty and statehood. The extent to which states are held to 
be sovereign, both internally and externally, has long been an important 
preoccupation of polititical and legal theorists. A brief introductory remark on the 
origins of the international law of territory may be useful here. Under the Eurocentric 
international law of the nineteenth century, the state was sanctified as the sole actor 
of international society. Accordingly, this system of law was premised upon an 
absolutist concept of statehood according to which the state was the supreme 
overlord of the territory under its jurisdiction. International law was solely assigned 
the task of delimiting state competences. Therefore, it was not entitled to interfere in 
the domestic jurisdiction of states which meant that the relationship of a state with its 
people was a matter for domestic law. International law could only become involved 
in this process in so far as a given state had delegated certain powers to international 
law (1). The non-western states, for their part, acceded to this system of law from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards on the basis of western positivistic doctrine. The 
principle of the 'sovereign equality of states', coupled with the principle of 'non­
intervention in the internal affairs of other states', in their view, granted them the legal 
right to defend themselves against western colonialism and imperialism (2). In other 
words, theirs was a pragmatic response to the crude realities of an international 
system dominated by western states.
International law is, for the most part, still governed by an absolutist concept of state 
sovereignty. This is perhaps not surprising given that international law is not based 
on an actual consent among states. Instead positivist legal language is used by states 
to justify their claims upon others "as if it were a universally accepted legal discourse" 
(3).
If this is so, the international jurist is bound to resist the temptation of engaging in an 
exclusively formalistic debate when analysing the international legal behaviour of 
states. This implies that, for instance, facts about inter-state disputes have to be 
related to the ideological beliefs of the contending parties. States tend to have a 
particular vision of themselves, and perceive international law in accordance with 
their official ideology, the modality of their international relations, their peculiar
l
history and so forth. This has to be taken into account when attempting to expose the 
actual behaviour of states in the larger international community. In other words, the 
legal jurist has to recognize the fact that states are autonomous centres of political 
and legal culture, and not simply internationally recognized sovereigns, with identical 
values and images, of a geographical space.
This requires that distinct approaches to international law be studied. However, the 
problem is that western international jurists are too conservative to admit any role for 
non-western systems and perceptions. As has been argued above, despite its claim to 
universality, international law is still based on western notions as to what law is and 
how it should operate in practice. One can, however, witness the emergence of a 
trend towards greater recognition of different legal cultures in the understanding of 
international law. Socialist and Third World perspectives (4) are prominent among 
such contributions. There is also a growing body of writing on the Islamic approach 
to international law (5). By the same token, scholarly treatment of case studies 
dealing with individual states explain a great deal about the ways in which the 
individual actors perceive international society and its legal framework (6). For its 
part, this study is intended to make a modest contribution to the final category of 
area studies.
These are some of the considerations which inform the methodological and 
substantive analysis pursued in this thesis. Hence, although focusing on the 
theoretical and empirical dimensions of Turkey's legal behaviour in international 
society, this study does not treat the Turkish state as an all-encompassing, immutable 
organism with a life of its own. Instead, it develops theoretically an explanation of 
Turkey's legal behaviour as integral to political, economic and social framework 
within which it takes place. An understanding of Turkish nationalism has a key place 
in such an analysis, since 'national objectives’ and 'claims' often define the boundaries 
within which foreign policy-makers have to operate. This is not, however, to deny 
the fact that the ideological disposition of the political elites themselves has an 
important bearing in the formulation and execution of policies towards international 
society. The 'nation' and 'political elites' constantly interact with varying degrees of 
influence towards one another. In order to establish this linkage in a methodical way, 
a hitherto neglected concept, 'national identity', will be employed as an analytical tool 
to explain the foreign policy process in Turkey. Bloom defines national identity as :
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" that condition in which a mass of people have made
the same identification with national symbols so that they 
may act as one psychological group when there is a threat 
to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of 
national identity" (7).
In this context, 'national identity dynamic1, a derivative of the concept of national 
identity, will be utilized to explain the interaction between three distinct categories 
and processes: the formation of Turkish national identity - politics - international 
relations of Turkey.
It is hoped that by exceeding the parochial boundaries of a formalistic discourse, it 
will be possible to shed light on the empirical findings relating to Turkey’s actual legal 
behaviour in international society. Why, for instance, does Turkey claim that the 
Kurds of Turkey do not constitute a minority under international law? How can one 
make sense of Turkey's relative indifference to the newly evolving rules and principles 
of international law, such as the international law of development, the new law of the 
sea, the principle of self-determination? And why is it that, although a developing 
country in economic terms and a Middle Eastern country by geography, religion and 
culture, Turkey has chosen to establish military, economic and politico-cultural 
alignments with the western group of states -such as NATO, OECD, Council of 
Europe, and the EC (as associate member)? These issues, as is believed, cannot 
properly be addressed without focusing on the specific political and legal culture in 
Turkey.
Hence, in this dissertation, an analysis based on 'globalization' or 'balance of power' is 
dismissed in favour of a 'hermeneutic' approach. Indeed, Turkey's historical 
experience shows that the impact of globalization on states should not be 
overestimated. It is argued that many of the problems that Turkey faces with regard 
to the outside world today have their roots in Turkey's ambiguous and ill-defined 
identity. Its historical location can be traced to Turkey's incorporation into western 
standards of civilisation in the nineteenth century -through various political and legal 
reforms. The process of westernization culminated in the creation of a Turkish 
nation-state after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following the latter's defeat in 
the First World War. The main objective of the Turkish nationalist leadership, led by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was the establishment of a secular nation-state based on 
modernity and rationalism. Throughout the 1920s and 30s, extensive political and 
legal reforms, ranging from the disestablishment of the Sultanate and the Caliphate to
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the introduction of the Latin alphabet, were undertaken to create the conditions of a 
social, economic and political system along the lines that existed in western Europe. 
For Kemal, the fight against the imperialist West had to be fought with the weapons 
of the West, including its political philosophy (8). Hence, from the outset, Turkish 
nationalism was effectively premised on the recognized supremacy of Western 
civilisation. Conversely, this entailed the rejection of the Oriental/Islamic identity as 
'backward' and 'despotic'.
Unlike their Ottoman predecessors, the republican political elites were suspicious of 
heterogeneity and cultural pluralism and, therefore, set out to impose a uniform 
identity (Turkish') upon diverse ethnic and sectarian communities. In other words, 
the state was intolerant of the intermediary institutions and societal processes which 
could provide a channel of communication between the nation and the state in 
Turkey. It was the ideals of the Third Republic in France which laid the intellectual 
foundations of this policy of homogenization and etatisme (9).
Turkey's incorporation into the western standards of civilisation was followed by its 
gradual co-optation into the western states system. Indeed, Turkey became a 
member of the OECD (initially, OEEC), Council of Europe, NATO, and an associate 
member of the EC in the post-Second World War era. For the Turkish ruling 
establishment, political, military and economic alignment with the western world 
reaffirms Turkey as a 'civilised' nation. Turkey's identification -at the official level- 
with the western bloc of countries prompts Turkish diplomats to perceive 
international society from a predominantly western perspective. Hence its reluctance 
to support the Third World initiatives towards establishing a new international legal 
order. Unofficially, however, people in Turkey generally feel a deep mistrust of the 
western world, which frequently evokes memories of Ottoman subjugation by great 
European powers in the nineteenth century, as well as of the Turkish War of 
Independence which was fought against Western occupying powers and their 
proteges. For many Turks, including a section of the ruling establishment, the 
Kurdish search for self-determination is, in fact, an imperialist plot, devised by 
western countries and by some 'external' enemies, intended to divide and then 
subjugate Turkey. It is argued that the ambivalent nature of Turkey's links with the 
western group of countries is a major cause of Turkey's insecure and ambiguous 
identity which has a significant bearing on its conception and practice of international 
law.
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Turkey's problematic identity should also be seen as a function of the authoritarian 
nature of the Turkish state. Although the contemporary Turkish state, its self- 
perception, and its conception of international law are in most respects diametrically 
opposed to those of its predecessor -the Ottoman Empire-, the elitist nature of the 
Ottoman state continues to mark the contours of the republican state today. The 
political establishment (politicians, bureaucrats, army) is still suspicious of civil 
society, although Turkey is seemingly a multiparty democracy. Political groups who 
are opposed to official policies are frequently branded as 'fundamentalist', 
'communist', 'separatist' or 'traitor'. The army has a major influence in the formulation 
of foreign policy objectives. As a result, the outside world is, for the most part, 
perceived from a security-oriented perspective. In foreign policy discourse, the 
countries adjacent to Turkey are often depicted as 'hostile', if not 'expansionist'. This 
is particularly true of Greece which, as Turkey's 'historical enemy', represents the 
negative referent against which Turkish nationalism defines itself. One of its 
ramifications is that Greco-Turirish disputes in Cyprus and the Aegean should not 
merely be understood as purely legal matters which can be resolved through a bi­
partisan application of positive international law. Instead it must be recognized that 
they involve highly emotional questions of 'national identity' and 'prestige' as far as 
mass public opinion in Turkey and Greece are concerned. Legal jurists, then, are 
bound to understand how the respective countries define the problem in the light of 
their peculiar historical experience as a 'nation', and how, then, they present a viable 
solution.
It is believed that the hermeneutic approach has some normative merits too: first, it 
enhances the possibility of inter-state understanding; second, it makes it possible to 
put the empirical data and behavioural patterns relating to the posture taken by states 
towards one another into the service of policy-makers before negotiations. This 
enhances the possibility of applying legal analyses in real life situations. As a result 
of the hermeneutic approach, concepts like 'perception' and 'image' are incorporated 
into the analysis of seemingly 'legal' situations.
It is the view of the present author that Turkey's legal behaviour in international 
society has received no major scholarly treatment. One may find here and there 
various books and articles on Turkish foreign policy, or on the Turkish position on 
some international disputes, like Cyprus and the delimitation of the Aegean, or on the 
Turkish approach to certain questions of international law. However these themes 
are explored on an empirical basis, and in a fragmentary way. Besides, Turkey's 
actual international behaviour is generally explained as a by-product of 'external'
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factors -international system, balance of power, external threats, international wars, 
other states' behaviour towards Turkey and so forth- to the exclusion of 'domestic' 
factors. The proponents of this approach tend to treat Turkish foreign policy simply 
as a function of international events, without any dynamics of its own. As a result of 
this, the existing studies on Turkey's international behaviour hardly discuss the 
questions as to why Turkey behaves the way it does, and how it defines its national 
interests in relation to a wider international society. In other words, that which is 
missing is a conceptual framework which seeks to locate the complex set of legal 
issues into the political and cultural context in which they take place. This study 
purports to take up this challenge.
Three distinct levels of analysis can be singled out in this dissertation : descriptive, 
explanatory, prescriptive. The descriptive analysis is designed to examine Turkey's 
official policy on various international disputes, such as the Cyprus and Aegean 
questions, and the problems over Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria on the 
one hand, and the Kurdish minority in Turkey on the other. In the same context, a 
description is made of the position taken up by Turkish representatives in the UN 
General Assembly on some of the newly evolving and progressive areas of 
international law. Indeed one of the main objectives of this study is to examine 
Turkey's conceptualization of international society as manifested behaviourally in the 
United Nations General Assembly. As opposed to official declarations of intent by 
government representatives, the voting pattern of states in the UN and the arguments 
on which they are based can be taken as reliable sources of state behaviour. Here 
there is a sufficient amount of independent empirical referents. The descriptive 
analysis is also extended to include some multilateral treaties relating to human rights, 
the protection of minorities, and the principle of self-determination to which Turkey 
may or may not be a party. Finally, the Turkish conception and practice of 
international law is uncovered by drawing on the official statements and/or editorial 
pronouncements on various international legal issues as published in such official or 
semi-official periodicals as Dis Politika (Foreign Policy) and Turkish Review 
Quarterly Digest.
As for explaining the Turkish approach to international law, this study will focus on 
the conceptual definition of the Turkish image of international society. Why, for 
instance, is Turkey's international behaviour the way it is? What are the main motives 
and goals that lie behind the formulation and execution of it? The causal questions 
worth raising and pondering through an investigation of Turkey's policy 
pronouncements and its actual behaviour are numerous indeed. For instance, can
6
Turkish behaviour within the larger community of nations be explained by its 
'national interests'? If so, what are they and how are they defined and manifested? 
Can they be explained in terms of Turkey's official ideology which is deeply rooted 
in Turkish nationalism? If so, what is the main doctrinal or ideological thrust of 
Turkish nationalism? How is it translated into the external arena? What is Turkey’s 
perception of the emerging international order? Can it be explained in terms of a 
coherent, long-term strategy with reasonable theoretical foundations, or of an ad hoc 
or pragmatic response to the initiatives of other international actors? These are some 
of the major issues that are explored under the explanatory level of analysis pursued 
in this dissertation.
As far as the prescriptive level of analysis is concerned, this study has taken up a 
modest challenge to attempt to project alternative policy options as far as the Turkish 
posture and strategy of international order are concerned. These themes, among 
others, will be elaborated in the concluding chapter of this study.
The method of analysis employed in this dissertation is significantly inspired by 
Foucault's exposition of the links between power/knowledge/discourse. As is well- 
known, Foucault's main concern was with power and its diffusion into the whole 
fabric of western societies. However, as he himself was well aware, the mechanisms 
of power, as they were manifested in the west, could equally apply to non-western 
societies due to increasing globalization. Besides, the repressive character of many 
regimes in the Third World make them ideal candidates for an analysis of power there 
(10). According to Foucault, discourse is the link between power and knowledge. 
He contends that in every society, discourse is produced, organized and redistributed 
according to particular patterns and processes (11). Hence, in the specific instance of 
the discourse relating to Turkish foreign policy, there seems to have been a subtle 
process in which the public are presented with a particular reading, or misreading, of 
international affairs that is likely to legitimize existing policies. This study focuses on 
two of the major institutions which shape public perceptions : the state and the 
academic establishment in Turkey (they are examined in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively).
This thesis is divided into two main segments. Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which follow the 
introductory chapter, lay the conceptual foundations of the analyses to be made in the 
rest of the dissertation. Chapter 2 introduces the foundations of the modernist (critical 
hermeneutics) paradigm adopted in this study. It discusses various approaches to law 
in general, and to international law in particular, and then seeks to establish why
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different theories, ranging from positivism to postmodernism, give an incomplete 
picture of international law. Accordingly, it suggests that a variety of analytical and 
conceptual approaches are needed to understand the nature and actual operation of 
international law. Chapter 3 makes a critique of the liberal notion of sovereignty and 
traces its impact on the international system. Sovereignty, as the expression of the 
political autonomy possessed by states, is essentially linked to nationalism in an age of 
nation-states. Hence the twin concepts of 'nationalism1 and 'nationhood' merit serious 
analysis in order that sovereignty is placed into its proper context. In this chapter, it 
is argued that the 'nation', although not entirely imaginary, owes much of its existence 
to the nationalist intelligentsia. It has to be recognized that the nation, not unlike the 
state, is not a static, all-encompassing organism with a unified identity. It is 
essentially a political concept in that its recognition as such depends, for the most 
part, on the armed struggle of the political community which claims to be 'nation1, 
thus becoming a ‘nation-state’. From this, it can be deduced that international law 
does not govern the rules that enable the emergence of states. As Carty observes, 
states have their own reasons to exist (12). Western liberal political theory, based on 
the notion of social consensus, defines the individuals living in a given territory not 
through their ethnic, religious or cultural identity, but as an indistinguishable part of 
the nation. This implies that individuals have an identity in so far as this is recognized 
as such by the state. This is at the very heart of the liberal theory of the state and the 
nation which has had significant implications for international law.
One of its implications is that this conceptual framework does not easily reconcile 
itself with the notion of minority rights or the principle of self-determination -outside 
colonial/alien/racist contexts. Minorities, in fact, are perceived as an indistinct part of 
the political community which purportedly possesses common aspirations and cultural 
references. It is argued that this is a myth of the 19th century modernist discourse, 
which exerted considerable influence on Kemalist nationalism -the official doctrine of 
Turkish nationalism. In chapter 3, it is also asserted that there is no such thing as a 
'Turkish nation' in the sense of having singular characteristics. Accordingly, this study 
seeks to 'deconstruct' this myth by revealing the diversity of interests, aspirations, 
memories and cultural symbols that exist in Turkish society today. It is argued that 
the Kurdish uprising since the mid-1980s, as well as the rise of Islamist ideology, have 
indeed bitterly shown the defects of Kemalist nationalism. Chapter 3 also draws on 
the impact of Turkish nationalism and national identity upon Turkey's approach 
towards international society. The same chapter also investigates the decision­
making process with reference to Turkish foreign policy.
Chapter 4 makes a critique of the Turkish 'school' of international law and relations. 
In the first section of this chapter, it is argued that Turkish scholars of international 
relations have failed to come to grips with new transnational actors and processes 
which cannot be properly addressed within the narrow confines of inter-state 
diplomacy. For this purpose, the textbooks of international relations and those 
relating to Turkish foreign policy will be surveyed to conclude that they are marked 
by a heavy reliance on the American realist school which gives prominence to power 
politics.
In the remainder of chapter 4, which is the main crux of that chapter, it is argued that, 
in the Turkish case, the dominant legal doctrine, legal education and foreign policy 
buttress a pervasive system of enduring patterns. For instance, the constraints of 
Turkey's posture within international society are also reflected in the substantive and 
methodological framework of international law scholarship in Turkey. Just as Turkey 
has since the 1950s defined itself within a negative framework -by reacting rather than 
initiating; pragmatic rather than idealist-, Turkish scholars of international law have 
generally adopted a conservative and positivistic stance in their treatment of the rules, 
principles and doctrinal conceptions of international law. In chapter 4, having 
examined the textbooks written by some prominent international jurists in Turkey, it 
is asserted that they have failed to exceed the boundaries drawn by classical 
international law at the expense of contemporary methodological and substantive 
challenges to established orthodoxies. For instance, issues like 'human rights', 'self- 
determination', and principles embodied in the 'New International Economic Order' 
have not received the attention which they deserve. This apparently anachronistic and 
uncritical perspective has to be perceived as an integral part of the foreign policy 
process in Turkey.
The chapters grouped under Part 2 are intended to serve as empirical cases for the 
conceptual analyses made previously. These chapters attempt to expose Turkey’s 
official interpretation of international legal norms in the light of specific cases. The 
first group concerns some of Turkey’s major international disputes : disputes with 
Greece over Cyprus (chapter 5), the delimitation of the Aegean sea (chapter 6), and 
Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria (chapter 7) -in the Bulgarian case, the 
policy of forcible assimilation of the Turkish minority has been ended after the demise 
of the communist regime there. Chapter 8 focuses on the Kurdish minority question 
in Turkey. After having established the status of the Kurdish community under 
international law, this section will proceed with an analysis of their rights, and, then, 
Turkey's obligations towards them. Chapter 9 concentrates on Turkey's voting
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behaviour in the UN General Assembly since the 1950s with regard to the newly 
emerging areas of international law. They may be labeled as 'progressive' issues in 
that they fundamentally challenge certain assumptions of classical international law 
such as 'absolute sovereignty', 'the principle of reciprocity among states', and the 
'principle of effectiveness' as the basis for sovereignty. The progressive issues are 
subdivided into three sections : decolonization and the principle of self-determination; 
search for a New International Economic Order, and human rights.
The Conclusion of this thesis makes a brief review of the previous arguments and 
reflects on their implications for the future.
Overall, this dissertation sets out to show that international law is still, to a significant 
extent, based on western assumptions of liberal legality, and on the autonomy of 
sovereign states. As a result, it leaves very little scope for the effective inclusion of 
human categories other than states -such as minorities, various cultural groups, and 
individuals- into the ambit of international law. The fact that states are treated as 
autonomous centres of power under international law, requires an understanding of 
the domestic environment within which decision-makers operate. Hence the 
usefulness of a subjectivist approach as is adopted here. (Bloom’s analysis of 
‘identification theory’ is central here) One of the main assertions made in this 
dissertation is that, with its broadly and vaguely worded rules and principles, 
international law encourages discretionary interpretations of international norms by 
states. Therefore, these defects, among others, have to be overcome before one can 
truly speak of 'international' law.
This study relies on primary sources as far as the legal materials are concerned. 
Hence an extensive use of Turkey's international treaties, which are relevant to the 
issues discussed, are made. This study also relies on the original materials with 
respect to international treaties, UN General Assembly and Security Council 
Resolutions and the rulings of international courts (Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and International Court of Justice). Besides, the arguments are 
advanced on the basis of official or semi-official documents when attempting to 
describe and explain Turkey's official policies towards certain questions of 
international law. When, however, the primary materials were not available, this 
study relies on secondary sources such as books, articles, magazines and newspapers.
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CHAPTER 2
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PARADIGM
Broadly speaking, the interaction between the system of international law and states, 
as primary subjects of international law, can be studied -at least- in two different 
ways. First, it can be examined in terms of what it claims to do rather than what it 
actually does. The first view suggests, if implicitly, that international legal doctrine - 
rules, principles and concepts- constitute a coherent and predictable system which 
guides or coerces behaviour. This analytical approach then proceeds to evaluate the 
behaviour of states by reference to positive rules of international law. If it concerns a 
dispute, the international lawyer formulates his/her legal reasoning on the basis of 
treaties, custom, precedents, juristic writings and so forth. This is the broad 
description of the 'positivistic approach' to international law. Second, the interaction 
between the system of international law and states can be examined by focusing on 
the practical operation of law to discover how it is actually perceived by states. This 
approach suggests that international law, as a social construct, is inevitably partial 
and reflective of the attitudes and perceptions of states. As such, it is not and cannot 
possibly be an exclusively positive system of law. Therefore, the second approach, 
which may be described as a 'sociological approach', favours an empirical 
understanding of how states (legally) behave and, perhaps, why they do so. By 
focusing on the function of international law in international society, the proponents 
of this approach hope to understand the limits and possibilities of the existing legal 
system. For its part, this study adopts this second analytical position, and employs a 
'sociological approach' which involves an investigation of actual 
understandingsAnterpretations of/attitudes towards international law in the Turkish 
context.
Before expanding on the concepts and ideas which will constitute the backbone of the 
theoretical position adopted in this study, an inquiry into the nature of law in general 
and into different analytical approaches to the study of law may be necessary here. 
Such inquiry allows a greater understanding of the status of international law as 'law' 
and introduces various ideas, approaches and concepts, some of which will be used 
to formulate the 'critical legal' position adopted in this thesis.
There are two classical schools of thought which dwell on the question of the nature 
of law and the ways of approaching the legal phenomenon. The debate between 
positivist and naturalist schools of jurisprudence centres around their differing views
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as regards the basis of legal obligation. Positivist theories of law concentrate upon a 
description of law by reference to formal, rather than moral or ethical, considerations. 
Positivism has been the dominant school of jurisprudence since the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world. The positivist theory of law was first 
developed chiefly by scholars like Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and some others in 
the nineteenth century.
A major concern of Bentham was to distinguish between the descriptive and the 
normative, between what 'is1 and what 'ought to be'. For him, these were separate 
issues which had to be dealt with separately. Bentham argued that the will of the 
sovereign was imperative upon legal subjects since those imperatives were backed up 
by sanctions. He asserted that implicit coercion is a major aspect of sovereign 
command. The subjects' habit of obedience, for Bentham, derives from the coercively 
induced fear of the sovereign and/or its moral authority (1). Austin, who was a 
disciple of Bentham, went beyond Bentham in asserting that the power of a sovereign 
was not subject to any legal limitation (2). Similarly, Hans Kelsen, a prominent legal 
theorist of the present century, distinguished law from other social orders on the basis 
of its character as a "coercive order" (3).
Hence the positivist theory of law attempts to identify law by reference to a single 
source, to a particular location of power. Since the validity of a legal system is 
effectively guaranteed by the state as sovereign, moral or philosophical arguments 
about the nature of law are bound to be speculative and irrelevant to the legal 
process. Hence legal positivists, ranging from Austin to Kelsen, are concerned with 
law as a technical discipline without regard to value judgements. Indeed Kelsen 
called his theory 'pure' in the sense that his legal theory precludes all considerations 
which fall outside the essence of 'law' (4). For Kelsen, law is always positive and 
independent of morality (5). Hence positivism claims that the methods of legal 
'science' should be objective. That is why this theory is concerned with the 
description of facts, and not of values (6). While value-judgements are not verifiable, 
factual observations are.
Legal positivists reject the claim that the analysis of law requires an analysis of the 
content of the legal norms. This is due to the positivist assertion that, since they are 
not empirically verifiable, there exist no underlying universal attributes of human 
beings which determine the content of norms (7).
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While the positivist theory identifies law by reference to a single source (a particular 
location of power), naturalist theory does so by reference to its content. Indeed 
naturalist theory is primarily concerned with morality, rather than with the formal 
status of a particular norm, which it claims should govern legal regulations (8). Hence 
it argues that governmental authority on law-making should be limited by moral 
considerations. This is the criteria for judging whether a particular norm qualifies as 
’law' (9). While recognising the positivist emphasis on formal criteria for identifying 
law, naturalists seek to involve moral and ethical considerations as relevant to law 
(10). The extent of the divergence between positivism and natural law, however, is 
often exaggerated.
The fact is that these two main classical theories of law (positivism v. naturalism) give 
different answers to different questions. Hence the purported distinction between 
them is mostly arbitrary. The positivist theory is primarily concerned with the 
identification of formally valid law. In this view, the sense of legal obligation derives 
from authority, and not from moral rightness. The question of the ultimate source of 
authority falls outside the scope of positivist enquiry (11). Naturalism, meanwhile, 
does not question the formal status of 'laws' as understood by positivists. Instead its 
main concern is to ascertain "the extent to which laws have a claim to obedience" 
(12). Although naturalists claim that the authority of law should be based on 
morality, they do not question the 'law' quality of a perceived immoral law (13).
It can be contended that neither of these classical theories of law provides an 
adequate basis for understanding legal phenomenon. Since this study is not an inquiry 
into the nature of law as such, the discussions will proceed with an elaboration of 
their weaknesses in the context of international law. To begin with, naturalism 
operates at the level of abstractions, and, therefore, does not adequately consider the 
complexity of international relations. Besides, its universalistic postulates such as 
justice and morality, are not capable of verification. The existence of a system of 
international law, however inadequate it may be, the rules of which are not always in 
conformity with the objective ideas of justice, testifies to the fragility of the naturalist 
claim. If, however, with a twist of logic, the binding character of international rules is 
claimed to derive from natural law, then the theory becomes tautological, in which 
case it loses its explanatory potential.
Contrary to the naturalistic approach, positivism is widely considered to be the most 
adequate approach to international law -which is after all a 'positivistic' system. 
Therefore the problems associated with positivistic analysis will have to be explored
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in greater detail. Positivistic analysis -not theory- is premised on a view that 
international law is a complete and gapless system of law which provides clear 
answers to all conceivable legal problems in international relations. Accordingly, the 
behaviour of states is observed and measured to test it against the prescriptions of 
international law. Admittedly such analyses may be rigorously researched through the 
disclosure of the apparent facts of a situation, and may be meticulous in terms of 
presenting all the relevant facts. But the critical question is how to make sense of the 
existing data. The problem with positivistic legal analysis is indeed two-fold : first, it 
lacks an explicit methodology or clearly differentiated levels of analysis; second, it 
treats international law as an absolute, complete and universally accepted system of 
law. These two defects need further elaboration.
Positivistic analysis of international law is premised on an anthropomorphic 
conception of states which possess coherent personalities. Under this scheme, states 
interact with one another as individualistic personalities. This approach frees the 
analyst from the theoretical problems of social integration and political mobilization. 
The psychological link between the state and national population is dismissed in 
favour of an uncritical acceptance of legal ties between the citizen and the state as 
given. In other words, individuals as citizens become passive bystanders in the power 
game between the representatives of states. This simplistic conception of international 
relations retains its appeal as an explanatory tool, particularly in times of international 
conflict The fact is, however, that decision-makers do not base their position on the 
basis of supposed international norms. Their objectives and motivations largely derive 
from the official discourse of historic rights and goals. Indeed national societies are 
functionally integrated social systems with their own coherent structures, prevailing 
world-view and a myth of historic rights (14).
Moreover, as an analytical approach in international law, positivism is premised on a 
rather exaggerated view of international law as a gapless and complete system. 
However the irony is that the classical theorists of legal positivism often contrasted 
municipal law, which they regarded as 'real' law, with international law being 
described as a primitive or less-developed system of law. To start with, John Austin 
describes international law as "positive morality" since there exists no sovereign in 
international society to secure compliance with international legal rules. Instead its 
duties are enforced by moral sanctions (15). In Kelsen's view, under municipal law, 
the observance of legal norms is guaranteed by the threat of sanctions which are 
stipulated and authorized by law (16). This is not the case with international law. He 
notes that international law relies on individual states which establish a decentralised
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system of self-help in the absence of a central authority. This system ranges from 
individual self-help, e.g. reprisals and war, to collective assistance. However 
recognizing that some elements of a centralized enforcement mechanism also exist in 
the case of collective security arrangements and universal organizations, like the 
United Nations, he describes international law as a partially centralized legal order 
(17). Hart too accepts that international law, unlike municipal law, does not qualify as 
a complete system of law for different reasons. He draws on the indeterminacy and 
arbitrary character of legislative and judicial process in international law (18).
Indeed, in order that international jurists take positive rules of international law as the 
sole frame of reference against which the behaviour of states is evaluated, there must 
be some degree of correspondence between rules and the actual behaviour of the 
members of international society. Although it is true that states mostly conduct their 
international relations in conformity with prescribed rules of international law, they 
often do not hesitate to disregard their international obligations when they perceive 
them as being contrary to their major interests and objectives (19). The ambiguity and 
legal lacunae that characterise many rules and principles of international law inevitably 
increase the possibility of such behaviour. Moreover, when they do conform with 
their international obligations, states often do not act on account of their respect for 
the law. Indeed international law is not necessarily a powerful motivational force in 
international relations (20). It has been seen that positivist legal theorists perceive 
international law as an incomplete system. It is true that at the time when Austin, 
Bentham and other classical positivists dismissed international law, their views were 
primarily shaped by the absence of an international sovereign in the same sense as 
municipal law. This is certainly not the case today. International economic, 
diplomatic or military sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter against states which contravene the principle of non­
aggression is an example of the greater centralization of international law. However 
international law still fails to satisfy the 'institutional' test set by classical positivists. 
Leaving aside the fact of the absence of a world government, world legislature and 
world judiciary, international law largely proceeds through the agreement of 
sovereign states.
Therefore the international system is maintained more through political bargaining 
between contending sides than legal proceedings, such as adjudication, compulsory 
arbitration or conciliation. It suffices only to recall how the system of compulsory 
arbitration provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations was beset by 
extensive compromises. Indeed states are reluctant to delegate matters, which they
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perceive as involving their vital security or other interests, to an international 
authority. Even under the UN system, the sovereignty of states is taken as the point 
of departure for the UN’s operation. For instance, states are entitled to resort to force 
under certain conditions. The vague language in which the discretionary powers of 
states are expressed is often exploited by them. The relative absence of major 
international wars since the end of the Second World War has been more due to the 
practical calculations of states than to their regard for international law (21).
Besides, despite the growing complexity of international relations which created new 
international actors and locations of power, the state has maintained its central role. 
Indeed in international relations, the roles of class, multinational corporations or 
transnational bodies seem subservient to the state. They may in effect have extensive 
influence in the determination, for example, of a developing state's economic policy 
and foreign policy, but these activities and effects take place within the boundaries of 
states (22).
Finally, sovereignty still persists as the most powerful political idiom employed by 
states in international relations. Undeniably, sovereignty has triumphed over other 
ways of justifying political authority. The final and absolute authority lies in the state. 
Indeed the existence of a sovereign authority is the most essential prerequisite for 
membership of the international community. For instance, Article 2(1) of the UN 
Charter states that the UN "is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its Members", while Articles 3 and 4 stipulate that only states qualify for UN 
membership (Emphasis mine) (23). The principle that there is no supreme authority 
beyond states has withstood the test of time. Many writers have dismissed 
sovereignty as an outmoded or immoral concept, particularly in this century, and yet 
the power and influence of states have increased with the impact of scientific and 
economic changes. Even in modem times, the state has managed to maintain its 
authority and effectiveness, although it is true that the actions of the state have 
greater ethical, legal and political limits than in the past (24).
Attempts by states to establish an international authority that possesses supranational 
powers have all failed; note for instance the failure of the League of Nations to secure 
such a system. The UN system did not dispense with the state as the ultimate 
authority in its own sphere. One can similarly draw on the problem of the gaps 
between institutional mechanisms and international rules on the one hand, and their 
execution in reality on the other. Indeed the principle of self-help still remains the 
most effective guarantor of international security (25).
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Therefore it can be argued that positivistic analysis of legal behaviour tends to 
exaggerate the influence of the international legal system on the behaviour of states. 
This thesis rejects the view that the international system or the system of international 
law determines the individual state's behaviour according to a coherent pattern. For if 
it were to be the case, Turkey would have never invaded the northern part of Cyprus 
in 1974, or would have to recognize Turkish Kurds as a minority, which would have 
been a natural concomitant of Turkey's official commitment to European integration. 
This seemingly contradictory position requires the extra-legal considerations of 
Turkish nationalism, Turkey's political and legal culture, and its perception of the 
outside world. Otherwise, coincidence of empirical data relating to Turkey's legal 
posture over various disputes and questions would provide insufficient evidence of its 
interaction with international society.
Such an analytical posture favours a sociological approach to law. Accordingly, it 
seoks to expose the deficiencies of a purely legalistic approach to law. The classical 
theories of law have been criticised and challenged by the sociology of law movement 
for ignoring the role of values behind legal norms. The members of this movement 
argue that the classical theories of law tend to ignore the gaps between rules and their 
application in reality (26). The sociology of law is a broad movement which seeks to 
link law with the society in which it operates. This movement does not propose an 
alternative legal theory, but seeks to enhance an awareness of the nature and 
operation of law through empirical inquiry. The sociological approach to law is a 
well-founded discipline whose origins can be traced over some two or three centuries. 
Some of its most influential theorists include scholars as diverse as Montesquieu, 
Weber and Parsons. Their common concern has been to contribute to a greater 
understanding of legal phenomena through the overcoming of partial perspectives 
(27).
The sociology of law takes law as a social phenomenon which is a useful tool to 
understand society. While positivists seek to analyse law in terms of the logical 
structure of legal doctrine, the sociologists of law seek to relate this logical structure 
to systematic empirical knowledge within a particular society. In other words, legal 
doctrine and institutions are related to the social environment in which they operate. 
The sociologists of law recognize that human experience and knowledge are 
inevitably partial and incomplete. This, in their view, has to be taken on board before 
making a systematic investigation of the empirical data of experience (28).
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The sociology of law is not a tightly defined discipline; instead there is a variety of 
distinct approaches and concerns within this tradition. A common concern that its 
proponents share is the search to understand law as a social phenomenon (29). For 
the sociology of law, law consists both of fact and value. Since impartiality is 
rejected, one must be aware of the value judgements which inform both the selection 
of topics to be discussed and their mode of analysis (30). Also the factors which have 
direct bearing on the interpretation of rules in particular contexts are as important as 
the content of such rules. Besides, it accepts that legal doctrine is constructed in 
social action. Legal doctrine takes its meaning and significance only in the context of 
the social conditions in which it is developed, interpreted and applied (31).
The sociology of law claims that 'objectivity' is more a myth than a reality. Observers, 
as other social agents, are strongly influenced by their social circumstances. Social 
science possesses the methodological means to understand, rather than simply record, 
social action in terms of its meaning for those engaged in it. As mentioned earlier, this 
thesis also favours a 'sociological' approach in the sense of exploring international 
law in terms of its actual operation in reality. In such an analytical scheme, notions 
like 'perception', 'values', and 'meanings' become relevant factors, alongside facts, for 
an understanding of the nature of the interaction between states as legal subjects and 
international law.
The idea of an autonomous legal order and the conception of law as an 'objective' and 
'pure' discipline is similarly challenged by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement 
The CLS movement takes the sociological analysis of law one step further. The 
critical legal movement makes a critique of classical theories of law, rather than -as 
yet- proposing an alternative theory of its own. Its distinctivenc^s lies in its 'critical' 
agenda which includes broader ideological and philosophical questions about the 
context of law in the workings of liberal capitalist systems. The CLS movement does 
not only focus on municipal law; there is a handful of critical scholars who are 
presently engaged in international law. Within the critical movement, there is a 
growing concern with the possibilities and limits of social communication between 
different traditions as represented by states. In this study, it is argued that such 
communicative undertakings, which hold varied views about the possibility of 
universal values and principles, have important implications for international law and 
legal analysis. These themes will be explored in the remainder of this chapter. First, an 
overview of CLS will be made here.
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The critical legal movement originated in the United States in the 1970s as a 
successor to the American realist movement American Legal Realism, although 
critical of it, was committed to liberalism. Realist scholars rejected formalism, and yet 
perceived legal reasoning as distinct. One of their major concerns was to improve the 
legal system (32). The critical scholars, for their part, reject the value-free model of 
law. They assert that law is an essential component in the workings of liberal society.
CLS draw on the arbitrary and contingent character of law, contrary to the liberal 
claim that it is rational and coherent (33). Hence the main targets of critical legal 
scholars' attack are liberal legal theories, and, in particular, positivist theories of law. 
Critical legal scholars regard liberal law as an ideology, although its emphasis on form 
and procedure hides its true nature. Liberal legal theory, they argue, cannot resolve 
conflicts objectively. Its objective exterior hides the power structure beneath law. 
Despite its claim to embody universal social values, it operates in such a way as to 
reflect the unequal distribution of power within society (34).
CLS assert that legal concepts are prone to manipulation and that legal texts can be 
interpreted in different ways. There is no way to agree on one authoritative 
interpretation. These 'possible' interpretations are determined by the political context 
which prompt the need for interpretation (35). However in spite of their sceptical 
view of orthodox legal reasoning, CLS do not deny the significance of legal doctrine. 
They accept that legal doctrine, as an important factor in social life, helps in the 
construction of a more orderly society. It provides categories of thought which 
legitimize the usefulness of social relationships (36).
The hierarchy of power envisioned by critical legal scholars differs from that of 
Marxism, in that for the latter, power is a function of class domination, whereas the 
former's notion of power is much more complex and diffuse. The critical scholars 
seek to expose the interaction between the dominant political culture, legal ideology 
and the legal consciousness of the population (37). They see power as an ongoing 
process which permeates various institutions and apparatuses of society.
CLS deny that legal logic or overarching values or traditions of the legal system are 
the main forces behind doctrinal development. The impetus for change comes through 
political struggle or economic changes, rather than through law itself. However the 
real forces are usually hidden beneath legal doctrine and legal reasoning (38). The 
critical legal approach seeks to enhance an understanding of the role and character of
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legal doctrine -rules, principles and concepts. To that extent, it also contributes to the 
effort to develop empirical legal theory (39).
The critical legal movement embraces a plurality of different views. While some 
critical scholars do not wholly reject liberal legality, others pursue an alternative 
agenda which proposes novel ideas and institutions. Unger, one of the figureheads of 
the American critical movement, falls into the first category in that he seeks to 
uncover the emancipatory potential of liberalism. He believes in the instrumental role 
of law for advancing egalitarian goals. Unger describes his alternative social ideal as 
'superliberalism' (40). Postmodernists, for their part, are extremely sceptical about 
the potentials of liberal law. They seek to deconstruct established systems and ideas 
to demonstrate that they conceal their hidden agenda through the use of a particular 
language/discourse. Postmodernists are wary of theories which they perceive as 
invariably totalitarian. For instance, Lyotard calls for an end to 'grand narratives'. His 
is a quest for heterogeneity, little narratives and provincial constructions of social 
systems. Universalism is not achievable since every society has different rules for its 
operation (’rules of the game'). Therefore Lyotard proposes local solutions to 
inevitably decentralised problems (41). The common thread that binds critical legal 
scholars, however, is their radical criticism of liberal legality and their methodological 
and conceptual quest to go beyond the empirical character of mainstream scholarship 
(42).
To make an overview of the discussions presented so far, while the sociological 
approach to law makes an empirical inquiry into the operation of law with due 
emphasis on the subjective context of the social agent, CLS extends its scope to 
include broader philosophical and theoretical questions about law and its relation to 
politics, economics and so forth. The critical legal movement seeks to establish 
whether law remains true to its own goals and promises. By focusing on law's 
operation in society, critical scholars attempt to show how the legal system favours 
certain values at the expense of others -mostly the economically disadvantaged 
groups. The substantive and methodological arguments presented by the CLS 
movement (whose methodological ancestry can be traced to the sociological 
movement in law), informs the analytical approach adopted in this thesis. Indeed, this 
study shares the CLS movement's criticism of liberal legality, its attack on positivistic 
scholarship, its emphasis on the arbitrary character of legal rules, its insistence on the 
need to understand law in relation to the social context in which it operates and its 
assertion that law does not only consist of facts, but also of values. The ideas and 
concepts elaborated by the critical legal movement will, in this case, be deployed in
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relation to international law. Henceforward the present discussion proceeds with an 
elaboration of some specific methodological concerns and normative suggestions 
which clarify the distinctive contributions that this thesis hopes to make.
Critical focus on the operation of law may also involve a reflective inquiry into how 
social agents perceive law and its function in social life. Some of the adherents of the 
CLS, as well as various 'critical' social theorists from Europe, have been engaged in a 
subjectivistic understanding of the behaviour of states which has important 
implications for the study of international law -however it should be borne in mind 
that this subjectivistic approach is not unique to the CLS movement This is the 
subject of the discussions that follow.
The subjectivist approach to the study of law may be traced to Max Weber, who is 
one of the founding fathers of the sociology of law movement. Weber's major concern 
was to understand the meanings behind social action. He considered social conduct as 
subjectively meaningful human behaviour (43). For Weber, law is only one of the 
determinants of social action (44). A social order is not necessarily maintained 
through law. The legitimacy of an order can equally be guaranteed by the subjective 
considerations of social agents, such as faith in its absolute validity, emotional 
attachment and habit of obedience (45). If an order is backed by legal coercion, it 
qualifies as 'law'. However force is not the only source of coercion. The coercive 
force of law may be guaranteed in a variety of ways, such as religious authority, 
political authority, or through the statute of an association (46).
Weber's subjectivistic approach to social action has had a lasting influence on 
hermeneutics (47) which comprises the general theory and practice of interpretation. 
Hermeneutics, as an interpretative technique, seeks to understand the social world 
not only in terms of what social agents understand, but also in terms of how their 
understandings are rooted in a particular culture and tradition. The hermeneutic mode 
of analysis, broadly speaking, may proceed in two directions : the first approach 
would be to take understanding as the purpose of analysis. It suffices that different 
traditions become aware of one another, and respect one another. This is Gadamer's 
position. The second position, represented by Habermas, seeks to go beyond mutual 
understanding to find certain elements of universal consensus. Before elaborating on 
the respective views of these two social theorists, a brief look at the German 
hermeneutical school is due here.
23
That every cultural system has its own peculiar conception of reality was a dominant 
view of hermeneutics in Germany during the nineteenth century. This hermeneutic 
understanding emerged out of the historiographical endeavours of German 
romanticism (48). A hermeneutical scholar is in a sense a cultural broker of different 
ages and nations (49). Schleiermacher was the founder of historical hermeneutics. 
Schleiermacher's programme of psychological interpretation is based on the 
understanding of other people's meanings in their own contexts. During this process, 
one 'loses oneself in order to identify with the social agent. This is a quest for inner 
thought and feeling. Psychological interpretation strives to understand social agents 
(individuals, cultures, etc.) in their cultural contexts, i.e. through the totality of their 
form of life. Hermeneutics is a process in search of a fuller reconstruction of totality 
(50). This search is based on the assumption that understanding is a work of reason 
which may be described as the rationalist position.
Gadamer has been among the most prominent members of the German hermeneutical 
school in this century. Among his major contributions is his elaborate hermeneutic 
scheme to enhance inter-cultural understanding, and his suggestions about a non- 
hegemonic acquisition of knowledge about different traditions. Gadamer's analytical 
proposition for enhancing mutual understanding is based on his rejection of 
conclusiveness in favour of open-ended interpretation which operates at the level of 
probabilities (51). Gadamer argues that rationality is inherent in traditions. There is 
no rationality beyond tradition (52).
Although Gadamer recognizes that there are general ideals of justice and equality, he 
asserts that they become meaningful only in social practice. In other words, rational 
enquiry should relate its findings into the particular society in which soc' l  agents live 
(53). For Gadamer, rationality and reflection become valid if they contribute to 
tradition (54). It is clear that this scheme precludes the possibility of achieving an idea 
of reason which transcends the existing set of social relations. All that can be done 
about different and conflicting views that social groups hold is to recognize this 
difference candidly and be prepared to compromise (55).
Gadamer’s rejection of universal reason is opposed by the critical rationalism of 
Habermas who is the most distinguished heir and successor to the critical theory. His 
adoption of a hermeneutical approach is among his unique contributions to the critical 
social theory. His theory of societal rationalisation adopts the paradigm of 'mutual 
understanding' between social agents (56). For Habermas, cultural traditions can be 
propagated, groups can be integrated, and social solidarities can become meaningful.
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This provides the context and resources for a process of mutual understanding which 
derives from a 'rationalized lifeworld' (57). According to Habermas, the social agents 
mobilize their rationality potential through 'meaningful communication'. Through 
communication, individual positionings merge into a 'common lifeworld'. Admittedly, 
such communication is often marked by ambiguity and instability, since 
communication is a process of negotiation between culturally-charged social agents. 
Therefore it is only through a continuous dialogue that mutual understanding can be 
achieved (58).
Habermas takes a transcendental view of social communication. Human beings are 
capable of finding common values through 'self-reflection and dialogue'. This position 
is clearly at odds with relativism. For Habermas, all social agents would be able to 
distinguish true statements from false statements in 'absolutely free and uncoerced 
circumstances' for unlimited duration. Only in such a situation can a transcendental 
criterion of truth, freedom, and rationality arise. Every social agent, if given the 
proper conditions, possesses an innate capacity to 'construct' the ideal speech 
situation. Hence universal consensus over a set of ideas and norms is achievable (59). 
The question is, is international law capable of creating ideal speech situations ?
For its part, this thesis adopts a 'critical hermeneutical’ position in understanding and 
explaining the role of international rules and principles in the determination of the 
behaviour of states. The normative features of social action, such as principles, norms 
and values, have to be made explicit in order to fulfil the need for a full articulation of 
social needs and expectations. This Habermasian 'communicative reason' posits 
international law as a communicative process which has the potential to increase 
mutual understanding between the major participants in international society. Such a 
position recognizes the possibility of a transcendental rationality in the sense of 
recognizing certain universal values and norms which are capable of transcending 
national traditions. It can be argued that human rights and the prohibition of 
aggression are among such universalistic values. The fact that there can be certain 
universal values and standards of behaviour is evidenced by the UN Charter which is 
recognized by practically every state, and is often claimed to have a law-making 
character. That it is an important source of international law should be welcome. The 
kind of universalism postulated here does not however foresee the homogenization of 
states in terms of their political structure or international outlook. The critical 
hermeneutical approach acknowledges heterogeneity and seeks to understand it  
However different cultural practices can be compatible with universal principles. For 
instance, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that agreements are to be performed in
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good faith, does not specify particular formalities for contracts which it accepts are 
matters for the legal system of states (60).
Admittedly, the hermeneutic mode of interpretation adopted in this study does not 
have to lead to the Habermasian position adopted here -in the sense of recognizing 
the possibility of universalism without denying heterogeneity. It may instead produce 
a variety of approaches on the validity or desirability of international law. 
Postmodernists, for instance, would favour the breaking up of international law and, 
in its place, propose localised solutions for resolving inevitably partial and complex 
problems. The problem with this approach however is that it tends to ignore the 
necessity of minimum normative and institutional standards for the orderly conduct of 
international relations. It has to be admitted that standardized general rules are 
necessary if chaos, arbitrariness and injustice are to be avoided. In a lawless 
international society, the manipulation and the exploitation of the weak by the 
powerful becomes inevitable. International law embodies the basic rules of 
coexistence among states. It restricts violence, and contains rules on issues like 
international treaties and the law of territory. It also helps -to some extent- to secure 
compliance with the rules of international society through putting restraints on the 
international behaviour of states and through mobilizing the non-legal considerations 
of states in favour of compliance with international agreements. The postmodernist 
position also ignores the constructive role -at least potentially- played by the 
'progressive' rules and principles of international law in bridging the economic, social 
and cultural gaps between rich and poor countries. The postmodernists also 
exaggerate the cultural differences between various traditions. They tend to ignore 
that notions such as 'justice', 'equality' and 'freedom', as natural human aspirations, 
can be found in every culture, although their content and pplication may vary from 
one culture to another. The difference in content does not however invalidate the idea 
itself. Once such ideas and principles are perceived as subjects of a discursive process 
among different cultural traditions, international law can no more be rejected than 
taken for granted.
For their part, assuming that they pursued a hermeneutic approach to the operation of 
international law, the positivists might still maintain that social reality can be 
explored on the basis of universal ideas. They would argue that, since international 
rules transcend the partial perspectives of states, international lawyers should accept 
that positive rules of international law are the only objective referents for assessing 
the behaviour of states. The problem with the positivistic approach, however, is that 
the standards of international law have to be applied in different social contexts
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which reflect heterogeneous human conditions. Since social reality consists of 
complex set of relationships and processes, and involve subjective considerations by 
human agents, the application of international legal rules and principles in concrete 
situations is bound to be problematic. Indeed the world is full of complexity, a fact 
which should be taken on board before discerning certain universal elements within 
international law. The analytical position proposed here suggests an evolutionary 
understanding of international problems, rather than, as is often presumed by legal 
positivists, a once-and-for-all solution. This requires a hermeneutic understanding 
of those involved in international disputes, which takes full account of non-legal 
considerations, as the point of departure for legal analysis; thus rejecting a priori 
assumptions about the transcendental quality of international legal norms. This is 
indeed the starting point for the critical hermeneutical position adopted here.
Taking a critical, multi-disciplinary position does not require that international 
lawyers should cease to expose and interpret existing legal rules as their main task. 
This is indeed a precondition for their distinctive contribution to international law. 
However, international lawyers should not simply emphasize the positive international 
law, but should trace the direction of its progressive development. This would be a 
contribution to international law since these scholars will be adequately equipped with 
concepts, normative concerns, analytical tools, and motivation to adapt international 
law into the changing structure of international society. International lawyers should 
also recognize that international law cannot be taken as a complete system of law 
whose effectiveness is undisputed. Instead they should take international law as a 
living law which operates in different spheres of international relations, and with 
varying degrees of success. International law is not only a normative order, but also a 
social system. In this sense, it has a subjective meaning for members of international 
society. This is the context in which to understand international law as a living law.
International law is part of the social reality in international relations. To the extent 
that states can associate themselves with the existing fora for international dialogue 
and with the existing and/or evolving norms of international law, the system of 
international law becomes part of their political culture. While the Eurocentric 
origins of international law cannot be denied, to the extent that it reflects the broader 
concerns of different cultural traditions and legal systems, its legitimacy and efficacy 
is bound to increase. Heterogeneity does not necessarily preclude consent. The 
authority of international law could similarly be enhanced if it can successfully 
address the complexity of international life. It is indeed encouraging to observe that 
international law is becoming more concerned with entities other than states, such as
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minorities, indigenous peoples and individuals. Besides, international law is not only 
concerned with maintaining international peace and security, but is actively involved 
in matters like human rights and the economic prospects of developing states. 
Although admittedly international law does not operate under conditions which are 
immune from coercion and intimidation exerted by powerful states upon the weaker 
ones, it nonetheless embodies some of the essentials for rational communication 
which may produce consent. However the inherent constraints of international law 
should not be underestimated. Indeed legal analysis of international problems is an 
arduous task which should preclude a priori assumptions about positive law and its 
capacity for conflict resolution.
The hermeneutic approach adopted here to understand and explain the international 
legal behaviour of Turkey is largely inspired by Anthony Carty's two works on the 
theory of international law (first, his book entitled The Decay o f International Law? 
(1986) and, second, his 1991 article entitled "Critical International Law: Recent 
Trends in the Theory of International Law", published in European Journal o f 
International Law). In his article, Carty argues that today "individual nation-state is 
prior to international law" (61). Therefore the internal organization of states has to be 
understood before making sense of how they behave in relation to the external world.
The point of departure for Carty is "whether international law really satisfies 
minimum requirements of positivism" (62). He rejects the view that international law 
is based on an actual consent among states. Instead its emergence and evolution 
largely derive from complex historical events. In addition, aside from the fact of the 
absence of a world legislature, executive and judiciary, present international law does 
not define "comprehensively the rights and duties of States towards one another"
(63). Neither the birth nor the disappearance of states is governed by international law
(64). Besides, for Carty, as well as for Koskenniemi, both of whom are engaged in 
the critical inquiry of international law at a theoretical level, behind its veil of 
objectivity, international law in fact gives a particular reading of the social world. As 
such, it is a type of discourse which promotes certain values and principles at the 
expense of others (65). The system of international law features many legal gaps and 
vaguely defined rules. For its part, positivist legal method ignores what it cannot 
analyse in strictly legal terms (66).
Carty proposes an alternative approach to international law among other possible 
approaches. In his view, international law can be more fruitfully studied by 
understanding how states perceive international rules, and how disputes of states are
28
often rooted in 'national' antagonisms between them. Therefore states must be treated 
as independent centres of culture, rather than as mere objects of a would-be- 
universalistic system of law. Such an approach seeks to enhance inter-cultural 
dialogue and understanding, while demonstrating the limits of international law (67).
This thesis seeks to test the validity of Carty's alternative methodological approach 
through various case studies. These case studies, as will be seen, largely confirm that 
the basic concepts, rules and principles of international law are too general and 
ambiguous to constitute a complete legal system. Therefore, their contents can be 
interpreted in different ways by different states and/or by the same states in different 
circumstances. The efficacy of international law is further compromised by the 
absence of law-making, law-enforcing, and adjudicative bodies with binding powers, 
unlike those that exist in municipal law. The limitations of international law in 
governing international behaviour also derive from the nature of international 
disputes. As Carty observes, states perceive international rules on the basis of their 
consideration of themselves as 'nations' and of their 'historic rights' and 'national 
objectives'. These considerations necessarily call for an understanding of the 
hermeneutic contexts of states which are the major players in international society. 
Indeed the Greco-Turkish disputes and Turkey's perception of the 'Kurdish problem' 
cannot easily be defined and understood in simple legal terms. They involve the 
difficult questions of 'national identity', 'politics', 'national security', 'historical rivalry' 
and so forth, which should be studied in terms of how the contending parties perceive 
them. To that extent, this thesis wholly agrees with Carty.
Carty, however, sees the function of the international lawyer solely as an 
intermediary of inter-cultural dialogue (68), which is not entirely shared by this study. 
Although the aim of Carty's hermeneutic understanding of states is to increase inter- 
cultural dialogue, he does not explore the further possibilities of moving beyond 
'mutual understanding' to arrive at 'consensus'. In other words, it is not clear whether 
Carty sees dialogue as an end in itself, or as a necessary step to strengthen the 
efficacy of international law in international relations. Dialogue can only become 
meaningful if it produces shared values through mutual compromise and 
understanding. Such shared values should in turn lead to concerted action which is 
potentially capable of producing greater ends than would otherwise be achieved. 
Such a possibility does indeed exist, and has more potent force than Carty admits. 
Carty's description of the current international society as being in a 'state of nature' 
tends to exaggerate its anarchic tendencies at the expense of its more orderly aspects.
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In a similar vein, Carty's theoretical scheme underestimates the influence of 
international law on states. States may be more prepared to respect international law 
than Carty suggests. For instance, states overwhelmingly conform with international 
law unless it involves their perceived vital interests. Similarly, Carty seems to ignore 
the dynamics of the interaction between states and the system of international law, the 
latter of which may, as a result of its growing involvement in international relations, 
come to play a central part in the former's policy considerations. In this context, 
Carty ignores the qualitative changes brought to bear upon international law by non- 
western states and/or ideologies, by holding to a somewhat exaggerated view that 
international law is still part of western culture (69).
Hence, for its part, this study, rather than positing a nihilistic rejection of international 
law, both as a normative system and as an academic discipline, hopes to contribute to 
its progressive evolution by discerning some of the problems associated with 
international legal theory and legal doctrine. Besides, it traces some of the underlying 
factors that lie beneath the gaps between the prescriptions of international law and the 
actual behaviour of states in international order. Such a critical inquiry is not designed 
to propose solutions, but, rather, to enable a greater understanding of the complexity 
of issues involved in apparently legal problems. It is herein suggested that legal 
doctrine should be more concerned with understanding different legal arguments, 
rather than seeking a single answer on the basis of orthodox legal reasoning. Besides, 
given the fact that international law includes a codification of behavioural norms, 
national behaviour needs to be examined, not least in order to understand the ways 
states behave. Indeed the observance of international law depends on the validity of 
its assumptions about the behaviour of states. It has been one of the objectives of this 
thesis to explain, th ough various case studies, why states comply with international 
law in some circumstances and yet ignore them in others.
This study avoids taking an absolute theoretical position which has the merit of an all- 
encompassing understanding of various issues and problems of international law. 
None of the legal theories, ranging from positivism to postmodernism, can adequately 
answer all questions relating to international law. While the existence of positive 
international rules cannot be denied, it must be admitted that many of these rules, 
particularly in matters of sovereignty, territory and security, lack precise content 
which makes them controversial. Therefore, in many cases, international law is not 
based on an actual consent among states. Meanwhile, certain rules and principles of 
international law may be said to reflect natural law concerns. Among them are the 
international protection of human rights, the principle of self-determination and the
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international law of development which, it may be argued, as ideals, have preceded 
the practice of most states. Although their binding character is less than certain, since 
many states tend to perceive them as mere recommendations, their gradual influence 
over the conduct of states is likely to transform them into solid rules. Similarly, the 
postmodernist approach to law, which tends to highlight the coercion and friction 
beneath the rhetoric of consent, as is done by Carty, exposes only a part of the reality 
of international law, as has been discussed earlier. Therefore, it can be argued that a 
variety of approaches are needed to explicate how individual states (legally) behave in 
larger international society. Such a mode of analysis interprets and contextualizes 
legal situations and problems. It is herein proposed that a multifaceted and multi­
disciplinary hermeneutical position, which pays due attention to international legal 
standards, is capable of grasping the complexity of international relations.
Not unpredictably, then, this thesis does not proceed on the basis of a single 
conceptual approach to expose the problematic dimensions of international law. 
While giving considerable attention to 'positive' rules of international law on various 
subjects, to be discussed, such as sovereignty, human rights and the law of the sea, it 
draws on a number of 'critical' approaches which are then applied to various case 
studies. These approaches are bound together with the thread of the critical 
hermeneutical mode of inquiry pursued in relation to Turkish behaviour in 
international society. First, deconstructionism is deployed for an exposition of conflict 
and heterogeneity which lie beneath the myth of 'national consensus' propagated by 
states. In this context, the following assertions are made : first, the 'state' and 'nation' 
are not necessarily synonymous; secondly, the 'state' is not a 'neutral' arena of 
competing forces and ideas. Instead it represents a particular ideology and normative 
outlook ; third, the official discourse is marked by ambiguity and contradictions. A 
second conceptual approach adopted here concerns the exploration of the link 
between power/knowledge/discourse, as propounded by Michel Foucault. Foucault's 
conception of power emphasizes the dispersion of power contrary to the assertions of 
the classical doctrines of centralized sovereignty; third, William Bloom's identification 
theory is deployed to uncover the interaction between nationalism, national identity 
and international relations; finally, a psychological approach is used to expose 
Turkish perception and image of the outside world, as represented by Turkey's 
decision-making elite. It is argued that the decision-makers tend to internalize the 
core values inculcated by the social environment in which they live.
The hermeneutical method of interpretation, which provides the context of analyses 
for different conceptual approaches employed in this study, involves an understanding
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of the culture and politics of a particular social system, in this case, Turkey, from 
within. To that end, this study deploys a variety of concepts, ideas and theoretical 
approaches in so far as they clarify the hermeneutic exposition of Turkey's 
international legal behaviour. Given that states' perception of themselves and of the 
external world derives from a complex mix of historical, political, cultural and 
economic considerations, the deployment in this study of traditional historical 
analysis, alongside novel theoretical approaches, such as 'identification theory', is 
hopefully justified.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKEY AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FROM A 'NATION- 
BUILDING1 PERSPECTIVE
3.1.Introduction
Despite its paradoxes, contradictions and deficiencies, nationalism is a prime fact of 
contemporary societies. There is no sufficient reason to predict its demise in the 
foreseeable future. Suffice to note that the demise of communism in eastern Europe 
and the ex-Soviet Union, which was premised on proletarian internationalism, has led 
to a resurgence of nationalist movements in large parts of those territories. Most of 
them are ethnically inspired, and often involve border disputes which threaten 
international stability. Even some long established, relatively stable, states in Western 
Europe are challenged by minority nationalisms - such as Catalan and Basque 
nationalisms in Spain; Scottish and Irish nationalist movements in the United 
Kingdom; Corsicans and Bretons in France. They all call for a better understanding 
of nationalism, not least because of their often dramatic impact on the international 
status quo. Unless their complex origins and varied functions are grasped, the vigour 
of nationalism and nationalist sentiments will continue to obstruct the creation of a 
more orderly and peaceful international system. One has to admit that nationalism is 
prone to create exclusive social and geographical space with its own discourse and 
disciplinary traditions. Nationalism is closely associated with politics. Its very 
flexibility and exclusivist nature makes nationalism an ideal instrument for political 
manipulation. Therefore, it can be suggested that one should endeavour to 
understand nationalism and not merely dismiss it as an 'artificial construct'.
However, thus far, present international law, founded upon western positivistic 
doctrine, has failed to come to grips with nationalism (1). The state as the sovereign 
is the primary type of international legal person. A group of people inhabiting a 
particular territory are recognized as a 'state' precisely because they have succeeded in 
becoming independent. Indeed effectiveness is the overriding principle of traditional 
international law. A state is entitled to claim international status when it is able to 
control a specific territory and the people inhabiting it, establish an effective 
administration, and has the capacity to enter into relations with other states (2). In 
the absence of a supreme authority capable of legitimizing new situations, or of core 
principles over which there is universal approval, international law is bound to rely on
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"force as the sole standard by which new facts and events are to be legally appraised"
(3).
However, the preceding observation has to be qualified. Since the formulation of the 
'Stimson doctrine' in 1932 -following the proclamation of the puppet State of 
Manchukuo as the result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria-, an evolution has 
been set whereby any political entity claiming statehood must also have legitimacy in 
order to qualify for international recognition. Indeed states are under an obligation 
not to recognize an entity which has attained the qualifications for statehood as the 
result of military occupation, or by denying the right of a people to self-determination
(4). This was, for instance, the case when, with the exception of South Africa, the 
international community withheld recognition to the white-minority regime which 
declared the independence of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia in 1965.
However the question remains as to whether international law does govern the rules 
that enable a state to emerge, when this does not relate to independence from 
colonial, alien (such as foreign occupation) or racist rule (5). It has to be admitted 
that modem international law recognizes the right of 'peoples' to self-determination 
in non-colonial situations as well (6). However it does not prescribe the methods of 
its implementation. When those who claim the right to self-determination declare 
their intention to secede from an existing state, they are likely to be confronted by 
government forces. Over the years, this has been a major cause of civil wars in many 
parts of the globe. As far as the international community is concerned, these conflicts 
fall outside the competence of international law since they are matters for the 
domestic affairs of the state concerned (7). Still the main rationale behind the 
enunciation of legal provisions concerning the rights of minorities is the preservation 
of the territorial integrity of existing states. This implies that, in practice, those who 
claim a right to self-determination in order to secede from an existing state, will find 
little support from international law (8). Even minority rights are poorly protected 
under present international law. Although admittedly international law has set some 
standards for minority protection (9), it has thus far failed to establish legal 
mechanisms for their effective implementation. The main obstacle here is that the 
international instruments regulating minority rights reaffirm the 'exclusive jurisdiction' 
of signatory states over their territory (10).
Under international law, then, states are recognized as the supreme sovereigns of the 
geographical and social space which they control. This is irrespective of the 
inhabitants whose 'general will', claim the theorists of nationalism, such as Herder
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and Fichte, as will be seen, are the very embodiment of the state. But, if this is so, if 
the state is one with the nation, then one is bound to understand the ways in which 
the state legitimates itself and defines national goals and interests. Most inter-state 
conflicts are in fact the result of rival 'national1 claims on a particular dispute -border 
disputes, territorial disputes, threats to 'national' security etc. However the problem is 
that international law has not developed an adequate normative or methodological 
framework to tackle these thorny issues. Instead, by treating states as immutable and 
all-encompassing entities with their own reasons to exist, international law has failed 
to play any meaningful role in the resolution of inter-state hostilities.
Since international law remains indifferent to the questions of state formation and 
popular legitimacy, it is necessary to focus on the western theory of sovereignty and 
nationalist doctrine, since they have become universal models, of course with 
varying degrees, for the non-European nationalist movements too. In this chapter, it 
is argued that an absolutist notion of sovereignty constitutes an obstacle to 
international peace and co-operation. As Prof. Kearney asserts, as long as the state 
enjoys an unlimited power in foreign affairs as a manifestation of national 
independence, not even a theoretical possibility of inter-state peace can be conceived 
(11).
It is hoped that the preceding discussions adequately convey the rationale behind an 
analysis of the peculiar characteristics of Turkish nationalism, national identity and the 
Turkish concept of sovereignty as vital determinants of Turkey's international 
outlook. This study, then, seeks to analyse Turkey's international behaviour from 
within. This, it is believed, is a more realistic approach than an analysis that focuses 
exclusively on external factors. For it is not simply the external reality -the 
international system, international threats, international law- that shapes foreign 
policy decisions; instead, it is heavily contingent on states' notion of themselves and of 
others, on their economic strategy, as well as on the cultural and ideological 
dispositions of the decision-making elites. This will be explored in the context of 
Turkey.
It is now increasingly accepted by scholars of international law and relations that a 
given state's international relations cannot be properly understood by merely focusing 
on the official memoranda, diplomatic transactions, or international treaties. One 
should go beyond the superficial enunciations of inter-state relations to understand 
the deeper motives, expectations, perceptions of international actors which prompt 
them to take a particular mode of action on a particular issue. However the
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prevailing view in Turkey is that state officials are conducting an apolitical, non- 
ideological duty which is 'neutral and non-partisan'. One of the objectives of this 
study is exactly to show that the state and the 'nation' are not necessarily one and the 
same thing with identical objectives and aspirations. Neither their historical origins, 
nor their definition of national interests are necessarily identical, as will be explored.
One is struck by the fact that studies on Turkish nationalism tend to ignore its 
impact on Turkish foreign policy (12). An equally neglected area is the process of 
foreign policy-making. There is hardly any survey of public perception with regard to 
Turkish foreign policy (13). In the absence of well-articulated analyses of public 
opinion on concrete foreign policy issues, this study intends to understand public 
perceptions by using indirect data. One way of approaching the question may be a 
reflection on how different social groups in Turkey respond to certain national 
symbols, or what their preference is with regard to status quo versus change-oriented 
approaches. Therefore, some of the remarks and suggestions made in this study will 
be tentative and impressionistic.
This Chapter is both methodologically and substantively informed along the lines set 
above. The first half of the chapter discusses the origins of the state-centric approach 
to international law as well as the contemporary challenges to this sovereignty- 
oriented system of law and legal analysis. The latter part focuses on Turkey's 
incorporation into western standards of civilisation, with particular reference to its 
acceptance of western liberal legality and nationalism. This Chapter then discusses 
its implications for Turkey's conception of international law and its perception of the 
outside world.
3.2.A Critical Analysis of the Classical Doctrine on the Law of Territory
The classical doctrine on the law of territory, established on the basis of the European 
system of law in the nineteenth century, was premised on the absolute autonomy of 
states. According to the doctrine, effectiveness was the overriding principle in the 
determination of entitlement to territory. The ties between population and territory 
were largely irrelevant Besides, its rules and principles were marked by imprecision, 
ambiguity and legal lacunae. It is below argued that, in spite of the introduction of 
human rights, minority rights and the principle of self-determination as matters for 
international law, the classical doctrine on the law of territory still, to a considerable
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extent, marks the normative and conceptual underpinnings of the present 
international law.
The competence of states in respect of their territory is generally described as 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The state as the sovereign is the most prominent subject 
of international law. Under international law, for a legal entity to claim statehood, the 
following conditions are required : a defined territory, a population, effective 
administration, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is clear, 
therefore, that international law does not consider the wishes of the population as a 
relevant dimension of state-formation, unless it relates to cases of decolonization. 
Moreover, under international law, once an entity becomes a state, it claims an 
exclusive right to represent the population in its territory. However whether the 
state is representative of the people or not -in terms of political legitimacy-, is not a 
matter for international law. A given state may have an authoritarian concept of itself 
and society, and/or it may seek to create a "nation" in its own image and ideology. 
Those segments of the society which resist or challenge the dominant power structure 
may be persecuted within the framework of 'domestic law'. In such instances, 
international law remains silent It is argued in this study that the ineffectiveness of 
international law in such instances arises from the fact that even today international 
society is regulated by a nineteenth century concept of sovereignty which sanctifies 
statehood. Despite the emergence of human rights and the principle of self- 
determination as distinct legal categories in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
international law is still, for the most part, premised on an absolutist concept of 
sovereignty.
Koskenniemi observes that many international developments seem to support the 
view that sovereignty is essentially beneficial (14). In this context, one can refer to 
various UN General Assembly resolutions concerning the state's permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources or to the growing claims of sovereignty beyond 
state territory, such as in air space or maritime areas, which increasingly attract 
general support. This implies that international society seeks to extend the use of 
sovereignty over varied fields of international conduct, instead of abandoning it. At 
this juncture, one observes that the state's exclusive right to decide what acts shall 
take place in its territory is undisputed : sovereignty by itself justifies the argument 
Indeed "the very term 'intervention' suggests the idea of the wrongfulness of the act" 
(15). Hence it is observed that sovereignty of States is a priori treated as a natural 
liberty. The sanctity of sovereignty is the starting point of international law in the
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same way as individual liberty is the basis of municipal legal order in western liberal 
societies (16).
Under international law, the concept of sovereignty covers three important rights 
which direct themselves to already established states : the right of equality, the right 
of independence, the right of self-determination. While the first right implicates 
equality of status among states under international law, it follows that they all are 
independent actors of international society. Self-determination, in its turn, is taken as 
a manifestation of independence within the domestic jurisdiction of the state (17). 
Therefore self-determination, as a relevant dimension of sovereignty, is only 
implicated in cases involving independent statehood : the right of the state to exercise 
the supreme power in its territory. Hence both the external and internal aspects of 
independence emphasise the exclusivity of the state's jurisdiction within a particular 
territory : freedom from external and internal interference. However there are certain 
developments which are likely to undermine the absolutist notion of sovereignty as 
will be explored later.
The state-centric nature of international law has had three repercussions for 
international relations : first, power imbalances among states are not deemed relevant 
to international law; secondly, self-determination of peoples is not legally recognized 
as a right -unless of course it relates to colonial, alien or racist cases which are largely 
passe; thirdly, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources within 
states is inevitably subordinated to the general rules on the transfer of state 
competences. Carty asserts that one of the reasons why these considerations are 
deemed irrelevant to international law has a lot to do with the 'formal' nature of state 
competence. The jurisdiction of the state is purely geographical. The doctrine is not 
concerned with the material objects of competence. As a result, both the territory 
and population of a state are treated as the 'objects' of state competence. The only 
limitation comes from the positive rules of international law or particular treaties 
which impose restrictions (18).
International legal theory took over this idea from the nineteenth century theory of 
the state (19). It was first and foremost the French Revolution which linked the idea 
of popular sovereignty with the notion of a homogeneous nation. Indeed post- 
revolutionary France witnessed the pursuance of assimilationist policies, which had 
already been under way, with greater vigour. Confrontations between central 
government and secessionary movements, often bloody, were not infrequent, 
particularly in the Basque country and Brittany (20). This is the context within which
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Rousseau's concept of 'general will', originally formulated to provide a genuine 
philosophical basis for the idea of popular sovereignty, was taken up by the Republic 
to legitimate its assimilationist policies. What was Rousseau’s idea of Social Contract, 
and why could it be manipulated for the policy of national assimilation?
In his famous treatise titled 'The Social Contract', Rousseau speaks of a Social Pact 
as an act of delegation of power and political representation by the whole community 
to the political sovereign -the state. However it is also clear that this act of 
'delegation' can be reclaimed by the collectivity should the Social Pact be violated by 
the state (21). In Rousseau's imaginary Social Contract, each and every person 
enjoys some rights towards others. On the other hand, "since each man gives himself 
to all, he gives himself to no one" (22). In the final analysis, the Social Pact comes 
down to this : "Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers 
under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every 
member as an indivisible part of the whole" (23). For Rousseau "general 
wiil...derives its generality...from the common interest" of the society (24).
The idea of Social Contract heavily relies on a state-centric notion of social and 
political organization. Rousseau argues that freedom can only be guaranteed by a 
powerful centralized state. He holds that the relations between the members of the 
body politic:
"..should be as limited, and relations with the entire 
body as extensive, as possible, in order that each citizen 
shall be at the same time perfectly independent of all his 
fellow citizens and excessively dependent on the 
republic -this result is always achieved by the same 
means, since it is the power of the state alone which 
makes the freedom of its members. It is from this 
second relationship that Civil Laws are bom" (25).
Clearly what Rousseau has in mind is a political community based on republican 
principles. His notion of common citizenry, however, is ill-at-ease with particularist 
loyalties. In Rousseau's terminology, the majority domination is sanctified as 'general 
will' and the 'common good'. He says:
"So long as several men assembled together consider 
themselves a single body, they have only one will,
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which is directed towards their common preservation 
and general well-being...It has no incompatible or 
conflicting interests; the common good makes itself so 
manifestly evident that only common sense is needed to 
discern it1 (26).
Rousseau dismisses the opposing elements during the making of the Social Contract 
by declaring them as "foreigners among the citizens". Rousseau is utterly intolerant 
towards dissenting voices and expects complete obedience from the citizens towards 
their state: "After the state is instituted, residence implies consent : to inhabit the 
territory is to submit to the sovereign". His only qualification is that the state be 
"free", presumably implying a republican one (27).
Rousseau seems, however, to be aware of the dangers involved in his Social Contract, 
since he raises the question : "How can the opposing minority be both free and 
subject to laws to which they have not consented?" His response is both simple and 
uncompromising : General will is always right. Since the minority cannot be allowed 
to impose its will upon the majority -since this will be contrary to the general will-, 
then the majority -which represents the general will- can legitimately impose its will 
upon the minority (28). Clearly Rousseau's argument is at its weakest here, since he 
relies on a simple tautology and an unsubstantiated presupposition. He indeed admits 
the demagogic nature of his project : "This presupposes, it is true, that all the 
characteristics of the general will are still to be found in the majority" (29).
Rousseau's expositions did not amount to a coherent theory of the state. It was the 
German philosophers and political theorists of the nineteenth century who provided 
the main premises of the nationalist doctrine and the theory of political legitimacy. 
According to the theory (which may be called 'ethnocultural nationalism'), in order 
that man realize himself fully and gain his freedom, he had to project his individual 
consciousness onto the state. The individual could not exist without having organic 
relations with the society whose supreme embodiment was the state (30). Individuals 
attain real freedom by merging their will into the will of the state. They do not obey 
rules, but give their active consent to the laws and actions of the state. Kedourie sees 
in this formulation the perfect recipe for state coercion if imperfectly applied. While 
the theory speaks of political legitimacy in terms of development, fulfilment, self- 
determination and self-realization, there is no guarantee that a coercive state will not 
monopolize religious or aesthetic matters to disguise its iron grip on people. In such 
cases, Kedourie argues, "Reason of state begins to partake of sovereign Reason, and
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necessity of state to seem a necessity for eternal salvation". Kedourie further 
observes that:
"this confusion between public and private, this 
intermixture between the spiritual and the temporal, has 
passed into current political rhetoric; and rulers have 
tried to persuade the ruled that relations between 
citizens are the same as those between lovers, husbands 
and wives, or parents and children..." (31).
Herder, expounding on post-Kantian themes, laid the intellectual grounds for the 
creation of an homogeneous type of nation-states. He argued that nations were 
separate natural entities ordained by God, and therefore every nation should establish 
its own state. For him the ideal and lasting state was the one formed by natural 
kinship ties. Multinational states, on the other hand, were unnatural and oppressive, 
and therefore, could not survive long (32).
Both Fichte and Herder expounded the idea of language as an integral component of 
the nation. This has had enormous influence on nationalist ideologies. For Fichte and 
Herder the most essential criteria for nationhood was the existence of an original 
language. Language, in their view, was the embodiment of the national character and 
spirit, and of the nation's past and future. Since a nation had to possess a language of 
its own, the language had to be cleansed of foreign influences. The nation's self- 
realization and freedom would accordingly be enhanced by the revival and 
development of the original language. Kedourie notes that this doctrine has had an 
enormous impact on nationalism, as has been witnessed by vast philological 
endeavours which have since accompanied the spread of nationalism all over the 
world (33).
Many non-European states have been similarly influenced by the western theory of 
political legitimacy, particularly its liberal version, as had been expounded by writers 
like Rousseau and Hobbes. Both of these writers placed the state in an all-powerful 
position with respect to community. Hobbes, for instance, failed to articulate 
necessary institutional mechanisms to delimit state action (34). Both Rousseau's and 
Hobbes' conception of political sovereignty failed to demarcate the legitimate scope 
of political action. To be sure, nationalist doctrine found an ideal breeding ground in 
liberal political theory, since the latter too was essentially based on the relationship
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between the individual and the state, without particularistic interventions through 
religion, ethnicity or local affiliations.
Indeed, as is well-known, modem liberal democratic political systems, the main 
mottoes of which are 'liberty', 'equality', 'fraternity', and which find their concrete 
formulation in the principle of 'one man, one vote’, are the end products of the 
centuries-old struggle against the exclusivist monarchies in Western Europe. The 
direction of the struggle brought to the forefront the rights of the individual citizen, 
not the group to which the individual belonged, against the all-mighty state. However 
the popular notion of sovereignty which sought to replace the absolutist monarchies 
did not do away with an essentially power-centric notion of sovereignty. Foucault 
argues that from medieval times onwards, the theory of right preoccupied itself with 
the legitimacy of power. Indeed as far as Western Europe is concerned, power was 
historically perceived in juridical terms : state, as the sovereign, the individual, as the 
subject Foucault thinks that this developed in the Medieval Ages when the monarchy 
presented itself as a referee to end violence among feudal forces. The monarchy 
allocated itself a juridical and negative function in order to make itself acceptable. As 
a result:
"...sovereignty, law and prohibition formed a system of 
representation of power which was extended during the 
subsequent era by the theories of right : political
theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person 
of the sovereign. Such theories still continue today to 
busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty" (35).
Hence in western societies, the notion of sovereignty was imbued by strategies of 
domination from the outset (36). Although admittedly the absolutist concept of 
sovereignty became anachronistic with the rise of industrial capitalism, in effect, the 
theory of sovereignty "has continued not only to exist as an ideology of right, but also 
to provide the organising principle of the legal codes which Europe acquired in the 
nineteenth century, beginning with the Napoleonic Code" (37). Rousseau's Social 
Contract also fails to escape this limitation, for under this frame of analysis, power is 
treated as an instance of negation. In other words, in its exercise, power is taken as a 
great absolute which forbids by decree (38).
Therefore the 'core' doctrine of nationalism, premised upon the homogenization of a 
state’s population through the imposition of the values of the dominant ethne, was
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able to consolidate its legitimacy through a power-centric notion of sovereignty. Carl 
Schmitt, a German political theorist who was influential in the 1930s, argues that 
parliamentarism should not be confused with democracy. In Rousseau’s concept of 
'general will', unanimity, in the sense of homogeneity, is taken for granted. For 
Schmitt, Rousseau's Social Contract is fundamentally flawed, since a contract 
assumes differences and opposition. In Schmitt's view, the idea of 'free contract' 
comes from liberalism, and not from popular sovereignty, as suggested by Rousseau 
(39). As a result, liberal democracy is caught in its own inconsistencies and 
inadequacies which means that minority or majority domination over the whole of the 
population is inevitable (40).
For Schmitt, the definition of democracy centres around the identity of governed and 
governing. While the people are heterogeneous and varied, they are identical with the 
state as far as the principle of democracy is concerned. He says that "democracy 
seems fated...to destroy itself in the problem of the formation of a will", because the 
will of the people is often controlled by narrow segments and/or narrowly defined 
interests of the society : "military and political force, propaganda, control of public 
opinion through the press, party organizations, assemblies, popular education, and 
schools". For Schmitt, "only political power, which should come from the people's 
will, can form the people's will in the first place" (41). Therefore democracy implies 
the identity of the quantitative (numerical majority) with the qualitative (justice) (42).
Although admittedly Schmitt lays too much emphasis on the role of the state in his 
scheme for popular democracy which might lead to totalitarian corporatism, he rightly 
draws on the self-defeating tendencies of liberal political theory, and on the role of 
political values in the proper functioning of democracy. To be sure, the absolutist 
concept of sovereignty is intimately linked to other forms of hegemonic relations 
within western societies -and most certainly in most non-western societies too. 
Foucault asserts that power should not be taken as one individual's domination over 
others, or that of one group or class over others. Power is the subject of an ongoing 
process with manifold relations of domination. Power is not only exercised by those 
who hold the monopoly of power, but as well as by single individuals. They are 
always simultaneously in a process of undergoing and exercising power (43).
Legal doctrine is bound to take the complexity of issues involved in the diffusion of 
power seriously. A right step in this direction is to challenge the simplistic dichotomy 
of 'state versus the nation' which has been the starting point of international rules on 
the law of territory. Such change has, to some extent, indeed come about with the
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emergence of new sets of rules and principles concerning human rights, the rights of 
minorities and the indigenous peoples, and of the principle of self-determination all of 
which have become or, are in the process of becoming, a corpus of international law. 
Here regard will be had to the principle of self-determination since it is around this 
principle that the fundamental premises of sovereignty are being challenged -through 
the granting of cultural and political rights for national minorities and indigenous 
peoples.
The principle of self-determination -some speak of a 'right' to self-determination- 
seems to have two major characteristics : first, it is vested in the people against the 
state in whose jurisdiction they happen to live; second, it is a collective right in that it 
is vested in the people as a whole (44). Crawford argues that the notion of 'people' 
does not solely apply to the whole population of existing states. Instead given the 
complexity and breadth of the issue at hand, regard has to be made to the context of 
the claim made by a particular social group to decide if it falls into the category of 
'people' (45).
There are several important problems of indeterminancy as far as the principle of self- 
determination is concerned : first, it is difficult to ascertain with clarity those groups 
which can legitimately be regarded as 'people'. The problem is worsened by the fact 
that not even the principal legal texts themselves give any indication of its scope. 
Therefore the dividing line between 'people' and lesser collectivities, like 'minorities', 
is not clear; second, the principle of self-determination is diluted with a major 
principle of international law : that the territorial integrity of sovereign states is 
inviolable. The only way out of this impasse would be to weaken the force of self- 
determination by reducing its operational framework into various cases of local 
autonomy; third, there are practical problems like the identification of the 
representatives of the social group claiming the right to self-determination and of the 
contents of the right itself (46).
Therefore, not surprisingly, the principle of self-determination has remained a 
controversial issue, not least because of the difficulties involved in determining what 
the 'self is and what it is to be 'determined'. It is also arguable whether self- 
determination is a universally accepted 'right' and whether it is legally effective. 
According to Pomerance, international law arises from what states practice constantly 
and uniformly. She argues that the entire history of self-determination, even during 
the UN era, has witnessed a subjective and selective interpretation of this principle by
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states. They claim for themselves what they deny for others. Not surprisingly 
therefore "no state has accepted the right of all peoples to self-determination" (47).
The principle of self-determination has an 'internal’ and 'external' dimension which 
further complicates the issue. 'External' self-determination concerns the international 
status of a people as an independent political unit. 'Internal' self-determination relates 
to the freedom of choosing the desired form of government (48). The question arises 
as to what extent are these two categories related under international law. The 
United States and other western states generally hold that genuine self-determination 
is best secured under a representative government For a majority of the Third World 
states, however, this formula does not necessarily represent their own priorities and 
interests. They mostly fear that this may lead to secessionary demands from 
disaffected groups within the country against an 'unjust state'. Accordingly, 'external' 
self-determination has remained the main focus of Third World strategies in the 
United Nations. They have generally maintained that the new states emerging out of 
colonialism must have a right to territorial integrity, and that the form of its political 
regime and its human rights record are not central to the principle of self- 
determination (49). Pomerance argues that unlike the UN principles in its earlier 
phase, the UN provisions on self-determination have tended to play down the 
significance of democratic governance in the effective implementation of self- 
determination. Therefore while people living under 'colonial', 'racist' or 'alien' regimes 
were accorded full 'external' self-determination, other groups under similarly 
oppressive regimes were accorded no rights in 'non-colonial' situations (50). This is 
evidenced by the UN practice concerning self-determination. For instance, while the 
Declaration on Colonialism (Resolution 1514) spoke of self-determination, under 
Paragraph 6 it was stated that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of 
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (51). Similarly the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations debilitates the vigour of self-determination by 
referring to the inviolability of territorial integrity of states (52). Pomerance argues 
that the principle of the 'sovereign equality of states' and 'non-intervention' are 
interpreted by a majority of states in such a way as to exclude the possibility of 
secession or the enforcement of representative governments. These inherently 
conflicting principles, over which there is no guidance for proper balance, have led to 
inconsistent practices as far as the principle of self-determination is concerned : while 
one right might be emphasized in one case, a contrary right might be enforced in a 
similar context (53).
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Not surprisingly, then, the legal effect of the principle of self-determination remains a 
dubious one. First, the UN General Assembly Resolutions and Declarations do not 
create binding obligations; second, many of the UN resolutions geared to the 
independence of colonial territories were adopted without unanimity. In such cases, 
they were often opposed by western states; third, certain states which voted in the 
affirmative were clearly careful to emphasize that the resolutions were an expression 
of a "political will1 devoid of legal force; fourth, there is often disagreement among 
the consenting states over the definition of the often vaguely worded resolutions on 
self-determination. These resolutions therefore fail to provide authoritative guidance 
for states; finally, the content and scope of self-determination is so broad, undefinable 
and subjective that even if it were to enjoy the character of legal right, its legal effect 
remains doubtful (54).
Moreover, since its formulation, the 'external' aspect of the principle of self- 
determination has been emphasized since it is this aspect which brings about changes 
in international relations. Indeed colonial self-determination since 1945 naturally 
gave an impression of independence as the usual outcome of self-determination (55). 
The only exception to this pattern emerges in cases where 'internal' self-determination 
is considered as a human rights issue (56).
The classical formulation of standards of human rights suggests that group rights 
would be duly protected by guaranteeing the rights of individuals. This is for instance 
the idea behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the two 
human rights Covenants of 1966. However, argues Brownlie, granting individual 
rights does not necessarily guarantee "collective rights" for a variety of reasons : first, 
the classical provisions do not envision positive actions on the side of the states to 
maintain the cultural and linguistic identity of communities. At this juncture, 
Brownlie refers to case-law under the European Convention on Human Rights which 
confirms that neither Article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention nor 
Article 8 of the Convention itself, which are concerned with the right to education 
and with the protection of private and family life respectively, impose "positive 
action" on the part of the signatory states towards their citizens (57); second, the 
classical formulations do not guarantee the land rights of the indigenous people; third, 
they fail to respond to the claims of specific social groups to self-determination (58).
Today it is generally accepted -not least by international jurists- that a right to self- 
determination exists in non-colonial situations as well. This implies that minorities 
may also be regarded as 'peoples' in the sense of entitlement to self-determination.
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Indeed Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (also included in Article 
1 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted the same year) of 
1966 which speaks of 'self-determination' does not exclude the possibility of its 
implementation outside the colonial context (59). However scholars generally agree 
that this should fall short of complete independence. For instance, Crawford takes a 
conciliatory view which seeks to combine the concerns of the state and the 
secessionary movement/s within the territory controlled by that state. A variety of 
outcomes, ranging from local autonomy to provisions for separate representation in 
legislative and executive bodies at central or regional level, may satisfy the needs of 
the minority group/s for self-determination, while leaving intact the territorial integrity 
of the state (60). This is also the position taken by a majority of other writers : a part 
of the population may be regarded as 'people' and, as a result, are entitled to self- 
determination, but the new arrangement should not endanger the territorial integrity 
of existing states (61).
The impact of the principle of self-determination over the composition and general 
structure of international society remains to be seen. It can nonetheless be predicted 
that the absolutist concept of sovereignty will gradually fade away to allow greater 
expression for different cultural, political and ethnic groups. Perhaps then the ruling 
elites, particularly in the Third World, will not dismiss ethnic, religious and other 
kinship loyalties as "primordial, traditional, obstacles to modernization" (62). They 
may also realise that a monocentric conception of national citizenry runs contrary to 
the realities of contemporary international society. Indeed today the world is full of 
multi-ethnic states which render obsolete any notion of a 'one state-one nation'. Very 
few state territories today correspond to a single nation. On the contrary, most 
states are composed of distinct ethnic and cultural communities. Furthermore, 
modem post-industrial capitalism has extended its operations beyond national 
boundaries, and thus rendered anachronistic any notion of a sacrosanct national 
sovereignty (63).
It may now be appropriate to examine some substantial and methodological 
challenges to the classical liberal doctrine on the law of territory. It is argued here 
that, by making a critique of the positivist legal doctrine and proposing an alternative 
view of notions like 'democracy' and 'sovereignty', critical legal theory appears to hold 
the greatest potential for an alternative approach to established orthodoxies.
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3.3. An Exposition of the Critical Approach to International Law
Various 'new' schools of thought which emerged after the Second World War have 
challenged the view that the Enlightenment represents an objective knowledge which 
is achieved through scientific enquiry. Critical legal theorists are among those which 
see the Enlightenment project from a different angle. Critical legal scholars insist that 
"the Enlightenment created a myth of science which held out an evolutionist and 
progressive image of accumulating knowledge giving access to reality". Accordingly, 
they challenge the most basic tenets of the Enlightenment project (64) by 
'deconstructing1 it. The main focus of this section will be on the legal dimensions of 
that project which is deeply imbued in the international legal discipline.
Critical legal scholars are deeply dissatisfied with the traditional legal doctrine which 
emphasizes the procedural and formalistic aspects of law at the expense of their 
social, economic and political context. For critical lawyers, by projecting law as 
autonomous and politically neutral, traditional jurisprudence ignores the role played 
by law in consolidating and maintaining "an extensive system of class, gender and 
racial oppression". Hence critical legal scholars "seek a theory and practice that 
makes the overcoming of such oppression a central political task" (65).
Proponents of the critical approach believe that law must be perceived as integral to 
other social disciplines -as well as to international morality. Thus they seek to place 
law into the political, economic, and social context in which it operates. Thus they 
attempt to reconnect law with every day struggles and experiences. Besides, critical 
legal theory tries to show that law is an "expression and medium of power". Foucault 
set out to show us that "truth isn't outside power". Contrary to the Enlightenment 
myth:
"..truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of 
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general 
politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements.." (66).
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From here Foucault goes on to establish the 'political economy' of truth which he 
characterises by five important traits :
"'Truth' is centred on the form of scientific discourse 
and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to 
constant economic and political incitement (the demand 
for truth, as much for economic production as for 
political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of 
immense diffusion and consumption (circulating 
through apparatuses of education and information 
whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not 
withstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced 
and transmitted under the control, dominant if not 
exclusive, of a few great political and economic 
apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it 
is the issue of a whole political debate and social 
confrontation ('ideological' struggles)" (67).
Since law is perceived as integrally linked to power, the critical approach requires an 
analysis of this relationship which is not self-evident Hence the need for theory (68).
However, while endorsing the need for theory, critical legal scholars are not unified 
within a single theoretical position. The movement embraces a plurality of 
approaches and strategies. For instance, the Marxist critique of law perceives liberal 
legality as rooted in capitalist accumulation, and therefore, a function of class 
relations. It argues that law represents the interests and priorities of dominant classes 
in the economic and social spheres. Hence law is neither autonomous, nor objective. 
Critical Marxism meanwhile recognizes the 'relative autonomy' of the legal, political 
and ideological superstructure from the economic sphere. Accordingly, critical 
Marxists seek to socialise and democratise both the form and content of law (69).
For its part, postmodernism represents the end of grand narratives. Marxism also 
takes its share of the postmodern offensive due to its totalizing, all-encompassing 
vision of truth. For its part, postmodernism celebrates difference. Society does not 
constitute an integrated whole; instead it is marked by opposition. However, grand 
theories ignore this reality by treating difference as non-existent. Postmodernists seek 
to deconstruct a given text by exposing its hidden assumptions, by 'liberating' its 
suppressed parts, and by putting the text into its proper context -political, economic,
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social or otherwise. Besides, the postmodern approach recognizes the relevance of 
the institutional setting in which a particular discourse takes place (70).
One should not overrate the significance of postmodernist approach for an 
understanding of law and its relation to society. Indeed within the critical school of 
thought, postmodernism is particularly intent on reminding us that "to remain critical, 
critical legal theory must resist simply replacing the liberal theory it criticises with a 
theory of its own, which is complete, coherent and determinate. This means that 
liberal legality can be no more totally rejected than it can be totally accepted" (71).
When deployed for an analysis of international law, deconstructionism claims that 
legal argument is dependent on the language it uses. It is not objective. It is known 
that individuals internalize the concepts and categories with which they are familiar 
through a process of socialization. The same holds true for the language of 
international law. International law, as it exists, conveys to us a particular 
interpretation of the social world under the veil of objectivity. Deconstructionism 
seeks to uncover the hidden assumptions behind what it calls the 'conservative' system 
of international law. Accordingly, it rejects any notion of an objective legal argument, 
and seeks to expose the normative nature of international order (72).
The critical approach, as the broad frame of reference for a multitude of approaches 
mentioned above, seeks to understand positive international law as a historical 
construct which has its roots in the liberal tradition. That system of law was, and still 
is, not sufficiently qualified to claim universality. According to critical legal scholars, 
this is evidenced by the absence of a central international order as an impartial 
referent for state actions. Besides, they argue, states should be treated as 
independent centres of legal culture, and must be understood in relation to one 
another. Hence the international lawyer is bound "to resist phony, reified, would-be 
universalistic legal discourse in favour of the recognition of the inevitably restrictive 
and exclusive nature of individual state discourses" (73). The critical international 
lawyer, therefore, seeks to facilitate inter-state/inter-cultural dialogue by attempting 
to produce impartial works of 'legal translation' (74).
Critical jurists assert that "legal knowledge does not relate to ideas and facts 
themselves, but to a (representational) meaning which might be discovered in their 
name" (75). This calls for an understanding of the mechanisms in which single, 
purportedly consensual, state discourses are produced (76). Therefore analyses of 
the states' international behaviour must include a precise examination of decision­
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making processes which allow an awareness of psychological perceptions (77). It can 
confidently be asserted that states' behaviour is a function of a "system of shared 
perceptions, practices and institutions within which communities of persons establish 
and advance their ends" (78).
For Carty one way of overcoming the lacunae that exists in international law is the 
recognition of "key factors which go to provide most states with varying degrees of 
internal cohesion, and from which they then view international society". He asserts 
tha t:
"..every political community must have its own distinct 
constellations of political values rooted in a specific 
political culture which defines what it regards as 
obligatory. This is the starting point for any work of 
legal hermeneutic or translation" (79).
The key for the international lawyer is "to determine what a people is, how it 
understands itself and how it judges others" (80). This implies that he/she engage in 
a hermeneutic of "the claims, allegations and actions of the states parties to a dispute, 
incident, etc., in terms of their 'cultural' pre-suppositions" (81). Scholars of 
international law are therefore bound to accept, as Stavrinides points out, that, in 
order to understand the nature of disputes between the hostile nations and the facts 
that constitute the actual casus belli:
"..it is necessary to examine the facts in question under 
the aspects of the ideological beliefs and values of both 
sides; for it is only within the frame of a national or 
group ideology that a set of facts bear a relationship to 
the rights and interests of the nation or group" (82).
Since critical legal theory asserts that international legal discipline is a historically 
conditioned discourse derived from liberal political theory, it questions the validity of 
the claim that positivist international law represents a universal system of law based 
on an actual consent among states. Instead it argues that positivist legal language is 
used by particular states and their representative legal scholars to justify their claims 
against others (83). Therefore there is no way in which to solve legal conflicts with a 
unique, objective legal technique.
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In the absence of a system of international law that is supreme arbiter of conflicting 
individual interests -in terms of its rules, norms, principles and institutions-, it is 
necessary to enquire "into the internal organisation of the state units". As Carty puts 
it, today "individual nation-state is prior to any international system". (84).
The postmodern approach, when applied to an analysis of nationalism, resists all 
forms of cultural uniformity which is frequently imposed in the name of a global, all- 
encompassing ideology. It also questions the validity of a linear, evolving notion of 
history which claims a clear transition from 'tradition1 to 'modernity1. Instead, it 
insists on seeing history in its multiplicity and complexity without drawing sharp 
distinctions between the 'old' and the 'new'. Diversity, not uniformity, is therefore the 
motto of the postmodern approach to history and society (85).
An analysis of the relationship between nationalism, on the one hand, and 
international law and society, on the other, may provide us with an invaluable tool for 
a better understanding of inter-state disputes. A recent contribution to the 
understanding of the relationship between nationalism/national identity and the actual 
foreign policy of a given state has been made by Bloom. However before discussing 
Bloom's theory of 'national identity dynamic', it is useful to expose nationalist 
ideology and its claims -with regard to 'itself and to 'others'- as a relevant dimension 
of contemporary international society.
3.4.Nationalism and the Nationalist Discourse
In the modem world of states, corporate loyalty and identity are manifested as 
patriotism and nationalism. According to Lewis, those two terms do not necessarily 
coincide. Whereas 'patriotism' is right and good -the love and loyalty which all of us 
owe to our country, 'nationalism' is less than clear (86).
The emergence of nationalism is generally associated with modernism. In this view, 
nationalism and nation-states came into prominence with the break-up of traditional 
societies in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. For instance, Gellner argues that 
nationalism is ideally suited to the requirements of an industrial social organization 
due to the former's programme of universal literacy, linguistic standardization, and its 
all-embracing educational system tied to a state-imposed cultural indoctrination. 
These characteristics are indispensable for occupational mobility, mass media, and 
sustained economic growth that are the hallmarks of modem industrial economy. In
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this sense, nationalism shoulders a progressive mission (87). Deutsch also works on 
the dichotomy between traditional and modem societies. He too perceives 
nationalism as a distinctly modem phenomenon. In his view, a national citizenry 
gradually emerges as a result of improved communications and centralized, scientific 
state structure (88). For his part, Breuilly treats nationalism as a political ideology to 
legitimize the seizure of state. He locates its emergence to the early modem Europe 
when the masses were increasingly estranged from politics (89). Finally, Kedourie 
sees nationalism as an artificial construct 'invented' by the marginalized intellectuals 
(90).
All these differing, yet interrelated, views concerning the origins and functions of 
nationalism tend to see it as a somewhat passive by-product of the economic, social, 
and political forces that have shaped the modem conditions. As a result of this, they 
fail to explain why appeals to nationalism have often aroused passionate responses 
from the mass of people. Smith asserts that nationalism is no more 'invented' than 
other forms of culture or ideology. Nationalism is dependent on earlier motifs and 
ideals since it is not only a political ideology and social movement, but a form of 
culture as well. As far as the formation of national identity in the west is concerned, 
it owes a great deal to the presence of pre-modem ethnies and the gradual emergence 
of national states (91).
Smith's view of nationalism as rooted in particular historical and cultural experience is 
partially shared by Benedict Anderson who recognizes the "cultural roots of 
nationalism", in his Imagined Communities. For Anderson, as far as the European 
continent is concerned, nationalism replaced religion as the proteg^ of lost dreams 
and imaginings as a result of evolving rational secularism after the late Middle Ages. 
Nationalism became a secular religion in a world that desecrated established customs 
and beliefs which were inculcated by religion (92). The decline of divinely-ordained 
polities, sacred communities, and of Latin as the sacred language of Europe were 
however manifestations of some fundamental historical forces and of new modes of 
thinking (93). The arrival of the printing press, in particular, novels and newspapers, 
greatly contributed in the forging of a sense of nationhood among their fellow readers 
(94). Anderson integrates the 'cultural' dimension of nationalism into an analysis of 
complex economic, social and political factors that gave rise to nationalist ideals : the 
emergence of capitalism; formation of scientific, rational state; 'discoveries'; and 
increasing communications (95).
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Most nation-states have been put together by force of arms and cultural pressure
(96). However the process of nation-building, whose origins are generally traced to 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, has not been a uniform phenomenon
(97). Two types of nationalisms are singled out in the context of Europe : western 
'civic' nationalism that emerged in 'old', established states like Britain, France and 
Spain, and 'ethnic' nationalism which was particularly prominent in Germany and 
eastern Europe. These models were later transposed into other societies in Asia and 
Africa which often contained various elements from both models.
Western 'civic' nationalism can be traced back to the presence of a core ethnie which 
incorporated other ethnic groups and their regions into its political territory. The 
strong central state with its homogenizing policies -administrative, economic and 
cultural- succeeded in forging a national culture (98). The western civic model of the 
nation is a predominantly territorial conception. This view of the nation holds that 
"nations must possess compact, well-defined territories" (99). A second element in 
this model is the idea of a patria, which is expressed through highly centralized and 
unitary institutions. Third, there is also the sense that citizens of the political 
community must enjoy legal equality before the law. Fourth, a measure of common 
values and traditions are deemed to be necessary for the cohesion of the population in 
their homeland (100). Hence western civic nationalism operated on the basis of a 
correspondence between nationhood and statehood which meant that patriotism was 
the loyalty which the citizen owed to his/her country, this being personified in the 
state representing the country.
The second type which can be described as 'ethnic nationalism' emerged in central and 
eastern Europe -and in Italy- where clearly-defined nation-states did not exist until 
the nineteenth century. Instead there were nations and peoples who were divided into 
small principalities, or subject to alien rule. As a result, these nations, including 
Germans, Poles, Italians and Hungarians, professed their loyalty not in the form of a 
state or country, but of nation and people. This type of nationalism, based on ethnic 
and linguistic commonality, was exclusively directed at the creation of an independent 
state (101). Not surprisingly, then, here ethnic/cultural community prefigures as the 
frame of reference for the 'nation'. In these instances, people figured as both the 
object and subject of political mobilization. In this form of nationalism, 'the law' in 
the western civic model was replaced by vernacular customs and traditions (102). 
Hence unlike France, where the 'national will' was said to constitute the basis for the 
nation, German nationalists sought to base their claims on 'ethnicity and culture'.
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This is evident in the writings of French and German scholars of the nineteenth 
century. For Renan, for instance, the foundations of the French nation were the 
common will and consent. Herder, a leading exponent of German nationalism in 
nineteenth century, meanwhile, longed for a genuinely cultural society outside the 
realm of an overpowering state. Most German thinkers resented the imposition of a 
French model of the rationalistic state on Prussia, and instead opted for an organic 
community with its distinct cultural identity. In this context, Herder rejected the 
individualistic universalism of the Enlightenment (103). German nationalism was 
essentially a romantic, pre-capitalist and cultural one. It appealed to the uncomipted 
peasantry and folldoric traditions, as well as to the German language, as vehicles for 
self-discovery (104). Hence on the surface while French citizenship made French 
nationality, German nationality made German citizenship (In passing, it can be noted 
that today, with the establishment of the European Union, the citizens of a European 
state also qualify for European citizenship).
However in reality the distinction is not as clear-cut. Western civic nationalism is not 
necessarily more benign than the German version. Smith rightly asserts that "every 
nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms" 
(105). Revolutionary France also forged a policy of national homogenization, albeit 
conflated with universalist principles. Indeed French state nationalism became diluted 
with linguistic assimilation under the Jacobins and thereafter (106). Weber notes that 
compulsory schooling was the main vehicle in the acculturation process that 
transformed people into 'civilised Frenchmen' (107). Similarly, England imposed its 
own language and political programme upon the Irish, Welsh and Scots under the 
banner of the United Kingdom (108).
Since Western civic nationalism and its ethnic version intermingle when both see the 
nation as the main unit of social and political loyalty, they may commonly be labeled 
as the 'core doctrine' of nationalism, as proposed by Smith. The 'core doctrine' sees 
the world as a society of nations. In this view, nations must be free and secure for 
peace and justice to prevail in the world (109).
The 'core doctrine' later became a universal referent for peoples in search of a state of 
their own. Nationalist movements in Asia and Africa -the 'last wave' of nationalism 
(110)-were however largely responses to global imperialism. The expansion of the 
colonial states whose functions had rapidly multiplied with the rise of capitalism 
required the recruitment of indigenous elites. However the 'natives' were generally 
barred from key positions in the administrative hierarchy. Combined with the impact
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of the printing press, and the earlier nationalist models in Americas and Europe, the 
resentful intelligentsia in the colonies strived hard to instil national consciousness 
among the members of the 'imagined community1 (111). As for the dynastic states in 
the non-European world which escaped colonization, they tended to imitate -of 
course with some additional flavour of their own- western civic nationalism (in other 
words, official nationalism) as in the case of Japan and Siam (now Thailand) (112).
Since the concept of nation embraces two sets of dimensions -civic and territorial, on 
the one hand, and, ethnic and genealogical, on the other- in varying proportions at 
different times, its very multidimensionality and flexibility has made national identity 
a formidable force in the contemporary world (113). For Smith, nationalism is best 
suited to bridge the contrast between "warm, intimate, spontaneous relationships 
supposedly characteristic of community, and cold, distant, reflective relationships 
supposedly characteristic of society" (114). Indeed while the state wants to exploit 
the opportunities provided by modernity (industrialization, universal literacy, 
improved communications), it seeks to compensate the sense of loss, which the very 
modernity creates, by emphasizing cultural identity and emotional solidarity. This 
implies that nationalism tends to be more attractive than universalistic doctrines of 
socialism and liberalism, exactly because "in a chaotic and rapidly changing world 
nationalism provides simple, concrete labels for friends and enemies" (115).
Nationalism is not inherently reactionary or anti-democratic. As Kearney asserts, 
one can and must distinguish between "those that emancipate and those that 
incarcerate, those that affirm a people's cultural identity in dialogue with other 
peoples and those that degenerate into ideological closure -into xenophobia, racism 
and bigotry". In this context, he points out that nationalism played an emancipatory 
role in the shaping of modem Ireland (116). One can similarly point to the 
progressive role played by the anti-colonialist nationalist movements in this century. 
Moreover nationalism can harness constitutional and social reforms, while 
legitimating new regimes in developing countries, as in India and Turkey. It can also 
provide fresh impetus for modernization and economic growth (117). Although 
nationalism in Asia and Africa was undeniably linked to colonialism and imperialism 
in its origins, national independence, inspired by the 'progressive' ideals of 
republicanism, common citizenship and populism, as had been espoused by the French 
revolution and independence movements in Americas, has generally improved the lot 
of the ordinary citizens in the economic, political and cultural spheres. National 
governments have often strived to improve economic welfare, promote popular 
education and expand the suffrage.
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This is not, however, to say that the transplantation of the nationalist principle, 
particularly the German type, into different historical and geographical contexts has 
been an easy one. One problem is that the mythic notions of 'nation' and 'state' could 
not properly be addressed in cases involving multiethnic and tribal societies, 
particularly in Africa. For doing so might inevitably lead to majority domination over 
the minority community/ies within a given state. Indeed modem states in the 
periphery (the Third World) have tended to exclude the endogenous social 
movements and networks of communication from the political apparatus. These local 
forces often have religious or ethnic foundations, and precede the formation of the 
modem state. However "the peripheral state, completely absorbed in the task of 
constituting itself, building up the necessary apparatus and integrating segmented 
communities into a nation, has ignored or often seen them only as obstacles to be 
overcome" (118). Therefore, not surprisingly, policies of national assimilation have 
been one of the major sources of civil wars and inter-ethnic conflicts in many parts of 
the Third World which have occasionally escalated into inter-state wars.
Certain problems are, however, common to all states, such as the legitimation of 
claims to a 'national' territory, and a constant need to cohere the nation around 
various nationalist narratives. Although the extent to which the nationalist doctrine is 
resorted to by the ruling elites appears to be more frequent and intensive among 
'younger' nation-states, the use of nationalist discourse is a prominent feature of 
international politics today. For instance, although power is said to reside in the 
people in those societies with representative governments, it is often observed that, at 
times of legitimacy crises, those in power tend to resort to coercion or charisma, or 
create an 'external enemy' to close the 'credibility gap' -note for instance the Falklands 
factor in Thatcherite Britain or the communist syndrome in McCarthyite America 
(119). Indeed states frequently appeal to nationalist sentiments in order to mobilize 
the 'nation' for a set of goals, which are often linked to 'external threats'. But what 
are these sentiments and why are they vital for nation-building?
Nationalist identities are often forged on the basis of an ethnic community. However, 
in most cases, an 'ethnic community’ is far from being a racial category. Ethnic 
community is "a community of historical culture with a sense of common identity". A 
race, on the other hand, refers to "unique hereditary biological traits" (120). That 
‘ethnic’ communities are far from being ‘racial’ communities is particularly the case 
with large territorial states in which diverse ethnic groups exist. Moreover in areas 
where resettlement of peoples have been a recurring theme in the course of time, it is 
difficult to trace the origins of ethnic groups (121). 'Ethnic community' must be
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distinguished from an 'ethnic category1 in that the latter is unaware or has a dim 
consciousness that it is a separate collectivity. As far as the ethnic community is 
concerned, at least part of the members are aware of their distinguishing features. 
Smith lists six main attributes of an ethnic community :
"1. a collective proper name
2. a myth of common ancestry
3. shared historical memories
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. an association with a specified 'homeland'
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the 
population" (122).
Ethnic consciousness (or awareness) requires the existence of the 'other', which is 
well-described by Connor:
"The sense of being unique or different requires a 
referrent, that is, the concept of 'us' requires 'them'.
Without the knowledge of the existence of foreigners 
with alien ways, there is nothing...to bind one villager 
to another...As against members of all other ethnic 
groups ('them') the two [villagers] are united 
psychologically in the collective 'us'" (123).
This may largely explain why the ethnic communities reinforce their identity at times 
of war. It is well-known that ethnies (ethnic communities) are frequently 
antagonistically paired : French and English, Arabs and Israelis, Egyptians and 
Assyrians etc. Wars provide future generations with myths and memories (124).
Ethnie and 'nation' are two different categories, although similar in many respects. 
The nation corresponds to an effective relationship with a territory. A nation "is a 
named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members" (125). However a 'nation' does not necessarily overlap with a 
'state'. Indeed most states emerged prior to the existence of a nation, while some 
nations were already in existence before establishing a state (126). For instance, the 
French state had been built long before the arrival of economic modernity which is 
generally supposed to be the main force behind nationalism. Through imposing a 
uniform socialization upon its citizens, particularly in education, France sought to
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legitimize the state (127). Similarly, the Turks' ethnic awareness of themselves was 
almost non-existent although they had been the founders and the principal rulers of 
the Ottoman Empire. Germans, on the other hand, provide a counter-example of an 
ethnically conscious people who were divided between a large number of territorial 
and juristic sovereignties until the mid-nineteenth century. There is another reason 
for distinguishing between the terms 'nation' and 'state'. Very few states today are 
composed of a single 'nation'. A survey of 132 states as of 1971 showed that only 12 
states were composed of a single nation, while in over fifty percent of the states, at 
least twenty five percent of the population were composed of ethnic minorities. 
Therefore it would be appropriate to conclude that "a prime fact about the world is 
that it is not largely composed of nation-states" (128).
Most states are in reality dominated by a 'core' ethne. This is exactly the problem in 
many states : the monolithic nature of nationalist historiography and political doctrine 
tends to marginalize the minorities. Since the state is founded upon the values and 
aspirations of the core group, a state-centric narrative pervades the social life, hence 
leaving little scope for minority perceptions and activities (129). It is no surprise, 
then, that the nationalist historiography contorts the past by converting various 
political communities into 'nations'. This is a process of discovering the past in the 
image of the 'nation', although human history is much more complex and multi­
faceted than the nationalist historiography suggests. Besides, states tend to propagate 
the idea that members of a particular nation must speak the same language and share 
similar aspirations for the well-being and security of the 'nation' (130). This explains 
why a ‘nation’ is not simply a given reality but "a work in progress, a model of 
something at once to be built and to be treated for political reasons as already in 
existence" (131).
One must not, however, label the ruling elites of states simply as 'devilish 
chauvinists'. Nationalism is not simply a pathological idea that is inherently prone to 
racism. One must only recall how nationalism has inspired cultural creations that 
narrate love, but rarely hatred (132). It must be recognized that the forging of a 
common, national identity among citizens is not an easy task. Weber rightly asserts 
that a painful and complex process awaits before "a number of vague, loose 
individuals" turn into a 'nation' (133).
The forging of national identity has varied functions and is activated through different 
strategies. Smith asserts that national identity legitimizes legal institutions which are 
deemed to represent the distinctive culture and traditions of the nation. Therefore
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"the appeal to national identity has become the main legitimation for social order and 
solidarity today" (134). Through public mass education and other socialization 
processes, individuals become 'nationals' and 'citizens'. Also through its repertoires of 
shared symbols -flags, anthems, monuments, ceremonies etc., the nation provides a 
social bond between individuals and classes. Besides a sense of national identity 
evokes social meanings and frames of reference for the individuals to associate with. 
In a rapidly changing world of uncertainties, national identity fulfils the human need 
for self-discovery (135). However the state is constrained by its own limitation in 
that any appeal to ethnicity must be vaguely formulated so as not to engender 
divisions among the 'nation' (136).
The mass media serves important functions during the process of 'nation building' by 
making national symbols part of public life of ordinary individuals. Hence the division 
between private and public spheres are broken down whereby national rituals become 
part of every day life. Without television and media coverage, the British royal family 
would have hardly become an icon of British national identity. International sporting 
competitions also inculcate national feelings among 'the imagined community of 
millions' (137).
In the final analysis, however, the main problematique of nationalism remains 
unresolved: its static view of the nation. In this view, nation and citizen permanently 
face each other without any intermediaries between them. Once the nation is forged, 
it is assumed that every kind of subgroup must disappear. But the paradox is that 
"the nation is a complex of collective bodies, all in process of perpetual change and in 
a constantly varying relationship with one another" (138). One cannot fail to see that 
the link between territory and culture is rapidly receding in an increasingly 
interdependent world for a variety of reasons. First, the state culturally constructs 
people to fit into the international division of labour which itself is also a part. This 
means that there are always some people "whose horizons transcend its (of the state) 
own territorial boundaries" (139). Secondly, the world is rapidly becoming a global 
society in which differences among distinctive cultures are slowly disappearing. This 
trend is accentuated by the diffusion of global images throughout the globe as a result 
of market-based economics. Indeed some of the transnational cultural commodity 
flow is marked by minimum attention to national differences among consumers (140). 
The result is, then, an inevitable conflict between a state-imposed monocentric vision 
of the nation and the realities of an increasingly globalized society, the ramifications 
of which are not yet clear.
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While admitting its contradictions and intellectual weaknesses, this section has 
nonetheless sought to understand nationalism's appeal for members of the 'nation1. 
As has been argued in the preceding sections, there is no reason to assume that 
nationalism is likely to lose its attraction in the foreseeable future for reasons which 
have already been discussed. But what is the process in which nationalism becomes a 
key to understanding the international behaviour of states?
To elaborate this point, the actual operation of the interaction between national 
identity and the foreign policy process in states will be examined. A coherent 
theoretical framework for such an analysis is provided by William Bloom's 'national 
identity dynamic', which will be examined here.
3.5.'National Identity Dynamic' as a relevant dimension of Foreign Policy- 
Making
The international relations discipline has recently elaborated new methodological 
approaches for a better understanding of foreign policy. Prominent among them is 
the 'identification theory'. This theory seeks to include the mass national public for a 
clearer analysis of the decision-making process within states. Bloom asserts that this 
is inevitable "given the long-term historical trend away from divine kingship and 
absolute individual rule to the more democratic conditions constrained by a world of 
evolving mass media and information technology" (141).
Bloom defines 'national identity' in the following words :
"National identity describes that condition in which a 
mass of people have made the same identification with 
national symbols -have internalised the symbols of the 
nation- so that they may act as one psychological group 
when there is a threat to, or the possibility of 
enhancement of, these symbols of national identity"
(142).
'National identity dynamic', on the other hand, "describes the social-psychological 
dynamic by which a mass national public may be mobilised in relation to its 
international environment" (143).
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Scholars of international relations have until recently focused on modernisation as a 
prescription for nation-building. This approach, according to Bloom, is flawed. The 
author argues that the theory of modernisation floundered due mainly to the inevitable 
deficiencies of presenting an exclusively western model of progress to fundamentally 
distinctive societies in the developing world. Another defect of the modernisation 
project relating to nation-building, for Bloom, was the lack of a consistent theory 
which could explain the people's transfer of sentiment and loyalty to the new state 
(144).
Since international law exclusively focuses on inter-state relations, it neglects the 
relationship between the 'nation1 and the 'state'. Indeed Bloom draws on the absence 
of a conceptual and analytical framework that explicates the relationship between a 
mass national population and the state. An exposition of this relationship is crucial in 
understanding the process of nation-building. It is also significant in that it 
demonstrates the role played by the mass national population in foreign policy 
decision-making. In short, this is an important aspect of the relationship between the 
'citizen' and the 'state'. By utilizing 'national identity dynamic', Bloom seeks to 
examine "the possibility of a psychological theory -identification theory- giving the 
mass national population of a state just such a theoretically coherent status" (145).
Bloom asserts that 'national identity dynamic' provides the widest possible 
mobilisation of national sentiment within a state. It theoretically transcends political, 
religious, cultural and ethnic cleavages. Therefore, if a politician "can symbolically 
associate herself/himself with national identity and mobilise it, s/he will then possess a 
virtual monopoly of popular support" (146).
Since the 'national identity dynamic' is based on the premise that the solidarity of a 
given society depends to a great extent on the degree to which the individuals 
irtemalise their society's values, norms and accepted patterns of behaviour (147), 
nation-building is never complete. First, there are always those -individuals or 
groups- who do not identify with the state. Second, changes in political 
circumstances may alienate certain groups and individuals (148).
The model of economic development may also be decisive in the use or non-use of 
national identity dynamic for foreign policy purposes -particularly in the developing 
countries :
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"Developing states which adopt capitalist economic 
growth policies, and which have internal cleavages 
based in ethnos, tribe or religion, will not be able to 
rely on the national identity dynamic and will tend not
to adopt aggressive foreign policies. If they do adopt
them, the likelihood of internal collapse is high" (149).
States which give low priority to social and economic justice, as in the case of South 
American states, will tend to "have a military that is used for internal order rather than 
external security, and to attempt to use minor border and territorial disputes to
mobilise the national identity dynamic" (150). Given the low-key nature of its 
international relations, this observation is equally valid as far as Turkey is concerned, 
as will be discussed later.
Bloom asserts that the national identity dynamic is a constant feature of domestic 
politics in western and non-westem states alike :
"As the national identity dynamic, based in the 
identification imperative, is constantly seeking 
enhancement and is therefore volatile, it is a permanent 
feature of all domestic politics that there be 
competition to appropriate the national identity 
dynamic" (151).
Moreover, in the face of a political and socio-economic environment that is constantly 
in flux, nation-building becomes a necessary requirement for maintaining political 
integration and stability. As a result of this sheer reality, governments are often 
tempted to mobilize 'national identity dynamic' in relation to the international 
environment Therefore every government must be concerned about the ways in 
which its international actions are perceived by the mass national public from the 
perspective of 'national identity dynamic'. International political behaviour of a state 
may thus be determined by internal constraints as much as the nature of its 
international relations (152).
Therefore international relations must not simply be understood as 'inter-state 
relations'; it must also connote the relations between 'nations'. This arises, as has been 
argued in the beginning of this chapter, from a belief that the state is the very 
embodiment of the nation, that it is the sole legitimate sovereign of its people and
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territory. If this is so, if the state is one with the nation, then one must advance the 
argument into its logical conclusion : "international politics, then, is not simply the 
relations between state structures, but is also the relations between the nations. In 
international politics, people, government and state fuse into one image" (153).
Bloom asserts that central to the mobilization of 'national identity dynamic' are the 
questions of 'national interest' and 'national prestige'. In his terminology, national 
interest is defined as "the political rhetoric...in which the domestic power competition 
for control of the national identity dynamic is communicated, is framed, rationalised 
and legitimised" (154). National prestige, on the other hand, "describes the influence 
that can be exercised or the impression produced by virtue of events and images that 
devalue or enhance national identity" (155). Bloom asserts that there exist two 
distinct levels of interstate activity in terms of national interest and prestige. That 
which involves the national identity dynamic, and that which does not However the 
dividing line between them is subject to constant flux (156). It may depend, for 
instance, on how the international threat is presented within a 'national' context; that 
is, the way any strategic threat to the existence of a given state arrives at the mass 
national public after being mediated through domestic media and communicators. 
Any external action that can be interpreted as 'national', can be presented to the public 
as 'threatening national interest' (157).
However identification theory does not necessarily contain a clear formula with 
regard to the final decision-making; they ultimately depend on the decision-makers 
themselves:
"At the micro level, identification theory can say litde 
about how the individual decision-makers will behave.
Certainly, a powerful public opinion and a mobilised 
national identity dynamic must affect the decision­
maker, but the actual decisions will depend upon the 
decision-makers' own degree of identification, peer 
pressure, group mores, individual psycho-history and 
so on -a kaleidoscope of elements worthy of substantial 
research" (158).
Besides, it is frequently observed that the public are misguided by political authorities 
who either misperceive reality and/or withhold information in their exclusive reserve 
(159).
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Although Bloom's theory appears to be implicated in cases involving inter-state 
conflicts, a closer examination of his analysis indicates the relevance of national 
identity imperative in the choice of foreign policy strategies, as will be seen later. He 
also succeeds in explaining the social-psychological basis of nationalism, namely 
relations between 'a mass of people1 (nation/citizens) and the 'state1. Finally, Bloom 
makes a strong case for international jurists to lay greater emphasis on the decision­
making process and its human and psychological dimensions, particularly when 
involving inter-state relations.
Thus far this chapter has focused on the relevance of nationalism and national identity 
dynamic in the conduct of inter-state relations. Now it is appropriate to see how 
these mechanisms operate in the Turkish case.
This section begins with an analysis of Turkish nationalism with particular reference 
to its similarities with other nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, as well as to 
its distinguishing features.
3.6.The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism
Until the second-half of the nineteenth century, the notion of the 'land of the Turks’ 
was an alien concept to the Turks. The idea of national territory was so new that the 
Turkish language even lacked a name for it. It was not until the Young Turk period 
(1908-1918) that the name Turkiye (Turkey) came into common usage (160). 
Therefore, not surprisingly, Turkish nationalism emerged as a result of a set of 
complicated factors, most of which were external: the disintegration of the Ottoman 
millet system; the de facto renunciation of the idea of Islamic umma by non-Turkish 
Ottoman Muslim subjects, like Arabs and Albanians; the dissemination of nationalist 
ideas by the Turkish speaking emigres from Russia; a growing number of 
ethnographic studies in Europe during the nineteenth century which included 
Turcology among its areas of interest. The findings of the Turcological studies were 
eventually taken up by the proponents of Turkish nationalism. These Turkists sought 
to influence the Turks’ conception of themselves along nationalist lines; finally, the 
Ottoman defeat in the First World War, and the ensuing War of Independence left no 
option other than the recovery of the ’Turkish national homeland’ (161).
In the Turkish case, not unlike the nationalist movements elsewhere in Asia and 
Africa, the nationalist doctrine made a novel account of the past. Accordingly, the
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Ottoman Empire ceased to be an Islamic dynasty, and became a 'Turkish' Empire. 
The new ideology was first propounded in the early decades of the twentieth century 
by the Young Turks. Later the Turkish publicists took up the Turkish cause with 
often absurd and unscientific glorification of 'Turkish civilisations'. Here is a small 
excerpt from this type of nationalist writing :
"It is time that it should be known, thought Ataturk, 
that the Turk, moving once more on the road of 
progress and civilisation, is only following the example 
of his prehistoric ancestors, who were the first 
cultured peoples of the world. The world, including 
the Turks themselves, has to understand that for 
thousands of years, when other peoples simply 
followed their conscience and their instincts, the Turks 
were agents of culture and progress, and that they have 
never ceased to be such except when subjugated by 
foreign cultures and mores" (162).
The idea of Turkism, as the basis of Kemalist nationalism, was first formulated by 
Ziya Gokalp. According to his understanding of nationalism, society was superior to 
the individual and was identical to the nation. Nation was the ultimate reality of 
modem international society. This meant that it was the collective conscience of the 
people, represented in nationhood, that could legitimately shape the ideals of 
individuals. Therefore Turks had to rise up to establish themselves as a nation in 
order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary civilisation (163).
For Gokalp, the main criteria for nationality was language and religion. This is how 
he expresses his reasoning :
"Language is the carrier of ideas and sentiments, the 
transmitter of customs and tradition; hence, those who 
speak the same language share the same aspirations, the 
same consciousness, and the same mentality.
Individuals thus sharing common and homogeneous 
sentiments are also naturally prone to profess the same 
faith" (164).
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He therefore observes that people belonging to the same language groups tend to 
adopt the same religion. This reasoning enables him to include all Ottoman-Muslim 
subjects into a future Turkish national state (165). These ideas of Gokalp were later 
duly taken up by the Kemalist nationalist leadership. The population exchange 
between Turkey and Greece, provided for by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, might 
have also been prompted, inter alia, by Gokalp's idea of nationalism, for he believed 
that the non-Turkish Muslims migrating to Turkey were becoming Turkified because 
of their religious affiliation (166).
Gokalp also asserted that nationalism should go along with modernism and 
secularism, since "a nation has to be a democratic society through centralization, 
homogeneity, and division of labour" (167). This could only be achieved by 
separating religion from politics and law, and doing away with Islamic umma as the 
basis of political loyalty (168).
Kemalism -in other words, Turkish nationalist doctrine- duly took up Gokalp's ideas, 
the latter of which had itself been an adaptation of Durkheimian sociology. Indeed 
the ideological offspring of the Kemalist movement was nineteenth century positivism 
and the Western liberal ideals of individualism, constitutionalism and nationalism. 
Kemalism must not be treated as an ideology because it lacks "universal content and 
rigidity". It was actually a pragmatic response of a newly established nation-state 
which sought to catch up with 'western civilisation' (169).
With the founding of the Turkish Republic, Islam was replaced by the elements of 
Turkish culture as the symbols of national identity. Although Ataturk had initially 
appealed for support of the liberation movement by partly appealing to the religious 
sentiments of people in Anatolia, after consolidating his political and military 
position, he soon began to blame, inter alia, the religious establishment for the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, various measures were taken under 
the new regime to undermine the power and influence of the Islamic establishment
(170).
Kemalist nationalism follows the general pattern of other nationalist movements by 
coupling nationalist consolidation with modernisation. Indeed industrialisation and 
rapid economic growth were seen by the Turkish nationalist leadership as a sine qua 
non of modem statehood. Modernisation was also perceived as a necessary 
prerequisite for the creation of a homogeneous and integrated citizenry. 
Simultaneously, non-Turkish ethnic and cultural identities existing in the country were
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gradually Turkified. Hence, not unlike most other national movements, it was 
through destroying other 'nations' that the Turkish national state emerged.
Turkish ruling elites advocated modernisation as a way, inter alia, of reinforcing and 
enhancing national sentiment and consciousness among diverse ethnic and sectarian 
groups in the country. Their sustained belief in modernity and secularism as a 
universal model prompted the nationalist leadership to deny the Ottoman/Islamic 
legacy which had been deeply embedded in the consciousness of the people. The 
state also sought to secure the loyalty of the people through a promise of sustained 
economic and social progress that could facilitate the process of national integration
(171).
Hence Turkish nationalism represents, perhaps paradoxically, a triumph for western 
norms and standards of culture, society and politics. Nationalism and its twin 
ideologies of modernity and liberalism were the by-products of the particular 
historical experience of western European societies. This is well-known, and need 
not be reviewed here. However the crucial role played by international law -an 
extension of European states system- in spreading these ideas is indicative of how the 
Ottoman and Turkish states were co-opted into Western civilisational standards.
Gong argues that the process within which the non-European countries entered 
international society was often the result of European coercion (172). The forging of 
European identity and, later, civilisational standards, had been greatly shaped by the 
'discovery' of the American continent by European explorers by the end of 15th 
century. The 'discoveries' resulted in the systematic misrepresentation of 'native' 
peoples and their cultures by many European observers. The indigenous peoples of 
the American continent were held to be inherently inferior to the Europeans since the 
former, as it were, were not equipped with adequate brains. It was only sometime at 
the beginning of the 18th century that the theory began to realise its limitations for an 
adequate description of the American world. The 'new' accounts of Indian culture 
and behaviour, however, had more to do with historical and intellectual 
developments in Europe than the existing realities in America. The European 
observer took upon himself -almost always a male- the task of bringing the Indians 
into the grasp of 'history' -European history, of course. Therefore the 'otherness' of 
the Indian behaviour was treated as something to be eliminated. And this 'task' was 
indeed carried out with remarkable brutality (173).
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As is well-known, European colonialism extended its sphere of influence to other 
parts of the globe from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The fact 
that the indigenous peoples in European colonies in Asia and Africa were denied 
independent political existence was justified on grounds that the indigenous peoples 
had not matured enough to 'determine' their 'self. In other words, as expounded by a 
variety of doctrines in Europe, the colonized people were legal non-persons. 
Recognition of a collective right to coexistence was only applicable in Europe. 
People in the European colonies could only enjoy, so to speak, 'the rights of man' 
(sic) as the result of European conquest -since it was only through the European 
conquest that they could acquire the knowledge and manners necessary to exercise 
the kind of rights enjoyed by people in the metropolitan countries. However, even 
then, the limits of such rights would be set by European rulers (174).
Not unpredictably, then, international relations in the nineteenth-century were not 
rooted in universal cultural norms or legal standards. At the time, the European 
Powers were willing and able to impose their own view of international law upon the 
non-western world (175). The Ottoman Empire was an obvious target for western 
coercion, for it had been hostile to European powers for centuries and its standards of 
civilisation did not conform to that of Europe. Although an integral part of the 
European power balance, the Ottoman Empire consistently refused to participate in 
the European system of international law, and renounced the standard of 'civilisation' 
as expounded by the European states. After all, as had been underscored by their 
military dominance and distinctive religious and political traditions, the Ottoman 
statesmen were convinced of "the immeasurable and immutable superiority of their 
own way of life". This prompted them "to despise the barbarous Western infidel from 
an attitude of correct doctrine reinforced by military power" (176). According to 
Gong, their belief in the supremacy of their standard of 'civilisation', made the 'infidel 
Turks' a threat to Christian and European civilisation. This mutual hostility and lack 
of common 'civilisational' standards were prolonged into the nineteenth century as 
exemplified by the Ottoman sultans' contempt for the emerging nation-states in 
Europe (177), which incidentally threatened the very frontiers of the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly in the Balkans. The fact, on the other hand, that the Ottoman 
Empire established closer diplomatic relations with European powers on the basis of 
the European state system as from the eighteenth century, must be understood as a 
pragmatic response to the continuous Ottoman decline : "playing by the rules which 
conferred the greatest advantage" (178). The same pragmatic approach was in 
evidence when, particularly following the Napoleonic expeditions to Egypt in 1798, 
the Ottoman statesmen rushed in to bring European science, technology and training
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into the lands of Islam. Accordingly, students were sent to European capitals for 
training (179).
The reform process gained further pace with the continuous military defeats of the 
Ottoman Empire at the hands of Russia, and with the insistence of European powers 
for 'liberal reforms'. Among these reforms were the 1826 army code of regulations 
which ordered European-style tunics and trousers. In 1847, mixed civil and criminal 
courts, composed of Ottoman and European judges in equal numbers, began applying 
European types of judicial proceedings in cases involving non-Muslim subjects or 
foreign residents. Meanwhile Sultan Mahmut tried to establish the structure and 
organization of a central government modelled on Europe in order, inter alia, "to 
impress European observers with the modernity and progressiveness of Turkey" 
(180). Most important of all, the Imperial Edicts of 1839 and 1856 guaranteed 
equality of civil and political rights to all the Ottoman subjects, irrespective of 
religious beliefs (181).
The reform process along western lines was an agonizing experience, and it 
precipitated a painful search for self-identity. For many Ottoman subjects, westem- 
style reforms were 'forced' upon the Empire by the European powers which deepened 
their sense of disillusionment The process of adoption of the European standards of 
'civilisation' dealt a double blow to the Ottoman self-perception : first, it implied the 
denial of certain important aspects of the traditional standard of 'civilisation'; 
secondly, it meant reconciliation with the 'infidel' enemy (182).
It can therefore be argued that Turkey's entry into the 'family of nations' was clearly 
precipitated by its gradual absorption into western civilisational standards. Having 
witnessed the persistent onslaughts of the supremely confident European powers over 
the material and moral integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman ruling elites had 
somewhat 'internalized', however reluctantly, the European perception of the 
Ottoman Empire as a static and backward instance of Oriental despotism. It was also 
clear however that the European ideas of nationalism, constitutionalism and secular 
liberalism coincided with their aspirations for a viable 'homeland' -following the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. As a result, 
soon after ejecting the enemy from the 'national homeland', the nationalist leadership 
sought to create new values and structures that could present an acceptable image of 
the 'Turks'; that is, acceptable to the European audience that was simultaneously 
civilised and powerful. When one tries to penetrate the social, cultural, and political 
milieu within which the ruling hierarchy of the new Turkish state grew, one observes
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that it was permeated by an irresistible European presence, with its literature, science, 
and political and military dominance; in short with its 'civilisational superiority'. For 
the Europeans, the 'other', the non-western world, represented everything that was 
'inferior', 'inefficient1 and 'barbarous' (183). It is natural therefore to assume that the 
Turkish educated elites of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
profoundly influenced by the existing atmosphere of unchallenged European 
dominance.
Kemalism represents the pinnacle of the reform process that was already under way in 
the nineteenth century. What distinguished the Kemalist movement from its 
antecedents, however, was the scale and the depth of westernization. In the Kemalist 
terminology, the criteria for 'civilisation' were used as analogous to 'European 
civilisation1. The new Turkish society was to be created in the image of a European 
society with its secular nationalism, its liberal economic and political outlook, and its 
notion of social solidarity based on functional association. Henceforward the Turkish 
ruling elites developed a habit of presenting a Turkish image to the outside world that 
would be acceptable to a distinctly western audience.
However the rise of Turkish nationalism was also the result of a genuine desire to 
preserve and reinforce Turkish cultural identity. Language and literature were 
therefore the main preoccupations of the early nationalists (184). This was clearly a 
quest for 'self discovery' and progress. It is an undeniable fact that the abrupt 
transition from a multinational empire into a compact territorial nation was a 
contingent result of historical events. However it is also noteworthy that the 
nationalist republican leaders were able to divest themselves of the Ottoman imperial 
heritage by accepting the new boundaries of the Turkish State. After having 
engineered the secession of the Turkish heartlands from the Ottoman empire and 
caliphate, they repudiated Ottomanism and Islamic legitimacy. These measures paved 
the way for a series of westernizing social, cultural and political reforms. Smith 
argues that "territorial and civic concepts of the nation require a solid basis in a 
national cultural identity" (185). This explains why the Kemalist leadership 
'discovered' a variety of ethnic myths and memories that revealed the unique qualities 
of the Turks. The extensive nationalist self-glorification during the Kemalist republic 
was also a necessary step for offsetting the agonizing inferiority complex resulting 
from the many years of Ottoman humiliation by the European powers (186). 
Kemalist nationalism was also an attempt to 'liberate' the Turkish nation from Arab 
cultural domination which had been a prominent feature of Ottoman public life (187).
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Kemalism created three essential myths as far as nation-building was concerned. 
First, Turks belonged to Anatolia from time immemorial and therefore had every right 
to settle in these lands. Second, Turks were an important contributor to western 
civilisation and therefore were entitled to enjoy the fruits of western civilisation. 
Third, Turks were a cultured and gifted people who were capable of great 
achievements, including economic and social progress (188). Having 'discovered' the 
necessary myths for nation-building, the ruling elites then adopted an educational 
programme to facilitate the assimilation of ethnic minorities. The images and ideals of 
the nation were those of the 'core' ethnie (ethnic Turks), and were employed to 
promote the idea of a 'one nation-one state'. These socio-psychological designs, in 
turn, provided the basis for the radical reforms to come.
Indeed the Kemalist reforms sought to change the traditional values and norms of the 
society along the lines that existed in western societies. Soon after consolidating its 
political monopoly, the Kemalist state tried to permeate the whole fabric of the social, 
economic, and cultural life in Turkey. The political idea on which the Turkish state 
was constructed came from France. It included :
"..the conception of a nationally homogeneous, 
administratively centralized, absolutely sovereign state 
which must be served by its citizens as a jealous God, 
intolerant of variety or autonomy in any form" (189).
Certain similarities in the historical experience of the French and Turkish states may 
have accounted for the sanctification of the state in both countries. To begin with, 
both were imbued with strong monarchical traditions (note that the predecessor of the 
Turkish Republic was the Ottoman Empire). Besides, both managed to rule over a 
variety of ethnic and religious groups through a centralized, bureaucratic state. In 
both countries, therefore, the state was assigned a quasi-mythic role in the political 
and cultural life of society. A prominent Turkish scholar argues that while the 
Kemalist model was an importation of the ideals of the Third Republic in France, the 
culture of Turkish intellectuals and their philosophical outlook were overwhelmingly 
of French origin. The Kemalist conception of society was indeed an amalgamation of 
French humanist ideals, as well as its elitist and secular traditions : severing of links 
between religion and politics, the belief in humanity as the basis of a moral universe, 
its elitist view of social engineering of the common folk, its belief in 'order' and 
'progress', and its belief in education as the main vehicle by which to join the 'civilised 
world' (190).
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To that end, the Kemalist national state discarded all forms of Islamic legitimacy from 
the realms of social and political life of the country. The Caliphate, the Sultanate, the 
Islamic brotherhoods and other identity-reaffirming entities were outlawed from the 
public realm in the name of secular nationalism. Modernist nationalist discourse 
sought to penetrate into the very fabric of social life through, for instance, the 
adoption of secular laws, of Roman script, and through Turkifying the language 
(191).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the state-centric nature of the Ottoman polity was taken 
over by the Turkish Republic, although the latter brought about drastic political 
changes. Indeed although the new regime went through a 'paradigmatic revolution', 
the Kemalist nationalist movement was in no way a social revolution. Kazancigil 
notes that "this 'revolution from above' did not need mass mobilisation. Commoners 
participated in the Kemalist movement as soldiers and not as revolutionaries" (192). 
For Kazancigil, this finding is not at all surprising given the prevailing political 
atmosphere in which the state was held to be the only source of legitimacy. In such a 
milieu 'saving the nation' was synonymous with 'saving the state' (193).
In the Turkish case, the definition of the 'nation', not unlike many other nationalist 
movements elsewhere, was an amalgamation of western civic, liberal nationalism and 
that of the ethnic/cultural type. The complexity of ethnic elements in the Turkish 
territory and the novelty of nationalism made it difficult to forge a coherent, well- 
defined national identity. One thing was clear however : the new Turkish state would 
not allow diversity for fear, inter alia, that this would destroy the national unity and 
the territorial integrity of the 'fatherland'. Mardin rightly observes that the pluralistic 
nature of Ottoman society was obfuscated by the Turkish Republic which fostered a 
myth of a homogeneous population, though it was apparent that the cultural 
peculiarities and primordial loyalties continued to persist, albeit officially 
unrecognized (194). And while it is true that the new symbols of the nation-state, 
such as the flag and the national anthem, did take hold, the average individual 
continued to see himselfrherself in the context of primary loyalties. This was due to 
the fact that national symbols did not have much significance in one's day-to-day life 
(195).
Not only did the domestic perception of the new ruling elites change, but their notion 
of foreign policy took a new turn with the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 
Ataturk believed that foreign policy was a function of domestic policy. Speaking in 
the opening days of the National Assembly in 1920, he said : "Foreign policy is
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largely affected by and is based on the internal organization of the state. Foreign 
policy must correspond to internal organization" (196). The 'internal organization' to 
which Ataturk was referring was that of a national state. Henceforward, as opposed 
to the Ottoman Empire which had been a multinational society, the new Turkish state 
would pursue a national foreign policy (197). Ataturk believed that human ideals 
could best be achieved within the national group. In his view, Turkey should strive 
for material prosperity within its national frontiers, instead of seeking territorial 
expansion at the expense of its neighbours. Such an approach would signal the end of 
rivalry between the national and human ideals (198). These ideas had first been 
propounded by the nineteenth century French sociologist Emile Durkheim (199) 
who had a profound impact on Turkish nationalists. Not unlike Durkheim, Ataturk 
believed that each national state would become a miniature representation of 
humanity. The Kemalist motto 'peace at home, peace abroad' was a clear expression 
of his desire to reconcile Turkish nationalism with the larger international society by 
renouncing irredentism and territorial aggression.
Ataturk's notion of 'national policy', unlike other nationalist movements which 
emerged in Asia and Africa after the Second World War, was neither anti-western 
nor anti-capitalist (200). Turkey's co-optation into western standards of civilization, 
which have already been discussed in this section, accounts for an important portion 
of this new state of affairs. The petit bourgeois character of the nationalist leadership 
and the nationalist movement was also decisive in this respect (201).
Kemalist nationalism still marks the ideological and normative foundations of official 
discourse in Turkey. The state is still regarded as the supreme protector of the 
'Turkish nation’. Its ideals, meanwhile, are defined as Turkey's co-option into western 
civilisation. But how far have these 'official' policies permeated to the fabric of the 
society, and to what extent has the society evolved through its own dynamics? These 
themes require an understanding of the peculiar characteristics of Turkish national 
identity, which will be examined here.
3.7.Main Characteristics of Turkish National Identity
The terms 'nation' and 'state' are frequently confused with one another, although often 
they refer to two different entities. This confusion is caused by the presupposition of 
the nationalist ideology that the nation and the state should geographically coincide in 
nation-states. This arises from two sources : first, the national ruling elites wish to
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speak in the name of the whole nation, not a section of it. This endows them with 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the whole people. Secondly, in most cases, those 
sections of the population which claim to be a 'nation' seek to establish their own state 
(202). To avoid confusion, one must be aware that a 'nation' does not necessarily 
denote a single ethnic or religious group with common values and aspirations. 
Instead it must be understood as a historical-political community. Indeed there are a 
multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups within nation-states. This picture of 
heterogeneity is further complicated by the uneven distribution of 'national 
consciousness' among the social groupings and regions of a country (203). To 
overcome these obstacles, the nation-state employs various strategies to cement these 
divergent groups. They include rituals, ceremonies, commemoration of past wars, 
'national history', ideals and so on, which are employed as occasions for reproducing 
and reinforcing national identity. At this point, it may be appropriate to see how this 
mechanism has worked for the Turkish national state.
A main achievement of Turkish nationalism has been the creation of a Turkish identity 
within a well-defined territory. Undeniably, the sense of being 'Turkish’ has become 
a common denominator among various ethnic groups -of course with the exception of 
the Kurds and presumably the non-Muslim minorities- as a result of the assimilationist 
policies over the years. This state of mind among people has been evoked and 
sustained through education, the media, national ceremonies and rituals -like the 
national anthem and the flag, state ceremonies and national holidays- the combined 
effect of which has been to replace religious affiliation as the main source of identity. 
A recent survey conducted among the workers of a textile factory has shown that 
50.3 percent of the workers saw themselves as 'Turks', as opposed to the 37.5 percent 
of those who saw themselves as 'Muslims'. A nation-wide survey has also confirmed 
the findings of the above-mentioned survey; that is, the sense of 'Tu^kishness, seems 
to be more prominent than religious loyalties of the people in Turkey (204).
One of the main strands of Turkish national identity is patriotic attachment to the 
homeland. The very existence of the nation as an independent political unit was 
secured after a successful resistance against foreign invaders. The National War of 
Independence involved not only Turks, but other ethnic groups as well. Therefore 
the feeling of 'patriotic solidarity' serves as one of the legitimating devices for the 
national unity and territorial integrity of the 'homeland'.
The Greek invasion of Turkey in the wake of the First World War also provided the 
necessary xenophobic element that Turkish nationalism required. However this was
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not enough to evoke an effective nationalist movement The opportunity later came 
with the military success of the resistance movement and with the identification of the 
Ottoman officialdom and Islamic religious leaders with the enemy due to their 
unfavourable view of the national resistance (205). This also partly explains the 
aggressive secularism of the new regime (206).
The heroic reassertion of Turkish independence is taught at all levels of schooling, 
frequently covered by the media, and taught to conscripts during military training 
(207). However it is also clear that the National War of Independence has been 
depicted as an achievement of the 'Turkish nation', the content and scope of which are 
less than clear. Indeed its very ambiguity -referring either to ethnic Turks or the 
whole people in Turkey- makes it into a flexible and infinitely employable term. 
Although it is true that Kemalist nationalism defined the 'nation' on the basis of 
cultural affiliation and political loyalty, the official discourse since Ataturk has been 
set out in accordance with the values and aspirations of the 'Turks'. In the Turkish 
context, therefore, 'nationalism' implies 'Turkish nationalism', despite the presence of 
a variety of other ethnic groups -large and small (208).
Meanwhile, Kemalist nationalism's definition of the nation -'Turkish nation'- as the 
'ultimate being' and as 'the source of all social attributes', still predominates the official 
discourse. As apparent in educational policy, "the glorification of national-patriotic 
morality and the idealization of national virtues constitute an important trait of 
political culture in Turkey" (209). Official discourse has glorified the hero figures of 
the past as the moving force of history and a guide for the consciousness and the will 
of the nation. This nationalistic indoctrination has reinforced and sustained the hero- 
centric nature of traditional culture (210).
Hence when one refers to the Turkish national identity, one must point to the 
superimposition of a single, nationalist narrative as seen from the spectrum of the 
dominant majority. The Turkish culture, which places martial virtues high on its scale 
of values, superimposes itself upon the distinctive peculiarities and cultural values of 
other ethnic communities. However it is also clear that since various ethnic 
communities in Turkey have lived together for centuries, they have come to adopt 
similar cultural, moral and attitudinal characteristics. Among them is patriotism and 
respect for authority. In Turkey the state has a quasi-mythic quality that commands 
respect and affection from people. Although the Ottoman empire was politically and 
economically subdued by European powers from the eighteenth to the twentieth 
centuries, unlike most other countries in Asia and Africa, it was never colonized. Its
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continued independent status has bred pride in the people living in Turkey. On the 
other hand, as Mango puts i t : "because the state belonged to them, Muslim Turks 
respected authority. The Turkish equivalent of Mother Russia is Devlet Ana, 'Mother 
State'" (211). A survey conducted by Kagitcibasi, a Turkish sociologist, has revealed, 
for instance, that respect for authority and patriotism were more prevalent among 
Turkish than American youth (212).
Meanwhile the Islamic faith is a unifying element that crosses ethnic cleavages within 
Turkish society given that some 99% of Turkish citizens are Muslims (213), although 
well over one third of the people living in Turkey are of non-Turkish descent. The 
population exchange with Greece during Ataturk, as well as the willingness of the 
successive governments to allow in many former Ottoman Muslim subjects from the 
Balkans irrespective of their ethnic origins, reveal the extent to which the Islamic faith 
is perceived to be an important element of national loyalty and harmony. After all, as 
Lewis sharply observes, the notion of a 'Christian Turk' is an absurdity to a Turkish 
mind (214). In this context, one might also point to the fact that Turkey has taken a 
close interest in the fate of Muslim minorities in the Balkans, irrespective of their 
ethnic origins. Turkey's active involvement in international attempts to find a solution 
to the sufferings of the Bosnian Muslims at the hands of Serbians is indicative of this 
trend.
Finally, the Turkish language must also be mentioned as a common denominator of 
Turkish national identity. The Turkish nationalist republicans believed in the need to 
purify the Turkish language from foreign elements, particularly Arabic and Persian. 
Not unlike German nationalist romantics, they believed that language encapsulates the 
peculiar history of the 'nation' and its future glories. In Ataturk's view, one could not 
claim to be a Turk without knowledge of the Turkish language. Turkish nationalists 
were clearly aware that a common language and religion were likely to forge and 
reinforce common customs, sentiments, philosophical outlook and solidarity. They 
would in turn forge and reinforce a sense of patriotism, and provide a solid basis for 
the introduction of secular, western-oriented reforms. To be sure, the ideal citizen 
that the Kemalist project intended to produce, can be described as a "nationalist 
European in outlook, secular and ...would feel himself to be a Turk" (215).
Although Turkey has taken great strides towards creating a national identity among 
various ethnic and cultural groups within the country, it is still difficult to speak of a 
'Turkish nation' as representing some kind of a coherent, unified and homogeneous 
collectivity of individuals. First, as the dominant ethnic majority, the Turks
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themselves are subject to sectarian divide. Indeed a Turkish sociologist observes that 
Sunni and Alevi Turks are still suspicious of one another as manifested in the 
marriage barriers and other cleavages which "remain solid walls dividing the 
communities in the country" (216). On the other hand, the resurgence of so-called 
Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey and among Turkish workers in Germany reveals 
the extent to which Turkish society is divided over the symbols of identity and 
loyalty. Meanwhile ethnic issues are also undermining national unity. Indeed the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey has become a major challenge to the Turco- 
centric nature of contemporary Turkish society. Meanwhile the pursuance of a 
capitalist economic strategy since the foundation of the Turkish nation-state -with 
shifting emphasis on the role of the public sector- has led to undesirable social 
consequences which are inimical to nation-building. Indeed the existing large-scale 
economic inequality between various classes and strata of Turkish society has clearly 
alienated many 'have-nots' from the political community. This inequality also testifies 
to "remarkable inequalities among regions" (217). One can also point to the absence 
of a unifying system of morality, since Kemalism has failed to replace Islamic morality 
with a secular one. Although inspired by Durkheimian notions of national solidarity, 
Kemalist nationalism neglected the spiritual/collective aspects of his ideals (218). To 
summarise, then, speaking of 'Turkey' as though it represents a single, coherent entity 
is misleading.
It is not therefore surprising to observe that the conflicting interests and aspirations 
within Turkish society have hitherto been maintained by the all-mighty Turkish state 
with the army as its 'iron fist' (219). For a clarification and elaboration of this point, it 
is useful to examine the Kemalist concept of sovereignty, and its repercussions for the 
political identity of the Turkish state today.
3.8.The Turkish Concept of Sovereignty
As is well-known, 'national sovereignty', as the political precept on which most states 
are based, derives from people and it rests with the people. This means that the 
source of governmental authority is the consent of the people. Hence, the ultimate 
authority lies in the people as sovereign, and not in the state. The state exercises this 
sovereignty through a popularly elected parliament and government. The legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of state power must be effectively maintained in 
checks and balances. This model of the separation of powers is the best guarantee 
against abuses of power by the state.
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However popularly elected governments are not necessarily 'democratic'. They may, 
for instance, in effect, represent partial interests and/or the interests of a particular 
ethnic or religious group. In order to overcome this, it is necessary that national 
sovereignty be complemented with popular democracy. Indeed it is among the 
primary tasks of the state to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens. Citizens 
should be trusted as the guardians of their own political and cultural dispositions, 
priorities and interests. In such a political milieu, the common good and the 'general 
will' can only be determined through public discourse and public agreement
In the Turkish case, however, 'national sovereignty' was, from the outset, prejudiced 
by an elitist political structure. Indeed, as opposed to the Ottoman state, the Turkish 
national state has sought to closely control the social units by a centralized state 
structure. This state-centric vision of society has left little scope for the interplay of 
social forces outside the realm of the state. In such a milieu, it is the official ideology 
that has created the social and political norms and values prevalent in Turkish society. 
In other words, the masses are allowed to participate in the political process in so far 
as they do not exceed the boundaries defined by the state (220).
To start with, the Kemalist concept of sovereignty emphasized two things as the 
raison d'etre of the Turkish state : 'republicanism' as a reaction to Ottoman 
patrimonialism, and the liberation of the nation from 'internal and external enemies'
(221). This conceptual framework presupposed a benevolent, enlightened state 
which was above and beyond parochial societal conflicts. The welfare and security of 
the 'nation' would therefore be provided by impartial ruling elites -civil and military
(222). National sovereignty was therefore not a form of direct political participation 
of the masses in the decision-making process; it simply implied a republican regime as 
opposed to a monarchy. The function of the Kemalist state was not that of an arbiter 
between conflicting classes and other social groups; instead its main function was to 
formulate and implement 'correct' political decisions for the benefit of the nation as a 
whole. Clearly from this point of view, the nation was perceived as an aggregate of 
undifferentiated individuals with identical backgrounds -ethnic, religious, sectarian, 
cultural, and so forth. On the other hand, since society was 'backward', it was the 
mission of the enlightened few, representing the State, to impose their own 
programme for social and economic progress. 'National sovereignty', they believed, 
could be transformed into reality only after the nation 'emancipated' itself (223).
Therefore for Kemalist ruling elites, the main vehicles for radical reforms were the 
state itself and the legal order; only through the efficient use of these two institutions
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could the nation and civil society be created. Hence the elitist, top-down political 
tradition of the Ottoman Empire was retained by the national state, despite the fact 
that the provisional constitution which the Grand National Assembly adopted on 20 
January 1921 declared that "sovereignty belongs without reservation and conditions 
to the nation". It was the identity and the goals of the new state which were radically 
different from those of the Ottoman Empire: "an ethnically and territorially defined 
nationalism replaces the universal non-territoriality of Islam...Its goal is no longer the 
conservation of the traditional status order but the creation of a nation and economic 
development" (224).
Indeed the Constitutions of 1921 and 1924 reflected the Jacobin characteristics of the 
Turkish national state. Although Ataturk repeatedly spoke of 'national sovereignty' 
and 'national will', sovereignty was in effect in the hands of the Grand National 
Assembly. This Assembly implemented its radical reform programme throughout the 
1920s and 30s despite frequent opposition from people (225). The Constitution of 
1924 provided for an 'assembly government' based on the unity or concentration of 
the legislative and executive powers. The theoretical supremacy of the National 
Assembly was however in effect often transferred to the executive, since the 
executive members were often influential party or faction leaders as opposed to the 
members of the Parliament who were politically much weaker. These features of the 
legislative and executive system in Turkey persisted during the single-party (1924- 
1946) and the multi-party (1946-1960) years (226).
Indeed, despite the introduction of multi-party politics in 1946, national sovereignty 
has not been duly transformed into reality. In this context, one can point to the 
periodic suspensions of multi-party politics as a result of military coups. One Turkish 
author asserts that the military takeovers in 1960, 1971 and 1980 had one peculiar 
objective in that they all sought to restore Kemalist sovereignty as the basis of state 
identity. The confrontational politics since the 1950s, it is argued, began eroding the 
absolute autonomy of the Turkish state and its paternalistic image. Indeed political 
cleavages between various segments of society -army versus civil society; 
progressives versus conservative elites, and so forth- were perceived by the army as a 
threat to national unity and harmony. It is not therefore surprising that immediately 
following the military coups, the new regimes resorted to Kemalism as a recipe 
against political rivalries and violence. This is also the case with the latest military 
take-over (1980) when Kemalism was presented as an antidote against 'foreign 
ideologies' and 'internal and external enemies' which endangered 'national unity' (227).
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The Kemalist notion of national unity, which is still central to the official ideology of 
the state, required complete loyalty from citizens, and sought to create national 
harmony through homogenizing society under the rubric of Turkishness1. In this 
context, anything perceived to be divisive of society such as social classes, or 
distinctive ethnic and cultural groups were written off as non-existent (228). Today 
the homogenizing nationalist discourse still prevails under the shadow of Kurdish 
separatism versus the traditional custodians of Kemalist nationalism, particularly the 
army and a 'faction of the state'. For the latter groups, the Kurdish search for greater 
self-expression "directly affects the survival of the 'Fatherland' and thus must be 
confronted with intransigence in which all means are legitimate" (229).
To recapitulate the preceding arguments in this chapter, the distinctive features of 
'Turkish nationalism', 'Turkish national identity', and the Turkish concept of 'national 
sovereignty' can be singled out. It is asserted that Turkey is a 'state-nation' in that 
the 'nation', composed of multi-ethnic communities, was created by the 'state'. 
Therefore the nation, which is naturally in a state of flux, constantly requires 
reproduction and re-interpretation. It is meanwhile argued, in the Turkish context, 
that the state and community lack meaningful intermediary institutions and locations 
of power to provide a substantial channel of communication. Accordingly, the 
Turkish State can be defined as 'centrist', 'elitist', and ultimately 'coercive'. However 
one should not assume that the 'state' has fully succeeded in imposing its own 
'identity' and 'vision' upon the 'nation'. The religious revival and Kurdish search for 
'self-expression', as well as the growing assertiveness of radical groups are a 
testimony to the fact that the 'nationalist discourse', with its Turco-centric secularism 
and pro-western orientation, is being challenged by rival claims and aspirations.
This chapter will proceed with an exposition of the ways in which nationalism has 
influenced Turkish perceptions of the outside world. However as far as Turkey's 
long-term foreign policy strategies are concerned, they are largely determined by the 
ideological dispositions of the ruling elites. The official ideology -in other words, the 
body of ideas espoused by ruling elites over a long period of time- legitimizes these 
strategies via nationalist language. In this sense, nation-building is an integral part of 
Turkey's assessment of its place within the community of nations, and its 
interpretation of international legal rules. Such an analysis is intended to contribute 
to an understanding of the meanings of social contexts for the states which are the 
major participants in international society.
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3.9.Turkish Perception of International Society from the Perspective of 
Nationalist Discourse
It is generally agreed that Turkish foreign policy is primarily oriented towards the 
western states system. Its ultimate objective is defined as Turkey's full integration 
with Europe. Indeed Turkey is a member of the OECD (since 1948), the Council of 
Europe (since 1949), NATO (since 1952), and is an associate member (a candidate 
for full membership as provided for by an association agreement between the EC and 
Turkey) of the European Community (since 1963). Meanwhile Turkey's approach 
towards the non-aligned bloc of countries has been one of indifference, while it 
remained distant towards the Islamic countries until the mid-1960s. Particularly 
following its isolation in the UN General Assembly over the Cyprus dispute, Turkey 
has sought to take a more sympathetic approach towards the non-westem world. 
Nonetheless Turkey still distances itself from Third World attempts towards 
establishing a new world order. It has however taken some constructive steps 
towards forging friendly links with the Islamic world, an indication of which is its 
membership of the Islamic Conference Organization since the end of the 1960s.
Although one might legitimately argue that Turkey has, objectively speaking, more in 
common with the Third World nations than with the western world, Turkish ruling 
elites tend to identify with their counterparts in the west. A major contention of this 
study is that Turkey's ideological disposition towards the western world has to be 
related to Turkey's historical experience as a nation-state, i.e. Turkey's co-option into 
western standards of civilisation which was examined in the preceding sections. 
Given that Kemalist nationalism has permeated the whole fabric of politics, culture 
and education for the last seventy years, it is not surprising that Turkish ruling elites 
have been relatively susceptible to western ideas and ideals of liberalism, modernism 
and secularism. Since this western model is thought to be desirable, forging close 
links with the western world is believed to facilitate Turkey's transition to a modern 
and democratic society.
Turkey's perception of itself, as propagated by official ideology, has an important 
bearing for its apparent lack of interest in the non-westem world. Turkish ruling 
elites and the academic establishment tend to think that Turkey is somehow unique 
among other developing countries due to its peculiar history and political identity. It 
is often argued, for instance, that although a developing country in economic terms, 
Turkey has a profound experience in statehood which sets it apart from other 
developing countries most of which have only recently gained political independence.
That Turkey cannot properly be categorized as a developing nation, it is argued, is 
also evidenced by the existence of a westem-style liberal democracy in Turkey (230). 
Besides, it is also suggested that since the Turks used to be the imperial masters 
themselves, the language of decolonization or anti-imperialist struggle is not relevant 
to Turkish priorities. The Turks' subjection to foreign occupation was for too short a 
period to cause bitter feelings against western colonialism. Most importantly, the 
Turks defeated the enemy. A logical corollary of these propositions is that Turkish 
ruling elites have had little psychological inhibitions or prejudices towards the west 
(231).
Turkey's search for identification with the western world has had important 
repercussions for Turkish foreign policy. The character and range of Turkey's 
relations with the industrialized countries of Western Europe and the USA are 
qualitatively different from those with the rest of the world. Turkey's perceived 'high 
policy' interests -security, political and economic integration- are concentrated in this 
area. This relationship is both multidimensional and multilateral. 'Multidimensional' 
because it covers a whole range of intergovernmental activities -political, economic, 
cultural, military. 'Multilateral' because their relations are conducted as much through 
international organizations as through bilateral channels. Turkish membership of the 
EC is perceived as the ultimate step in Turkey's full integration with Europe, and by 
implication, with the western world.
Turkey's international outlook, then, is marked by first, a tacit acceptance of the 
dominance of western states and their liberal ideology in the legal regulation and 
actual conduct of international relations; and secondly, by an often thinly disguised 
contempt and suspicion of Third World initiatives directed at the enhancement of the 
Third World's role in the international system and/or concerning demands for a fairer 
share of world resources.
However the success of these long-term political strategies in gaining the support of 
mass public opinion must be weighed against the constraints of nation-building. It is 
known that nation-building is a dynamic process in that socio-economic and political 
realities constantly change which, in turn, bring about new identifications and 
loyalties. In the face of such reality, states are tempted to appropriate and manipulate 
the external environment in order to evoke nation-building. Much of contemporary 
politics, including those in the developed states, revolve around continuous attempts 
by states to appropriate 'national identity dynamic'. If the citizens are convinced that 
the state is there to protect the nation against external threats, besides materially
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benefiting them, national identity is likely to be reaffirmed. This, in turn, consolidates 
the legitimacy of the state (232).
The problematic of nation-building, then, is an important variable of foreign policy 
decisions in Turkey. If a review of Turkish foreign policy since the 1920s is made 
from a ,nation-building, perspective, it can be seen that Turkey is a clear-cut example 
in which a successful war against foreign occupation followed by a large-scale reform 
process resulted in successful nation-building -of course with the exception of 
Kurds. This enabled an active and independent foreign policy during Ataturk's 
presidency (1923-1938). The post-1950s however was marked by an economic 
policy of laissez-faire albeit diluted with etatism. Declining social welfare and 
increasing class divisions have ever since threatened national unity (233). Moreover, 
the rise of Kurdish nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism have threatened the 
ideological and territorial basis of the Turkish state. Many have indeed spoken of the 
need to create a 'Second Turkish Republic' -less Turco-centric, more decentralized 
etc. Increasing cleavages within Turkish society have limited the options for an 
active and independent foreign policy. Today there is little scope within which the 
nation can be mobilized, except in cases involving external 'enemies'. A case in point 
is the enmity between Turkey and Greece.
Indeed Turkey's disputes with Greece over the control and the status of the Aegean 
sea and Cyprus are among the few international problems over which an 
overwhelming public support exists. The Turirish-Greek hostilities have a long 
history of their own and are deeply embedded in the consciousness of the people in 
Turkey. Leaving aside the era preceding the First World War which witnessed the 
Greek nationalist struggle for independence in the 1820s and various other wars 
fought between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, it is observed that the emergence 
of the present day Turkish Republic was attended by a long and exhaustive war 
between the Turks and the Greeks in the aftermath of the First World War. The 
resultant hostility was so bitter that Turkey and Greece immediately agreed on an 
exchange of populations on an exceptionally large scale for fear of further bloodshed. 
As far as Cyprus is concerned, the mutual prejudices of Turkish and Greek sides are 
invoked to such an extent that myth and reality are difficult to separate. This study 
mainly concerns itself with the Turkish vision of the Greeks and of the Cyprus 
problem -one can imagine that similar stereotypical images and prejudices do also 
prevail as far as the Greeks' perception of the Turks are concerned-, as has been 
exposed by at least one Greek scholar (234).
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For ordinary Turks, the Cyprus problem is caused by Greeks who want to displace 
the Turks in Cyprus, as they had tried against the Turks of Anatolia during the bitter 
war of 1919-1922. Besides many Turks still believe, as Tachau observed during his 
conversations with various Turks, that "the Greeks still harboured ambitions for the 
re-establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople" 
(235). This may partially explain why the Greek possession of Aegean islands, some 
of which are situated a few miles off the Turkish coast, is perceived as a strategic 
threat to Turkish national security. Turks tend to believe that Greece wants to 
convert the Aegean into a 'Greek lake'. It is frequently asserted that Greece does not 
hesitate to abuse international law for the purpose of changing the delimitation of the 
Aegean in its favour. The long history of intense rivalry between the Turks and 
Greeks has also ensured that the Cyprus and Aegean problems do not merely relate to 
Turkey's material interests, but to its 'national prestige' too (236). Therefore for the 
average Turk and the ruling elites alike, the acquisition of yet another island, Cyprus, 
by Greece would absolutely be intolerable (237). After all, the Turks are convinced 
that Greece could not have a legitimate claim over Cyprus since "the whole world 
knew that Cyprus had been part of Turkey for fully three hundred years" (238).
It should not therefore come as a surprise that the attacks on Turkish-Cypriots in the 
wake of the military coup against President Makarios (July 1974), which led to large- 
scale atrocities against Turkish villages by Greek militias, were a clear threat to 
Turkish national identity. Lack of a military response by the Turkish government 
would have presumably led to its downfall. Indeed it was impossible for the regime in 
Turkey not to react given the scale of historical animosity between Turkey and 
Greece. Having successfully engineered a military 'intervention' (or 'occupation') in 
Cyprus which led to the downfall of the junta regime, the prestige of the Turkish 
State and army were reinforced in the popular perception. In terms of 'national 
identity dynamic', observes Bloom, one could say that "with Turkish national identity 
threatened, the Turkish government replied successfully and appropriated mobilised 
mass public opinion...The Turkish regime was strengthened" (239).
It is also clear from the preceding argument that despite Turkey's official renunciation 
of pan-Turkish irredentism, the question of relations between the Turks of Anatolia 
and Turks outside the borders has remained an important preoccupation of Turkish 
foreign policy. Not only has Turkey actively been involved in Cyprus where a 
sizeable number of Turks live, but it has also taken a close interest in the fate of the 
Turks of Bulgaria and Greece, by virtue of geographical proximity and cultural
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affinity. Any threat to their security and ethnic identity is a matter of grave concern 
for Turkey (240).
Turkey's conception of 'threat' and 'external enemy' as a relevant dimension of nation- 
building is not only directed at the Greeks or at those who threaten the welfare, 
identity and security of the Turkish 'nation'. Turkey's heightened sense of security 
owes much of its raison d'etre to strategic considerations. A prominent Turkish 
scholar of international relations asserts that Turkey's concern with national security 
has a lot to do with Turkey's long geographical frontiers. Turkey's geopolitical 
significance dramatically increases when one considers that the Turkish Straits 
constitute the only outlet to the Mediterranean for countries surrounding the Black 
Sea (241). By the same token, it is frequently pointed out by official and non-official 
circles alike, that Turkey is surrounded by many 'unfriendly' nations. Prominent 
among them was the Soviet Union before its collapse. The Soviet memorandum of 
1945 which demanded territorial concessions in eastern Turkey and naval bases in the 
Turkish Straits in favour of the Soviet Union, has been depicted in foreign policy 
discourse as one of the primary reasons for Turkish entry into NATO. Now that the 
Soviet Union does not exist any more, the emphasis appears to be shifting towards 
Armenia and Georgia -both of which share frontiers with Turkey- in whose name, it is 
claimed, the aforementioned Soviet demands had in fact been made (242).
There are other perceived 'threats' to Turkey's territorial integrity : it is occasionally 
asserted that, alongside Greece, Bulgaria still hopes for some territorial gains at the 
expense of Turkey. It is believed that this is deeply embedded in their (Greeks and 
Bulgarians) national consciousness, and kept alive through education and cultural 
policies (243). Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours are similarly portrayed as major 
threats to Turkish national security. It is frequently asserted that, given the intensity 
of rivalries among the Middle East countries, Turkey might be dragged into a war. 
Furthermore, Syria and Iran are believed to be particularly hostile to Turkey for their 
own reasons -historical and ideological respectively (244). Syria still regards Hatay, a 
Turkish province ceded to Turkey in 1938 when Syria was still under the French 
mandate, as part of Syrian territory. For this purpose, as is widely believed, Syria 
does not hesitate to collaborate with various groups hostile to Turkey (245). Iran's 
hostility is perceived to be directed at Turkey's constitutional order. It is frequently 
asserted that Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, actively support Islamic fundamentalist 
groups in Turkey. Meanwhile the Kurdish nationalists rank among those who want 
to damage Turkey's territorial integrity. Finally, the left-wing radical groups in the 
country are depicted as a threat to the constitutional order in Turkey (246) -though
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to a lesser extent after the demise of the so-called 'communist regimes' in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.
In the light of the preceding analysis, it can be argued that nationalist discourse is by 
nature exclusivist, and constantly in need of reproducing itself, inter alia, by 
exaggerating the dangers posed by 'enemies'. For its part, the media tends to 
dramatise external events, particularly at times of international conflicts, which are 
perceived to threaten national security. This is most importantly "due to the fact that 
national chauvinism is commercially successful" (247). While national identity is a 
"foreign policy resource", so is foreign policy a "tool for nation-building" (248). This 
pattern is certainly relevant to the experience of nation-building in Turkey. It is also 
relevant to an understanding of why Turkey behaves the way it does, and how it 
interprets international legal rules. However the picture would not be complete 
without an investigation of how the actual foreign policy decisions are made. In what 
follows, it will be argued that the restrictive scope of decision-making process in 
Turkey tends to highlight the defensive/security-oriented aspects of nationalism.
In Turkey -although this is hardly unique- foreign offices and diplomatic services 
continue to be staffed from a narrow section of the Turkish society. Parliament and 
public opinion exert only a partial influence on the political process at governmental 
level. Foreign affairs are still the prerogative of a group of westernized elites who 
conduct policies in secret (249). A Turkish jurist observes that despite the fact that 
the 1921, 1924, and 1961 constitutions gave the legislature some important 
responsibilities, in practice it is the executive who has exercised all the power in 
foreign policy making. In Turkey the final decision on foreign policy matters rests 
with the government. The Prime Minister would usually bring an issue to the cabinet 
after having already arrived at a final decision with the Foreign Minister. The 
reluctance of the Prime Minister to have a full discussion in the Cabinet meeting of 
the issues involved arises out of the alleged need for secrecy, and also shows the 
elitist nature of decision-making in Turkey. Soysal points out that the Prime Minister 
"would be reluctant to have the decision further debated in the cabinet for fear of 
leaks and because it could distort the issue" (250). On the other hand, the 1961 
Constitution established a new institution, called the National Security Council 
(NSC), which would have some role to play in foreign policy decision-making. It 
consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, certain 
ministers, and the commanders of the three armed forces. It is noted that their 
meetings are closed, and their decisions are kept secret. Although on paper their role 
would be advisory, in reality the National Security Council is one of the most
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important foreign policy sources in Turkey today (251). Hence while the key 
decisions are made without an active participation by the Cabinet, the NSC is 
effectively involved in the articulation of foreign policy options.
On the other hand, the army, as 'the guardian of the nation', has, with three 
exceptions, produced all the Presidents of Turkey since the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic. This has certainly enhanced the role of the military establishment in the 
selection of priorities, setting up of objectives and methods of implementing foreign 
policy (252). Since in Turkey it is the military establishment that has dominated the 
political scene -either directly or indirectly-, 'national interests' have come to be 
understood predominantly from a military perspective. Accordingly, Turkish foreign 
policy has generally taken a security-oriented, power-centric, strategic approach to 
international relations.
Hence although international law operates upon the minds of Turkish statesmen who 
often present their policy-decisions as "the will of the nation", the mass of private 
individuals hardly know of their existence. The activities and interests of ordinary 
individuals are subordinated to a rigid administrative system that claims to advance 
'national interests and objectives'.
The arguments presented here suggest that while, on the one hand, Turkish ruling 
elites have internalised the values and dominant perceptions of their counterparts in 
the metropoles, they have consistently resorted to a nationalist language as a way, 
inter alia, of mobilizing the 'nation' for the protection of 'national rights'. The 
nationalist vocabulary with which they speak is based upon the beliefs and values they 
hold with regard to such matters as Turkish history and traditions, Turkey's ethnic 
character, its place within the international community, its culture and major 
institutions etc. These perceived values and beliefs are utilized to reinforce the 
nation's sense of cohesion and identity. Stavrinides asserts that since national rights 
and interests are defined in accordance with certain ideological beliefs and values, the 
language of national rights and interests is characterized by partiality, ambiguity and 
self-flattery. Therefore, particularly in conflict situations, the area of language is 
readily susceptible to abuse and manipulation by national propagandists (253).
What is argued here is not that the 'threat' is simply imaginary, but that it is frequentiy 
subjected to manipulation in the hands of nationalist ruling elites who are anxious to 
appropriate the 'national identity dynamic'. This tendency is likely to remain
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unchanged in the foreseeable future unless perhaps a genuinely multicultural society 
and its political framework has been established.
3.10.Conclusion
This study, as is hoped, reveals that the leading exponents of political and nationalist 
theories which anticipated the modem state, ranging from Rousseau and Fichte to 
Hobbes, in their own ways, perceived the ’nation1 as a homogeneous conglomerate of 
identical individuals. It did not occur to them that some members of the 'nation' 
might have possessed a distinct culture, language and symbols of identity of their 
own. This meant in law that individuals had an identity only in so far as this was 
recognized by the state. These theorists, similarly, treated the state as an immutable 
reality with a raison d'etre of its own. The fact of its existence was sufficient to 
legitimise its claim to exclusive sovereignty. According to this paradigm, the 
interaction between the state and the nation was a static one, since it was based on a 
unilinear notion of history which was devoid of heterogeneity and conflict 
Accordingly, then, the nation and the state were perceived as manifestations of one 
and the same thing with no intermediaries in between.
The influence of such views on the theory of sovereignty has been immense. Indeed 
the theory concerned itself with power and strategies of domination from the outset. 
On the other hand, the sovereignty of states became the starting point of positive 
international law. The latter concerned itself with the 'form1 of state competence, and 
not with its 'substance'. Accordingly, international law confined its role to the 
delimitation of jurisdictional spaces possessed by states. It has been argued that the 
state-centric nature of international law still persists, although its rigidity is somewhat 
loosened by recent legal developments, particularly in the field of human rights and 
minority rights.
Critical legal scholars, among others, challenge the primacy of the state as the 
absolute sovereign. Besides, they assert that diversity, and not uniformity, is the 
common pattern of social and political evolution. Accordingly, they seek to 'liberate' 
the suppressed identities from the unitary discourse imposed by the domineering state. 
Minorities, individuals and other social categories, in such a frame of analysis, 
become active participants in the complex network of local and global politics. 
Critical legal scholars also dispute the existence of international law as an objective 
reality. They argue, particularly those belonging to the postmodernist school of
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thought, that international law is marked by ambiguity and partiality, since it is not a 
complete legal system with clear conceptual and normative premises. In the absence 
of a supranational system of law and a universally-recognized world court, individual 
states themselves define law and legal facts in the light of their own view of 
themselves and of their historic rights. Therefore critical legal scholars are not 
content with the formalistic overtones of conventional legal analysis and methods of 
conflict resolution; instead, they seek to relate a given legal discourse into the proper 
cultural and historical context in which it takes place. For critical lawyers, then, an 
hermeneutic frame of analysis becomes the key for discerning the dynamics of change 
in international law.
Therefore, the relative and subjective nature of inter-state relations must be exposed 
if international law is to free itself from the limitations posed by nationalist discourse. 
This requires that nationalism not be ignored by simply labelling it as an ’artificial 
construct1 or, as most international jurists do, treating it as non-existent. The ideals 
of the 'nation', its specific political and legal culture, and its conception of itself and of 
others play a vital role in the actual behaviour of states. Indeed many inter-state 
disputes are rooted or implicated in national antagonisms and/or rival nationalist 
ideologies. However this is not to deny, as has been seen in the Turkish case, that 
the mass of people are rarely involved in international conflicts which are rather 
considered as matters for the ruling elites of conflicting states.
However, while broadly in agreement with the postmodernist critique of international 
law, this study does not dispute the significance of international law in the orderly 
conduct of international relations. States take international law more seriously than 
the postmodernists suggest. For example, excepting issues which involve their 
perceived vital interests, such as national security, national unity or territorial claims, 
states tend to act in conformity with international law. Even in matters which involve 
their perceived vital interests, states seek to justify their position in accordance with 
international law. Hence international legal norms and institutions have become vital 
components of international life. The fact that states have a particular vision of 
international society deriving from their peculiar experience, does not necessarily 
preclude the possibility of universal norms and values. Rather what it suggests is that 
the rules of international law become meaningful only in the context of the concrete 
circumstances in which they are addressed. Returning to the possibility of 
universality, it may be argued that one of the principal functions of international law is 
to provide a common language in which states exchange ideas and discuss their 
differences. Such dialogue may gradually produce consent, and influence the future
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development of international law. Arguably such consent does exist with regard to 
matters such as the protection of human rights and the prohibition of aggression, at 
least in terms of their desirability, in spite of a plurality of concerns and priorities that 
inform different traditions and legal systems.
The effectiveness of international law largely depends on its ability to accomodate the 
changing realities of international life. This challenge is most acutely posed in relation 
to the subjects of international law. Although their status as 'law' is still disputed, 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the adoption of a range of international 
treaties and UN resolutions on the rights of individuals, minorities, and various other 
human categories, some of which have been examined in this chapter, has, to say the 
least, broadened the thematic and territorial scope of international law, while 
challenging the exclusive monopoly enjoyed by states over their 'subjects'.
It is the task of the international lawyer to take these developments on board. Indeed 
international can no longer be perceived simply as a system of law that governs 
relations between 'states'. It has to be recognized that peoples, ethnic and religious 
minorities, and, in some cases, individuals are perfectly entitled to be subjects of 
international law. Therefore international documents dealing with self-determination, 
human rights and minority rights bear great significance, and must be granted more 
effective status, particularly through more effective implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms. The next chapter focuses on the state of international relations and 
international legal disciplines in Turkey. Some major questions will be raised in this 
context: Have textbooks on international relations, for instance, given the weight that 
actors and processes going beyond inter-state relations deserve? Has the Turkish 
school of international law come to grips with contemporary challenges to classical 
international law? Are there any links between the official ideology and the doctrinal 
attachments of international jurists in Turkey? These themes will be explored through 
an analysis of Turkish textbooks of international relations and public international 
law.
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AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SCHOLARSHIP IN TURKEY
This chapter is an attempt to explore the role played by the Turkish academic 
establishment vis-k-vis the prevailing discourse relating to Turkey's interaction with 
international society. As has been argued in the preceding chapters, the legal 
behaviour of states cannot simply be explained in terms of their reaction to the 
external environment Instead, their behaviour must, with greater justification, be 
related to the internal factors which prompt states to adopt a particular approach with 
regard to various rules and principles of international law. It has been argued that the 
individual nation-state, on the basis of which international frontiers are presently 
demarcated, constitutes an independent centre of political and legal culture. Chapter 
3 was an attempt, inter alia, to expound and explain the ideological and normative 
foundations of Turkish nationalism and its impact on Turkey's attitude towards 
international society. Indeed the 'nationalist discourse’ is among the primary 
instruments by which the state, with its legislature, executive, judiciary and army, 
seeks to impose its own projection of the outside world on society. However the 
state is not the sole institution by which the society is presented with a particular 
image of the outside world and the ’nation’s1 peculiar place therein. Among these 
institutions are the media and the educational establishment as nation-wide 
transmitters of ’knowledge’ and imagery. Within the specific confines of this thesis, it 
is the academic profession -those involved in the teaching of Turkish foreign policy 
and international law- which constitutes the next subject of the conceptual analyses 
pursued here. Given that a primary raison d'&tre of this study is to make a critique of 
Turkish conceptions and practices of international law, a far greater proportion of this 
chapter is devoted to an analysis of major textbooks of international law written by 
Turkish scholars. The shorter section, which follows next, reviews some of the 
textbooks relating to Turkish foreign policy, and seeks to find out their impact on 
Turkish perception of international society. After having reviewed the Turkish 
’school’ of international law and relations, the analyses made in the present chapter 
will be related to the fundamental arguments made previously.
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4.1.A Brief Survey of the Literature on Turkish Foreign Policy
This section attempts to explore a part of the literature relating to Turkish foreign 
policy. Those which have been selected for review are among the primary materials 
used in the international relations departments of Turkish universities. The few 
works examined here should not be seen as merely intellectual enterprises, but also as 
a relevant dimension of the discourse relating to the Turkish image of international 
society.
To start with, a general feature of studies on Turkish foreign policy is their exclusive 
focus on inter-state relations. International actors, other than states, are treated 
marginally. These studies draw heavily on Turkey's diplomatic treaties, its military 
and economic ties , as well as on crisis situations. In this analytical framework, 'high 
politics' are deemed to be relevant as opposed to 'low politics'. Turkey is treated as a 
junior partner in the international power game. Turkish scholars of international 
relations, therefore, belong to the realistic school of thought with their emphasis on 
'state', 'power politics', and 'confrontation'. For this 'power paradigm', as observed by 
Korany:
"...questions of interstate conflict and 'national security' 
were 'high' on the agenda, whereas issues of culture, 
economy and even society were very low' and almost 
fell outside the paradigm's focus" (1).
This is equally true of the Turkish 'school' of international relations-as well as of those 
conducted by western, in particular, American, scholars on Turkey -with the 
exception that since the oil 'crisis' in 1973, Turkish scholars of international relations 
have increasingly focused on economic issues too. It is argued that today the state- 
centric, problem-solving pragmatism of 'cold-war' studies on Turkish foreign policy 
still predominate in the discipline.
To start with, in Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (2) (Turkish Foreign Policy by 
Events), which is a collective study of some prominent academics, the authors pay 
almost no attention to Turkey's relations with international organizations. The book 
is merely a chronology of events which are relevant to Turkey's security and 
economic prospects. To cite some of the headings may make the point clearer : 
"Soviet threat in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War", "Truman 
doctrine and Marshall Plan which secured Turkish sovereignty against Soviet
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aggression”, "Balkan Pact and Baghdad Pact” -military pacts, "Cold War and 
Turkey", "Suez Crisis and Turkey", "Cyprus crisis", "Greco-Turkish disputes", "The 
plight of Turkish minority in Bulgaria", and so forth. Evidently, the main focus of the 
book is the confrontational politics of the Cold War era of which Turkey was a part 
The authors treat foreign policy as a matter of static interaction between states 
without considering the contextual dimensions of their behaviour. This power-centric 
analytical attitude, moreover, assumes that states interact with international society 
solely to maximize their national interests. Finally, the book deals with the general 
evolution of international affairs in the twentieth century in so far as this has direct 
and immediate bearing on Turkish foreign policy.
An article written by Duygu Sezer, a Turkish academic of international relations, 
entitled 'Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000” (3), is equally caught in the 
rigidity of a state-centric approach in spite of its detailed analysis. This article was 
prepared for a conference in 1987. The major concern of this paper is Turkey's 
diplomatic relations with other countries, although subsections include Turkey's 
relations with NATO and the EC -given that Turkey has been a member of NATO 
since 1952, and an associate member of the EC and a candidate for full membership 
in the future-. Here, too, power politics is a dominant frame of focus which 
permeates the whole article. In her attempt to account for the external factors in the 
formulation and conduct of Turkish foreign policy, the author draws on the following 
: Iran-Iraq war- which was still under way at the time of writing; changes in the 
domestic and foreign policies of the now defunct Soviet Union, and the Superpower 
agreements on nuclear and conventional arms reduction in Europe; and the 
probability of an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict (pp.77-89). As 
a result of this security-oriented analysis, non-military dimensions of international 
relations are ignored. This type of Hobbesian approach to international relations is 
well described by Braillard :
"From this standpoint, the state is seen as the central 
actor in international relations, whose dynamic is the 
evolving pattern of the balance of power among states.
The sphere of foreign policy is quite distinct from that 
of domestic policy, and its central concern is the 
security of the state. Foreign policy options are 
rational choices made in the national interest" (4).
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Although Sezer’s analysis of the external determinants of Turkish foreign policy 
suggests that the international system is undergoing profound changes towards 
peaceful co-existence between the hitherto rival ideological camps, Sezer argues that 
there is no clear-cut alternative to the existing pro-Western foreign policy. She 
presumes, without any material evidence, that "no political party today that espouses 
a radical change of course...can be elected to power" (p.94). This assertion leads her 
to conclude that Turkey must remain within the existing military and political 
alignments, in spite of her admission that "the larger strategic environment has been 
undergoing an intense phase of transition " (p.95).
This rather prophetic view of Turkish foreign policy is a common feature of most 
Turkish foreign policy analysts. Its logic derives from rather simple and mechanistic 
assertions : that Turkey must remain in NATO because it is surrounded by aggressive, 
hostile and unpredictable countries; that Turkey is bound to pursue pro-western 
foreign policies because the western world is superior to the rest of the world in 
economic, political, military and cultural spheres. Broadly speaking, the main 
differences among Turkish scholars centre around the extent to which Turkey, in 
their view, should co-operate with the non-western world without endangering its 
links with Europe and the USA. Hence, while agreeing that the Arabs and the 
Iranians are often motivated by primitive instincts and extremist views which evoke 
caution, they consider it as being desirable to extend links with the countries in the 
Middle East. This is mainly due to the following considerations : first, these countries 
are among the world's major oil exporters, a commodity of which Turkey is short; 
second, these countries share common historical, religious and cultural ties, which are 
deeply-embedded in the consciousness of the common folk, with Turkey -a fact 
which cannot be ignored; third, a greater co-operation with Islamic countries is seen 
as a vote-winner in the UN and other international organizations where the Cyprus 
problem and some other Turkish disputes are being discussed. It is clear that these 
considerations are not made out of a desire to open up and broaden Turkey's rather 
rigid and monolithic approach towards the international community, but rather out of 
a pragmatic urge to advance Turkey's self-interests.
There is also an ideological dimension which should be emphasized here. Turkish 
scholars of international relations tend to share a liberal, modernist outlook shaped by 
a capitalist world view. They presume that since the international system and its 
conceptual and cultural framework are still underpinned by the western world, it is 
futile and undesirable to challenge the status quo. Therefore, the implicit argument 
goes, Turkey should strive to share in its spoils by joining in the western orbit.
Inevitably, then, the non-western world becomes marginal in this scheme of things. In 
Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasiy there is hardly any mention of Turkey's relations with 
the Third World countries. The same applies to Sezer's article: although the author 
extensively examines Turkey's relations with a variety of states and regional 
organizations, such as NATO, the EC, the US, Greece, the Middle East and Western 
Europe, she totally dismisses the Third World countries. It can be suggested that this 
attitude is evoked by the low level of economic and military links between Turkey and 
the countries in the 'periphery'. Similarly, Ucarol's book, Siyasi Tarih (5) (Political 
History), which uncritically narrates major political developments since the French 
Revolution in 1789, totally bypasses Turkey’s relations with the Third World in his 
chapter on Turkish foreign policy.
Another common trait of studies on Turkish foreign policy is that the themes are 
examined at a descriptive level. There is hardly any criticism of Turkish foreign 
policy. The themes are presented as a chronology of events with heavy reliance on 
official Turkish sources. Their general tone is marked by an apologetic attitude which 
seeks to justify Turkey's foreign policy behaviour on almost every issue. Inevitably, 
such an apologetic attitude undermines the scholarly quality of these studies.
For its part, 20.Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi (6) (The Political History of the Twentieth 
Century), published in 1991, is an extreme example of this apologetic attitude. 
Written by Fahir Armaoglu, a prominent Turkish professor of international relations, 
the book is full of nationalistic demagogy and inconsistencies. In his book, he 
blames Greece and the ex-Soviet Union for everything that has gone wrong in Cyprus 
(pp.275-286). On the other hand, he relies almost exclusively on Turkish official 
sources when concerning Turkish foreign policy as such. As far as international 
affairs are concerned, he resorts to Anglo-American materials; a natural outcome of 
his pro-westem bias and preconceptions.
In conclusion, one can observe that the Turkish scholars of international relations 
generally adopt a non-critical and nationalistic attitude towards their subject matter. 
In addition, their analytical approach is very much informed by the American school 
of realpolitik. On the other hand, the fact that these studies are marked by 
Eurocentrism and strategic concerns may partially be attributed to the limitations of 
Turkish foreign policy itself. In other words, the subject of analysis -Turkish foreign 
policy- and the subject itself often overlap.
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4.2.The State of International Law Scholarship in Turkey
4.2.1.Introduction
This section, which constitutes the main bulk of this chapter, focuses on the 
textbooks of international law written by academics in Turkey. Rather than 
investigating the whole range of issues relevant to international law, the scope of this 
section is limited to a review of the international legal themes which are indicative of 
the normative and methodological posture adopted by Turkish publicists. They 
include the following themes which are commonly found in international law books: 
the historical origins of international law; its formal sources; subjects of international 
law; the law of territory and self-determination; international law and development
In this chapter, it will be argued that one of the anomalies and inconsistencies of 
Turkey's interaction with the society of nations can be attributed to the textbooks of 
international law in that country. These books are generally written from the vantage 
point of western positivism. For the authors of these books, international law should 
deal with "what is", excluding "what ought to be". Besides, they solely focus on 
technical/procedural themes, while ignoring the historical/ideological forces behind 
international law. This study purports to show that these works are often ambiguous 
and problematic, both substantively and methodologically. These considerations are 
then linked to the current discourse on Turkey's place in international society and the 
role assigned to international law in such deliberations.
This chapter will start with a preliminary analysis of the legal system in Turkey. 
Indeed, an important determinant of the intellectual outlook of Turkish scholars of 
international law has to be sought in the domestic legal system of that country. 
Turkey began experiencing a process of legal transformation by the middle of the last 
century from a predominantly Islamic legal structure towards a European-oriented 
legal system. This radical shift in legal orientation has simultaneously altered the 
doctrinal conceptions and the method of inquiry employed by the international law 
professionals in Turkey. After providing the reader with this background, the study 
will continue with an examination of some major textbooks of international law 
written by Turkish scholars. In this context, the following questions, among others, 
will be raised: What are the main themes of their analysis? How can their method of 
investigation be defined? (e.g. formalistic/substantive; technical/multi-disciplinary) 
Do they bring any contribution to the discipline? (either through the individual
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intellect of the authors and/or by inserting the Ottoman/Turkish context into the 
analysis)
4.2.2.Major Features of the Turkish Legal System
Turkey is often regarded as one of the first states to incorporate an 'alien' system of 
law -European, or Romano-Germanic- by its own decision. Historically, the western 
European systems of law were transplanted into other parts of the world either by 
force, as in the case of European colonies in Asia and Africa, or they were adopted by 
European settlers who carried their legal codes into the new settlements in the United 
States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and in parts of South Africa
and South America. Turkey’s reception of western legal codes, en bloc, soon after
the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1920s is a different case:
"...an independent nation of its own decision resolves 
to import into itself a system of law, or some parts of a 
system, which not only is foreign but is the product of a 
markedly different culture" (7).
Indeed, for centuries, Turkey had formed part of the Islamic world, both in political, 
religious and cultural terms. The moral values, the mental framework, and the legal 
outlook of the society were, broadly speaking, shaped by Islamic precepts. The state 
was of a theocratic nature, and, in this connection, the legal basis of the state was the 
Islamic sharVah. The law was administered by the people of religion. However, 
things began to change by the middle of the 19th century when it became clear that 
the existing legal system could not respond to new circumstances. While western 
codes contained elements of canon law which were becoming secularized, no such 
transformation took place in Islamic legal doctrine (8). The 'modernization' of the 
Turkish legal system is generally traced back to 1839 when the Sultan Abdulmajid 
proclaimed the Tanzimat (re-organization). This charter promised legislative reforms 
safeguarding life, honour and property of the Ottoman subjects, while promising a 
strict adherence to the letter of the law in criminal justice. This is described by a 
prominent Turkish scholar as "an act of auto-limitation" which curtailed the 
prerogative powers of the Sultan (9). This was the beginning of a process whereby 
the law of the state and Islamic law differed (10). The Tanzimat charter was later 
followed by a series of new legislative codes received from the European countries. 
In 1850 a new commercial code was introduced, followed in 1858 by a criminal code.
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While a new maritime law was enacted in 1864, an important part of the civil code 
was codified in the Medjelle in 1877 (11). It is noted that in this process of legal 
reformation -however imperfect or casuistic it may be- a generation of jurists began 
receiving their training in the law faculties where the principles of the law of the 
European states were familiar. Furthermore, in 1908 some twenty students were sent 
by the Turkish Ministry of Justice to study law in various European universities. 
They later played crucial role in the process of legal modernization (12).
The westernization of the Turkish legal system within a comprehensive framework 
was ultimately realized after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. 
President Ataturk, the founder of modem Turkey, was determined to create a secular 
nation-state based, inter alia, on western notions of law. This was the main motive 
behind the castration of Islam as a source of political and legal legitimacy. To that 
end, the institution of the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 which was a blow to the 
religious hierarchy. This act was accompanied by the abolition of the Ministry of 
Shari'at, of the separate religious schools, and of the special Shari'at courts in which 
the men of religion administered the Holy Law (13). These measures were followed 
by a series of new legal codes imported from the various European countries: the 
Penal Code (1926), the Civil Code and the Code of Obligations (1926), the 
Commercial Code (1926), the Code of Civil Procedure (1927), the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (1929) and the Code of Maritime Law (1929). Hence, by the end of the 
1920s, Turkish law ceased to belong to the so-called "Muhammadan" legal systems 
and became a part of the positivist system of law. As Hamson rightly observes, 
Turkey "decided to re-create itself in the image of a European state" (14).
Since then the positivist conception of law has greatly reinforced its status as the law 
of the land. This is reflected in the legal profession too. Since the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic, generations of jurists have been trained in law faculties to grasp the 
principles of European legal systems. Besides, the need to master thoroughly the 
principles of legal codes has compelled an increasing number of jurists to study the 
European legal literature and to cultivate an acquaintance with western culture in 
general (15). Contrary to the privileged status of European law, Islamic legal 
doctrine is not accessible to the students of law, since it is not part of the curricula.
This is the background upon which the disciplinary knowledge and the ideas of 
international law scholars in Turkey are shaped. They are solely acquainted with 
positivistic European law, and speak at least one European language. They generally 
view 'modernization' as a desirable project. By contrast, they see in Islam an inherent
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'backwardness' when looked at from an intellectual vantage point. They have neither 
the educational background, nor the linguistic skills to study the Islamic concept of 
international law. The acceptance of the Latin alphabet in 1926 to replace Arabic 
script has literally cut off the Turkish intelligentsia from its history, while preventing 
them from establishing intellectual contacts with their counterparts in the Middle 
East These considerations, as is believed, have to be taken into account before 
making sense of international law scholarship in Turkey.
4.2.3.Preliminary Remarks on the Development of the International Legal 
Discipline in Turkey
It has to be stated that international law is relatively at a premature stage of 
development in Turkey. Turkey -or more correctly, the Ottoman Empire- entered 
'international society’ as late as the middle of the 19th century when the Ottoman 
Empire was accepted into the ’Concert of Europe'. As Pazarci, a Turkish scholar of 
international law, notes, this date also corresponds to the involvement of Ottoman 
jurists in international law (16). At the time a significant portion of international law 
books, which were generally in the form of translations or adaptations from European 
textbooks, were written by Christian minorities.
It was only after the foundation of the Turkish Republic that the in-depth studies 
began to be carried out in the field of international law, as well as in other disciplines. 
These studies, for the most part, focused on general aspects of international law. 
Leaving aside the doctoral thesis of the Turkish jurists in the European universities, 
Turkish scholars managed to produce only five studies addressing an international 
audience before the end of the Second World War.
The aftermath of the War has witnessed a growing number of studies by Turkish 
jurists of international law, particularly in matters of general international law and 
those which are closely related to Turkish foreign policy, such as EC Law and the 
Law of the Sea. However these studies have not made any major contribution to the 
discipline, as observed by Pazarci. This is evidenced by the fact that a very limited 
number of Turkish jurists have been represented in international courts and law 
commissions (17).
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4.2.4.An Examination of International Law Books Written by Turkish Scholars
This section focuses on a number of textbooks of international law written by 
Turkish jurists. The purpose is to show how the present body of international rules 
and principles are conveyed to the reader. The books are examined both in terms of 
their substance and methodology. The topics that are selected for investigation are 
intended to reveal the prevailing doctrinal conceptions and normative assumptions 
lying behind the Turkish 'school' of international law. These themes include the 
following : the historical origins and basic features of international law; formal 
sources of international law, subjects of international law; law of territory; and, 
international law and development. In this context, five of the major textbooks of 
International Law will be investigated here: Edip Celik, Milletlerarasi Hukuk 
(International Law) (18); Huseyin Pazarci, Uluslararasi Hukuk Dersleri 
(International Law Lectures) (19); Hamza Eroglu, Devletler Umumi Hukuku (Public 
International Law) (20); Sevin Toluner, Milletlerarasi Hukuk Dersleri - Devletin 
Yetkisi (Lectures on International Law - The Jurisdiction of the State) (21); Seha 
Meray, Devletler Hukukuna Giris (Introduction to Public International Law) (22). 
These authors are deemed to be representative of the state of international legal 
discipline in Turkey given that, with the exception of Seha Meray, they hold 
professorships in various Turkish universities, while their books are widely read by 
students and professionals alike.
A qualification with regard to the latter two studies is due here. As is obvious from 
its title, Toluner's book has a narrower scope, in comparison to the others, in that she 
merely focuses on the jurisdiction of states. Because of this, her study will be 
reviewed only within the section titled 'the law of territory'. As for Meray, unlike 
other studies all of which have been published after the 1980s, his book was edited in 
1968. This discrepancy in dates is important for two reasons : first, the linkage 
between international law and development was most firmly established after the 
1970s; second, the overall influence of the non-western states over the direction of 
international law and the impact made by revisionist scholars upon the international 
legal discipline were only vaguely felt when the book was written. Because of this, 
Meray's book is only partially representative of the present state of international legal 
scholarship in Turkey. Therefore, greater emphasis will be laid on those textbooks 
written after the 1980s. This has to be borne in mind when evaluating the various 
assessments made in this Chapter.
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4.2.4.1.Historical Origins and Basic Features of International Law
Meray apart, the scholars under consideration show a scant interest in the historical 
roots of international law. Meray starts his book with an analysis of the historical 
evolution of international law in two chapters. He draws on the evolution of 
international law in antiquity and medieval eras before discussing its formative years 
from the 17th century onwards. In this context, he examines, inter alia, the Islamic 
conception of international law which underpinned the ideological outlook of the 
Ottoman Empire (Meray : 12-15).
As far as Eroglu is concerned, he does not investigate the historical conditions under 
which the rules, principles and institutions of international law emerged and evolved. 
Neither is any mention made of the doctrinal conceptions lying behind legal rules. 
Without providing any context within which to trace the historical origins of 
international law, the author restricts himself to the description of rules and 
institutions which govern international relations; and he does this, within a formalistic 
framework. Furthermore, he does not question the claims of classical international 
law to universality (Eroglu : 1-23).
As opposed to Eroglu, Celik notes that international law is of European origin and 
that its rules were an outgrowth of the 'balance of power' in Europe after the 
Napoleonic wars. For this author, the 'Public Law of Europe' could not claim 
universality, as it merely reflected the colonial interests of European Powers in the 
nineteenth century (Celik : 2-4, Vol.l). Nonetheless, the author does not go far 
enough to show the relevance of its Eurocentric origin in the understanding of the 
basic concepts and norms of present international law.
Pazarci seems more committed to the investigation of historical development of 
international law. He informs the reader that international law has hitherto been an 
exclusive preserve of the Eurocentric system of law. Besides, while most Turkish 
jurists trace the history of international law to that of the Public Law of Europe, the 
present author states that from the vantage point of international relations, the rules 
of conduct among states first developed in antiquity. The author points out that the 
first examples of international agreements, arbitration and mediation appeared in the 
Middle Eastern region and China. He also notes that during the medieval period, the 
main contributions towards the development of international legal norms came from 
the Islamic Middle East, alongside Christian Europe. He later describes the main 
features of the Islamic concept of international law during the Medieval era. (Pazarci:
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35-42, Yol.l) Hence the author does not omit the experiences of international 
relations -more correctly, inter-state relations- preceding the nineteenth-century 
European experience.
Nonetheless, Pazarci seems to be less than critical as regards the impact of the 
experience of European colonialism on the conceptual framework and the normative 
assumptions of classical international law. When informing the reader of the non- 
recognition by the European Powers of the political communities outside the 
Christian world as sovereign states, the author does not explain why they did so. He 
does not, for instance, mention the colonial powers' intention to occupy those 
territories which were declared as "lacking statehood". It is well-known that they 
went as far as refusing to 'recognize', until the middle of the nineteenth century, those 
non-European States with a long experience of statehood such as the Ottoman 
Empire, Siam, China, Persia and Japan as members of 'international society'.
The international law of the nineteenth century can be defined as a 'ruler's law' 
according to which "the non-European, colonised peoples were the object rather than 
the subject" (23). Accordingly, the powerful states in Europe used their military and 
technological superiority to compel the dependent or weak independent states to 
grant economic concessions and privileges through unequal agreements of 
capitulation, extra territoriality and alike. This meant that international law reflected 
the economic interests of western states (24). Pazarci, however, ignores this link 
between colonial expansion and the legal rules developed to justify i t
While Eroglu remains indifferent, Celik speaks of radical changes which have had 
significant repercussions on the legal structure of international society in the twentieth 
century. In this context, he refers to the following developments as the new 
challenges to classical international law: the decline of European colonial powers after 
the First World War, in particular, Britain and France; the socialist revolution in 1917 
in Russia; the experience of Nazism and Fascism in Europe after the First World War 
which revealed the inadequacy of international law in securing peace; the experiences 
of decolonization after the Second World War. (Celik: 4-6,Vol. 1)
It has been argued, particularly by scholars in the Third World, that classical 
international law, developed as it was among the western Christian countries, is not 
adequate for the extended world-wide community of states with different legal, social, 
cultural, ethical and religious backgrounds. For instance, Anand, an Indian 
international lawyer, wrote in 1966 that as international law is no longer the exclusive
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preserve of Christian Europe, it has to take the consent of non-European communities 
which are far more numerous than the former. Secondly, for Anand, the liberal, 
individualistic doctrine of law, which forms the basis of conventional international 
law, is not suitable for the present heterogeneous society (25). The majority of the 
states that make up international society are indeed economically weak and vulnerable 
as a result, inter alia, of the shortage of capital and technology. Therefore they need 
the protection of international society :
"More important, while the earlier international society 
was extremely nationalistic and individualistic, and put 
the greatest stress on sovereignty and national 
independence, the present society, in spite of its vast 
horizontal expansion, has become extremely 
interdependent The fantastic scientific and 
technological developments have already made the 
world too small. Not only peace but prosperity has 
become indivisible" (26).
These are some of the underlying phenomena which have greatly contributed to the 
emergence of the law of co-operation among nations.
In spite of the fact that Celik takes notice of the new challenges to classical 
international law, he does not further elaborate this theme. For instance, although 
recognizing that the Soviet Union, while initially partially rejecting international law 
which in its view had been reminiscent of capitalist/imperialist hegemony, gradually 
undermined some of the basic doctrines and rules of the ’old' law, he does not say 
what they are, and how they can be relevant to an understanding of the present 
international law. (Celik : 27-38, Vol.l) Eroglu, for his part, is totally dismissive of 
the 'progressive* forces within the discipline. As a result of this anachronistic 
approach, the author does not investigate issues like "the protection of human rights 
at international level" or "the principle of self-determination". Contrary to Eroglu, 
Pazarci tackles these issues. He draws the reader's attention to the changing structure 
of international society and the emergence of new issues as a relevant dimension of 
international law, as in the case of 'human rights' and 'the protection of the 
environment'. However, although Pazarci speaks of the impact of the Third World on 
the operation of the United Nations, he does so briefly and without focusing on the 
problematic confrontation between the NORTH and the SOUTH. (Pazarci : 51-58, 
Vol.l) Nonetheless, it has to be welcomed as one of the first attempts by a Turkish
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jurist to come to grips with the Third World dimension, albeit merely in the context 
of the United Nations.
In conclusion, it can be argued that there does not appear to have been a common 
attitude among Turkish publicists in regard to their exposition of the historical 
origins and the general characteristics of present international law . While Eroglu 
seems to align himself with 'conservative positivism', with total indifference to the 
historical dimension of international law, this is less true for others. They are both 
aware of the Eurocentric origins of classical international law, and also of the 
contemporary challenges to that system of law. Nonetheless, excepting Meray, they 
fail to elaborate on these themes or on their relevance to present international law.
4.2.4.2.Formal Sources of International Law
With the exception of Meray, the authors under consideration lean heavily on treaties 
and customary international law as sources of international law. These themes are 
examined from a formalistic perspective. For instance, when dealing with treaties, 
they describe the legal procedures which give treaties their binding effect. There is 
hardly any discussion with regard to the actual operation of international treaties. 
Similarly ignored are the doctrinal discussions relating to the formal sources of 
international law.
This section will start off with Meray, who appears more aware of the emerging 
trends compared to others. When examining the legal sources of international law, 
the author also includes the general principles of international law and the secondary 
sources such as court decisions and doctrinal writings. (Meray : 92-106) On the 
other hand, at the time when this book was written, the new legal and normative 
developments of what may be termed as 'progressive' international law had not yet 
crystallised. Therefore, the author can be excused for not mentioning some new 
standards among the general principles of international law, such as respect for human 
rights and self-determination of peoples. (Meray : 101-102)
The question of the formal sources of international law is in fact a hotly disputed 
issue. Some developing countries, for instance, assert that the newly independent 
states should not be bound by customary law as they have played no part in the 
development of such an alleged custom. Moreover, they draw on a wide range of 
resolutions in various organs of the UN, especially in the General Assembly, as a
130
legitimate source of international law with binding force (27). However, excepting 
Meray, the scholars under examination do not involve themselves in these 
controversial issues, except noting in passing that due to the sharp economic and 
social changes in the twentieth century, customary international law has increasingly 
been replaced by international treaties. It seems that, not unlike those positivistic 
legal scholars in the west, these jurists advocate the view that norms must conform to 
a particular model in order to be acknowledged as law. It is therefore no wonder 
that no mention has been made of UN resolutions as a relevant source of international 
law.
This is not to say that the authors under consideration preclude all sources other than 
treaties and custom. With the exception of Eroglu who totally dismisses them, 
Pazarci and Celik draw on the general principles of law, judicial decisions and 
scholarly writings as relevant sources of international law. While citing examples, 
Celik accounts for the following principles as established sources: supremacy of 
international law; permanence of states; the requirement to exhaust municipal law 
procedures. (Celik : 165, Vol.l) For Pazarci 'some of the significant general 
principles of international law1 are somewhat different: the prohibition of the denial of 
justice; the principle of non-discrimination; the prohibition of the abuse of rights; the 
principle of equity; and, acquired rights. (Pazarci: 216-224, Vol.l) The authors seem 
to ignore, when giving examples, that there are other generally accepted principles 
which may, with equal weight, be relevant to the contemporary realities of 
international society : the principle of self-determination; respect for human rights; 
international co-operation; good faith and so forth.
Today the political, ideological and ethical sources of international law are no longer 
limited to a particular group of nations. Indeed, it is now generally recognized that 
classical international law, far from being universal, was simply a response to the 
dominant ideas of a particular period -at the time of the industrial and commercial 
expansion of western powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries- in European 
history. Therefore for progressive publicists, any contributions made by the non- 
western community of states has to be welcome since this brings the idea of a 
universal system of law closer to reality. This is the context in which to evaluate the 
novel concepts and legal materials introduced by various regional, ideological and 
political groupings in this present century. It will later be examined how, alongside 
the communist bloc of countries, the challenge posed by the Third World countries, 
which are linked by some common or shared historical experiences and/or by poverty 
(28), has transformed the normative assumptions of classical international law.
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In the face of the apparent multiplicity of approaches to international law, the Turkish 
jurists, Meray aside, continue to treat their discipline as a unified, cohesive and 
universal body of rules against which the non-westem opposition is a 'marginal' 
posture. Hence, for these scholars, if a particular rule or principle is rejected by 
western states and/or if it does not conform with the western mode of law-making 
(unanimity, precision, and so forth), then it has to be dismissed as 'non-legal'.
4.2.4.3.Subjects of International Law
In this case too, Meray appears more in tune with the contemporary developments 
than the rest of the authors under consideration. In addition to states, the author also 
accounts international organisations, certain political communities short of statehood 
and individuals -although far limited international personality than states- among 
subjects of international law. (Meray : 135-136) Indeed an entire chapter is devoted 
to an analysis of the status of individuals under international law. Having examined 
various categories of international crimes, such as slavery, piracy, war crimes and 
genocide, which might be committed not only by states but also by individuals, the 
author shows that in some cases individuals are also accountable under international 
law. (Meray : 232-236) That individuals have an international personality -albeit 
limited- is, according to the author, also evidenced by the fact that they have been 
accorded the right of locus standi before the international courts established by some 
regional organizations such as the Central American Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights. (Meray : 236-237) The specific international 
protection of minorities, refugees and stateless persons also indicates, according to 
the author, that individuals also qualify for subjecthood under present international 
law. (Meray : 237-250) Finally, human rights are among the major concerns of 
present international law. All of these factors, the author concludes, ensure that 
individuals and various categories of social groups are among the subjects of 
international law -albeit a limited one (Meray : 250-263). Meray's extensive focus on 
individuals is clearly a novelty in so far as Turkish textbooks of international law are 
concerned. (Meray : 229-263) Meanwhile, the author notes that the Mandates 
System was in fact a legal cloak used by colonial powers to justify their continued 
hegemony over the mandated peoples, territories, and their resources. (Meray : 193)
Pazarci, too, notes that certain progressive developments within the community of 
nations have rendered as outmoded a conception of the state as the sole actor of 
international law. He holds therefore that not only states but also international
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organizations and individuals can be singled out as subjects of international law. 
(Pazarci : 1-3, Vol.l) Speaking of the "mandatory regimes1 after the First World 
War, the author states that the people living in the mandated territories were deemed 
by Britain, France and other mandatory states -victors of the First World War- as 
lacking the experience and capacity for independent statehood. Typical of his 
approach throughout the book, the author does not attempt to inform the reader of 
the political/economic interests involved in the mandatory process; neither does he 
express his own views on this question. (Pazarci : 18-19, Vol.2) Not unlike his 
colleagues under consideration, Pazarci focuses on the formal requirements for 
statehood -a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government- while 
excluding substantive issues such as the question of legitimacy, i.e. the nature of links 
between a state, its territory and people. (Pazarci: 93-109, Vol.2) This theme will be 
elaborated in the next section.
A common attitude of Pazarci and Eroglu is that both examine various forms of 
limited statehood which are no more in existence. Neither the "mandates system" nor 
"the regimes under trusteeship" are in operation today. "Vassal regimes" and "the 
protectorates" are also matters for the past Similarly, cities like Danzig, Saar and 
Trieste are no longer under international status. (Pazarci: 112-115, Vol.2) (Eroglu : 
114-124) The criticism brought here is not that they are irrelevant per se, but that 
their inclusion into a contemporary analysis of sovereignty and statehood is wholly 
anachronistic. Should these jurists examine them as a matter of practice which 
existed at a particular stage of history, their approach could be justified.
Another similarity between Pazarci and Eroglu is in their treatment of the "mandates 
system". The authors merely present the relevant provisions of the UN Charter on 
the rules governing the mandated territories. Neither of the jurists make any 
reference to the political/economic context in which these rules were adopted and put 
into operation, nor the way in which they were implemented in fact. Besides, Eroglu 
goes as far as employing the term "under-civilised" for peoples who lived under 
mandatory regimes in Asia and Africa. A similar Eurocentric attitude can be 
observed in relation to "the territories under trusteeship". This suggests that the 
authors have no qualms about the legitimacy of the mandates system. (Pazarci: 115- 
119, Vol.2) (Eroglu : 119-123)
Unlike Pazarci and Eroglu, Celik observes that the mandates system was established 
by the victors of the First World War to rule over the territories formerly governed by 
defeated powers -the Ottoman Empire and Germany. The author dismisses the
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British and French claims that the mandated peoples were incapable of governing 
themselves. Furthermore, drawing on the actual operation, he raises serious doubts 
as to whether the populations living under the mandates system gained any benefits 
out of i t  (Celik : 234-237, Vol.1) Celiks critical stance also prevails over the 
subject of "recognition,,. The author states that "recognition", as a precondition for 
new states to join the 'international community1 -which was controlled by European 
powers until the second half of the present century-, was an ‘invention’ of European 
colonialism. The author argues that this requirement was used as a legal cloak to 
dismiss the demands of the colonial peoples for independence. Therefore, Celik 
rejects the view that recognition is a precondition for independence. Recognition, he 
says, has to be regarded as a declaratory act which confirms rather than constitutes 
the independence of the recognized state. (Celik: 221-222, Vol.l)
It is observed that the sphere of international law has been rapidly expanding to cover 
new fields of human activity, while embracing new actors which had hitherto been 
treated as exclusive preserves of state sovereignty. This emerging trend is observed 
by Celik. He asserts that today international relations are not only conducted 
between states, but between other actors, such as international organizations, as well. 
He disagrees with those who merely examine inter-state relations in spite of a 
complex network of transnational transactions and activities which are witnessed 
today. (Celik : 302, Vol.l) For his part, the author avoids this pitfall by examining 
international organizations and individuals as subjects of international law. Celik 
maintains that international organizations are an integral part of international legal 
life, and therefore, have to be examined from a legal point of view. That is exactly 
what he does : he describes the institutional structure and the objectives of 
international organizations, in particular the League of Nations and the United 
Nations; albeit purely from a legal/procedural perspective, though on occasion, he 
draws on the actual operation as when he notes that the League of Nations did not 
succeed in securing peace and security. (Celik: 247-283, Vol.l) This is also the case 
with his treatment of individuals. He notes that individuals possess rights and hold 
responsibilities in certain areas which are sanctioned by international law, as in the 
case of human rights. In this context, he speaks of the international conventions and 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations. (Celik : 283-301, Vol.l) However he 
does not express his opinion as regards their implementation, or the legal force and 
effectiveness of international documents on human rights.
For his part, Eroglu refuses to incorporate individuals as relevant actors in 
international society. Instead he focuses on various international organizations. The
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criticism raised against Celik can be transposed to Eroglu par excellence: he simply 
informs the reader of their purported objectives and of the institutional machinery 
devised to implement those objectives. (Eroglu : 135-168) In the end, the reader is 
left wondering what has happened in actuality and what the author thinks of them
This formalistic/technical mode of analysis is also the approach adopted by Pazarci. 
He ignores the historical background and the political/ideological forces that have 
shaped the formal framework of international organizations. He is merely descriptive 
in his handling of the issues. The author takes for granted the rales and institutions of 
international law. He narrates the technicalities of his subject from a western 
positivistic perspective. Pazarci seems to ignore the fact that despite their formal 
equality, some states are "more equal" than others in the decision-making forums of 
certain international organizations, like the IMF, World Bank and the UN Security 
Council. For the author, it seems this is 'natural'. (Pazarci : 119-160, Vol.2) In 
addition to his dubious moral position, Pazarci wholly ignores the background 
necessary for an understanding of why some states hold a privileged status in the 
decision-making bodies of key international organizations. As a result of this 
uncritical approach, the reader is bombarded with mere information that lacks the 
kind of critical insight necessary to comprehend the issues at stake.
A similar attitude prevails over his treatment of human rights issues. He makes no 
comments on the implementation of human rights provisions by states which have 
adopted them. For instance, while noting that Turkey has not signed the two 
conventions of the UN General Assembly adopted in 1966 on the protection of 
human rights, Pazarci does not explain why. It seems that Pazarci avoids being 
involved in politically 'sensitive' issues. Instead he seeks to justify the Turkish 
position and deny the legal effect of the human rights conventions in question (The 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights). In order to strengthen his argument, the author does not hesitate to pursue 
an eclectic attitude by making use of socialist doctrine of international law -as 
professed by the communist states, particularly the Soviet Union, which were 
reluctant to accept the 'internationalization' of human rights for fear, among others, of 
its being used as a pretext for western interference in their domestic affairs. (Pazarci: 
203-223, Vol.l) In fact, the major assumptions of socialist doctrine contrast with a 
positivist concept of international law which the author seems to advocate throughout 
the book. This example demonstrates that Pazarci lacks a coherent and well- 
formulated analytical approach which could prevent him from inconsistencies and, at 
times, contradictory statements. Meanwhile, the author dismisses the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as "non-binding", without however discussing 
its political and moral force -given that it was unanimously adopted by the General 
Assembly.
It can be concluded that there is a growing awareness among Turkish publicists, with 
the exception of Eroglu, of the extension of international law to cover international 
organizations, various social groups and individuals as subjects of international law. 
However their analyses generally remain at a purely legalistic and descriptive level.
4.2.4.4.The Law of Territory
International law does not make any distinction as to whether a polity claiming 
sovereignty and asking for recognition is a legitimate representative of the people 
unless it relates to colonial rule, racist minority regimes or foreign occupation. It 
suffices that the claimant is effectively controlling a clearly defined territory and its 
population. This principle of ’effectiveness' is the result of the Eurocentric origins of 
international law which was initially premised on the existing balance of power. This 
came about as a result of the need of the colonial powers in Europe to set up a 
system of law to legitimize the status quo and to demarcate the territorial limits of 
their colonial expansion. In this context, the term terra nullius, which had been 
designated for any piece of land without a possessor, was transposed to describe the 
non-European territories inhabited by tribal groups with distinct forms of political 
administration. The designation of these territories as terra nullius meant that the 
occupation and effective administration of these territories by colonial powers were 
sufficient for the occupier to claim sovereignty under international law . (29)
This theme is taken up by Celik and Pazarci. Celik rejects the view that societies in 
the territories labelled by colonialists as terra nullius were lawless. He argues that 
this was a gross distortion of reality. They had, like any society, a different set of 
rules and an administrative framework to govern the relations between the members 
of their community. Therefore, for the author, acquisition of these territories by 
certain European powers was nothing other than a 'conquest1. (Celik : 18-21, Vol.2) 
Pazarci draws on the historical experience of western colonialism after the so-called 
"discoveries" of other continents from the fifteenth century onwards. Just as Celik, 
the author notes that the term terra nullius was a legal cloak used by the colonizers 
to occupy the territories of the so-called 'primitive' people which supposedly lacked a 
proper political and social organization. (Pazarci: 237-240, Vol.2)
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Leaving aside the historical issues, both Pazarci and Celik focus on the national 
jurisdiction of states and the limitations posed by international law. They also 
summarize the doctrinal discussions as regards the nature of relations between a state 
and its territory. These authors, as well as Eroglu, examine the legal requirements for 
the birth and the extinction of states. (Eroglu : 124-134) (Celik : 7-73, Vol.2) 
(Pazarci : 6-58, 234-245, Vol.2) As usual, these themes are investigated from the 
point of view of the classical doctrine on the law of territory. They do not, 
furthermore, discuss the doctrinal conceptions behind this methodological framework. 
(These themes have been discussed in Chapter 3)
The doctrinal conceptions behind the classical law of territory are only discussed by 
Meray. Indeed the author brings to light the legal foundations of the jurisdiction of 
states over their territory and its population. In this context, he presents a brief 
summary of the arguments made by various schools of thought for an explanation of 
the doctrinal conceptions behind the law of territory. (Meray : 143-146) The author 
does not fail to discuss the principle of nationality and self-determination when 
accounting for the population factor as an essential component of statehood. (Meray : 
138-143) His analysis of the question of self-determination draws both on its 
evolution during the League of Nations and the United Nations era, as well as on the 
decisions of international courts and scholarly writings in regard to this principle. 
(Meray : 139-143) Finally, when discussing types of statehood, he draws on some 
non-western cases too. (Meray : 168-171)
The other jurists under investigation, for their part, simply take the classical doctrine, 
which was premised on the principle of effectiveness, for granted. No attempt is 
made to discuss its origins, or its implications for present international law. Besides, 
no mention is made of the contemporary challenges to the classical notion of 
exclusive sovereignty exercised by states. This anachronistic approach inevitably 
limits further inquiry into substantive issues, such as the question of legitimacy and 
the question of whether a people could have a right to self-determination under 
international law. Toluner's book is a case in point
The author focuses on the jurisdiction of states in the context of the law of territory. 
For its part, Chapter 2 deals with the acquisition of territory under the 'old' 
international law which was largely premised on the principle of effectiveness. 
(Toluner : 5-22) However she does not devote as much space to the contemporary 
legal and political criteria for the acquisition of territory or qualifications for
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statehood. Neither does she mention that the principle of human rights and the 
protection of minorities have limited the scope of exclusive jurisdiction enjoyed by 
states. She also fails to discuss the implications of the principle of self-determination 
for disaffected minorities. Instead, noting that the principle of self-determination 
precludes secession, she refrains from further analysis. Hence for the author, self- 
determination is no more an applicable principle of international law since it was 
merely intended to bring about independence for peoples living under colonial 
domination. Its relevance today largely derives from its affirmation of the principle 
of non-interference. (Toluner : 27-30) As a result, she devotes only four pages to 
self-determination out of a book of four hundred pages.
To conclude, it appears that 'the law of territory' is treated by Turkish jurists as an 
exclusive preserve of the state. At this juncture, international law is assigned an 
abstract, formal function of reaffirming the existence of states and endowing them 
with rights and duties arising out of international law towards other states. Issues of 
substantive significance which relate to the relationship between the state, the 
territory and the people are dismissed as 'irrelevant'. This analytical framework is a 
far cry from the realities of an interdependent international system in which 
international law increasingly permeates into the municipal laws of nation-states.
4.2.4.5.International Law and Development
This section initially examines the historical reasons behind the incorporation of the 
notion of 'development' into the scope of international law. Next, it exposes the 
major premises and objectives of this new subject by referring to the rules and 
principles adopted to achieve those ends. Finally, it discusses the position of Turkish 
jurists on these matters.
As has previously been examined, traditional international law reflected the liberal 
individualism of industrializing, capitalist nations in Europe during the 18th and 19th 
centuries. This was a law of coexistence and non-intervention whereby 'security' was 
the catch-phrase of this Eurocentric system of law (30). It also reflected the colonial 
and commercial interests of European powers.
The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 in Russia was the first crucial blow to 
established international law. The new Soviet regime, refusing to accept the 
traditional rules governing state succession, repudiated the debts and treaties inherited
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from Tsarist Russia. This marked the beginning of a voluntary international law as 
opposed to a legal system that had been imposed by strong nations. The creation of 
the United Nations after the Second World War also represented a major step 
towards the establishment of a more just and progressive international order (31).
Real progress in international law came with the process of decolonization in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The emergence of newly independent states has 
had significant repercussions on the composition of international society, and on the 
nature and purpose of international law. The numerical superiority of these 'new’ 
Asian and African states, together with the equally disgruntled Latin American states, 
-together they are referred to as the 'Third World' countries- enabled them to exert 
significant influence in the United Nations General Assembly and other universal 
organizations. The newly independent states came to realize that "political 
independence" had to be matched with "economic independence" if they were to 
achieve real independence. They also realized that:
"...traditional international law has helped to make 
independence a completely superficial phenomenon, 
beneath the surface of which the old forms of 
domination survive and the economic empires of the 
multinational corporations, and the powers that protect 
them, prosper" (32).
The newly independent states were therefore not willing to accept some of the old 
treaties which reflected their unequal position vis-^-vis the European powers. They 
challenged these unequal treaties and some of the established principles of 
international law. They have been seeking to eliminate those rules which constitute 
an obstacle to their national sovereignty and aspirations for a real self-determination. 
Besides, they have also demanded that the industrialized nations should actively 
contribute a fairer share of the world's wealth and resources. To them, these are 
necessary preconditions to eradicate poverty and relieve them from bonds of 
illiteracy, disease and early death. The Third World has launched an "anti-colonialist, 
anti-racist crusade" which has put former colonial powers on the defensive. 
Furthermore, they often recall that today's 'developed' nations were partly responsible 
for retarded development in the 'periphery' -in the light of the historical evidence that 
their wealth was sucked and their markets saturated by the goods originating in the 
industrialized 'centre' (33). Therefore, the newly independent states have put forward
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various demands which have, to some extent, changed the course of the present 
system of international law:
-they are willing to annul 'unequal' treaties,
-they refuse to grant economic and political privileges to their former colonial 
masters,
-they demand equality of rights and participation in the international community,
-they demand the protection of law against the might of powerful states, particularly 
in the economic field,
-finally, not satisfied with a negative law of peace, they are demanding the active 
contribution of international law to their development efforts (34).
The General Assembly of the United Nations has been used by developing nations to 
legitimize their claims, actions and policies since the late 1950s. In this context, 
numerous "law-making" resolutions, particularly in the field of economic co­
operation, have been adopted by the General Assembly. Hence, as opposed to the 
formation of customs in the preceding era, which used to take generations to develop 
and become binding, the second half of the 20th century has witnessed the formation 
of customs rapidly -in response to the acceleration of the rhythm of modem life (35). 
Of particular importance are the UN Resolutions adopted in the 1970s.
As is well-known, the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions on 1 May 1974 
at its sixth Special Session which primarily concerned themselves with the 
development problems of poor nations (36). They were adopted upon the insistence 
of the Group of 77 which is a consortium of developing countries containing more 
than one hundred and twenty members. The first is the Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. This Declaration proclaimed 
that the current economic order had to change with a view to establishing a new 
international economic order. The Declaration laid down general principles on which 
the new economic order had to be founded. The second Resolution spoke of 
concrete measures designed to bring about the general objectives mentioned in the 
first resolution.
The same year, on 12 December 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted "The 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" (37). Although its normative force 
was somewhat weakened as a result of the intense opposition from western 
governments, the Charter has a greater legal force in comparison to other resolutions 
since its language is "couched in a language more akin to international legislation" 
(38). Given that the Charter, with its specifically defined provisions, has become a
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primary legal referent for later discussions with regard to the substance and the scope 
of 'international law and development1, it is worthwhile to discuss its content with 
some detail.
Its preamble defines the fundamental purpose of the Charter as "the establishment of a 
new international economic order". Article 2(1) reaffirms the right of every state to 
enjoy permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. Article 2(2c) states, in spite 
of strong opposition from developed countries, that every state has the right to 
nationalize or expropriate alien property on payment of "appropriate compensation" 
in accordance with its domestic law. Several other Articles in the Charter invite the 
international community to favour or give preference to the developing countries in 
economic and trade matters. Aware of the tremendous achievement of the oil- 
producing countries (OPEC) in their oil embargo against the western powers in 1973- 
74, Article 5 holds that the producers of primary commodities have the right to 
associate for the purpose of balanced development of their economies. This Article 
was also adopted with western powers opposing i t  The same Article goes on to 
impose a general duty on all states to refrain from "applying economic and political 
measures that would limit it" (the association). Article 6 urges the conclusion of 
long-term multilateral commodity agreements to promote trade with stable and 
equitable prices. Article 13 speaks of facilitating the transfer of science and 
technology for the benefit of developing nations. Article 14 makes it a duty for all 
states to promote the expansion of world trade and an improvement in the welfare 
and the living standards of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries. 
Article 17 makes clear that "international co-operation for development is the shared 
goal and common duty of all states". The rest of the Charter calls on the developed 
countries to extend and improve the system of generalized preferences to the 
developing countries on a non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis.
Not unexpectedly, there exists a clear disagreement between developed and 
developing countries, as well as among legal scholars, with regard to the legal force 
of this Charter. Contrary to the assertions of the developing countries, developed 
countries insist that the Charter cannot be binding, since it is neither universally 
accepted nor adopted by those who are empowered to legislate binding instruments. 
On the other hand, those who challenge this view argue that the UN resolutions 
evidence the practice of states and thus "contribute to the crystallisation of a rule of 
customary international law" (39). In other words, they gradually gain binding force. 
One can note that through its 'non-binding' resolutions, the General Assembly has 
initiated a process which played a central role in undermining various colonial and/or
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unequal dimensions of traditional international law. This function of the General 
Assembly, defined by Anand as 'collective legitimation', has been evident during the 
whole process of decolonization through the adoption of resolutions denouncing 
colonialism, affirming the principle of self-determination, and through the redrafting 
of the Law of the Sea. Therefore, as Anand puts it, traditional lawyers can, if they 
wish, dismiss the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as not legitimate, 
but they can not afford to ignore the political force of this resolution in changing the 
traditional law (40).
Whatever the position of international lawyers on these issues, it is clear that the 
notion of 'development' has been incorporated into the fabric of international law. It 
has also challenged certain principles of classical international law, in particular, the 
principle of equality and its corollary, reciprocity. The poor nations are not satisfied 
with a "formal" equality without any material basis, but ask for the active 
participation of international law to reduce the disparity between rich and poor 
nations. This may imply the setting aside of the principle of equality of rights and 
obligations in favour of "positive discrimination", granting of financial aid, 
technological assistance and so forth. Therefore it is only to be expected that the 
relationship between international law and development is discussed in Turkish 
textbooks of international law.
Typical of his general treatment of his subject, Eroglu sticks to the classical doctrine, 
and, as a result, totally dismisses 'international law and development1. Celik, 
meanwhile, while ignoring this subject, makes some observations with regard to the 
question of "state succession", some aspects of which may be related to the economic 
problems of newly independent states. The author criticises the scholars who 
examine this matter -state succession- from the stand point of the ex-colonial state. 
He argues that the process of decolonization has become a general feature of present 
international law. Therefore, in order not to be trapped by the classical doctrine, the 
jurists are bound to focus on the 'new' state. (Celik : 272, Vol.l) In this context, the 
author takes an anti-colonialist/anti-imperialist stance on the theme of "state 
responsibility". He notes that often the treaties of succession between the ex-colonial 
state and the newly independent state are rendered meaningless as a result of the 
concessions received by the former from the latter -the 'cost of independence'. He 
therefore questions the legitimacy of these agreements. Besides, he points out that 
the constitutions of newly independent states were often in effect drawn by the former 
colonial masters which were keen to secure their privileges. The author, however, 
notes that the works of codification by the UN on "state succession" and "state
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responsibility" have radically transformed the rules of the previous regime. The 
author welcomes the new developments which he perceives as being beneficial to the 
newly independent states. (Celik: 315-319, Vol. 1)
However the progressive posture adopted by Celik with regard to the specific issues 
mentioned above falls short of concern for 'development law1 as such. It can be 
assumed that he does not regard the UN resolutions dealing with this question as 
being binding. If this is the case, then it can confidently be asserted that he is attached 
to a positivistic conception of law which draws a sharp distinction between 'hard' law 
and 'soft' law. Since, technically speaking, the UN resolutions are not binding, the 
author, it seems, dismisses them out of hand.
Not unlike Celik, Pazarci also remains indifferent to the legal developments towards 
the creation of a new international economic order. Instead he draws on some of the 
evolving principles of international law which are vital prerequisites for the 
establishment of a new international economic order. In this context, he draws on the 
principle of "positive discrimination" which is designed to contribute to the 
protection of poor nations against the industrialized rich. (Pazarci : 18-19, Vol.2) 
This, as far as the present author is aware, is one of the first attempts by a Turkish 
publicist to recognize the existence of an exception, sanctioned by international law, 
to the conventional principle of "reciprocity". Though he merely 'informs' of its 
existence without further elaboration, this 'new' approach may set a precedent for 
future studies in Turkey. The author also makes a reference to the principle of 
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources" when examining the body of rules 
relating to sovereignty. (Pazarci: 28-29, Vol.2)
Broadly speaking, then, Turkish jurists have not yet come to recognize "development 
law" as a corpus of international law. While the "radical" lawyers, particularly in the 
Third World and the (former) socialist states, show a great deal of interest in the 
development of the normative aspects of law, the Turkish scholars of international 
law are attached to a liberal positivistic tradition which insists on detailed and precise 
legal rules for legal norms to gain mandatory force. Hence, given that the resolutions 
adopted in response to the development problems of poor nations do not conform to 
the western standards of law-making, they are ignored by Turkish scholars.
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4.2.4.6.An Overview of the Methodological and Substantive Analysis
Starting with Eroglu, his is a descriptive study and takes the established rules and 
conceptions of classical international law for granted. He hardly initiates any 
arguments or discussions. As the author declares in the preface, this textbook is 
written in the form of a handbook. Apparently, the book was written hastily as it 
looks quite sketchy and disorganized. It is doubtful whether the book has any 
purpose other than informing the reader of the general practice of international law. 
The issues are dealt with from a formalistic framework in which mles and institutions 
are described in abstract, and with an almost exclusive focus on the procedural 
dimensions of the law, legal process and institutions. The author takes a positivistic 
view of international law since he sees the already established, binding and 
enforceable rules as the sole legitimate source of international law. On the other 
hand, he does not rely on source materials other than those written in the west. Not a 
single source from non-western literature can be found in the book. Neither does the 
author refer to the Ottoman or Turkish context. Finally, Eroglu totally ignores the 
historical background of international law, whereas he dismisses the contemporary 
issues of international law, such as human rights, the right to self-determination and 
'international law and development1. Therefore, this study can be "stereotyped" in the 
sense that it epitomizes all the weaknesses and prejudices of international legal 
scholarship in Turkey.
As for Pazarci, his textbook is written for an audience that does not challenge the 
ideological/doctrinal basis of the present international system which is still dominated 
by a western bloc of states. The author describes the existing mles and institutions of 
international law as they are, and only draws on western legal experience of inter­
state relations. Not unlike Eroglu, he lays too much emphasis on the procedural 
aspects of international law. The author often declines to elaborate on the themes 
that have been discussed in this study or on the operation of rules in reality. By 
concentrating his efforts on the traditional issues of international law, this being 
purely from a legal/technical perspective, the author fails to relate international law 
into wider international relations. As a result, he fails to open a discourse which may 
be of help towards an understanding of the context in which Turkey faces 
international society.
Not unlike Eroglu and Pazarci, Celik lacks the kind of critical attitude necessary for 
exceeding the parochial boundaries of conventional scholarship. However this is not 
to say that the author wholly ignores contemporary developments. He does, for
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instance, make brief references to recently adopted rules and principles which benefit 
the developing nations. However they do not alter his Eurocentric frame of analysis 
which he takes for granted. As a result, the reader is deprived of conceptual and 
normative tools with which to assess the new actors and processes of international 
law and the patterns of its development.
The same also holds true for Toluner. Although her book was published in 1989, no 
reference is made to the new legal and jurisprudential developments, or scholarly 
writings in the 1980s in the field of sovereignty and statehood which are the main 
topics of her book. Besides, nowhere does she make use of non-western materials 
or writings.
For its part, Meray's book is immune from most of the criticisms made above. His is 
an elaborate and insightful study which treats international law in its entirety. The 
author seeks to explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of 
international law as evidenced by the diversity of legal materials on which he relies : 
doctrinal discussions relating to the nature and foundations of international law, 
treaties, custom, UN resolutions, judgements and advisory opinions of international 
courts. Besides, as has been seen, this book appears rather progressive for its time.
With the exception of Meray, then, Turkish scholars of international law have drawn 
almost exclusively on western legal experience and practices in their treatment of the 
subject. For these authors, the fact that ’traditional' international law was a creation 
of the so-called 'Public Law of Europe'- the rules of which served to legitimize the 
imperial interests of European Powers- is simply 'irrelevant' given that it has sound 
basis to claim 'universality'. These textbooks do not rely on materials other than those 
produced in the west This bias is unjustified given that the family of nations is no 
longer limited to a handful of European countries. On the contrary, it has rapidly 
grown into a world-wide society of nations. As Prof. Khadduri states:
"To draw on the experiences of an increasing number 
of other nations is as logical as it is pragmatic, for 
diversity of experience serves the common interests of 
an expanding community of nations" (41).
Furthermore, it is stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice that one of the sources of international law is "the general principles of
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international law" which also includes the general principles of the public orders of 
various nations (42).
In addition to the uncritical acceptance of European legal tradition as the sole 
framework of inquiry, Turkish scholars of international law seem to take side with 
the positivist school within that tradition. Similar to the English school of 
international law, they limit themselves with what 'is', to the exclusion of what 'ought 
to be'. As a result, in Turkey, international law has remained as a highly technical 
discipline with its hierarchical and formalistic framework. For instance, Turkish 
scholars are reluctant to concede legal consequences to resolutions of the General 
Assembly, even for the states which have voted in the affirmative. As a result of this 
posture, while the 'hard-core' sources of international law, namely treaties and 
customary rules, constitute the main bulk of legal analyses, other sources, such as 
resolutions, general principles or doctrinal writings, are treated marginally. This 
conceptual and methodological framework inevitably leads to an outmoded 
conception of international law which is frozen in its formality and neutrality. This 
contradicts with the nature of international law as it is a dynamic process in which the 
changes in economic and social structure in international society finds its expression 
(43). Hence, it can be asserted that the relative weakness of international legal 
discipline in Turkey is due to the inability and/or unwillingness of legal scientists to 
come to grips with the evolution of law. To put it more explicitly, in the Turkish 
case, legal science is reduced to the mechanical description of an existing body of 
mostly conventional topics without due regard to the dynamics of international law.
Not unpredictably, then, as far as the academic establishment is concerned, 
international law discourse in Turkey has thus far failed to come to terms with the 
contemporary problems and trends in international society. Turkish publicists tend to 
adopt the kind of analytical method which is devoid of the economic, social and 
political context in which legal standards evolve. Besides, the contemporary 
conditions shaping the future evolution of international law or the influence of legal 
institutions upon the realities of the present world order are often ignored. By this 
token, a large number of themes which are vital to the explanation and exploration of 
international law are not at all investigated: what, for instance, is the historical 
background to the emergence and development of international law? what were the 
economic and political interests behind the 'Eurocentric' international law? what are 
the distinctive contributions of 'progressive' trends on the conceptual and doctrinal 
framework of international law? what is the nature of the relationship between 
'international law’ and ‘development1 as an expanding discipline within international
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law? Besides, they do not seek to understand what part, if any, international law plays 
in the actual conduct of international relations. In the Turkish tradition, this has 
largely been left to the experts of international relations. On the other hand, the 
choice of topics generally centre around the rights and duties of sovereign states and 
international organizations. Only a small segment of contemporary issues -issues 
which do not smack of 'politics1- are incorporated into the analysis of international 
legal rules and principles, such as 'the protection of environment' and the new 'law of 
the sea'.
4.2.5.Conclusion
It appears that Turkish academics of international law and relations generally lack a 
tradition of critical scholarship. Their analytical and normative frame of reference is 
based on the acceptance that Turkey is part and parcel of the European -or westem- 
states system, which then relegates the non-westem world into a secondary status. 
This is premised on a belief that Turkey's official policies towards the outside world 
are essentially 'correct' as they are 'desirable'. Hence the task for the Turkish foreign 
policy analyst is to 'describe' and/or 'narrate' Turkey's actual behaviour as seen from 
the perspective of Turkish diplomats. As far as Turkish publicists are concerned, 
their analytical attitude is largely informed by Eurocentric assumptions. Law is 
perceived in its technical formality and procedural dimensions, without much 
attention to its substance or context.
The following observation of a Turkish sociologist in relation to the state of social 
sciences in developing countries experiencing a process of modernization, equally 
applies to the state of international legal scholarship in Turkey. She asserts that the 
uncritical transmission of 'knowledge':
"...becomes more important than to analyse, to think 
and to discover new relationships...Because of the 
dominance of scholasticism, the most striking 
characteristics is the extraordinary weight given to 
teaching, on the one hand, and the low quality and the 
limited amount of research, on the other...Repetition of 
dated knowledge, as in scholastic teaching, continues 
to be considered appropriate" (44).
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Indeed, for their part, broadly speaking, Turkish academics of international law have 
been unaware of, or indifferent to, the actual or potential role played by international 
law in contemporary international relations. As a result, Turkish jurists have failed to 
play a critical role in the dissemination of legal knowledge, and, instead, remained as 
uncritical transmitters of often outdated standard textbooks written by western 
scholars. Though often not clearly discernible, the theoretical/ideological position of 
Turkish academics of international law can be defined as 'liberal positivism' of a 
conservative type. For it appears that the international law establishment in Turkey 
takes an apolitical stance of legal scholarship founded upon the belief that it is 
possible to be value-free and that a legal scholar can operate as a technical expert 
Here the legal ideology is treated as legal reality. However as the findings of the 
sociology of knowledge have shown, no scholar could claim to be free of 'prejudices' 
or 'ideological assumptions'. Personal feelings are often reflected in one's work. 
Therefore, the Turkish academics whose works have been examined in this chapter 
do not represent a 'neutral' and 'scientific' system of thought. Their assertions about 
the rules and basic assumptions of international law are not necessarily universally 
valid and good for international society. They merely propagate a particular model of 
doctrine -western positivism- which claims to provide a minimum of standards 
necessary for the conduct of international relations.
The uncritical stance of Turkish international lawyers cannot be duly understood 
without examining certain non-academic factors. The members of the universities in 
developing countries are also members of the elite (45). This assertion is particularly 
valid for Turkey where academics of international law are also often employed as 
functionaries of the state. Most of these scholars are legal advisers and/or 
representatives of the Turkish government in international organizations. Therefore, 
they are either ideologically aligned to the official establishment or are unwilling to 
resist official policy. This is inevitably reflected in their studies. Since they see 
themselves as advisers/employees of the state, they tend to be pragmatic rather than 
theoretical or critical. It is therefore not surprising that they frequently refrain from 
'stirring' politically 'sensitive' issues which might undermine Turkey's official position 
on various questions of international law.
Also of particular relevance is the experience of statehood in Turkey. It is observed 
that in newly independent states or in relatively young nation-states, such as Turkey, 
the academics in social sciences often find it difficult to adopt a critical approach on 
the politics, the economic and social system or the foreign policy of their countries. 
Given that, in such countries, national unity is almost never complete, there is always
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a likelihood that the non-conformist researcher will be accused of undermining 
'national interests', 'national unity’ and other perceived high interests' of the 'nation' or 
the 'state'. For instance, in the specific instance of foreign policy, the scholars of 
international law and relations are expected to support, or at least suggest, minor 
modifications to, official policies. This fact, coupled with the lack of democratic 
traditions in most developing countries, tends to create a docile and non-critical 
tradition of scholarship in those countries.
In the light of the analysis made above, it might be asserted that the scholars of 
international law and relations may find it difficult to enjoy the luxury' of being 
critical and argumentative, for fear that this might undermine Turkey's official policies 
and, therefore, its 'national interests'. Indeed the fact that an exclusive weight has 
been accorded to the western group of states in the formulation of Turkish foreign 
policy, is partly to account for the formalistic/conventional attitude of Turkish 
scholars of international law. Although one might argue that the methodological 
framework of international law books written by Turkish scholars is hardly relevant 
to Turkey's priorities and aspirations as a developing nation, it is also clear that this 
frame of analysis with its Eurocentrism and positivism coincides with Turkey’s 
official policy of alignment with the western group of countries. In other words, 
instead of taking a critical attitude toward existing policies, the Turkish academic 
establishment seem to have reproduced and reinforced the dominant discourse 
relating to Turkey's official conception of international society and its legal 
framework.
Finally, a brief recapitulation of the preceding chapters is due here. It was stated in 
the Introduction that a major purpose of this dissertation is to make an exposition of 
the link between power and discourse, as formulated by Foucault, in the context of 
Turkish nationalism. Chapter 3, inter alia, has been an attempt to construct a 
paradigm for a clearer understanding of the conceptual and normative foundations of 
Turkish perceptions of international society. Turkish nationalism and national identity 
are among the cardinal instruments of this paradigm. In Chapter 4, it has been argued 
that the analytical focus and the conceptual framework of international law and 
relations books are subsumed to the limitations of Turkish foreign policy. In other 
words, the academic discourse in Turkey has become an integral part of a process in 
which the 'nation' is presented with a particular vision of the international order. For 
their part, the chapters that follow seek to expose Turkish conceptions and practices 
of international law in the context of specific disputes and questions.
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The case studies that follow are designed to test the validity and implications of the 
theoretical arguments presented in the first part of the thesis. It is therefore 
appropriate to give a brief review of the preceding discussions. Chapter 2 was 
intended to provide the foundations of the analytical and conceptual posture adopted 
in this study. It argued that the critical hermeneutical analysis of international law 
transcends the constraints posed by an approach informed by a single legal theory. 
For its part, Chapter 3 was an attempt to identify the historical, political and 
psychological constraints within which Turkish foreign policy is formulated. It was 
intended to show how Turkish nationalism became the normative underpinning of 
Turkey's definition of itself and its conception of the outside world after the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. It was 
argued that nationalism, in the Turkish context, was from the outset imbued with 
modernism, western conceptions of legality, and elitism. It was also noted that 
Turkey's incorporation into western standards of civilisation was in congruence with 
the western orientation of international law which Turkey accepted uncritically. 
However it is wrong to assume, as discussed in chapter 3, that Turkey's political 
identification with the western world as well as with its standards of civilisation has 
been devoid of frictions between Turkey and the international society which is still 
largely dominated by western powers. It has been seen that, in the specific case of 
Turkey, concepts like 'national honour', 'national prestige’, and 'national 
consciousness' have played a disproportionate role in the conduct of foreign policy. 
The inherent tensions between 'nationalism' and 'legal formalism', which has been a 
prominent feature of Turkey's international behaviour, has been particularly visible in 
the case of the Cyprus dispute and Turkey's problems with the Kurdish minority. 
These will be elaborated in Part H
Another raison d'etre of chapter 3 was to expose the priorities, motives and 
objectives that lie behind the Turkish approach towards the outside world. It is hoped 
that these expositions will make it possible to relate a particular legal situation or 
problem to the broader framework of Turkish foreign policy. The overall purpose of 
chapter 3, then, was mainly to explore the internal variables -of course in interaction
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with the external world- that have direct or indirect bearing on Turkish conceptions 
of international law.
If chapter 3 was an attempt to trace the emergence and the evolution of Turkish 
nationalism as defined by ruling elites, chapter 4 sought to explore the contribution 
of the academic establishment to the construction of a particular discourse as far 
Turkey’s conception of the outside world is concerned. Together they were intended 
to show that ’power’ has to be understood in relation to the particular ’discourse' in 
which it takes place. For their part, the individual chapters that follow, unlike chapter 
3 which deals with the overall context of their formulation, examine the execution of 
particular policies with regard to various test cases.
Indeed the chapters compiled under Part II focus on the individual legal disputes of 
Turkey as well as its posture regarding the newly evolving rules of international law. 
The disputes which will be considered here are as follows : 'Cyprus dispute', 'Aegean 
dispute', 'Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece' on the one hand, and the 'Kurdish 
minority in Turkey' on the other. The final chapter of Part II explores Turkey's voting 
pattern in the UN General Assembly since the 1950s in respect of newly evolving 
areas of international which may be described as 'progressive': decolonization and the 
principle of self-determination; search for a new international economic order; human 
rights. An analysis of Turkey's legal behaviour in the context of specific disputes and 
cases does not merely highlight some of the major preoccupations of Turkish 
diplomacy since the 1950s, but also demonstrates the Turkish position on various 
concepts, rules and principles of international law, such as 'self-determination', 
'minority rights', 'sovereignty', 'the use of force' and so forth.
In the chapters that follow, it will be argued that the increasing impact of UN 
resolutions and other international instruments over the conduct of international 
relations has heightened Turkey's feeling of insecurity in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. This is partially due to the fact that the balance (military and political) 
established by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) has been increasingly undermined by 
the creation or codification of new international legal rules and principles adopted 
mostly under UN auspices. Among them are the following : first, the adoption of UN 
resolutions which accorded the right of 'self-determination' for territories under 
colonial domination eventually resulted in the establishment of the independent 
Republic of Cyprus, which had formerly been under British sovereignty, in 1960. 
However the independence of Cyprus also carried the seeds of the future conflicts to 
come. For Turkey, the well-known desire of the Greek-Cypriot majority to unite
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Cyprus with Greece would, should it become a reality, not only endanger the lives of 
the Turkish-Cypriots but also upset the military and strategic balance in the eastern 
Mediterranean in favour of Greece. The 'Cyprus problem' has since the early 1960s 
become a major preoccupation of Turkish foreign policy, and remains so up to this 
day. Besides, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, as well as the 
continued presence of Turkish armed forces in northern Cyprus, have been largely 
condemned by the international community as an 'occupation'. Secondly, the 
emergence of international human rights and the system of minority protection has 
become one of the major pillars of the UN system after the Second World War. As 
far as Turkey is concerned, this has brought to the forefront the plight of the 'Kurdish 
minority' in Turkey. Turkey's refusal to recognise the Kurds as a 'minority' and its 
poor record of human rights in general have been internationally criticised, not least 
by the European Community in which Turkey seeks full membership. Thirdly, the 
adoption in 1982 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea has undermined the 
balance in the Aegean in favour of Greece. Under the Convention, islands also 
possess their own territorial waters and continental shelf. Its outright implementation 
in the Aegean would place some seventy percent of that sea under Greek sovereignty. 
That is, inter alia, why Turkey is among a handful of countries not to have signed 
the Convention.
In the following analysis, it will be argued that these unforeseen international 
developments, combined with Turkey's alignment with the western group of countries 
and its failure to formulate clear and well-planned foreign policy objectives, are the 
major factors behind the contradictions and inconsistencies of the legal dimensions of 
Turkish foreign policy. They are also central to an understanding of Turkey's 
pragmatic but frequently anachronistic conception of international society and its legal 
framework.




The Cyprus conflict is internationally known for the intractability and the intensity of 
the hostilities between two rival ethnic and religious groups. This conflict has also 
has become one of the main preoccupations of Turkish diplomacy and a microcosm 
of the problematic dimensions of Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s. As a 
Turkish scholar and former diplomat, Suat Bilge, puts it, the conflict over Cyprus is a 
'national1 issue which is beyond party politics (1). Granting the complexity of the 
Cyprus 'problem', as well as its special significance as part of the domestic politics in 
Turkey and Greece, it is difficult to give a fair account of its legal dimensions. In the 
light of the objectives of this thesis, this chapter is primarily concerned with Turkey's 
perception of the Cyprus dispute. However, when discussing the legal dimensions of 
Turkish military involvement in Cyprus and the following partition of the island, the 
Greek thesis will also be presented.
First, it may be useful to understand the legal and political justifications of Turkey's 
involvement in Cyprus since the 1950s. First, a well-known principle of international 
law, the doctrine of historical continuity, applies here. Cyprus was an Ottoman 
province from 1571 until 1914. At the outbreak of the First World War, the island 
was annexed by Britain which exercised sovereignty over the island until the 
establishment of the independent Cyprus Republic in 1960. Turkey legally recognized 
British sovereignty over Cyprus by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. In order to 
justify Turkish involvement in Cyprus, some Turkish scholars have argued that since 
Turkey renounced its claims over Cyprus in favour of Britain, any changes in the 
political status of the island would require Turkey's consent (2).
There is also an ethnic dimension of Turkish involvement in Cyprus. It is known that 
Turkey did not claim sovereignty when the British and French mandated Arab 
territories, which had formerly been ruled by the Ottoman Empire, gained 
independence in the 1930s and 40s. The sole exception here is the province of Hatay, 
in which a sizeable Turkish community, alongside Arabs and some other smaller 
communities, was living. When it became clear in the 1930s that France was about to 
give independence to Syria, Turkey laid claim to Hatay which had an autonomous 
status during the mandate regime. While initially reluctant to succumb to Turkish 
demands, France eventually accepted the Turkish claim in order to secure Turkey's
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support for the anti-revisionist bloc against Germany and its allies (3). In Cyprus, as 
in Hatay, a significant fraction of the population are of Turkish descent (roughly 20 
per cent Turks, 80 per cent Greeks). When the independence of Cyprus was being 
discussed in the 1950s, Turkey feared that the Greek majority of the island would 
either seek to join mainland Greece and/or suppress the Turkish-Cypriots which made 
up some twenty percent of the island's population. From the Turkish point of view, 
history lent support to Turkish suspicions. A Turkish scholar points out that the 
origins of the Cyprus crisis can be traced to the nineteenth century when the 
'nationalist virus' 'infected' the Greek-Cypriots who were led by the Greek-Orthodox 
church (4). The enosis movement, which aimed at the union of Cyprus with Greece, 
was active during the reign of the Ottoman Empire and of Britain. However both 
sovereigns managed to contain this nationalistic fervour. The principle of self- 
determination became a cardinal principle of international relations in the post- 
Second World War era, and sanctioned the independence of many Asian and African 
colonies. However, given that, under this principle, that which was to be 
'determined' was to be decided by the 'majority' of the population of a particular 
territory, the search towards the 'self-determination' of Cyprus in the 1950s, in 
Turkey’s view, could eventually lead to the destruction of the Turkish 'minority'. 
Therefore, it was suspect from the outset (5).
The legal arguments in favour of Turkish involvement in Cyprus are reinforced with 
the added dimension of political and strategic considerations. Cyprus is 
approximately forty miles south of the Anatolian coastline, which makes the island 
strategically vital for Turkey's security. Turkey is particularly sensitive to the idea of 
being 'strangled' by Greece from Thrace to Cyprus.
When the question of the independence of Cyprus, which was then a British colony, 
was raised by the Greek majority of the island in the 1950s, Turkey was reluctant to 
become involved in Cyprus for fear of weakening NATO as a result of a possible 
confrontation with Greece (6). At the time, the main focus of Turkish diplomacy was 
directed towards the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. This compelled the 
Menderes government to keep a low profile over Cyprus unless the situation 
dangerously showed signs of getting out of hand. Turkey initially favoured the 
continuation of British sovereignty of the island, as was explicitly stated by the 
Foreign Minister in 1951 (7). This Turkish posture prompted Greece to accuse 
Turkey of being an 'accomplice of colonialism' (8).
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In response to the growing demands of the Greek-Cypriots for independence, 
Britain decided to invite Greece and Turkey to discuss the future of the island. This 
was the first time since the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that Turkey 
became a party to the Cyprus question (9). The first London conference (1955). 
ended in failure with Greece asking for the implementation of the principle of self- 
determination, and Turkey advocating the continuation of the status quo (10). 
However, as it became clear that Britain was intent on renouncing its sovereignty 
over Cyprus due to growing international pressure, Turkey began advocating the 
partition of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots (11). This was, however, 
an unlikely prospect since the international community, particularly the newly 
independent Asian and African states, was not prepared to accept the territorial 
disintegration of Cyprus, which was perceived as being contrary to the principle of 
self-determination.
The final agreement on the status of Cyprus was reached in 1959 with the convening 
of the Zurich and London Conferences. The Conferences were joined by the 
representatives of Turkey, Greece, the UK, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. 
While Turkey dropped its insistence on the division of the island, Greece renounced 
its sovereignty claim over Cyprus. Britain, meanwhile, accepted the independence of 
the island after having secured the preservation of its bases there (12).
The Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, as well as the Cypriot 
Constitution, initially drawn during the Conferences as the Basic Structure of the 
Republic of Cyprus', reflected the Turkish distrust of the Greek-Cypriot majority. 
The Constitution (13) provided both internal and external checks and balances as a 
guarantee to secure the safety, well-being and the cultural identity of the Turkish 
community in Cyprus. Though, on paper, the Republic of Cyprus was to be a unitary, 
sovereign state, it was in effect a 'functional federation'. The Constitution recognized 
the two communities as equal partners by establishing the principle of bi- 
communality. In this context, the communal affairs of the islanders were to be 
relegated to the responsibility of the Communal Chambers (prg.10). The 
Constitutional provisions were designed in such a way as to give equitable 
participation to the Turkish community in the functioning of the state; that is, in 
legislative, judicial and governmental affairs. While the President was to be chosen 
from amongst the Greek community, the vice-president was to be of Turkish origin 
(Prg.l). The Turkish community would have a fair share in the composition of the 
Cabinet and of the National Parliament (Prgs.5 & 6). In case of a legal dispute 
involving Turks and Greeks, mixed courts were to be authorized (Prg.17).
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Meanwhile, as expressed in the Treaty of Establishment, the new status of the island 
was to be guaranteed through the close co-operation of the Republic of Cyprus with 
Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom (14). A similar arrangement was made in the 
Treaty of Guarantee which was designed to "ensure the maintenance of its (Cyprus) 
independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for the 
Constitution". The same Article "prohibited any activity likely to promote...either 
union with any other State or partition of the island" (15). Here one can easily 
observe the existing mutual distrust between Turks and Greeks. The Turkish side 
was presumably fearful of Greek designs to unite the island with the 'motherland' 
Greece, whereas the Greeks wanted effective guarantees against the establishment of 
a separate Turkish state in Cyprus.
The most vital and controversial of all the clauses in the Treaty of Guarantee was 
Article 4. This reads :
"In the event of a breach of the provisions of the 
present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to 
the representations or measures necessary to ensure 
observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove 
possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers 
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re­
establishing the state of affairs created by the present 
Treaty" (16).
In most probability, the last paragraph was included upon the insistence of Turkey. 
Indeed, according to Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister at the time of the Zurich 
and London agreements, the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu had, during the London 
conference, stated that the right of unilateral action was a measure against a possible 
coup de main in Cyprus, or against any attempts directed at the union of Cyprus with 
Greece (enosis) (17). Turkey's insistence on a unilateral right of intervention was an 
indication of its mistrust of Greeks, as well as of the United Kingdom. As has been 
discussed in the preceding chapters, Turkey's perception of the outside world is 
marked by a sense of isolation and insecurity. In so far as Cyprus was concerned, 
this meant that Turkey was adamantly opposed to any security arrangement which 
precluded the possibility of a unilateral Turkish action in Cyprus.
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The Cyprus Agreement which provided for the independence of Cyprus was actually 
signed under the patronage of NATO, with effective British involvement, and was 
hailed as a triumph for diplomacy. However in reality it was "imposed upon the 
Cypriot people without their consent" (18). Besides, the consociational character of 
the Constitution was hardly workable due its "complicated and inflexible nature" (19). 
This meant that the new status of the island was doomed to failure, unless the 
communities acted with a spirit of co-operation.
Perhaps not unpredictably the Greek-Cypriots were resentful of the new 
arrangements. They felt that the Constitution unduly and unjustly favoured the 
Turkish community. In their eyes, although the Turks were a 'minority', they were 
unjustifiably treated on a par with the Greek majority who made up some eighty 
percent of the population. This was a major factor behind the ensuing Constitutional 
deadlock in a variety of matters in the years that followed the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus. Barely three years after the establishment of the Republic, the 
Greek-Cypriot President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, proposed 
thirteen amendments to the Constitution. These proposed amendments, six of which 
were part of the Basic Articles which had been declared immutable by the Treaties 
and the Constitution, were clearly intended to shift the balance of power in favour of 
the Greek-Cypriot majority (20). Combined with the ensuing armed assault against 
Turirish-Cypriots, this constitutional 'coup' prompted the Turkish members of the 
Government to withdraw.
Meanwhile, the Greek-Cypriot leadership began to argue that the international 
agreements over the status of Cyprus had become obsolete since they had been 
imposed on Cyprus before independence. In this view, which was also declared 
before international fora, since the Republic of Cyprus had been admitted to the 
membership of the United Nations as a sovereign state, any right of intervention by 
foreign powers in the affairs of Cyprus would be inadmissible under international law 
(21). However, to the dismay of Greek-Cypriots, having discussed this matter in 
1964, the UN Security Council passed no decision on the question of the validity or 
the legal effect of the Treaty of Guarantee (22). The Security Council took a similar 
posture when the Treaty of Guarantee was once again invoked in 1965 (23).
The inability or unwillingness of the two communities to agree on constitutional 
reform resulted in mutual recriminations between the leadership of the respective 
communities. Meanwhile, Turirish-Cypriots became the target of growing attacks by 
various armed groups. This culminated in the launching of attacks on some Turkish
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villages in 1963-64 by some members of the newly created Cyprus National Guard, 
many of whose members were sent from Greece. In the face of these grave 
developments, the Turkish Government decided to intervene in Cyprus. However 
this decision could not be implemented due to the last minute intervention by the US 
President Johnson who, in his letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu, made it 
clear that Turkish military action in Cyprus would be unacceptable to the United 
States, and warned that should Turkey send its troops to Cyprus, the US would not 
feel obliged to defend it in case of Soviet aggression against Turkey (24). The 
Johnson Letter', as this incident is known in Turkey, outraged the Turkish political 
establishment and the masses alike. They came to believe that Turkey's unsuspecting 
alliance with the western world did not necessarily guarantee its security (25).
The period between 1967-1974 was similarly marked by continuous tensions and 
inter-communal strife in Cyprus. The mutual distrust between the two communities 
intensified when, in 1967, the army took over power in Greece. This led to a 
greater rearmament of the Greek-Cypriot forces and the increasing involvement of 
Greece in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The inter-communal talks between Turkish 
and Greek-Cypriots, meanwhile, seemed fruitless, since the parties could not agree on 
a plan towards the reconstruction of a workable constitution. This deadlock resulted 
in the setting up of a "Transitional Administration" by Turkish-Cypriots in December 
1967 (26).
The 1970s witnessed growing friction between Makarios, the President of Cyprus, 
and the Greek military junta due to the latter's increasing interference in the internal 
affairs of Cyprus. This confrontation took a new turn, when, with the encouragement 
of the military regime in Greece, General Grivas, a veteran of the enosis movement, 
secretly returned to Cyprus in September 1971. Soon he founded a terrorist 
organization called EOKA-B with the aim of reviving the struggle for enosis. The 
EOKA-B members, as well as some members of the church and those who 
sympathized with the enosis cause, began to call for the deposition of Makarios for 
betraying the 'sacred' cause. As is well-known, these events culminated in the coup 
d'etat of 15 July 1974 which led to the overthrow of Makarios (27).
It is not the intention of this chapter to give a full account of the events leading to the 
Turkish intervention in Cyprus or of the military action itself. Instead it mainly 
concerns itself with the objectives and the legality of the Turkish action in Cyprus. In 
this context, the legal dimensions of Turkish military intervention of 1974, which has 
since become the focus of much controversy, will be discussed here.
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Immediately after the deposition of Makarios, Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA 
activist, was appointed as the President of Cyprus. This unconstitutional move posed 
a clear threat to the security and well-being of the Turkish community. Indeed the 
aftermath of the coup led to the break-out of violence during which the Turks 
suffered a large number of casualties. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council 
condemned the coup d'etat in Cyprus. Makarios also testified that this was an 
'invasion from outside1, and asked for the restoration of the constitutional order (28).
Relying on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit immediately urged the United Kingdom and Greece for a prompt action to 
restore the constitutional order, while sending an ultimatum through the intermediary 
of US Under-secretary of State J. Sisco for the resignation of Nicos Sampson. He 
also asked for the withdrawal of the 650 Greek Officers of the Cypriot National 
Guard, and firm pledges that Cyprus would not be united with Greece (29). However, 
none of these demands were met. A Turkish scholar asserts that Turkey was fearful 
that the United Kingdom would eventually recognize the new regime out of its 
concern for the British bases in Cyprus. The author adds that Turkey was equally 
suspicious of the apparent passivity of the United States (30). Under these 
circumstances, Turkey felt obliged to send Turkish troops to restore the 
constitutional order and to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus. Hence, it can 
be argued that, before sending its troops to Cyprus on 20 July 1974, Turkey had 
exhausted all diplomatic avenues in search of a solution to avoid military 
confrontation. Seeing that no effective international action was forthcoming, the 
Turkish government decided to resort to a major motto of Turkish foreign policy in 
order to find a definitive solution to the Cyprus problem: self-reliance.
Immediately following the cease-fire on July 22, Turkey joined the Geneva 
Conference alongside Greece and the United Kingdom in response to the request of 
the Security Council. The conference ended on 30 July with a joint declaration 
which confirmed the existence in effect of 'two autonomous administrations' in 
Cyprus (31). The second Geneva Conference took place between 8-13 August 1974, 
with the additional participation of the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot delegations. Here, 
the Turkish delegates put forward two proposals which could be acceptable to the 
Turkish side: a political arrangement based on a bi-zonal federation or a cantonal 
administration. Neither of these proposals, however, were accepted by the Greek 
side. The conference came to a stalemate, when, during the plenary session, the 
Greek side asked for an extension of the deadline set by the Turkish delegation for a 
consideration of the Turkish proposals. Turkey rejected the Greek request for fear
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that the suspension of a definitive agreement might endanger the lives of many 
Turkish-Cypriots who were surrounded by Greek-Cypriot forces. Indeed, 
immediately after the news of some Turks who had been killed by Greek forces was 
heard, the Turkish military operation resumed on August the 14th. As a result of this 
second intervention, which ended on the 16th of August, some 36 percent of the 
island fell into the hands of the Turkish forces (32).
Although Turkey had no doubts about the legality or the morality of its military 
intervention in Cyprus, the international community almost universally condemned the 
Turkish 'invasion1 of Cyprus. It was particularly the second military operation which 
lent support to the Greek thesis that this was an 'illegal invasion'. Indeed, Turkey was 
not as much blamed after the first military intervention. For instance, the Security 
Council resolution No. 353 of 20 July 1974 was non-committal. Paragraph 1 called 
on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
Cyprus (33). Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its 
resolution No. 573 of 29 July 1974, admitted that the Turkish military intervention 
was an exercise of a right arising out of an international treaty (Treaty of Guarantee) 
(34). However, after the second military operation, neither the UN Security Council 
nor the Council of Europe maintained their previous 'mild' stance. For instance, 
Security Council resolution No. 360 of 16 August 1974 expressed its "formal 
disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of 
Cyprus" (35). Furthermore, Turkey was utterly isolated when the UN General 
Assembly resolutions in 1975 (36) and 1976 (37) demanded the restoration of the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus as well as the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. Turkey alone voted against the 
resolution. For the first time in its modem history, Turkey confronted international 
society as an 'aggressor'. Apparently, the Turkish ruling establishment was 
bewildered by the extent of the gap between the Turkish perception of the Cyprus 
crisis and that of the rest of the international community. After having kept a low 
profile in world affairs with its policy of legal formalism since the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey was once again in the 'spotlight'.
The legal dimensions of the 'Cyprus problem' have been subject to innumerable 
scholarly writings and countless discussions in the UN. It is almost impossible to give 
an 'impartial' account of such a delicate and complex problem, and propose a 
definitive legal prescription accordingly. The assessment of the facts and the position 
of international law with regard to these facts often depends on the preconceptions 
and the emotional biases of the commentator himself/herself. Before expressing the
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views of the present author -which will inevitably be subjective-, it is more 
appropriate to present the respective positions of the Turkish and Greek sides, as well 
as the views of some 'non-partisan’ observers with regard to the Turkish military 
intervention in Cyprus.
The Greek view is most systematically put forward by Jacovides, a former 
ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the United States, which merits particular 
attention. In his view, the Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus was legally unjustified, both in 
terms of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee and that of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. He argues that, contrary to Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey 
did not meet the requirement of 'consultation' with Greece and the United Kingdom 
before taking military action (38). However, this argument is refuted by an 
independent observer, Glen Camp, who notes that the Turkish Prime Minister had 
prior consultation with his British counterpart before the Turkish troops landed at 
Cyprus (39). A second point made by Jacovides in relation to Article 4 of the Treaty 
of Guarantee is that the term ’action’ could not be interpreted as meaning the use of 
'armed force'. The same view was expressed by the representative of Cyprus before 
the UN Security Council:
"Those words 'concerted action' mean lawful action, 
peaceful action, through measures of representation, 
through the Security Council and through other means, 
not through aggression, which under the Charter of the 
United Nations is forbidden" (40).
Returning to Jacovides, he also asserts that the right of intervention is, inter alia, 
contrary to the doctrine of sovereign equality of states as had been embodied in 
Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter (41). This view was also echoed by the Greek- 
Cypriot representative before the UN Security Council. He argued that Turkish 
action was inconsistent with Articles 2 (1), 2 (3), and 2 (4) of the UN Charter which 
prohibits the threat or the use of armed force between sovereign independent states, 
this being a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law as confirmed by the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (42).
Jacovides also argues that the Turkish military action in Cyprus was not taken "with 
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty"; 
instead Turkey's aim was to impose by force its own prescription for a political 
solution which contravenes the Treaty of Guarantee (43). He also points to the lack
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of proportionality between the harm done to the Turkish community as a result of the 
Sampson coup of 1974, and the 'devastating consequences' of Turkish military 
'occupation' of the island (44).
To reinforce his arguments, the author also refers to Article 103 of the UN Charter 
which holds that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, the obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." 
Therefore, according to Jacovides, Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee "did not and 
could not authorize use of armed force by Turkey against Cyprus" (45). Besides, 
even if it were to be interpreted as authorizing the use of force, this would still be a 
clear violation of the peremptory norms of international law (46).
In the face of these sophisticated legal arguments, Turkish representatives in the UN 
and elsewhere have consistently argued that Turkey's unilateral intervention in Cyprus 
was based on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. As has been mentioned earlier, 
this provision explicitly states that if the parties- meaning, Turkey, Greece and the 
United Kingdom- do not agree on a collective action in the event of a breach of the 
treaty, "each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action" (47). 
For Turkey, this alone justifies its use of force in the face of a coup d'etat which 
overthrew the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, and whose main 
objective was to create a union between Cyprus and Greece. It has been seen that 
the right to 'unilateral use of force1 had been inserted into the Treaty upon the 
insistence of Turkey. Before launching military intervention, Turkey had indeed 
consulted the other parties for a concerted action -which was rejected- before taking 
the military initiative. The legality of the Turkish action, the argument goes, is also 
evidenced by the fact that, following the Turkish intervention, the legitimate 
government of Cyprus was reinstalled and the independence of the island restored
(48). David Hunt, who very much sympathizes with the Greek position, fervently 
argues that, rather than resorting to unilateral use of force, Turkey should have gone 
before the UN Security Council in accordance with Article 24 of the UN Charter to 
ask for immediate action to remedy the situation created by the coup d'etat in Cyprus
(49). However, as two Turkish scholars put it, it was only after Turkey intervened in 
Cyprus that the UN Security Council took any decisions, although Turkey had been 
calling for immediate action following the military coup in Cyprus (50).
Turkey has, of course, rejected the view that Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee 
was null and void since it authorized forcible action in Cyprus. The Turkish thesis
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regarding the unilateral right of intervention in Cyprus was expressed before the UN 
Security Council in 1964 by the Turkish representative :
"The very preamble of our Charter demands respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources 
of international law. In fact, respect for pledges and 
commitments embodied in international treaties is the 
only foundation upon which stability in international 
relations can be achieved" (51).
Indeed Turkey consistently argued, during the years between 1964-74, that Turkey's 
right to unilateral action, as a last resort, derived from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.
As for the Greek claim that 'the use of force' is contrary to the peremptory rules of 
international law, the Turkish side has argued that the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties of 1969 has no retroactive effect as expressed under Article 4, which 
means that it is not applicable to the Treaty of Guarantee which was signed in 1960 
(52). Furthermore, no objection regarding its qualification as a sovereign state was 
raised when the Republic of Cyprus was admitted to membership of the United 
Nations (53). Finally, as quoted by a Turkish scholar, "neither the Security Council 
nor the General Assembly has ever declared a treaty void under Article 103, although 
the issue has been raised in both bodies" (54).
It has already been stated above that Turkey has also been blamed by the other party 
for transgressing the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee due to the continuing partition 
of Cyprus caused by Turkish military action in 1974. This view is also shared by 
Gillian White, a British scholar of international law, who, while accepting that 
Turkish military intervention cannot be characterized as a violation "against the 
territorial integrity or political independence" of Cyprus, since the Republic of Cyprus 
had consented to the possibility of the 'use of force' as it was among the Parties to the 
Treaty of Guarantee, she argues that Turkish action in Cyprus went beyond what 
was necessary for restoring the constitutional order there. In this sense, argues the 
author, the Turkish action is contrary to the UN Charter, as well as to the Treaty of 
Guarantee itself (55). To this, the Turkish side responds by asserting that the 
expression "to re-establish the state of affairs" is meant to correspond to the period 
which preceded the break up of the inter communal partnership caused by the Greek- 
Cypriot constitutional'coup' of December 1963. The reversal to the period between
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December 1963-1974 could only restore the "illegitimate regime of Makarios" (56). 
Considering that the Republic of Cyprus was founded on the basis of a functional 
partnership between the two equal communities, the argument goes, one has to 
accept that their (Turks and Greeks) respective rights of self-determination were 
implicitly recognized in the constitutional arrangements and the international treaties 
which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus (57). The new situation, the roots of 
which lie in the break-up of the inter communal partnership in December 1963, "will 
require the making of a new constitution. In view of this, it seems that when a 
settlement is reached, the Treaty of Guarantee, which is now in force, will have to be 
up-dated" (58).
The respective legal claims of the two sides which have been examined above clearly 
show that a major contention between Turkey and Greece is the precise point of time 
when the Cyprus crisis first arose. For the Greek side, the crisis began with Turkey's 
military occupation of Cyprus in 1974. In Turkey's view, however, the origins of the 
Cyprus problem have to be traced to 1963 when the bicommunal partnership was 
destroyed by the Greek-Cypriots. Furthermore, since December 1963, the Turirish- 
Cypriots had been forced to live in 'enclaves' due to armed attacks by various Greek- 
Cypriot elements. On the other hand, the Turkish intervention in 1974 should not, in 
Turkey’s view, be singled out as an isolated instance. It has to be related to the coup 
d'etat, the main aim of which was to put Cyprus under Greek sovereignty, which was 
the sole raison d'etre of Turkey's military involvement in the island. This view was 
emphatically expressed by the Turkish Foreign Minister before the UN General 
Assembly in 1989. He asserted that it was "Greece and the Greek-Cypriots who are 
responsible for the coup of 15 July 1974 when they tried to deal a final blow to the 
independence of the island and the Turkish-Cypriots' existence there" (59). From the 
Turkish point of view, then, the Turkish position was legally and politically justified. 
It was morally justified too, since Turkish military action was the only way to protect 
the lives, property and welfare of the Turkish community in Cyprus. In this context, 
Turkish diplomats and scholars almost universally agree that, at the time when the 
pro-enosis coup d'etat took place in Cyprus, no Turkish Government could afford 'to 
sit back and watch the massacre of Turkish-Cypriots' in the face of growing public 
pressure for action. The Turkish public only remembered too well how Turkey had 
been deterred from unilateral action during the inter-communal strifes of 1963 and 
1967 which had resulted in the loss of many Turkish lives. This time, however, the 
mass public were not prepared to see another failure on the part of the Turkish 
government (60).
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One can easily observe that the contending parties perceived the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus from different angles which led them into opposing conclusions. 
The Greek-Cypriots tended to emphasize the 'unitary* nature of the Republic of 
Cyprus, while the Turkish-Cypriots drew on its 'bicommunal' functionalism. This is 
perhaps not surprising. The Republic of Cyprus emerged as a result of an externally- 
imposed partnership which did not necessarily reflect the consent of the 'people' of 
Cyprus. Never in the history of the island did the Greek and Turkish communities 
share common symbols of identity or political loyalties. In this sense, the notion of a 
Cypriot 'national identity1 was simply a myth. Britain is partly to blame for this, since, 
during its colonial rule in Cyprus, it pursued a policy of keeping the two communities 
apart in order to secure its hold on the island. This meant that Britain had no interest 
in harnessing a Cypriot national identity among the Greek and Turkish communities 
(61). The Greek-Cypriot community speaks Greek, belongs to the Christian church, 
and emotionally identifies with Greece. The Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand, 
speak Turkish, belong to the Islamic faith, and emotionally identify with Turkey. 
Furthermore, the communities possess separate historical memories and cultural 
symbols which, in some cases, are defined in contradistinction to one another. The 
problem in Cyprus, then, was, and is, one of conflicting nationalisms.
As has been mentioned earlier, as a result of the Turkish intervention in 1974, 
Turkish-Cypriots took possession of some 36 percent of Cyprus. There have been 
ongoing negotiations to end the partition of Cyprus since then. However they only 
helped to underline the extent of the rift between Turkish and Greek views of an 
appropriate solution. To start with, the inter-communal talks in 1974-75 ended in 
failure when the Greek side favoured a strong central government, as opposed to the 
Turidsh-Cypriot proposal for a weaker one. Soon after the meetings ended, the 
Turkish-Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in February 
1975. The Turkish side, however, assured the Greek-Cypriots that this did not imply 
the establishment of a separate state, but was intended to make up the Turkish- 
Cypriot wing of a future Federal Republic of Cyprus (62).
Not unexpectedly, this new initiative was not welcomed by the international 
community. For instance, on March 12, 1975, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 367 -without vote- regretting that "a part of the Republic of Cyprus would 
become 'a federated Turkish state"' (63). Both the UN Security Council and the 
General Assembly reaffirmed that there was only one state in Cyprus irrespective of 
the de facto division of the island (64). However these resolutions also recognized the 
existence of two separate communities in Cyprus. Indeed, Resolution 367 spoke of
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"...the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two 
communities on an equal footing" (65). This implied, as Wolfe remarks, the 
acceptance of a bicommunal statehood in Cyprus (66).
In pursuance of paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 367, which entrusted the UN 
Secretary General with a new mission of good offices, inter-community talks resumed 
in August 1975. At the third round of the talks, on 2 August 1975, the parties agreed 
for a voluntary exchange of populations. During the sixth round of Vienna talks 
which took place between 31 March and 7 April 1977, the Turkish-Cypriot side 
proposed a "federation by evolution". It was for the first time during these communal 
talks that the Greek side accepted the notion of bi-communality and the principle of 
bi-regionality. However, the talks were interrupted with the death of Makarios (67). 
After the resumption of talks, the Turkish side submitted a proposal in January 1978, 
described by the UN Secretary General as "concrete and substantial", which was 
rejected by the Greek-Cypriot leadership (68). Talks in May-June 1979 also failed 
over the priority of the topics to be discussed. Whereas the Turkish side wanted at 
first to discuss the issues of 'bi-zonality' and 'security', the Greek side prioritised the 
resettlement of Maras (Varosha). (69). A few months later, on 20 November 1979, 
the UN General Assembly passed Resolution No. 34/30 by a vote of 99 to 5 with 35 
abstentions demanding, inter alia, the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from Cyprus. The Resolution also called on "all states to support and help the 
Government of Cyprus to exercise its rights on the Republic, and its people to full 
and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its 
resources" (70). (Emphasis mine). This was undoubtedly a major diplomatic victory 
for the Greek side. The resolution unambiguously advocated the Greek thesis that 
Cyprus should remain a unitary state, and that any moves which could lead to the 
creation of a separate state were unacceptable. Besides, the resolution demanded the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, which was another blow to the 
negotiating position of the Turkish side.
The Greek strategy of 'internationalizing' the Cyprus dispute gained new impetus with 
the election of Papandreou to the Greek premiership in 1981. His government 
declared that neither the formal negotiations, nor the UN-sponsored inter- 
communal talks, could succeed unless the Turkish forces in Cyprus were withdrawn. 
Besides, the Papandreou government began calling for an international conference 
which was hoped to compel Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus (71). From 
the Turkish point of view, this 'uncompromising' stance of the Greek government was 
an obstacle to the negotiation process (72).
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In 1983, while a new round of talks was scheduled for May 31, the UN General 
Assembly, with the initiative of the Non-Aligned Contact Group on Cyprus, adopted 
another resolution which reaffirmed its Resolution No.34/30 of 1979. Resolution No. 
37/253 of 13 May 1983, inter alia, recalled the Greek proposal for an international 
conference on Cyprus (73). In reaction to this development, the Turkish-Cypriots 
boycotted the new round of talks. Furthermore, in defiance of the international 
community, the Turkish-Cypriot Legislative Assembly passed a resolution on 17 June 
1983 affirming that "the Turkish people of Cyprus have a right to self-determination" 
(74). Shortly after, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish-Cypriots took a historical 
decision by proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Henceforward, 
TRNC). On the same day, Turkey recognized the new Republic (75).
From the Turkish point of view, the proclamation of independence in the northern 
section of Cyprus was primarily intended to increase the bargaining position of the 
Turkish-Cypriots in inter-communal talks. Indeed, in his letter to the Secretary 
General of the UN, Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, assured that 
the Turkish side was willing to continue the inter communal talks (76). Nonetheless, 
as is well known, this Turkish initiative has been universally condemned by the 
international community. For instance, the UN Security Council Resolution No. 541 
of 18 November 1983 considered that the Declaration was "incompatible with the 
Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee", and that it was 'legally 
invalid". Accordingly, it called for its withdrawal, while urging "all countries to 
refrain from recognizing it" (77). The following year, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution No.550/84 which reaffirmed Resolution No.541 and condemned all 
"secessionist acts" in Cyprus (78). Meanwhile, in its Recommendation No.974 of 23 
November 1983, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe rejected the 
"unilateral declaration of independence of the northern part of Cyprus" and demanded 
the immediate withdrawal of the "occupying Turkish troops" as an indispensable 
condition for a solution to the Cyprus crisis (79). Other organizations followed suit 
with verbal condemnations, including the European Community and the 
Commonwealth, as well as the United States, the former Soviet Union and Britain. 
Indeed no state, other than Turkey, has so far recognized the TRNC.
The representatives of the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey have repeatedly assured the 
international community that the proclamation of independence in northern Cyprus is 
not an irreversible decision. This point was made clear by Turkey's Permanent 
Representative to the UN in his speech to the Security Council on 18 November 
1983. First, he argued that the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus was based on the
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recognition that both communities had the right to self-determination. Since this 
system was destroyed by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots were again free to enjoy 
their right to self-determination. However, he assured that the independent republic 
in northern Cyprus would remain so unless "both communities agree to come 
together again on an equal footing in the Federal Republic of Cyprus in a bi- 
communal, bi-zonal and federal framework" (80).
Turkey is all too aware that the international community is unlikely to recognize the 
TRNC in the foreseeable future. As Groom rightly observes, "practically all states 
have a vested interest in condemning secession" (81). Indeed, many states are fearful 
that the recognition of the TRNC might create a dangerous precedent in international 
law by giving legitimacy to the struggle of many beleaguered minorities for 
independence. Turkey itself is not immune from these considerations since, as will be 
seen later, some sections of Turkey's Kurdish minority are demanding the right to 
self-determination, which is flatly rejected by the government Therefore, it is also in 
Turkey's interest to advocate a single state in Cyprus -albeit within a federative 
structure.
The inter-communal negotiations have not come to a halt despite the proclamation of 
an independent Turkish republic in northern Cyprus. The UN Secretary General's 
proposed plan in 1986 called for the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of a bi­
national federal republic with a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turidsh-Cypriot vice- 
president, both of whom would have a veto power over a bi-cameral legislature. The 
proposal suggested a reduction in the land controlled by Turks from 35,8 percent to 
a little over 29 percent. While the Turkish-Cypriots accepted the proposals, the 
Greek-Cypriots put forward certain preconditions, such as the withdrawal of Turkish 
forces from the island, before any consideration of the proposals. In response, 
President Denktash of the TRNC, in his letter to the Secretary General of the UN, 
stated that there could be no withdrawal of Turkish troops until all aspects of the 
Cyprus problem were settled. In the face of this disagreement, the Secretary 
General's plan was dropped (82).
Due to an apparent lack of agreement over some key issues, such as the presence of 
Turkish troops in Cyprus and the powers to be assumed by the central government, 
the parties have failed to resolve the Cyprus problem to this day. This deadlock in 
negotiations has only encouraged the Turidsh-Cypriot community to distance itself 
from the larger Greek community. This tendency can be discerned in the latest 
proposal (1990) of Rauf Denktash in which he suggested a confederative solution as
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the political framework in which to bring the two communities together. Besides, the 
proposal spoke of the Turkish 'people* rather than the 'community', while expressing 
its right to 'self-determination' (83). This shift in policy is attributed to the recent 
disintegration of the federally-constructed states in central and eastern Europe, as 
expressed by the Attorney-General of the TRNC. He asserts that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, both of which were based on federal structures, has 
"demonstrated peoples' reliance on the right of self-determination" (84). Returning to 
the 1990 proposals made by the Turkish side, not unpredictably, they were rejected 
by the Greek-Cypriots.
The apparent unwillingness of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to accept even a federal 
constitutional arrangement has however been largely criticised by the international 
community. A UN Security Council resolution, adopted unanimously on November 
25, 1992, attributed the failure of the latest round of UN-sponsored talks between 
the Greek and Turkish representatives of Cyprus largely to the fact that the 
"positions adopted by the Turkish-Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with 
the Set of Ideas" put forward by the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (85). 
Earlier, on November 6, Rauf Denktash, the President of the Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, had been blamed by Boutros-Ghali for being "in total opposition to all UN 
resolutions, to the society of nations and to the Security Council". His reaction had 
been prompted by Denktash's insistence on two separate states, his rejection of the 
proposed map and his refusal to hand over Varosha, previously the Greek suburb of 
Famagusta, to UN administration (86).
At this point, it may be appropriate to discuss the principle of self-determination and 
its failings in the context of Cyprus. Under present international law, the declaration 
of independence in northern Cyprus seems unacceptable. Independent observers 
have almost universally agreed on the illegality of the Turkish declaration of 
independence in northern Cyprus in 1983. Wolfe asserts that international law does 
not empower a community to secede from an existing state. He asserts that:
"Were that to be the case would not the independence 
and territorial integrity of many U.N. members be at 
risk? The Treaty of Establishment was indeed signed by 
democratically chosen representatives of both 
communities, and it was a commitment to maintain the 
Republic, not dissolve it" (87).
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Hunt too points out that, in violation of the treaties establishing the Republic of 
Cyprus, the Turkish side has presented as its intention "one of the two courses 
formally excluded by the Treaty, namely the partition of the island" (88).
Similarly the Greek side has all along argued that the Turkish-Cypriot community 
does not have a right to exercise separately the right to self-determination. This view 
was expressed in the UN Security Council by the representative of the 'Republic of 
Cyprus' -of course not recognized as such by the Turkish side : "The principle of self- 
determination cannot be interpreted in such a way as to impair the unity of the people 
and the territorial integrity of any state" (89).
However, the Turkish view is that, contrary to the pretensions of the Greek-Cypriots, 
the Republic of Cyprus had ceased to represent the whole people of Cyprus as of 
December 1963. One Turkish scholar asserts that sovereignty requires the consent of 
the people, which was non-existent in pre-1974 Cyprus. He argues that the first 
mission of a state is to guarantee the self-realization and self-government of the 
individuals within its territory. This requires that states should not be treated as the 
only subjects of international law; otherwise, all the conventions dealing with human 
rights would loose their original raison d'etre (90). Once it is accepted that the 
legitimacy of the state is a sine qua non of sovereignty, then the ’Republic of Cyprus' 
can be described as an ’illegal state' given that it sought to deny the right of existence 
to Turkish-Cypriots and suppressed their national aspirations (91). In such cases, the 
argument goes, the 1970 UN General Assembly declaration on the right of self- 
determination permits secession. This declaration does not authorize "any action 
which could dismember...independent states conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle...of self-determination of peoples...thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people...without discrimination as to race, creed or colour" 
(92). Since the Republic of Cyprus ‘only represented the Greek-Cypriots’, the 
declaration of independence in northern Cyprus was a perfectly legitimate act of self- 
determination.
As for the Greek claim that it was the Turkish military occupation which created the 
'illegal' state in northern Cyprus, the Turkish view is that the use of force by Turkish 
armed forces in Cyprus was legally justified under the terms of the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Besides, the TRNC was not established immediately following the 
Turkish military intervention. It was only after having exhausted all diplomatic and
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political avenues for a lasting and just solution all of which had failed, the Turkish- 
Cypriots finally decided to declare independence some nine years after Turkish 
intervention. In any case, not all cases of foreign intervention result in the non­
recognition of the state created as a result (93). For instance, the fact that the state of 
Bangladesh succeeded in seceding from Pakistan in 1971 largely thanks to Indian 
military intervention did not deter the international community from recognizing the 
new entity (94). In other words, in the Turkish view, an act of international 
intervention which is a breach of international law does not necessarily invalidate the 
legal existence of the new state (95).
From a strictly legal point of view, the position of those who advocate the Turkish- 
Cypriots' right to self-determination is hardly defensible. Even if the Turkish military 
intervention in Cyprus could be justified by reference to Article 4 of the Treaty of 
Guarantee which permits 'unilateral' action, the same article strictly states that "the 
sole aim" of the action must be to "re-establish the state of affairs created by the 
present Treaty" (96). Given that the Turkish intervention, far from restoring the 
previous constitutional order, led to the division of the island, it may ex post facto be 
seen as a clear violation of the Treaty of Guarantee. Again, from a legal point of 
view, Turkey's campaign for the recognition of the TRNC is, by definition, 
inconsistent with its call for a federative solution in Cyprus. Indeed if the TRNC 
were to dissolve itself within a future federative state, the fact of its international 
recognition would become immaterial. On the other hand, the case of Bangladesh is 
an exception rather than a rule. Besides, unlike the situation in Cyprus, Bangladesh 
was geographically separated from West Pakistan. International law does not 
recognize the right of a minority to self-determination unless a minority group 
succeeds in seceding from an existing state through its own efforts. As has been 
argued in Chapter 3, international law is premised on an anachronistic notion of self- 
determination. It assumes that once a previously colonized territory gains 
independence, the relationship between the new state and its citizens becomes a 
matter for domestic law. Under international law, self-determination is not treated as 
a continuum of rights, but a once-and-for-all right to independent statehood based on 
'majority rule'. This implies that the question of legitimacy or the political aspirations 
of minority groups are irrelevant to international law. Although the 'international 
protection of human rights' comes close to ensuring the legitimacy of states, even in 
this case, these measures are primarily designed to preserve the existing system of 
states. Besides, states themselves possess the ultimate authority in deciding how to 
implement international legal instruments (For a detailed analysis of these points see
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Chapters 3 and 8). In the light of these considerations, it appears that the Turkish 
conception of self-determination in the context of Cyprus is legally untenable.
Perhaps not surprisingly, instead of engaging in a strictly legalistic discourse, Turkey, 
at the official level, has sought to draw on the humanitarian and political dimensions 
of the internal conflict in Cyprus before Turkey militarily intervened in 1974. Turkish 
diplomacy has, inter alia, resorted to the following principles to justify the Turkish 
position in Cyprus : the principle of pacta sunt servanda; the principle of human 
rights; appealing to reason, and a sense of justice and fairness. To make an overview 
of the kind of arguments advanced by Turkish diplomats, they may briefly be 
formulated as follows : perhaps Turkish actions in Cyprus have not always been in 
conformity with existing international law, but they were morally justifiable and 
politically correct The Turkish ‘people1 of Cyprus had been forced into submission 
by an 'alien' majority from 1963 onwards. It is only due to Turkey's determination in 
the face of an indifferent international community that their lives and security were 
spared. The declaration of independence in northern Cyprus is not an irreversible 
step; on the contrary, it will hasten the process towards the establishment of a 
"bicommunal, bi-zonal federation based on the political equality of the two peoples of 
the island" (97). That is why Turkey has all along advocated the continuation of 
negotiations.
Hence, in the final analysis, one's view of the Cyprus dispute depends on the posture 
he/she takes. An international lawyer of a conventional type might rely on the 
established rules of international law on questions of sovereignty, self-determination, 
the use of force and so forth. He/she could then conclude that Turkey "has brought 
in question the whole modem concept of the rule of law in international affairs" (98). 
An unorthodox scholar of international law might, for his/her part, draw on the newly 
evolving areas or perspectives of international law to justify the Turkish position on 
the question of self-determination: the doctrine of legitimacy, secessionary self- 
determination and so forth. Admittedly, the 'conventional' international lawyer has a 
clear advantage over his/her 'unorthodox' counterpart, since, the issues raised by the 
latter do not, as yet, form part of the corpus of international law. As far as the 
principle of the sanctity of treaties is concerned, it cannot justify the continued 
partition of Cyprus.
As the Cyprus conflict demonstrates, international law is still dominated by 
anachronistic rules with regard to questions like 'sovereignty', 'self-determination' and 
'recognition'. It treats law per se, without due regard to the complex set of non-legal
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factors which have direct bearing on a particular legal situation. For instance, 
international law has nothing to say about 'national identity1 which has played a key 
role in the Cyprus conflict Besides, the question of the legitimacy of states is 
subordinated to the principle of effectiveness or, as in the case of Cyprus, to majority 
rule. Its apparent indifference towards factual realities has often led to the ineptitude 
of international law in solving conflict situations. This vacuum between international 
law and 'the problem out there' is also observable in Cyprus.
As far as Turkey's handling of the Cyprus problem is concerned, one sees that despite 
its initial reluctance to engage in such an intricate issue for fear of weakening the 
NATO alliance in the eastern Mediterranean, it has managed to assert itself as a key 
player there. Indeed Turkey has skillfully exploited the existing vacuum in 
international law as well as the inner contradictions of the Republic of Cyprus in its 
own favour. With a long and enduring experience in statecraft, Turkey is an old 
master of diplomacy. It is, for instance, keenly aware of the power-centric nature of 
the international system. Besides, it knows well that international law still largely 
lacks rules and institutions to ensure that 'aggressors' are punished. The UN often 
remains impotent in conflict situations since, for instance, the UN General Assembly 
is not authorized to adopt binding resolutions. Similarly, the UN Security Council 
resolutions are not backed up by enforcement mechanisms, save in cases which 
threaten 'international peace and security' as is enunciated under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. Furthermore, the decision-making in the Security Council is too 
'politicised’ to provide clear guidelines with regard to the consequences of unlawful 
behaviour by states. For instance, despite the UN Security Council Resolution 
No.242 of 1967 (99) which called for its withdrawal from the occupied Arab
territories, Israel has consistently refused to abide by them, knowing that the United 
States will veto any resolutions demanding sanctions against itself. Turkey itself 
being a member of NATO and a strategic ally of the US, these considerations were 
presumably taken on board before it finally decided to rely on its own resources 
following the pm-enosis coup in Cyprus in 1974.
On the other hand, contrary to Greek strategy, Turkey has been adamantly opposed 
to the 'internationalisation' of the Cyprus conflict As has been argued earlier, the 
Turkish vision of the outside world is marked by a 'siege mentality'. This manifests 
itself in the context of Cyprus par excellence. Turkey detests the idea of a Cyprus 
under Greek sovereignty which, as it sees it, would provide Greece with another 
foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. This, in turn, would have finalized Turkey's 
'encirclement' by Greece. One can also draw on the fact that, before the emergence
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of Turkish-speaking republics in the ex-Soviet Union, Turkey lacked an 'international 
political and ethnic constituency" (100). This was, and still is -given the relative 
weakness of the Turkish-speaking republics-, another factor which contributed to 
Turkey's opposition to third party involvement in Cyprus. Besides, Turkey bitterly 
recalls how the Council of the League of Nations unanimously voted to put Mosul, 
which was also claimed by Turkey, under British sovereignty in 1925 (101). On the 
other hand, Turkey has never been a part of the Non-Aligned movement, which
partially explains why it was often rebuffed by its members in international fora.
Indeed a large fraction of these countries, which make up the majority in the UN 
General Assembly, have accused Turkey of 'occupying' a small state like Cyprus, and 
asked for the withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from Cyprus, which they perceived 
as "an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem" (102). In this context, 
they have refused to accept a dual right of self-determination in Cyprus. Turkey has 
equally been suspicious of the western bloc of countries which it perceives as unjustly 
favouring Greece against Turkey, not least in Cyprus.
It is true that Turkey has financially and diplomatically suffered a great deal after 
militarily intervening in Cyprus. It also suffered the consequences of an American 
arms embargo during the period between 1975-79. However the politicians and the 
general public are convinced that it was a price worth paying. No one can deny that 
Turkey's determined action in Cyprus has greatly enhanced the bargaining position of 
the Turkish-Cypriots in inter-communal negotiations. Suffice it to say that the 
Greeks have gradually come to accept the idea of a federal republic in Cyprus, which 
they had previously dismissed. The same change of attitude has been observable with 
regard to the international community at large. Although a number of UN 
resolutions adopted since 1974 have harshly criticised the Turkish 'occupation' of 
Cyprus, the same provisions have called on the parties to seek a negotiated solution 
based on a 'bi-communal federation'. The Cyprus report of the Secretary General of 
the UN in March 1991 was indeed very close to the Turkish position. The report 
notes that:
"Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot communities whose relationship is not 
one of majority and minority, but one of two 
communities in Cyprus...The objective is to work out a 
new constitutional arrangement for the State of Cyprus 
that will govern the relations between the two 
communities on a federal basis that will be bi­
n s
communal as regards constitutional aspects and bi­
zonal as regards territorial aspects" (103). (Emphasis 
mine).
The preparedness of the international community to accept a 'bi-zonal' and ’bi- 
communal* federation in Cyprus, according to which the territory of Cyprus will be 
divided between the two communities and the constitution will be arranged on the 
basis of power-sharing between them, is clearly a diplomatic triumph for Turkish 
political strategy in Cyprus. It is also a testimony to the failure of international law 
which, instead of solving disputes of an ostensibly legal nature, often constructs legal 
formulae which suit the state of affairs created as a result of non-legal means, e.g. by 
the use of force.
Cyprus is only one aspect of Greco-TurJrish disputes. The parties also disagree over 
the delimitation of the Aegean Sea, which will be examined next.
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Turkey and Greece also disagree over the delimitation of the Aegean sea. The 
'Aegean dispute' covers a variety of issues : sovereign rights over the Aegean 
continental shelf; territorial sea limits; the control of military and civil air traffic; and 
the re-militarization of the Greek islands close to Turkish borders. Controversy over 
these matters is aggravated by the intensity of overall hostility between the two sides, 
as discussed in the preceding chapters. The 'Aegean dispute', therefore, has both 
legal and political dimensions. This chapter initially examines each of the matters of 
the dispute separately. Since the main concern of this dissertation is to make a 
critique of the Turkish conceptions and practices of international law, the specific 
details and technicalities of the various disagreements involved in the Aegean dispute 
will largely be by-passed. Therefore, following an introduction to various aspects of 
the Aegean dispute, the essential rationale behind Turkey's official position will be 
explored. The historical and psychological factors which have direct bearing on the 
legal posture adopted by Turkey -and occasionally, by Greece- will also be examined.
The question of the delimitation of the Aegean sea became a matter of dispute in the 
wake of the world-wide 'oil crisis' in 1973 which severely affected both Greece and 
Turkey. The same year Greece discovered oil resources off the island of Thasos. 
The crisis was sparked off by an announcement by the Turkish government that a 
Turkish petroleum company was granted a licence to explore oil resources in the sea­
bed areas near the Greek islands of Lemnos, Mytilini and Chios. Greece immediately 
protested this Turkish move and claimed that these areas formed part of its own 
continental shelf. Turkey, in response, argued that those Greek islands were a natural 
extension of the Anatolian peninsula Greece, for its part, asserted that under Article 
1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, each of the Greek 
islands in the Aegean had its own continental shelf (1). This meant that Turkey could 
not claim any rights to the west of the Greek islands. Unlike Greece, Turkey was not 
a signatory to this Convention for reasons which are not difficult to understand. The 
Convention provides that islands are entitled to continental shelves. Article 1(b) 
states that the term 'continental shelf refers, inter alia, "to the sea bed and subsoil 
of...submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands". The problem with this article 
is that its very general wording was bound to create confusion and conflicting claims 
in certain maritime areas. Indeed, in objecting to the Greek claims, Turkey has
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argued that the Aegean is a special sea whose delimitation has to be based on the 
principle of equity; otherwise, the argument went, the Aegean would become a 
Greek 'lake' due to the fact that the Greeks possessed an innumerable number of 
islands some of which were a few miles from the Turkish coast (2).
In 1975, Greece proposed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
This was rejected by Turkey. Instead, Turkey insisted on bilateral negotiations. In 
1976, following a renewal of tension over the continental shelf dispute, Greece 
brought the problem before the UN Security Council. The latter called on the parties 
to "resume direct negotiations over their differences", which was fully in accord with 
Turkish policy (3). Following this failed initiative, Greece unilaterally appealed to the 
International Court of Justice for a ruling on the delimitation of the Aegean 
continental shelf. In its submission, Greece requested the Court to adjudge and 
declare that the activities of exploration and exploitation pursued by Turkish naval 
vessels since 1973 over the maritime area which, in its view, encroached upon the 
continental shelf belonging to Greek islands are illegal. Pending the final decision of 
the Court, Greece also requested interim measures of protection. To Greece's 
disappointment, however, the Court held that the alleged breach by Turkey of the 
exclusive right claimed by Greece was capable of compensation by appropriate 
means. Therefore the Court concluded that there was no sufficient reason "to justify 
recourse to its exceptional power under Article 41 of the Statute (of the International 
Court of Justice) to indicate interim measures of protection" (4). Soon after the 
Court's interim ruling, the Greek and Turkish sides decided to freeze the dispute by 
an agreement in Beme on 11 November 1976. Under the terms of the agreement, 
both parties undertook to refrain from any action which might prejudice the 
negotiations (5). Two years later, the Court announced its ruling with regard to the 
dispute relating to the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. It held that the 
Court had no jurisdiction in matters which were brought without the other Party 
consenting to it (6). The Court, inter alia, argued that in the absence of an express 
commitment by Turkey joindy to submit the present dispute to the International 
Court of Justice, there was no rule of international law which obliged it to act 
otherwise (Parags. 100-107).
The question of the continental shelf was among the major considerations of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. During the discussions, 
which came to fruition with the signing, in 1982, of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, Turkish delegates consistently drew on the special features of 
the Aegean ('semi-enclosed sea'), and, therefore, the necessity to apply the principle
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of 'equity' in that area (7). The final text adopted by the conference was, however, 
more akin to the Greek position, since it provided islands with their own territorial 
waters and continental shelf (8). This explains why, unlike Greece, Turkey has 
refrained from signing the new convention.
In the Turkish view, the heart of the controversy over the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and of the territorial seas in the Aegean, both of which remain 
unresolved to this day, is that many of the Greek islands are situated very close to the 
Anatolian peninsula. Should the Greek argument be accepted, then the Aegean 
would virtually become a Greek sea (9). This fear of encirclement by Greece 
constitutes the security dimension of Turkey’s interpretation of the rules relating to 
the law of the sea. Turkish international lawyers have maintained that there is 
considerable legal support for the Turkish thesis. They argue that the International 
Court of Justice recognizes the special nature of the 'semi-enclosed seas', such as the 
Aegean, and, accordingly, accepts that the criteria for their delimitation should be 
based on the equity principle. This, one Turkish jurist argues, was the position of the 
Court in the North Sea dispute in 1969 (10). But if that is the case, one wonders why 
Turkey has consistently refused the Greek proposal to bring the continental shelf 
dispute before the International Court of Justice. A Turkish scholar of international 
relations, who has close links with the Turkish diplomatic establishment, candidly 
expresses the reason behind the Turkish reluctance for international adjudication : 
although the probability of the Court's decision being in Turkey's favour is some 
eighty percent, there is still a twenty percent risk that the Court's ruling will favour 
the Greek position. He therefore concludes that Turkey cannot let its vital interests 
be delegated to fifteen judges over whom it has no control. That is why, in his view, 
Turkey should press for bilateral negotiations (11). In these words, one can easily 
trace the Turkish mistrust of 'third parties' in cases which involve Turkey's national 
interests, as has been argued in previous chapters.
Besides that of the continental shelf, the delimitation of the territorial waters is 
another question that complicates the controversy over the Aegean. Presently, 
Greece and Turkey observe a six-mile limit with regard to their territorial waters in 
the Aegean sea. Given that under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
islands are assigned their own territorial seas, with well over 2000 Greek islands, 
Greek territorial waters presently make up over one-third of the total area, while 
Turkish territorial waters are merely one tenth of the Aegean sea. However Greece 
has repeatedly declared that its territorial waters should extend from six to the more 
common twelve miles which is the main cause of the friction in this matter. If the
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Greek demand were to be realised, then the Greek territorial waters would embrace 
some two-thirds of the Aegean. Conversely, if Turkey followed suit, it would not 
gain substantial benefits. Turkey has made it clear that it would resist by any means 
should Greece extend its territorial waters to twelve miles. Indeed, Turkey has 
declared that it would regard any Greek action in this direction as a casus belli. So 
far, Greece has acted with restraint, while purportedly reserving the right to make 
such an extension in the future (12).
As in the case of the continental shelf, Greece lays greater emphasis on general 
international law and international adjudication, while Turkey advocates a primarily 
'political' solution reached through bilateral negotiations (13). Greece asserts that as 
a general rule of international law, which is reaffirmed under Article 3 of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, territorial waters can extend as far as twelve 
miles. The same rule should apply to the Greek islands too. Besides, in Greece's 
view, the littoral state is entitled to proclaim the boundaries of its territorial waters 
unilaterally. From a Turkish point of view, however, there are no clear-cut, standard 
rules concerning the delimitation of territorial waters. Before declaring the limits of 
its territorial seas, the littoral state is obliged to consider the geographical peculiarities 
of the region in question. Turkey has all along claimed that the Aegean constitutes a 
special case because, first, it is a semi-enclosed sea, and, secondly, when the 
generally applied twelve-mile rule is applied to the Aegean, it would hardly gain 
access to the 'open seas', due to the presence of a great number of Greek islands in 
the vicinity of the Anatolian peninsula (14). Turkey also fears that the new status of 
the territorial waters could greatly damage its security and economic interests in the 
Aegean (15). These considerations all mean that Turkey has every reason to insist on 
mutual diplomatic negotiations which would address the complexity of issues relating 
to the Aegean.
Another controversy between Greece and Turkey relates to the control of the air 
space in the Aegean. In 1931, Greece extended its air space to ten miles which was 
not at the time challenged by the Turkish government, although Turkey never 
recognized the extension explicitly. However, following the outbreak of the Cyprus 
crisis in 1974, the Turkish government demanded that all civil aircrafts crossing the 
median line in the Aegean should report to the Turkish FIR (Flight Information 
Region). Turkey has since refused to recognize Greek control over the air space 
extending beyond six-miles -which is also the outer limit of territorial waters assigned 
for Greece. In response, Greece has continuously protested that Turkish flights over 
the disputed four-mile strip are a violation of its sovereignty (16).
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The militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands has also been a matter of friction 
between Turkey and Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which, inter alia, 
settled the long standing problems between Turkey and Greece, reaffirmed Greek 
sovereignty over the Aegean islands, with the exception of Imbros (Gokceada) and 
Tanados (Bozcaada), which the latter had acquired in 1912 during the first Balkan 
War. This Treaty prohibited the militarization of the Greek islands off the western 
entrance to the Turkish Straits -Mythilene, Chios, Samos, Nikaria, Samothrace and 
Lemnos. This meant that no naval base or fortification was to be allowed in the 
islands; instead, the military forces would be limited to the requirements of internal 
security. The Treaty of Lausanne imposed a similar prohibition for the Turkish 
Straits (17).
The balance established in the Treaty of Lausanne changed in Turkey's favour with 
the signing, in 1936, of the Montreux Convention which permitted Turkey to 
remilitarize the Straits. The Convention made no mention of the Greek islands which 
had been demilitarised in Lausanne (18). When the Treaty of Paris of 1947 transferred 
the sovereignty of the Dodecanese islands from Italy to Greece, these islands were 
declared to be demilitarized too (19). The problem, according to Turkey, is that, 
contrary to the terms of the Montreux Convention, Greece has been remilitarizing and 
fortifying the afore-mentioned islands, particularly since the outbreak of the Cyprus 
crisis in 1974. In reaction to this Greek move, Turkey has created an 'Aegean Army' 
which is outside NATO control (20). For its part, Greece has either denied the fact of 
violation or the validity of such obligations (21).
The respective arguments of the contending parties with regard to the militarization 
of the Greek islands can be roughly summarised thus : Greece asserts that the Treaty 
of Lausanne of 1923 sought to bring a security balance between Turkey and Greece 
by imposing military restrictions not only on the Greek islands off the Turkish coast, 
but also in the Turkish Straits. Therefore, since the Montreux Convention of 1936 
allowed Turkey to re-militarize the Straits, by implication, the same should apply to 
the Greek islands (22). It is hence clear that Greece relies on an established rule of 
international law, rebus sic stantibus, (the term refers to changes in material 
circumstances which could not be foreseen at the time when the relevant treaty had 
been signed) to justify its claim. Greece also draws on a speech made by the Turkish 
Foreign Minister in the National Assembly soon after the signing of the Montreux 
Convention in which he said that, as far as Turkey had been concerned, the Greeks 
could have fortified the islands in question (23). In any case, argue the Greeks, no
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treaty provision can override a country's basic right under international law to defend 
its borders against an "aggressive adversary" (24).
Turkey has countered these claims by arguing that the whole rationale behind the 
militarization of the Turkish Straits, as had been explicitly reaffirmed by the Montreux 
Convention, was to guarantee Turkish security. That is why the Convention did not 
authorize the fortification of the Greek islands in question. Neither had the Greek 
representatives forwarded such a claim during the Montreux Conference (25). Turkey 
asserts that the legitimacy of its claims is further evidenced by the fact that, during the 
secession by Italy of the Dodecanese islands to Greece under the terms of the Treaty 
of Paris of 1947, the same imposition of demilitarization was also explicitly 
mentioned therein (26).
The Greco-Turidsh dispute over the islands took a dangerous turn since the beginning 
of the 1980s when Andreas Papendreou was first elected to the Greek premiership. 
The Papandreou government adopted a new military strategy according to which the 
main ’threat’ to Greek security came, not from the ex-Warsaw Pact, but from Turkey. 
As a result, Greece began fortifying the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean, besides 
deploying the bulk of its troops in Western Thrace -bordering Turkey. The 
controversy over the island of Lemnos, situated a few miles from the Dardanelles, is 
particularly revealing. Greece deployed a brigade and built an airport in Lemnos, 
which, in Turkey's view, serves as a strategic stronghold against itself. Turkey 
believes that there is ample historical evidence to justify its fears, among which is the 
fact that the island of Lemnos served as a base for the Allied military campaign 
against the Dardanelles during World War I. The Papandreou government sought to 
legitimize this fait accompli by proposing, in 1984, the inclusion of Lemnos in NATO 
military exercises. Although NATO had initially taken a sympathetic attitude to 
Greek suggestions, the plan was dropped as a result of the Turkish veto (27). In 
1986, Greece signed a treaty of non-aggression with Bulgaria which, in Turkey's 
view, was directed against its own security. For Turkey, this Greek initiative was 
contrary to the 'NATO spirit', because a member of NATO was entering into a legal 
commitment with a Warsaw Pact member against a fellow member of NATO (28). 
These Greek moves further complicated the crisis over Lemnos and some other 
Greek islands.
The Turks generally resent that, although a much smaller country, it is Greece which 
possesses most of the islands in the Aegean. In a meeting held in Turkey in 1986 on 
the Aegean question, one Turkish professor drew on the fact that Turco-Greek
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friendship during Ataturk's leadership (from 1923 to 1938) often operated in favour 
of Greece. He complained that, at the time, Turkey naively let the islands slip into 
Greek hands without much consideration of the long term implications for its 
national interests. The same scholar also complained that, after gaining independence 
in 1829, Greece largely extended its territory at the expense of Turkey in pursuit of 
megalo idea -the half-nationalistic, half-religious ideal of a greater Greece (29). This 
scholar's view of Greece as a 'cynical expansionist' is shared by many other observers 
in Turkey. Indeed the memories of the Turkish War of Independence is still alive in 
the collective consciousness of the people. The Greek occupation of Western 
Anatolia in the aftermath of the First World War seemed to Turks as the first step 
towards the partition of Asia Minor. For the Turks, this abortive Greek attempt was 
not only a threat to the territorial integrity of the 'homeland', but to their own 
existence as an independent nation. Turkish perceptions of Greece are therefore 
associated with 'aggression and expansionism'. Here is a small passage from a quasi­
official article, written in 1990, on Greco-Turirish relations. Noting that Turkey and 
Greece became allies after both entered NATO in the 1950s, the authors add :
"The Megalo Idea, however, was beneath the surface in 
the relations of Greece and Turkey, and it surfaced to 
create the Cyprus and Aegean issues. Both of these 
problems could be solved by peaceful means. But the 
desire of Greece to own everything has cut off all roads 
to a peaceful solution" (30).
Hence when assessing the Aegean dispute, one could clearly observe that the 
collective memories of the 'nation' with regard to the past events underline much of 
the negotiating position held by Turkish statesmen and diplomats. From the Turkish 
perspective, it is always Greece which is to blame for any inconvenience in the 
Aegean or in Cyprus. Mass public opinion in Turkey almost takes it for granted that 
the Greek approach to any legal dispute involving Turkey is 'irrational'. The Turks 
tend to believe that "the Greeks' only function in history has been to make trouble for 
Turkey in general and between Turkey and Europe in particular" (31). (It is almost 
certain that Greeks have similar convictions about the Turks. However, since the 
principal purpose of this dissertation is to uncover the Turkish perception of the 
outside world, the main focus of this chapter is the Turkish view of Greece). As 
Tachau sharply observes, the Turks are a very emotional people, and tend to classify 
nations as either friends or enemies of their country. Greece is undoubtedly seen as a
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national enemy (32). In Turkey, anything that is associated with Greece conjures up 
nationalist sentiments which, in turn, is exploited and manipulated by the 
sensationalism and chauvinism of the popular press. As a result, apparently legal 
questions, like the delimitation of the territorial sovereignty in the Aegean, are swiftly 
turned into questions of national honour, national pride or national prestige, and 
makes it all the more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement In Turkey, as in 
Greece, the armed forces see themselves as the guardian of the nation which further 
exacerbates the situation, and prejudices a clear understanding of the substantive 
issues (33). Boulding observes that the way in which foreign policy decision-makers 
interpret any given situation is less determined by the objective facts than their 
subjective perception of the situation, and their images of other states. In this sense, 
argues Boulding, the subjective interpretation of a given situation may not necessarily 
correspond to the objective facts (34). This observation applies to the Greco-Turkish 
disputes par excellence, as has been observed above.
Turkey frequently declares that relations between itself and Greece are based on the 
balance of rights and obligations set up by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This 
implies that for Turkey, the Greco-Turkish disputes "have been the result of Greek 
attempts to bring about changes in the various aspects of this balance" (35). The 
proponents of this view draw on the fact that the boundaries of territorial sovereignty 
are defined in such a way that neither Turkey nor Greece could obtain military 
advantage over the other in the Aegean (36). However, the problem is that the Treaty 
of Lausanne did not, and possibly could not, solve all the matters of contention that 
are seen today. As has already been examined, the so-called 'balance' in the Aegean 
changed in Turkey's favour when the Montreux Convention of 1936 allowed Turkey 
to re-militarize the Straits. The balance then changed in favour of Greece when Italy 
ceded the Dodecanese islands to Greece in 1947. In the meantime, new 
developments in international law since the 1950s have significandy enhanced Greek 
claims for sovereign rights in the Aegean.
Indeed, under the terms of the new Law of the Sea Conventions of 1958 and 1982, 
islands are assigned their own territorial waters, contiguous zone and continental 
shelf, with the addition of an exclusive economic zone in the latter convention (37). 
Under Article 3 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, territorial waters can 
extend as far as twelve miles. Granted that the exploitation of sea resources -e.g. 
petroleum, minerals, fishing- have become increasingly significant in the economic life 
of states, Greece has sought to make full use of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. 
However, today, even with the declared six-mile limit for its territorial waters, Greece
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already controls well over one-third of the Aegean sea in comparison with the mere 
one-tenth controlled by Turkey. Turkey has understandably drawn on 'the principle 
of equity' when renouncing Greek claims of a twelve-mile limit for its territorial 
waters, and of entitlement to continental shelf for each of the Greek islands. Turkish 
domestic law relating to territorial waters explicitly adopts the principle of 
reciprocity, save for the Aegean where the 'median line' is to determine the 
delimitation of territorial waters (38). Clearly it is the very proximity of Greek islands 
to the Anatolian peninsula which the legislators had in mind. Greece, however, has 
been challenging this Turkish posture by arguing that this is contrary to the new Law 
of the Sea. Greece is well-aware that the emerging rules and principles of 
international law seek to furnish the littoral states with utmost rights by, for instance, 
extending the maritime areas under their sovereignty. Greece therefore has been keen 
to bring the Aegean dispute before international arbitration or adjudication, in 
particular, before the International Court of Justice. Clearly Turkey is aware that 
from a strictly legal point of view, Greece, as in the case of Cyprus, has the upper 
hand. Therefore, fearing that the ruling of the Court might result in favour of Greece, 
Turkey has refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court on this matter. Turkey is 
not a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore, it is not 
bound by its terms. Greece argues however that the new rules have taken the 
characteristics of customary international law to prove that they are binding on 
Turkey too (39). In turn, Turkey draws on the novelty of these law-making rules', 
and on the fact that they are not yet universally accepted (40). Besides, in the Turkish 
view, the Greek demand for the uncritical application of the general rules of the 1982 
Convention in the Aegean constitutes "an abuse of right" (41).
The preceding arguments must have shown that the Greeks and the Turks perceive 
the Aegean dispute not merely as a matter of 'legal difference', but as part of the long 
struggle between Turkish and Greek nationalisms. Indeed, as in the case of Cyprus, 
the Aegean dispute cannot simply be perceived in legal terms, but, granting the 
historical enmity and suspicion that has so long prejudiced relations between Turkey 
and Greece, it has political, strategic and security dimensions without which the 
intensity and the extent of the Aegean dispute cannot be understood. This implies 
that the jurist cannot take for granted the positive law as an ideal and objective 
referent to which the contending parties should conform. Besides, Turkey is not even 
a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which makes it all the more 
difficult to make a meaningful legal analysis of the Aegean dispute. Not only do 
Turkey and Greece disagree on the substantive issues, but, as has been seen, they 
also have divergent views over the methods to be used for the settlement of the
196
dispute. As has been argued throughout this thesis, today the individual nation-state 
is prior to international law. As the Court expressed in the Aegean Continental Shelf 
dispute, Turkey had not been under any obligation to recognize its jurisdiction in that 
particular case in the absence of an express commitment by that state. It can 
therefore be argued that international jurists are bound to recognize the relative 
autonomy of states, and, accordingly, should seek to understand nation-states from 
within. This means that the international lawyer is bound to engage in a hermeneutic 
of mutual claims and perceptions of contending parties in terms of their normative 
presuppositions. Only then can a set of facts be related to the legal argumentation.
The hermeneutic approach is, as is believed, also one of the key prerequisites for 
resolving the particular dispute in question. In other words, the Aegean dispute will, 
in most probability, have to be settled on the basis of a comprehensive settlement 
between the contending parties themselves. It is indeed revealing to note that 
official circles in Turkey are convinced that if Turkey and Greece were treated equally 
by the international community, particularly by the west, this would encourage 
Greece to take a more conciliatory posture towards its disputes with Turkey (42). 
Not surprisingly, it has been outraged by Greek attempts to involve NATO and the 
EC into the Greco-Turkish disputes. This Greek strategy has played into the hands of 
those who are keen to draw negative analogies with the past Here is a small 
quotation from such a Turkish article :
"To conclude, since gaining her independence from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1829 with the help of England,
France and Russia, Greece has made it a policy to be 
ally to all states hostile to the Empire in an effort to 
expand her frontiers at the expense of the Ottoman 
Empire" (43).
Less demagocical quarters, meanwhile, draw on the cordial nature of Greco-Turkish 
relations from the mid-1920s to the 1950s, when there was no 'outside interference'. 
Thus, Bulent Ecevit, a former Turkish Prime Minister, writes :
"Turkey and Greece cannot solve their 
problems...under the shadow of others...because 
whenever other countries were involved in the Turco- 
Greek differences, the Turks and Greeks ended in 
conflict But, whenever they were left alone to settle
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their own differences, they showed great ability to do 
so" (44).
It seems, however, that considering the extent of the imbalance in their respective 
military strengths (Turkey being the stronger side), it is unlikely that Greece will 
cease its quest for international support against Turkey. This would in turn suspend 
the final resolution of the Aegean conflict with Turkey refusing to bow to 'outside 
pressure'.
Greco-Turkish relations are also complicated by the controversy over the treatment 
of the Turkish minority in Greece. The question of the 'Turkish minority' also 
worsened Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the 1980s. While Turkey has sought to gain 
international support against the 'suppression' of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece, and propagated the right of Turkish-Cypriots to self-determination, Turkey 
itself has been accused of 'suppressing' the Kurdish minority in Turkey. It is therefore 
necessary to understand the rationale behind this seemingly contradictory position. 
The chapters which follow seek, inter alia, to expound on Turkey's legal 
interpretation of various concepts and rules which are central to 'progressive' 
international law, such as 'minority rights', 'human rights' and 'the principle of self- 
determination'.
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TURKISH MINORITIES IN BULGARIA AND GREECE
Before discussing the human rights violations suffered by Turkish minorities in 
Greece and Bulgaria, it is more appropriate to understand Turkey's official 
interpretation of the concept of 'minority'. It is important precisely because Turkey 
itself has for long been accused of suppressing the Kurdish 'minority' in the country. 
For instance, Michael Gunter complains that "the suppression of the Turkish Kurds is 
particularly ironic given the official Turkish complaints about the suppression of the 
Turkish minorities in Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Greece" (1). Turkey's apparently 
contradictory posture can meaningfully be comprehended by tracing the emergence of 
the Turkish nation-state in the early 1920s. Following that, the legal and some non- 
legal dimensions of the problems faced by Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece 
will be discussed. Finally, Turkey's behavioural attitude towards the plight of these 
minorities will be assessed.
Soon after the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence, it became obvious 
that the nationalist leadership perceived minority issues from a religious perspective. 
Article 1 of the National Pact, which set out the nationalist programme for the first 
time (1919), stated that with the exclusion of the territories inhabited overwhelmingly 
by an Arab majority, the parts of the Ottoman Empire "which are inhabited by an 
Ottoman Muslim majority...form a whole which does not admit of division for any 
reason..." (2). This article reveals that, irrespective of the ethnic composition of the 
territory which later became Turkey, Muslim peoples formed the natural human 
element of the new 'nation' which was 'indivisible'. Article 5 of the National Pact 
stated that "the rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the 
Entente Powers and their enemies...shall be confirmed and assured by us." This article 
was clearly intended for the Christian and Jewish minorities living in Turkey.
Indeed, the Ottoman millet system, which had been based on the separation of 
various ethnic groups along religious lines, continued to shape the policies of the new 
Turkish state throughout the 1920s and 30s. This was despite the avowed principle 
of secularism which was declared as being one of the pillars of the new regime. To 
give an example, the selection of individuals to be repatriated under the terms of the 
compulsory exchange of populations which took place between Turkey and Greece 
during the years between 1923-1930 was not simply based on ethnic criteria. This
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was rather an exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims (3). 
Among those who were 'repatriated' to Greece were the Greeks of Karaman, who, 
although Greek Christians by religion, spoke only Turkish. Similarly, many of the 
'repatriated' Turks knew little or no Turkish (4). Besides, during the same period, the 
Christian Turks of the Balkans, called Gagavuzes, were not allowed in Turkey, while 
the Boshnaks and Pomaks of the Balkans, although ethnically distinct from Turks, 
were accepted into the country thanks to their Islamic faith (5). This peculiarity of 
Turkish nationalism is sharply observed by Bernard Lewis who draws on the 
centrality of the role played by religious affiliation in the construction of a 'national 
citizenry’ :
"In the Turkish Republic, the constitution and the law 
accorded complete equality to all citizens. Yet even on 
the official side, in the structure and policies of the 
state, there were signs that, despite secularism and 
nationalism, the older idea that Muslim equals Turk and 
non-Muslim equals non-Turk persisted" (6).
This religion-centred conception of nationhood was also deemed to be vital as a 
matter of statecraft According to Baskin Oran, a Turkish scholar of international 
relations, one major motive behind this approach was to avoid granting minority 
rights, which Turkey had undertaken under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, to an 
additional flow of Christian populations. Besides, the nationalist leadership was well 
aware that Muslim communities, irrespective of ethnic differences, tended to have 
similar values, traditions and ways of life. This faith-based selection, then, was 
deemed to increase the chances of social harmony and political loyalty of citizens (7).
Hence, it is clear that, during the early years of the Turkish Republic under Ataturk's 
presidency, the Turkish notion of 'minority' was based on religious criteria. The 
same attitude still prevails today. That this is still the case should not come as a 
surprise given that the fundamental principles of Kemalist nationalism have not yet 
been challenged in contemporary Turkey (See chapters 3 and 8 for further analysis of 
Kemalist nationalism and its centrality in contemporary Turkey). This is the context 
in which to understand the fact of the non-recognition of the Kurdish community, 
which is overwhelmingly Muslim, as a 'minority group'. As will be seen in Chapter 8, 
the Kurds are generally perceived, both by the government and mass public opinion 
alike, as an integral part of the Muslim people of Turkey.
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Whilst, internally, the Turkish concept of 'minority' is based on religious criteria, 
externally, i.e. those in Greece and Bulgaria whom Turkey regards as Turkish Muslim 
minority, it is a joint mixture of ethnicity and religion -both Turkish and Muslim. It 
has to be noted, however, that not all the Muslims of Greece and Bulgaria are 
ethnically Turks. Nonetheless, Turkey tends to treat them as 'Turks', which is 
another indication of its identification of Muslims as Turks in the context of Turkey, 
Greece and Bulgaria. The population exchange between Turkey and Greece during 
the 1920s, which has been examined above, excluded two categories from its ambit: 
the Muslim Turks of Western Thrace in Greece, and the Christian Greeks of Istanbul 
in Turkey. Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, these two groups 
were recognized as 'minorities' with corresponding rights (8). It was therefore clear 
that the formulators of the Treaty of Lausanne also advocated a notion of minority 
which was based on religious affiliation. Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Turkey undertook to give equal treatment for non-Muslim minorities, including 
those belonging to the Greek Orthodox church, while Greece took similar 
undertakings in respect of the Muslim minorities living there. Both countries were 
under an obligation to grant these minorities the same civil and political rights as
those enjoyed by the rest of the population. Article 40 is specifically designed for the
protection of minority rights:
"...they shall have an equal right to establish, manage 
and control...any charitable, religious and social 
institutions, any schools and other establishments for
instruction and education, with the right to use their
own language and to exercise their own religion freely 
therein..."
The mutual commitments of Turkey and Greece were, as stated in Article 37, in the 
nature of "fundamental laws"; and furthermore, under Article 44 "these provisions 
constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee 
of the League of Nations". The rights mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne were 
later reaffirmed in bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and Greece (9).
However the question of the treatment of minorities has, over the years, become a 
major area of contention between Turkey and Greece. Both sides have accused one 
another of harassing and violating the rights and freedoms of the minorities under 
consideration -Muslim Turks in Greece and Greeks in Turkey. Greece has 
complained that the Greek community in Turkey has shrunk from 112,000 in 1934 to
205
a mere 6000 in recent years which, it claims, is a result of discriminatory measures 
imposed on them by the Turkish government That the Turkish community in Greece 
has actually increased from 106,000 to 125,000 during the same period is, in the 
Greek view, a testimony to Turkey's failure to comply with international treaties. 
Greece mentions a specific instance which, in its view, was a clear case of 
discrimination against non-Muslims in Turkey : in 1942, the Turkish government 
introduced the notorious Varlik Vergisi (Capital tax) according to which non-Muslim 
taxpayers in Turkey were asked to pay up to ten times as much as the Muslims. 
Those who could not afford to pay, among them many Greeks, were victimised and 
punished: arrests, deportations and confiscations were a common occurrence at the 
time (10). The Greek side has also drawn on the continuous harassment of the 
Patriarchate in Istanbul and of the Greek schools and religious institutions (11).
In response, Turkey has claimed that the Greeks of Turkey, being economically well- 
off, have deliberately chosen to live abroad (12). It also denies the existence of 
harassment against Greek institutions. Besides, for its part, Turkey has complained 
that in the light of the high birth rate among Turks, the figure indicating the Turkish 
population of Western Thrace should have been much higher. In this context, it has 
claimed that due to official and semi-official discrimination against the Turkish 
minority in Greece, many of them have been forced to migrate to Turkey (13).
There is little doubt that the existence of Turkish and Greek minorities in their 
respective territories is frequendy exploited and manipulated by the Turkish and 
Greek governments as part of their power struggle. Although the Greeks of Turkey 
are a shrinking minority and cannot possibly be perceived as a ’potential threat’ to 
Turkish security, since they are a minor fraction of the largest city in Turkey 
(Istanbul), Turkey has not always complied with the Lausanne arrangement. Greek 
policies, meanwhile, are designed to assimilate the Turkish minority and/or cause their 
displacement from Western Thrace so as the alter the population balance of that area 
in favour of Orthodox Greeks. Unlike the Greeks of Turkey, the Turks of Greece, 
among whom the annual birth rate is around 2.8 percent, are likely to increase for the 
foreseeable future. This means that their share of the population is likely to increase, 
unless large-scale migrations occur. This, the Greek government sees as ’threatening’, 
particularly in the light of the fact that the Turkish minority in Greece is concentrated 
in the region -Western Thrace- which is close to Turkish borders.
Innumerable evidence suggests that the Greek policies against the Turkish minority 
are designed to ’overcome’ this new form of ’Turkish threat’. To start with, Greece
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has consistently sought to assimilate the Turkish minority, in contravention of its 
international commitments. It is pointed out by Turkish observers that, since 1967, 
Turkish foundations have been prohibited from buying estates. Besides, Turkish 
houses, schools, mosques and other buildings are not granted permission for repairs. 
Meanwhile, Turkish schools have been deprived of educational equipment and 
teaching materials, while the Turks are not allowed to open new secondary schools. 
On the other hand, the Greek government has frequently confiscated Turkish lands. 
The Turks are also barred from purchasing land or houses. It is noted that some 80 
percent of the lands expropriated by the government over the years belongs to the 
Turks (14). Turkish observers argue that these measures are designed to force 
internal migration of the Turks in order to change the demographic composition of 
Western Thrace in favour of Greeks. This Greek policy has recently gained a new 
momentum with the planned settlement in Western Thrace of some 100,000 Pontian 
Greek emigrants from the ex-Soviet Union, which Turkey has sharply criticised (15).
Furthermore, the Turks are not employed in public services, whereas they are 
deterred from commercial activities through restrictive measures, like the withholding 
of permits and licences. It is therefore obvious that members of the Turkish minority 
in Greece are not treated equally before the law with the rest of the population. They 
are economically disadvantaged, even marginalized, as a result of deliberate legal and 
administrative restrictions. Besides, their civil, educational and cultural rights are 
severely violated. As a result, their long-term collective existence as a distinct 
ethnic, linguistic and religious community is being threatened through assimilationist 
pressures (16).
Finally, as Turkey has protested angrily, the Greek government has recently embarked 
on a campaign of designating the Turks' as 'Muslims' (17). It is true that the Treaty of 
Lausanne spoke of 'Muslims' rather than 'Turks'; however, this was presumably 
intended to distinguish Muslim Turks from Turkish-speaking Christians. Indeed, 
Turkey has consistently sought to ensure that the rights of Turkish 'Muslim' minorities 
in Greece and Bulgaria are protected, whereas, by contrast, it has not shown much 
interest in the fate of the Christian Turks living in those countries. Therefore, it is 
clear that, instead of resorting to a literal interpretation of the related provisions, 
regard must be made to the intention and the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne. That 
the term 'Muslims' in fact corresponds to 'Muslim Turks', is also evidenced by the fact 
that Article 3 of the 1923 Convention on the Compulsory exchange of Turkish and 
Greek populations speaks of "Turkish inhabitants" to be exchanged (18).
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In response to the 'suppressive' policies of the Greek government, Turkey has 
launched complaints before various international organizations. Indeed, after having 
examined the Turkish complaint concerning the maltreatment of the Turkish minority 
in Greece, the Helsinki Watch Committee, in a report published in August 1990, has 
condemned the Greek 'oppression' of the Turkish minority (19). This matter is also 
currently being investigated by the European Commission of Human Rights. The 
maltreatment of the Turkish minority in Greece, whom the Greek government legally 
recognized as a 'minority' by the Treaty of Lausanne and undertook to secure their 
rights and freedoms accordingly, is a clear violation of various other international 
instruments of which Greece is also a p a rt: Article 1(3) of the UN Charter speaks of 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ''without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion" (20); Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms sanctions the principle of non­
discrimination in regard to the rights and freedoms embodied in the Convention 
(mainly civil and political rights) (21); The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 prohibits racial 
discrimination by states against their citizens (Article 2), guarantees the right of 
everyone to equality before the law (Article 5), and provides for adequate legal 
remedies against any acts of racial discrimination as well as adequate compensation 
for damages suffered (Article 6) (22); Article 5(c) of the Convention against 
Discrimination in Education of 1960 obliges signatory states to respect the 
educational rights of national minorities (23); Article 27 of the 1966 Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights guarantees the cultural and linguistic rights of minorities 
(24); finally, Principle VII of the Declaration on Principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
of 1975 accords equality of treatment for national minorities (25). It is therefore 
clear that by failing to abide with its international obligations, Greece contravenes a 
fundamental principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda -the rule that treaties 
must be performed in good faith.
The question of the treatment of the Turkish minority was also, until recently, a 
major cause of friction between Turkey and Bulgaria. The extent of the problem in 
this case far exceeded the Greek case, and deeply touched the sensitivities of public 
opinion in Turkey. First, with a population estimated at around one million, the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria makes up some 10 percent of the population in Bulgaria. 
Secondly, the extent of forcible assimilation was such that it threatened the very 
existence of the Turkish community as a distinct 'minority'. The whole policy of 
forcible assimilation, in this instance, was put into practice systematically and with a 
sense of urgency, the effect of which was immediate and imminent
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The campaign, which was initiated in 1984 and lasted until the demise of the Zhivkov 
regime towards the end of 1989, included the following measures : the prohibition of 
the use of the Turkish language in work places and of religious gatherings in 
mosques, except for Friday prayer; the forcible replacement of Turkish/Muslim 
names with Slav names; the denial of the existence of the ’Turkish1 community who 
were claimed to be 'Bulgarian Muslims'; the closing down of Turkish schools; the 
prohibition of Islamic practices, like fasting, circumcision and Islamic burial; the 
killing or imprisonment of those who defied the forcible measures of 'Slavization' 
(26).
Under present rules of international law, the Turks of Bulgaria should easily qualify 
as a 'national minority'. Just as the Turkish Muslims of Greece, they have certain 
traits which set them apart from the rest of the population : ethnic and religious 
difference; possession of a separate language; different customs and symbols of 
identity; and, most of all, a collective willingness to maintain their distinct identity. 
The Turkish Muslims of Bulgaria -just as the Turkish Muslims of Greece- have 
already been recognized as a minority, and their rights are guaranteed accordingly, 
under various international treaties. (The question of the international protection of 
minority rights will be extensively examined in the next chapter)
To start with, the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which confirmed Bulgaria as an autonomous 
principality, spoke of the 'Turkish Muslim' minority in Bulgaria, and guaranteed their 
rights and freedoms accordingly -religious, cultural, linguistic (27). The Istanbul 
Protocol and Convention of 1909, signed between the Ottoman Empire and 
Bulgaria, obliged the latter to protect the religious properties of the Turkish Muslim 
minority (28). The Neuilly Peace Treaty (1919) contained detailed provisions on the 
legal, religious, cultural, communal/institutional, linguistic and educational rights of 
minorities, not least those of the Muslim Turks, in Bulgaria (29). The Treaty of 
Friendship (30) and the Turirish-Bulgarian Convention on the Conditions of 
Residence (31), both of which were signed in 1925, reaffirmed the rights contained in 
the aforementioned international treaties.
Not unpredictably, Turkey continuously protested at the forcible assimilation of 
fellow Muslim Turks during the mid-1980s, and asked for the restoration of their 
rights. When this was not forthcoming, it asked the government of Bulgaria to hold 
bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute. However, the Bulgarian side reacted 
angrily at what it saw as an interference in its internal affairs. Besides, the 
government claimed that, contrary to allegations of forcible assimilation, the changes
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were the result of the fact that the ’Muslim' minority had 'instantaneously' and 
'voluntarily' realized its Bulgarian identity (32). However, relying on Bulgarian 
sources, a Turkish professor of international relations draws on the fact that even an 
official book admitted that the Turks came from Asia and that they constituted the 
largest minority in that country. Besides, prior to 1984 when the forcible assimilation 
began, Thodor Zhivkov, then the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 
had acknowledged the existence of Turks in Bulgaria (33). In any case, it is irrational 
to think that the Turks realised their 'true' identity overnight, given the fact that any 
form of collective cultural mutation takes place over a long period of time.
Upon the initiative of its Turkish members, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe adopted a draft resolution on September 26, 1985, which 
condemned the coercive measures against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and asked 
for the restoration of their rights (34). In January 1986, Turkey brought the problem 
before the summit of the Islamic Conference Organization which then passed a 
resolution calling Bulgaria to restore the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims 
of Bulgaria (35). The Islamic Conference adopted a similar resolution in March 
1988, while deciding to keep the issue on record until a satisfactory solution had been 
found (36). Similarly, Amnesty International condemned the maltreatment of Turks 
by Bulgarian authorities in its 1986 report (37). Although the condemnations by these 
international fora were far from having any binding force, they nonetheless had the 
effect of increasing the awareness of world public opinion and damaging the prestige 
of the Bulgarian government
In 1989, upon the insistence of the Turkish government, Bulgaria agreed to grant 
passports to the members of the Muslim Turkish community who were willing to 
emigrate to Turkey. Around 300,000 Turks took up the offer, some one third of 
whom later returned to Bulgaria due to unpleasant economic and social conditions in 
Turkey. As a result of the massive inflow of Bulgarian Turks, the Turkish 
government, strained by housing shortages and a high unemployment rate in the 
country, soon closed the borders to the further influx of Turkish migrants (38). This 
typically self-reliant, nationalistic 'heroism' is another example of Turkey's 
anachronistic approach to international relations. Indeed, without considering its 
consequences, the Turkish political establishment was drawn into the nationalistic 
fervour which was, to a great extent, the result of the polemical exploits of the media 
and the press.
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The restoration of the rights and freedoms of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria did not, 
however, come about as a result of international pressure -though it might have had 
a catalysing impact Indeed, following the fall of the Zhivkov regime, which 
precipitated democratic changes, the new regime in Bulgaria acknowledged that 
grave mistakes had been done, and that the rights of the Turkish minority were to be 
restored (39). Accordingly, on the basis of the existing constitution, which 
guaranteed equal rights to all citizens irrespective of race, colour or religion, the 
Bulgarian National Assembly abolished all the measures designed to assimilate the 
Turks (40).
Certain similarities can be drawn from the two cases concerning the plight of Turkish 
minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. First, both communities are concentrated in 
Western Thrace bordering Turkey. In this sense, they live in areas which are 
strategically significant Secondly, the Turkish minorities, in comparison to the 
majority Greeks and Bulgarians, have a high birth rate and a young population. 
Third, both communities have maintained their distinct Turkish Muslim identity. 
These are presumably among the major considerations behind the assimilationist 
policies pursued by Bulgaria -until recently- and Greece. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
nation building is a never-ending process, since those who make up the 'nation', as 
well as the economic, political and social strategies pursued by the state, are always 
in flux. The nation-state, engrossed in the 'task' of creating a homogeneous 'national' 
identity, often regards those who are distinct from the dominant majority as 'alien 
intruders' whose very presence is a constant reminder of the fragility of the nation­
state. This explains a great deal about the attitude of the political establishment in 
Greece and Bulgaria towards the Turkish minority. Indeed, the latter, with their 
'otherness', i.e. their ethnic difference, Islamic creed, use of the Turkish language, 
peculiar customs and rituals, were perceived as obstacles to the self-assurance of the 
national majority. Even the avowedly communist regime in Bulgaria did not do away 
with a nationalistic strategy based on ethnic exclusiveness. It is revealing to note that, 
at the height of the assimilationist campaign in 1985, the Chairman of the Bulgarian 
National Assembly declared that people had come to realise that Bulgaria was a "one- 
nation state" (41).
In response to the report submitted to the Islamic Conference Organization, meeting 
in Amman on March 19-26, 1988, which reaffirmed the existence of human rights 
violations against Muslim Turks, Bulgaria blamed the Organization for placing its 
prestige "at the service of self-seeking pan-Turkish objectives" (42). However, in 
fairness, it must be noted that Turkey has done nothing to manipulate the situation,
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either in Bulgaria or Greece, for irredentist objectives. Turkey, instead, merely asked 
for the proper implementation of existing international treaties according equal 
treatment for, and guaranteeing the minority rights of, the Turkish communities in 
Greece and Bulgaria. It did not, for instance, call for the granting of autonomy or 
self-determination to fellow Turks. Turkey’s reliance on existing legal arrangements 
rather than on ambitious, but mosdy controversial, legal deliberations, is in line with 
its traditionally cautious and formalistic approach to international law. This posture 
may also be explained by its fear that this strategy -of resorting to international 
conventions and resolutions on the protection of minority rights or on self- 
determination- might eventually backfire, since, it might, with greater justification, be 
used by Kurdish nationalists in their struggle against the Turkish state. Finally, 
Turkey's cautious handling of the problems faced by Turkish minorities is also a 
function of its defensive nationalism. In other words, given that the territorial 
objectives set out by the nationalist leadership during the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919-1922) were largely achieved, the raison d'etre of Turkish 
nationalism is to legitimate the state and to ensure that Turkey's territorial integrity 
remains intact Besides, as has been seen in Chapter 3, ethnic irredentism is largely a 
discredited idea in republican Turkey.
The minority problems which are dealt with in this chapter also testify to the 
fragmentary nature of international law. Indeed neither the international community 
nor international legal instruments have played any significant role in the resolution of 
the problems faced by the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. While, contrary 
to binding international treaties, Greece continues to violate the rights -both collective 
and individual- of the Turkish minority, Bulgaria had taken no notice of international 
condemnations prior to the demise of the communist regime which resulted in the 
renunciation of the policy of forcible assimilation. International law is conceptually 
and institutionally ill-equipped to ensure that states comply with established norms of 
behaviour. As has been argued in Chapter 3, sovereignty of states is the starting 
point of international law. Since the state is the dispenser of rights and enjoys wide 
discretionary powers, individual human rights are frequently sacrificed by 
governments in the name of political expediency -'integrity of the nation', 'indivisibility 
of the homeland', 'national interests' and so forth. This has indeed been the case with 
the Turkish minority problems explored here.
If Turkey is the 'claimant' in both minority cases mentioned above, it is the 'defendant' 
in the case of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Turkey has long been accused of 
forcibly assimilating Turkish citizens of Kurdish descent through linguistic, cultural,
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political and economic pressures. The chapter that follows focuses on the legal 
dimensions of the ’Kurdish problem' on the basis of two major questions : first, what 
is the status of Turkish Kurds under international law? ; second, what are Turkey's 
obligations under international law with regard to the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of the Kurdish community?
213
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1.Michael M.Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey", Middle East Journal, 
Vol.42,1988, 389-406, p.400.
2.The Turkish National Pact, in A. J. Toynbee & K. P. Kirkwood, Turkey (London, 
Ernest Benn Limited, 1926), pp.85-86.
3.Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, and 
protocol, signed on January 30, 1923, League o f Nations Treaty Series, Vol.32, 
1925, 75-87.
4.Bemard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London-New York-Toronto, 
Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.348-349.
5.Baskin Oran, Ataturk Milliyetciligi, Vol.2, (Ankara, Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp. 159- 
160.
6.Lewis, op.cit., 1961, p.350.
7.0ran, op.cit., p. 159.
8.Treaty of Lausanne and other Instruments signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, in 
League of Nations Treaty Series, 1924, Vol.28, 11-113.
9.Prominent among them being the Ankara Convention of 1930 which guaranteed the 
property rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace : Convention 
between Turkey and Greece regarding the Final Settlement of the Questions 
Resulting from the Application of the Treaty of Lausanne and of the Agreement of 
Athens Relating to the Exchange of Populations, signed on June 10, 1930, Ibid., 
Vol. 108,1931,233-253.
10.Lewis, op.cit., pp.291-293.
11.Richard Clogg, "Troubled Alliance : Greece and Turkey", in Richard Clogg (ed.), 
Greece in the 1980s (London, Macmillan, 1983), 123-149, pp.136-137.
214
12.Andre Mango, '’Greece and Turkey : unfriendly allies", The World Today, Vol.43, 
1987, 144-47, p. 145.
13 JLoc.cit., in note 11.
14.Baskin Oran, Turk-Yunan Iliskilerinde Bad Trakya Sorunu, (Ankara, Mulkiyeliler 
Birligi Yakfi, 1986), p. 122.
15.Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1990, p.37516.
16.Yusuf Sarinay, "The Rights of the Turks of Western Thrace and the Greek 
Policy", Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Spring 1991, 27-38, pp.31-34.
11.Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1988, pp.36116-36117.
18.L0c.dr., in note 3.
19.A Helsinki Watch Report, Destroying Ethnic Identity : The Turks o f Greece, 
August 1990.
20.Charter of the United Nations, in Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1947-1948, 
987-997.
21.The Convention was signed on 4 November 1950 among members of the Council 
of Europe, in European Convention on Human Rights : Collected Texts, 
(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 4-21.
22.General Assembly resolution 2106 A(XX) of 21 December 1965, Yearbook o f the 
United Nations, 1965,440-446.
23.This Convention was adopted on 14 December 1960 by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in UNESCO's 
Standard-Setting Instruments, 3-10.
24.This Covenant was adopted on 16 December 1966 by the General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 A(XXI), Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1966,423-432.
215
25.Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, in 
John J. Maresca, To Helsinki-The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 1973-1975, (USA, Duke University Press, 1985), 227-283.
26.Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1985, pp.33670-33671; Keesing’s..., 1986, 
pp.340509-340510; Keesing’s..., 1987, pp.35520-35521.
27.Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13,1878, American Journal o f International Law, 
Vol.8,1914, Supplement, 27-45.
28.Qoted in, ibid., Vol.6, 1912, p.663.
29.Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, signed 
on November 27,1919, ibid., Vol. 14,1920, Supplement, 185-309.
30.The Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria with Protocol annexed 
thereto, signed on October 18, 1925, League o f Nations Treaty Series, Vol.54, 1927, 
125-133.
31.The Turkish-Bulgarian Convention on the Conditions of Residence, signed on 
October 18, 1925, ibid., Vol.54, 1927, 135-143.
32.Turkkaya Ataov, "The Turks of Bulgaria", A.U.SJB.F. Dergisi, Vol.44, Ocak- 
Haziran 1989, No. 1-2,135-152, p.136.
33Jbid., pp. 136-137.
34.Resolution 846, in Official Report o f Debates o f the Parliamentary Assembly, 
1986, p.342.
35.Fahir Armaoglu, 20.Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi, 2 Volumes, (Ankara, Turkiye Is Bankasi 
Kultur Yayinlari, 1991), Vol.2, p.312. Here it must be noted, in passing, that the 
resolution speaks of 'Muslims', not of 'Turks'. This may be attributed to the fact that 




37 Annual Report of Amnesty International, 1986, 272-275.
38.Armaoglu, op.cit., p.316.
39."Foreign Policy of Turkey", Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Spring 1991, 5-16, 
p.15.
40.Armaoglu, op.cit., Vol.2, p.317.
41 Xeesing's Contemporary Archives, 1985, p.33671.
42 Ibid., 1988, p.36305.
217
CHAPTER 8
THE KURDISH MINORITY IN TURKEY AND THEIR RIGHTS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
8.1.Litroduction
While innumerable scholarly articles have been written about the plight of Turkish 
minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, as far as the present author is aware, not a single 
scholarly work has been undertaken by Turkish international lawyers about the plight 
of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. For mainstream scholarship, the Kurdish problem 
exists only in a political sense as something to be resolved through political and 
economic means. In other words, as far as the academic establishment is concerned, 
the Kurdish question does not fall into the ambit of international law; hence, it is not a 
legal matter.
However, in the analysis that follows, it will be argued that this is not necessarily so. 
First, the Kurds are not simply a subsection of Turkish society. They are a 'people' 
with a separate culture and identity of their own; second, the Kurds are not merely 
asking for equal treatment with the rest of the population in Turkey. They also 
demand the recognition of their separate identity. Thirdly, the question of minorities is 
not only a matter for states themselves. It is, under certain conditions, also a matter 
for international law.
The exposition of the Kurdish problem and its legal dimensions is intended to expand 
the preceding arguments relating to Turkey's peculiar approach to international law. 
In this context, an attempt will be made to relate Turkey's failure to come to terms 
with the Kurdish reality with Turkey's authoritarian notion of itself and the 
monolithic 'construction' of a Turkish national identity. This chapter also contributes 
to an exploration of the problematic dimensions of international law, this time, in the 
context of human rights, minority rights and self-determination. Here, before 
engaging in legal analyses, it may be useful to make an overview of the international 
setting which has highlighted the need to regulate the rights of minorities in recent 
years.
Today while the Cold War is over, ethno-territorial conflicts have become the order 
of the day. Bloody conflicts among various ethnic groups in the ex-Soviet Union, and
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the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia are a testimony to this new trend. For 
long suppressed under the monolithic disguise of the communist systems in eastern 
Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, nationalist sentiments and ethnic hostilities are now 
threatening political stability and the existing territorial arrangements in many states, 
while causing loss of lives, human misery and hardship. Many victims of war have fled 
their countries to become refugees. The scale of refugee flow is such that -three 
million from ex-Yugoslavia alone-, it is seen as the greatest 'refugee crisis' in Europe 
since the Second World War. Conflicting national and ethnic claims are clearly 
endangering international peace and security and call for urgent international 
measures to remedy the situation. It is generally agreed that the establishment of an 
effective system to guarantee human rights, as well as minority rights in countries 
with mixed populations, will be a major step in the right direction.
Not unexpectedly, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
which embraces all the countries in Europe as well as the United States and Canada, 
held a conference in July 1991 on problems of national minorities in Europe. All 35 
CSCE members were present The conference was marked by disputes between east 
European delegates about the treatment of minorities in their respective states. In the 
end, the delegates adopted a document on minority rights and protection (1).
Some trends are emerging within the CSCE mechanism for the protection of human 
rights in the member states : first, derogation in some cases from the principle of 
unanimity in decision-making; second, a growing conviction that international 
concern over the protection of human rights within the member states does not 
constitute an interference in domestic affairs. German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher went further by suggesting during the third Conference on the Human 
Dimension on September the 10th, 1991 that Germany advocated the creation of a 
CSCE peace-keeping force with the power to intervene in member states which are 
suspected of violating human rights "even if their governments do not agree to this" 
(2).
It remains to be seen whether the CSCE members will agree to delegate the necessary 
force to the legal texts to ensure their effective implementation within the internal 
jurisdiction of the member states. The force of events and public pressure are likely to 
persuade many governments to derogate from 'exclusive jurisdiction' in cases 
involving human rights and minority protection. The growing international concern is 
also underscored by the fact that the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration in 
December 1992 (3) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed
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a recommendation in February 1993 (4), both of which are specifically designed for 
the protection of national minorities -as will be discussed later.
The emergence of inter-ethnic conflicts all over eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet 
Union incidentally coincided with the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi 
government in the wake of the Gulf War. The declaration of a 'safe haven' by the UN 
Security Council -under the auspices of the US and some other western govemments- 
in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from persecution by the Iraqi forces has 
apparently led to the creation of a quasi-independent Kurdish state in that region. 
However this new development has been widely resented by regional states with a 
substantial Kurdish population -Turkey, Iran and Syria-, and prompted them to enter 
into closer understanding and co-operation against "western-sponsored projects". 
Any idea of an independent Kurdish state is an anathema for all, for fear that this 
might encourage similar moves among their brethren in neighbouring countries. 
Indeed a tripartite meeting was held in November 1992 between Turkey, Iran and 
Syria with the aim of discussing the ways to ensure that "solutions to regional issues 
are confined to the regional states", hinting that they would not welcome an 
independent Kurdish state (5).
The number of Kurds is estimated at around 20 millions, of whom some 10 to 12 
millions live in Turkey. Turkey is particularly apprehensive about the US backing for 
Iraqi Kurds, fearing that Kurdish self-determination on the other side of the border 
might have a catalysing impact on the Kurdish nationalist movement inside Turkey. 
Granted that the Kurdish community in Turkey is far more numerous than that in Iraq 
and enjoys far less freedom of self-expression, Turkey's ambivalence over a "safe 
haven" for the Iraqi Kurds is not difficult to understand. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of the PKK -Kurdistan Workers Party which is the political wing of a Kurdish 
guerrilla movement, continues to advocate total secession from the Turkish state, as 
opposed to the Iraqi Kurdish leadership which seems to be content with regional 
autonomy under a federal structure.
Indeed the PKK continues with its armed campaign for secession which was first 
launched in 1984. The scale of fighting has intensified in recent years as Kurdish 
provinces are increasingly oppressed and economically isolated. There is a state of 
emergency in many provinces of south-east Turkey. According to the official figures, 
the nine years of insurgency has produced over 10,000 fatalities by the end of 1993 - 
guerrillas, soldiers, policemen and civilians. More than a half of them died in 1991- 
93.
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In January 1991, at the expense of antagonizing the conservative factions within his 
party and the army, the late President Ozal paved the way for the easing of 
restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. He had hoped to achieve two 
objectives with this move : first, to undercut the popular support for the PKK; 
second, to improve Turkey's minority rights record. The head of the new government 
which came to power in October 1991 announced his government's intention to 
continue with Ozal's policy of greater cultural rights for the Kurdish minority. 
However he could not afford to ease off the campaign against the PKK guerrillas for 
fear of antagonizing the army and the nationalist factions of the state (6). During 
October 1992, the PKK guerrillas and the Iraqi peshmerga fighters engaged in 
fighting in northern Iraq when the peshmerga asked the PKK to evacuate northern 
Iraq. The Iraqi Kurds calculated that the expulsion of the PKK guerrillas from the 
areas they control was a necessary price for Turkish acquiescence in the semi­
independence they had just declared in the Kurdish part of Iraq. They were also 
anxious to ensure that Turkey continued to allow its air bases to be used by the allied 
forces in order to provide the Kurdish 'safe haven' with air protection (7). Meanwhile 
on October 16, 1992 Turkish armed forces entered Iraq in a large scale air and 
ground operation in order to force the PKK out of Iraq. As a result of this operation 
which lasted over two weeks, around 1,000 members of the PKK were killed (8).
The Kurdish question continues to constitute the main political problem facing the 
Turkish government. Liberal observers have generally been agreed that the former 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (currently President) and his successor from the 
same party, Tansu Ciller, have, contrary to Demirel's pledges, failed to humanize 
the government approach towards the Kurdish problem. On March 30, 1992, 14 
Kurdish deputies resigned from the Social Democratic Popular Party (SHP), which 
was -and still is-, junior partner in the coalition government dominated by the centre- 
right True Path Party (DYP). This decision was prompted by the failure of the 
government "to keep its promises" towards the Kurdish population (9). The 
European Parliament meanwhile condemned the "scale and excessive severity" of 
Turkish government actions in the south-east (10).
In recent years various studies have been published in the English language that 
sought to understand different aspects of the Kurdish problem -its historical origins, 
as well as its political, economic and cultural dimensions. It seems, however, its 
international legal dimensions have not been adequately explored. For instance, are 
the Kurds a 'people' or a 'minority1, in the sense of entitlement to self-determination? 
And if so, what is it to be 'determined'? And finally, what obligations does the
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Turkish government hold towards its Kurdish citizens under international law? By 
engaging in this kind of legal discussion, it may be possible to advance some concrete 
and practical suggestions that could provide a conciliatory framework for a 
meaningful dialogue between the two contending sides -the Turkish government and 
the Kurdish nationalists.
8.2.Minorities and Self-determination
As has been argued in Chapter 3, it is a difficult task to put the principle of self- 
determination into appropriate legal terms. There is neither an international consensus 
regarding the status of secession in the context of self-determination, nor a universal 
criteria for a legitimate secessionist movement Under international law, all peoples 
are entitled to self-determination. However it is not clear what is meant by ’peoples', 
or the way in which this right is to be exercised. This right has so far been invoked 
successfully by colonial peoples only. Moreover it is not easy to enforce the principle 
of self-determination in concrete cases. For instance, the presence of the UN 
Resolution has not done much to establish the sovereignty of the indigenous people in 
East Timor (11).
Another difficulty with regard to the principle of self-determination is that it is 
generally a part of the vocabulary employed by minorities whose demands do not 
necessarily coincide with secession (12). Self-determination can be defined as the 
right of a 'people' freely to determine their own political organization and the form of 
their relation to other social groups. The end result of this right is not limited to 
independent statehood. It may take the form of association with other social groups 
under a federal framework, or autonomy, or assimilation in a unitary state (13). For 
instance, Puerto-Rican people have, time and again, declined independence, and 
instead opted for a special legal status under the protection of the United States - 
particularly for economic reasons (14). Nonetheless the explosive potential of the 
principle of self-determination has often prompted governments to deny its relevance 
to certain well-established social groups in their territory. At this point, two questions 
can be raised : how can one differentiate between 'peoples' and 'minorities'? And can 
minorities qualify as 'people' under certain conditions?
A former member of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ermacora, argues that 
the notions of 'minority' and of 'people' are neither exclusive of one another, nor are 
they identical. He points out that "the term minority is a man-made notion comprising
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man-made situations", while "the term peoples is of an archetypic nature" (15). 
Therefore a group of people may simultaneously be a 'people' and a 'minority'. Those 
who categorically deny minorities any right to self-determination do not consider the 
meaning of the term 'people'. Before elaborating on the notion of 'people', the 
definition of the concept of ‘minority’ has to be clarified. A report prepared for the 
UN by Capotorti appears practical for this purpose:
"Minority means a group numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, -whose members being nationals of the State- 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and 
show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
language" (16).
It is clear from this definition that not all human categories which may sociologically 
qualify as minorities should be regarded as such by law. As Ermacora puts it, a social 
group which can be distinguished from the rest of the society by ethnicity, religion or 
language, must have a group consciousness and some form of organizational 
structure in order to claim minority status. If the group is content to assimilate into 
the mainstream society, then it does not qualify for specific measures that go beyond 
the general system of human rights (17).
Capotorti’s definition is clear enough for minorities which accept the territorial status 
quo of states in whose domain they live. Once, however, a given minority claims a 
right to self-determination, any attempt to distinguish between the notion of 
'minority' and 'people' is blurred. The logic follows that the notion of people itself is 
inevitably controversial. Cristescu, in his report to the UN, compiles varying views on 
'peoplehood' in the following definition:
"The word 'peoples' should be understood to mean all 
those that are able to exercise their right of self- 
determination; occupies a homogeneous territory and 
whose members are related ethnically or in other 
ways" (18).
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Here there is an added dimension of territory and capacity for self-determination. It is 
thus clear that any minority group with a distinct ethnic or religious identity and a 
separate geographical location -in the sense of constituting the majority over the 
territories to which they lay claim-, can claim to be a people. However its effective 
transformation into reality depends on the claimants' capacity to exercise their right 
of self-determination. One of the implications of this definition is that if force is used 
to seize a territory on the basis of a claim to self-determination, the new state may 
more readily be recognized by the international community than in cases of unlawful 
capture of territory (19). The case of Bangladesh is relevant here. The Bengalis of 
East Pakistan, ethnically and geographically separated from West Pakistan, and thus 
qualifying for self-determination, succeeded in gaining independence after waging war 
against the latter -though with substantial assistance from India. The new state was 
rapidly and widely recognized by other states (20).
It is therefore clear that international law does not explicitly prohibit the use of the 
language of self-determination by minorities in so far as they qualify as 'people'. This 
implies that minorities cannot legitimately be excluded from the right to self- 
determination a priori. However if self-determination is to be understood as the right 
to secede from an existing state, then it is arguable whether it is a universally 
accepted 'right', and whether it is legally effective. According to Pomerance, law 
arises from what states practice constantly and uniformly. She argues that the entire 
history of self-determination, even during the UN era, has witnessed a subjective and 
selective interpretation of this principle by states (21). While full 'external' self- 
determination was accorded to peoples living under 'colonial', 'racist' or 'alien' 
regimes, such arrangements were denied for peoples living under similarly oppressive 
regimes in 'non-colonial' situations (22). Since 'colonial' regimes have been reduced to 
a handful of cases, the principle of self-determination has gradually been transformed 
from 'state creation' to 'human rights enforcement' in the form of 'internal' self- 
determination (23). Today most international lawyers agree that minority groups 
which qualify as 'people' should be accorded a limited degree of cultural and political 
autonomy. However such an arrangement would have to preclude secession. (For 
further analysis of this question, see Chapter 3)
It is indeed difficult to ignore the existing realities of the international system and its 
legal framework which are premised upon the immutability of state boundaries. 
However arbitrary, they remain the dominant reality. The debate on self- 
determination has shown that states are unwilling to accept it as a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of all other human rights. Instead they insist that it should be subordinate
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to other principles of international law, such as the inviolability of existing borders 
and the maintenance of international peace. Therefore it can be concluded that the 
general trend in international law is that the right to self-determination must not lead 
to changes in existing frontiers.
8.3.The Kurds of Turkey and the Principle of Self-determination
It is generally accepted that the Kurds can be distinguished from the Turks, both 
ethnically and culturally. It is noted that their ethnic and cultural progenitors were the 
tribes of Medes who were settled in the mountains of western Iran by the seventh 
century BC. The Kurdish language is deemed to be a "distinct and separate language 
belonging to the Aryan branch of the Indo-European family" (24). Ismail Besikci, a 
Turkish scholar of sociology, has documented the distinctive nature of the Kurdish 
language, culture and historical heritage, as well as the injustices committed against 
them (25).
Indeed the Kurds had already developed a distinct identity of their own during the 
nineteenth century when the survival of the Ottoman Empire seemed tenuous. For 
centuries, due to the remoteness and mountainous nature of their locations -eastern 
Anatolia and upper Mesopotamia-, the Kurdish tribes had largely remained beyond 
the direct authority of the central government Often, the central authorities chose 
not to interfere in the ’internal affairs' of Kurdish communities for fear that this might 
provoke a rebellion, which was not infrequent The area was in effect controlled by 
feudal landlords and religious sheikhs. Moreover, the Kurds did not mix with the rest 
of the population, and only spoke Kurdish. This peculiarity of the Kurdish case leads 
a Turkish scholar to conclude that "the Ottoman sovereignty in Kurdish areas was 
only on paper." (26).
Britain and other members of the Allied coalition were quick to observe secessionary 
tendencies among the Kurds of Anatolia (and northern Iraq) in the aftermath of the 
First World War. Immediately after the occupation of Turkey, the Kurds were 
promised independence by the victorious European powers which were keen to get 
their support against Turkish nationalists (27). The promise was soon fulfilled with 
the signing of the abortive Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920. Under Article 62, 
the Kurds of Turkey were promised local autonomy in predominantly Kurdish areas 
of eastern and south-eastern Turkey. For its part, the Turkish government based in 
Istanbul agreed to accept the terms of that provision (Article 63). Article 64 made a
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further promise to the effect that should the majority of the Kurdish people in the area 
decide to become independent within one year, and subject to this being approved by 
the Council of the League of Nations, Turkey was under an obligation to renounce all 
its claims over these areas. The Allied powers finally committed themselves not to 
raise any objection should an independent Kurdistan and the Kurds of Mosul province 
-this province formed part of northern Iraq which was then under British occupation- 
choose to unite (28).
However the Kemalist leadership, based in Anatolia and opposed to the Sevres 
arrangement, managed to win the support of the Kurds for the nationalist struggle by 
playing on two themes: a holy jihad against the 'Christian invaders', and a possible 
Armenian 'threat' to the survival of the Kurds should the Armenians succeed in 
establishing an independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia (29). An 
overwhelming majority of the Kurds responded to the call by joining the Kemalist 
resistance movement believing, furthermore, that their 'national aspirations’ would be 
fulfilled after victory. There was indeed some indications that this might be 
materialized after the ejection of the 'infidel' enemy. For instance, throughout the 
National War of Independence, Ataturk spoke of the 'people of Turkey’ rather than 
'Turkish people’. Furthermore, in a press conference in 1923, Ataturk promised 
autonomy for Kurds (30).
However the whole promise was shelved after the Turkish victory was complete. 
Turkey's territorial borders and other outstanding issues were finally settled by the 
Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 (31). Henceforward, in the official parlance, the 
term 'people of Turkey' was replaced by 'Turkish people' (32). Besides, the public use 
of the Kurdish language and any other manifestations of Kurdish identity were 
banned. At least, as far as language was concerned, the forcible imposition of the 
Turkish language was in stark contrast with Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne. It 
was therein stated that:
"No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any 
Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, 
in commerce, religion, in the press or in publications of 
any kind or at public meetings" (33).
However the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne clearly preferred to ignore this 
Turkish commitment in order to establish 'friendly' relations with the new Republic.
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Feeling betrayed, the Kurds frequently took up arms against the Turkish government 
in the 1920s and 30s (34). As a result, many Kurds were subjected to forcible internal 
deportations throughout the 1920s and 30s (35). The Kurds of Turkey were further 
harassed by the chauvinistic extremities of the 1930s. The Turkish 'language' and 
'history thesis' glorified Turkish 'civilisation', while the Kurds were branded as 
'mountain Turks'. The schools of Republican Turkey propagated the 'superior' 
qualities of the Turkish race, its culture and history (36). It is indeed striking to note 
that once in the peak of state apparatus, Kurdish statesmen have tended to deny the 
existence of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Prominent among them was Ismet 
Inonu, Ataturk's long time ally and his successor to the presidency, who was 
discouraged from revealing his Kurdish identity. He took a strong nationalist - 
Turkish- stance against Kurdish demands for autonomy. When referring to the 
Kurdish uprisings in eastern Turkey during the 1920s, he declared that "Only the 
Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this country" (37). 
These apparently racist policies increased the sense of isolation felt by Kurds, 
particularly among Kurdish intellectuals. The avowed motto of the new Turkish 
Republic, 'national unity and solidarity', could only be maintained through military 
means (38). To be sure, at the time, Turkey was inhabited not only by Turks and 
Kurds, but as well as by Circassians, Lazes, Bosnians, Albanians, Arabs, Greeks, 
Armenians, Jews and others. The experience over the years has shown that the non- 
Turkish Muslim minorities have largely been assimilated and enjoyed equal 
participation in the political life of the country. Meanwhile, the non-Muslim 
communities in Turkey, excepting occasional obstructions, freely enjoy their specific 
rights as minorities which are guaranteed under the Treaty of Lausanne.
Therefore it is clear that among the non-Turkish Muslim communities in Turkey, the 
Kurdish community alone resisted the temptations of assimilation by maintaining its 
distinctive cultural traits and language. The reasons probably lie in a combination of 
cultural, historical, geographical and economic factors. As has been seen, the Kurds 
have an identity which can partially be discerned from the rest of the population in 
Turkey. Besides, their collective suffering at the hands of a Jacobinist state has 
enhanced their group cohesion. Third, the fact that the Kurds have lived in a more or 
less separate geographical location -south-eastern Anatolia- for hundreds of years has 
reinforced their claim to a separate nationhood. Finally, one must also mention the 
relative economic deprivation of eastern Anatolia in comparison to other regions in 
Turkey. All these factors have combined to convince the Kurds that they are a 
'deprived and neglected community', and reinforced their separate identity (39).
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It is therefore clear that the Kurdish quest for self-determination has largely, though 
not exclusively, evolved as a reaction against a repressive majority. In this sense, to 
some extent, the Kurdish case resembles the situation in Cyprus: Turkish nationalism, 
like Greek-Cypriot nationalism, asserted itself against colonial rule which, in turn, led 
to a 'majority* domination over a 'minority'. As a result, the minority itself has come 
with counter claims for self-determination -although the extent to which this idea is 
supported by Kurds is not known. Here, as in the case of Cyprus, the dialectic 
between conflicting nationalist aspirations has created a dangerous confrontation 
which is hardly reconcilable in legal terms. (The Cyprus question is examined in 
Chapter 5)
In the light of the preceding analysis, it can confidently be asserted that the Kurds of 
Turkey constitute a "minority" as defined under international law. They are ethnically, 
linguistically and culturally discernible from the rest of the population. They have 
sufficient numbers to claim such a status -between 10 to 12 millions. Besides, there is 
every indication to suggest that the Kurds of Turkey are willing to maintain their 
distinctive identity.
They may also be regarded as a 'people' given that they make up the majority in the 
territories claimed by Kurdish separatists. Moreover they are concentrated in a 
territory in which they have lived for about three thousand years. However it is 
difficult to ascertain whether the majority of the Kurdish population seek 
independence, since they were never allowed to manifest or exercise their right to 
self-determination. Therefore periodic resurgence of Kurdish nationalist activities 
have until recently been expressed solely through violent confrontation with the 
Turkish state. However today there exists a political party which exclusively 
represents Kurdish electorates in eastern Turkey and takes its place in the National 
Parliament The People's Labour Party (HEP) -recently closed by the Constitutional 
Court, but was immediately replaced by another party (Democracy Party)- seeks to 
secure the demands of the Kurdish minority within the existing political system, and 
rules out the possibility of secession. Given that the Kurdish electorates in eastern 
Turkey overwhelmingly voted for this party in the 1991 elections, it may be assumed 
that a majority of Turkey's Kurds would prefer to remain within Turkey's existing 
frontiers.
If, however, the majority of the Kurdish people decided to exercise their right to 
self-determination with independence as the final goal, they would hardly find 
support from international law for reasons discussed above. Besides, international law
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does not draw a clear distinction between those who qualify as minorities and those 
who are entitled to self-determination. Neither does it prescribe the methods by which 
new states are to be established. Moreover, most states have a stake in advocating 
Turkey’s existing territorial status-quo given that an overwhelming majority of them 
contain minority populations, and, therefore, are fearful of its repercussions for then- 
own country. Therefore, it can be predicted that, in the final analysis, the eventual 
outcome of the Kurdish claim to self-determination would be decided on the military 
front The international recognition of an independent Kurdish state would then 
largely be a matter of political expediency on the side of the states advocating this 
claim.
8.4.Minority Protection under International Law
International law is not as passive when it comes to the protection of minorities. It is 
generally agreed that the recognition of minority rights strikes an adequate balance 
between the interests of states and the needs of minorities. As was mentioned earlier, 
under the United Nations system, 'minority rights’, as a distinct human rights 
category, was first mentioned in Article 27 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. This article enunciates the following principle:
"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language" (40).
This article is clearly designed to ensure that the non-dominant groups, vulnerable to 
assimilationist pressures, may maintain their distinct identity. The rights contained in 
this provision do not in any way imply political or economic self-management, while 
the article itself is declaratory in nature (41).
The fear of states, particularly those in Asia and Africa which have recently gained 
independence, that a 'full' recognition of minority rights might eventually lead to 
claims for self-determination, has been a main obstacle on the way to providing 
minority groups with precise and effective protection. This largely explains why the 
United Nations has so far failed to adopt a binding convention specifically designed to
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protect minority rights. On the other hand, international human rights documents 
which touch upon the ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, tend to emphasize 
the 'principle of non-discrimination' -with few exceptions. It is however worthwhile 
to have a brief look at these documents, as they highlight various aspects of minority 
protection and the risks to which minorities are exposed.
To start with, the Convention against Genocide adopted in 1948 seeks, inter alia, to 
protect ethnic and racial groups from the threat of annihilation (42). The ILO 
Convention N o .lll of 1958 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis, 
inter alia, of "race" and "national extraction" (43). The Convention against 
Discrimination in Education of 1960 seeks "to promote equality of opportunity and 
treatment for all in education". Accordingly, no distinction among citizens is allowed 
on grounds, inter alia, of "race", "language" or "national origin". Furthermore, 
Article 5(c) speaks of cultural autonomy of "members of a national minority", by 
holding that it is essential for them "to carry on their own educational activities, 
including...the use or the teaching of their own language", on condition that this 
would not prejudice the integration process of minorities and the national sovereignty 
of states (44). The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of 20 November 1963 aims at eliminating all practices of 
segregation and discrimination against individuals (45). The International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted in 1965, seeks to 
guarantee equal rights for all citizens of states. The Convention, without mentioning 
"minorities" as such, also stipulates that the states take necessary social, economic 
and cultural measures to "ensure the adequate development and protection of certain 
racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them 
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" (46). The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 enunciates, 
inter alia, that the educational system in the Member States "shall...promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among...all racial, ethnic or religious groups" 
(47).
These conventions and covenants are binding on the states party to them, and 
accordingly, the signatories must comply with the obligations enunciated under these 
international instruments. On the other hand, by its very nature, the UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does not have binding force. Clearly 
these international documents represent a piecemeal approach to a question which 
requires an unequivocal commitment against pressures faced by the minorities, both 
individually and collectively. The legal instruments mentioned above try to secure
230
legal equality for minorities before the law, while ignoring, or else vaguely referring 
to, educational, linguistic and cultural rights, the question of the protection of the 
distinctive identity of minorities. Furthermore, they refrain from an explicit reference 
to "minorities" as such, almost denying the very existence of minorities as subjects of 
international law.
On the other hand, the texts which specifically include minority rights often fail to 
provide adequate legal guarantees. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is a case in point. 
Principle VII of the "Declaration on Principles" deals with human rights and contains 
the following stipulation:
"The participating states on whose territories national 
minorities exist will respect the right of persons 
belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, 
will afford them full opportunity for the actual 
enjoyment of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms 
and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate 
interests in this sphere" (48).
This provision is apparently a weak one as far as collective minority rights are 
concerned. First, there is still the problem of the 'existence' of minorities, which 
moreover is reduced to those 'national minorities' (49). Ermacora informs us that a 
'national minority', as a sociological category, comes closer to 'nationhood' than 
racial, linguistic or ethnic minorities in that, it "is a group of persons who besides the 
characteristics of an ethnic minority, have the will to exercise as a group those rights 
which give minorities the possibility to take part in the policy-decisions process within 
a given territory" (50). However the distinction between a 'minority' and a 'national 
minority' is bound to be an arbitrary one, since it is difficult to ascertain whether a 
minority group wants to take part in the 'policy-decisions process'. Clearly the above- 
mentioned clause of the Helsinki Final Act fails to dispense with "exclusive 
jurisdiction" by placing the recognition of "national minorities" under the discretion of 
the member states. The same document also ignores any 'right to identity', and merely 
speaks of "interests", which represents a lower category than "rights" (51). Principle 
VUI of the Helsinki Final Act speaks of self-determination in the following 
terms:"...all peoples always have the right...to determine...their internal and external 
political status...and to pursue...their political, economic, social and cultural 
development". Although the provision might be interpreted as benefiting minorities
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too, it is generally agreed that this is not so, in that the term "people" here actually 
refers to the dominant majority which identifies with the state (52).
Contrary to the preceding era, it appears that the 1990s will be an era of greater 
activism in the field of minority protection. Indeed the steps taken in recent years 
have transformed minority rights beyond non-discrimination and equal protection to 
specific protection of minority groups. As is well-known, the Paris summit formally 
ended the Cold War, which had been the major cause of confrontation and division in 
Europe for four decades, with the signing, on 21 November 1990, of the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe. The summit reaffirmed that the protection of "the ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities" was among the 
cardinal principles upon which the new Europe was to be based (53).
Indeed the CSCE has rapidly been transformed from being a predominantly inter-state 
security conference to a forum for international co-operation. Under the CSCE 
system, new institutions with law-making functions are being established. The 
changing face of Europe brought into fore hitherto unexplored issues for discussion, 
among which human rights is of cardinal importance. The Copenhagen summit, held 
between 5-29 June 1990, was the second of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
which was sponsored by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
The summit, inter alia, confirmed the right of national minorities to use their own 
language, both in private and in public, and set up educational and religious 
institutions. A major significance of the document is that it mentioned "local or 
autonomous administrations" among the possible means to protect and promote the 
distinctive identity of national minorities. Meanwhile, the final document called on all 
the participating states to accede to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments. The statement however is not forceful enough to 
oblige them to do so : "the participating states reaffirm that they will consider 
acceding" to the aforementioned instruments (54). On the other hand, proposals for 
strengthening mechanisms to monitor human rights in signatory countries was 
rejected (55).
One year later, the Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, 
adopted on 19 July 1991, generally reaffirmed the principles contained in the 
Copenhagen Document (56). For instance, it reaffirmed that "persons belonging to 
minorities will not be subjected to assimilation against their will" (HI. para.4). 
However in some respects it went further. It promised that, in the future, the
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discussions on minorities would also involve the minorities themselves (HI. para.l). In 
addition, recognizing the inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms as far as the 
protection of minorities is concerned, the Document called for "a thorough review of 
implementation" procedures (13. para.l). However this statement may also be taken as 
an admission of the failure of the Member States to accept a monitoring system which 
could ensure that the norms and principles relating to minorities are transformed into 
reality. One of the most controversial aspects of the Document is that it leaves wide 
open the question of who constitutes a minority. Indeed, in the fourth paragraph of 
section two, it is stated that "not all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences 
necessarily lead to the creation of national minorities". This creates a dangerous 
loophole since states might use it as a pretext to deny minority status to those who 
feel that they share a common identity by virtue of ethnicity, culture, language, 
religion and so forth. Is it, for instance, up to the states or to the members of the 
minority themselves, to decide whether a minority group qualifies as a 'national 
minority1? Finally, not unlike other international instruments on the rights of 
minorities, the Document states that these rights -minority rights- will be enjoyed by 
"persons belonging to national minorities" "alone” or “in community with others". 
From this, one is tempted to infer that the present system of international law 
downplays the collective aspects of minority protection in favour of individual rights.
In recent years, the UN has recognised that the protection of individual human rights 
is not adequate as far as minorities are concerned. Although it is true that UN bodies 
have set up standards -which often lack effective guarantees- to protect minorities, 
they need to be articulated in a single document whereby vaguely worded principles 
can be transformed into concrete and clear obligations. This task is taken up by the 
UN General Assembly. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted on 18 December 1992, 
is designed to set up certain legal standards that could provide a basis for the 
protection of minorities around the world (57). Article 1 of the Declaration demands 
that the existence of minorities, as a collective category, be guaranteed. Besides, 
states are requested to "encourage conditions for the promotion of their identity". To 
that end, they are under an obligation to "adopt appropriate legislative and other 
measures". Article 2 speaks of cultural, religious and linguistic rights of individuals 
belonging to minorities, as well as to their right of association, and the right to 
participate in the decision-making process on matters which relate to the minority to 
which they belong. Article 3 reiterates Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Article 4 deals with special measures to ensure that 
minorities effectively enjoy the rights contained in the previous Articles. Article 5
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imposes a novel obligation upon states. It declares that "National policies and 
programmes shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate 
interests of persons belonging to minorities". Under Articles 6 and 7, states are 
requested to co-operate in protecting and promoting the rights of minorities. Article 
8, paragraph 4, reaffirms the inviolability of the territorial integrity and political 
independence of states. This implies that minorities are entided to special protection 
in so far as they recognize the legitimacy of the states in whose jurisdiction they 
happen to live.
The Declaration is, by definition, not binding on states. Therefore, this text will 
almost certainly have only limited influence in the protection of minorities. However, 
if the Declaration is taken as a codification of existing standards, it may prove to be a 
standard text on which minorities may rely in the future. In its preamble, the 
Declaration states that "the United Nations has an increasingly important role to play 
regarding the protection of minorities", which is reiterated in Article 9. The 
Declaration generally restates the already existing rights and freedoms for minorities. 
Besides, not unlike other international instruments which contain provisions for 
minorities, it fails to address the collective rights of minorities, with the sole exception 
of a phrase about individuals enjoying minority rights "in community with other 
members" (Article 3), which had already been included in Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Besides, its language is full of 
vaguely formulated phrases and references to national laws which give states too 
much discretion when it comes to implementation: "wherever possible", "encourage 
conditions", "appropriate measures", and so forth. Furthermore, the proposal fails to 
address the fundamental obstacle posed by "exclusive jurisdiction", by reaffirming 
states' absolute sovereignty over their territories. As a result, the application of the 
rights protected under the draft Declaration is severely prejudiced (58). Finally, the 
Declaration lacks a monitoring mechanism to supervise its implementation.
Does this mean that minorities cannot rely on international legal instruments unless 
the states under whose jurisdiction they live consent to binding treaties? This is not 
necessarily so. First, human rights are an exceptional aspect of international law. They 
are accorded to individuals directly; in other words, without the interposition of the 
state (59). Furthermore, international law seeks to protect the individual against the 
state, which is clearly a limitation on state sovereignty. The individual in this sense is 
"excluded from the domain reserved for the domestic jurisdiction of states. " (60). 
Furthermore, international human rights have become "universal and general" (61). 
Secondly, when regard is made to the specific case of minority rights, it will be
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observed that the rules on the prevention of chscrimination which have been 
recognized in various instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character, have 
become jus cogens (having the status of peremptory norms from which no derogation 
is permitted) in international law (62). As international human rights instruments are 
gradually adopted by a growing number of states irrespective of a particular state's 
consent, the obligations concerned can become binding on all states by virtue of 
customary international law. However it is also clear that states are more likely to 
respect a commitment to which they have consented specifically rather than one 
which arises through customary law (63).
As to whether minorities can rely on international law for the enjoyment of specific 
minority rights, the emerging tendency is towards responding in the affirmative. The 
essential question here is whether minority protection measures are an integral part of 
human rights standards, and whether they can be resorted to by minorities even if the 
minorities are not recognized as such by the state. Some authors, like Ermacora, 
argue that minority protection is an autonomous notion of international law, in that it 
binds states regardless of whether they legally recognize minorities or not (64). 
Therefore, individual states have an obligation towards the international community 
to guarantee minority rights in their territory. However, this view is not always shared 
by states, as is evidenced by the absence of a binding convention on minority rights - 
although the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe will soon be discussing 
an additional protocol on minorities which will be referred to shortly.
It is well known that states do not always comply with international instruments 
which they endorse, particularly when they perceive this to be contrary to their 
national interests. Because of this, the value and effectiveness of international human 
rights on minorities ultimately depend on the supervisory mechanisms intended to 
monitor the performance of states. There are those which monitor state performance 
at intergovernmental level. Prominent among them is the UN Commission on Human 
Rights which is composed of fifty-three experts. It is authorized to examine any 
matters relating to human rights. Through its Special Rapporteurs or Working 
Groups, it prepares reports on the situation of human rights in a particular country or 
on a particular theme. The Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities is entrusted with the task of investigating private complaints 
relating to the violations of human rights. If the Subcommission reaffirms the 
existence of a violation, it then submits its report to the Commission on Human 
Rights. The latter may then investigate the case further. This procedure, which was 
established by ECOSOC -Economic and Social Council- resolution 1503, remains
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confidential until the Commission decides to announce the names of the states which 
are found to be in violation of human rights. It is asserted that "the fact that such 
complaints are taken up may have a certain corrective effect" on states (65).
The Commission may also publicly discuss human rights situations in all parts of the 
world. Any of the individual member states may raise the question of the violation of 
human rights by other state/s. The Commission may then adopt resolutions which are 
submitted to ECOSOC and to the General Assembly. The Commission may also 
decide to conduct further enquiries into the problem through country rapporteurs. 
The latter procedure has been widely used, inter alia, on questions relating to the 
problems faced by minorities, as is the case with countries like Iraq and Romania
(66). A unique feature of the Commission on Human Rights is its admission, 
alongside the Member States, of a large number of non-govemmental organizations 
with consultative status into its debates. Among them are the monitoring bodies such 
as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the various 
"watch" committees which constantly call for effective enforcement mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights.
Although the resolutions adopted under the auspices of the Commission on Human 
Rights are not binding for states to which they are addressed, they bring certain 
problems to international attention, which the states can hardly ignore. Together with 
the pressure of the international community at large, the influence exerted by the 
press and the public may help correcting the wrong-doings of states. Having said that, 
however, it must be admitted that ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly cannot 
effectively punish governments for their lack of compliance with human rights norms. 
It is the UN Security Council which has the real bite, though it can only act if "a 
violation of human rights threatens international peace and security", which is a rarity
(67).
One of such exceptions has been the establishment by allied forces of a 'safe haven' in 
northern Iraq in the aftermath of the aborted Kurdish insurrection against the Iraqi 
government forces following the Gulf War in 1991. Its purpose was declared as being 
the protection of the Kurds from the impending threat of massive attacks by Iraqi 
troops. However it is noted that the Security Council Resolution 688, although, inter 
alia, expressing grave concern over "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a 
massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross 
border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region", did
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not authorize the allied forces to take military protective measures to create a 'safe 
haven' in northern Iraq (68). Therefore the legal validity of this 'humanitarian 
intervention' remains dubious.
The main dilemma in such cases lies in the inherent contradiction between the 
prohibition of the use of force against states as sanctioned under Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter and the act of humanitarian intervention which is launched against the 
wishes of the state in whose territory the action takes place. Besides, as noted by 
Malanczuk, the prevailing view rejects the legality of humanitarian intervention under 
international law on grounds that it may be abused by powerful states for their own 
ends (69). However this is not to deny that, whatever the political and strategic 
motivations in the Iraqi Kurdish case, it has set a precedent for future humanitarian 
interventions in cases of gross and systematic human rights violations committed by 
states against their population. The establishment of 'safe havens' may indeed become 
an effective means by which the UN Security Council involves itself with matters 
conventionally perceived as belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of states. In other 
words, if properly applied, this practice may in the future constitute a source of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. The establishment of 'safe areas' in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina -although, in this case, with the consent of the Bosnian 
government- is indeed a testimony to such a trend.
When exploring the supervisory mechanisms for the international protection of human 
rights, one may also refer to judicial or quasi-judicial institutions and mechanisms 
which are an important source of standard setting in international law. For instance, 
although they concern specific conflicts and issues, the judgements or decisions of 
international courts or committees of experts "provide concrete guidance to states for 
future conduct in analogous situations" (70). Prominent among them is the Human 
Rights Committee which was established as an independent body of experts to 
examine complaints by individuals against their state under the procedure established 
by the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which entered into force on 23 March 1976. However its decisions are not binding 
for it is only entitled to "forward its views to the state" against which the complaint 
has been made. On the other hand, for its part, the International Court of Justice has 
not yet developed a jurisprudence in the field of minority rights.
Hence, it can be argued that although the international standards on minority 
protection are reasonably well-established, particularly in the field of non­
discrimination and affirmative action for individual members of minorities, the
237
enforcement mechanisms for their effective implementation are less than adequate. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, the implementation of minority protection measures still 
remain in the legal domain of individual states. Indeed the studies carried out for the 
United Nations have shown that "it is up to the states to bring about their minority 
protective measures bilaterally, regionally and by national law" (71).
However this is not to say that existing international mechanisms have no role to play 
in this process. Indeed, they can be effective "by exerting moral, psychological and 
political pressure and by making use of public opinion-in the country concerned and 
in the whole international community" (72). On the other hand, experience has shown 
that human rights are best protected at the regional level due to greater ideological or 
political homogeneity (73). Indeed legally binding human rights instruments are easier 
to adopt at regional level. Such is the case with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (came into force in 
October 1986) and the American Convention on Human Rights (came into force in 
July 1978).
It is generally agreed that the policy of forcible assimilation is against the principles of 
international law. Assimilation of minorities has to be a matter of sociological 
process, an autonomous desire of minority groups "to renounce their will to preserve 
their characteristics, and so become equal to the rest of the population of a state"
(74). In this sense only, international law is not against the assimilation of minorities
(75). However it would be wrong to assume that dominant majorities within existing 
states always try to assimilate minorities. For instance, the UK approach towards 
different ethnic communities can be described as 'internal multinationalism'. The state 
does not interfere with different cultures and national traditions (although, as has been 
argued in Chapter 3, this was not always the case in the past when the British 
government suppressed the linguistic and cultural identity of the Irish, Scots, and 
Welsh). Today one can be British without ceasing to be English, Scottish, Welsh or 
an Ulsterman (76). However, the British case hardly constitutes a general pattern. 
More often than not, states are tempted to forge a uniform culture -almost always the 
culture of the dominant majority- in order to create a "national identity". Therefore 
the importance of minority protection at the international level is not to be 
underestimated.
A general consensus is beginning to emerge with regard to minority protection : first, 
no discrimination should be practised against individuals belonging to a minority 
group, and against the group as a whole. The principle of non-discrimination against,
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inter alia, minorities has become jus cogens in international law. States are bound by 
this principle; second, special economic, social and cultural measures may be required 
to ensure the equality of minorities with the rest of the population in fact; third, 
equality of treatment towards minorities must encourage legal integration, not 
assimilation. However the latter may, not must, be a sociological consequence of this 
integration (77). At this point, a distinction must be drawn between 'nationality' and 
'citizenship'. Every citizen of a state should have the right to choose his/her national 
identity. This does not however in any way imply the questioning of the sovereignty 
of the state; finally, the emerging trend in international law is that it is not up to states 
to decide whether there exist minorities in their territory or not This is a factual 
matter which can be ascertained through the criteria set by international law.
It is within the framework of the above-mentioned discussion -on the position of 
minorities under international law- that the "Kurdish problem" in Turkey can 
properly be addressed. Two questions are central here : first, is the Turkish 
government under an international obligation to recognize the Kurds of Turkey as a 
"minority"? second, if so, what measures should be taken to guarantee their rights?
8.5.Turkey's Obligations Towards the Kurdish Minority under International 
Law
First of all, it must be admitted that Turkey has been consistent in avoiding any 
international obligations which might oblige it to guarantee the rights of Kurds as a 
minority. Turkey is not a party to the Convention against Discrimination in Education 
(1960), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), or the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) which are 
binding on the states adopting them (78). It is generally agreed that under 
international law, states are not bound by international obligations unless they have 
consented to them -with the exception of peremptory international norms. Turkey is 
not a party to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which explicitly refers to 
'minorities', on grounds that this provision contradicts Article 3 of the Constitution 
which holds that "the Turkish State is an indivisible whole with its territory and 
nation. Its language is Turkish" (79). Indeed Turkish Constitution is still based on a 
homogeneous notion of territorial nation (80).
Instead, Turkey has signed only those international texts which merely reaffirm the 
principle of non-discrimination. It did not, for instance, hesitate to join in the Helsinki
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Final Act without putting reservations on minority rights. This is presumably because 
the provision relating to minorities solely speaks of the principle of non-discrimination 
which is also guaranteed by the Turkish constitution. Article 6 of the 1982 
Constitution declares that all individuals are equal before the law regardless of 
language, race, colour or religion. Article 11 guarantees the right of the individual to 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The Constitution also includes other basic human 
rights commonly found in liberal democratic constitutions, such as freedom of speech, 
press, association, assembly, travel, communications, sanctity of law, right to privacy, 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and so forth (81).
These civil and political rights are also guaranteed under the system established by the 
Council of Europe to which Turkey has been attached since 1949. The Commission 
of the Council of Europe is authorized to examine cases brought by one state against 
another. In such cases the Commission undertakes an investigation concerning an 
alleged violation of human rights, and then tries to secure a friendly settlement 
between the related state parties. This procedure was used when Denmark, France, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden collectively launched a complaint against 
Turkey in 1982 concerning the alleged human rights violations in the country under 
the military regime. A friendly settlement was finally agreed in 1985 (82). In case a 
friendly setdement is not achieved, the Commission prepares a report, and submits 
this to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Committee then 
prescribes a period within which the government concerned is expected to take 
satisfactory measures to remedy the situation. In case the remedy is not forthcoming, 
the Committee is entitled to take further action, including the suspension of the 
defendant government's membership. Any state which claims to be democratic, 
cannot afford to be unconcerned about the publication of a report by a competent and 
impartial international organ. Although this procedure exerts considerable 
international control, it does not allow individuals to seek an international remedy 
against their own governments.
An individual right to petition is indeed provided under Article 25 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, under the terms of which only those states which have 
expressly declared that they accept it are bound by i t  In January 1987, Turkey 
submitted a declaration which recognized the competence of the European 
Commission of Human Rights to receive applications from individuals or non­
governmental organizations claiming to be victims of a violation by the Turkish state 
(83). The Commission is not entided to take a binding decision regarding individual 
applications. Instead it submits its report concerning the alleged violation of human
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rights to the Committee of Ministers. The Member States are bound by the decision 
of the Committee concerning the individual complaint
The recognition, initially made for a three-year period, was extended in 1990 -for 
another three years- during which time Turkey also recognized the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (84). Under Article 47 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Court may only deal with a case when 
the Commission fails to reach a friendly settlement with a defendant state. The 
Turkish declaration (of 1987) with regard to the individual right to petition was 
accompanied by a number of provisos. First, Turkey sought to limit the territories in 
which the right could be invoked to that of Turkey proper. This was presumably 
intended to exclude the possibility that this complaint procedure might be resorted to 
by Greek-Cypriots in relation to the acts committed by Turkish troops in Cyprus. 
Second, Turkey declared that it could derogate from its obligation under special 
circumstances by virtue of Article 15 of the Convention. This Article allows Member 
States to derogate from their obligations in exceptional circumstances, such as "war" 
and "public emergency". In Turkey's view, moreover, "the special circumstances" had 
to be interpreted in the light of Articles 119 to 122 of the Turkish Constitution. These 
Articles state that the exercise of human rights and liberties can be restricted in times 
of "martial law" and "state of emergency" -in addition to "war" and "public 
emergency" (85). Because of these "conditions", Turkey's declaration was perceived 
by the depository, Greece and some other Member States as a "reservation" which 
was inadmissible under Article 25 of the Convention.
In the Chrysostomos case, the Commission (of the Council of Europe) found these 
conditions, except the temporal one, to be incompatible with Article 25 of the ECHR 
(86). In the Commission's view, this did not however affect the validity of the 
recognition of the individual right to petition. The Turkish Government has recently 
promised, to a delegation of the Council of Europe, that these conditions, with the 
exception of the territorial one, will be lifted soon (87). The delegation was also 
assured that the present derogation relating to the non-applicability of the individual 
right to petition in areas under the state of emergency -mainly Kurdish provinces-, 
which Turkey had sought to justify on the basis of Article 15 of the Convention, 
would also be lifted (88).
A number of individuals have already made use of the individual right to petition. 
Some cases have been declared admissible by the Commission (89). It can be 
anticipated that, once Turkey has lifted the derogations, Kurdish citizens will be able
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to challenge domestic court rulings by launching complaints to the Commission with 
regard to human rights violations committed in south-eastern Turkey. However, in 
most probability, the plaintiffs will not be able to rely on the Commission of Human 
Rights for alleged violations of specific minority rights since Turkey has not accepted 
to be bound by any of the European Convention provisions relating to this matter.
The Council of Europe has recently adopted a European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages (opened for signature on 5 November 1992) (90). This Charter 
was specifically designed to protect and promote regional or minority languages in 
the Member States of the Council of Europe. The preamble celebrates 
interculturalism and multilingualism as representing "an important contribution to the 
building of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and cultural diversity". 
Under the Charter, states undertake to create an atmosphere of tolerance towards 
minority languages in education and encourage the mass media to pursue the same 
objective (Article 7). They are also under an obligation to allow the use of regional or 
minority languages during judicial and administrative proceedings in areas where "the 
number of residents justifies" these measures (Articles 9 & 10). So far, the Charter 
has been signed by twelve Member States. Turkey is not however among the 
signatories (91).
Soon after the adoption of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a 
recommendation on an Additional Protocol on the Rights of Minorities to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1 February 1993) (92). This new initiative 
was particularly prompted by the emergence of serious minority problems in the post­
communist central and eastern European states. Its preamble states that "international 
protection of the rights of minorities is an essential aspect of the international 
protection of human rights and, as such, a domain for international co-operation". 
Article 1 gives an account of the prerequisites necessary to qualify as a "national 
minority" : first, its members must hold the citizenship of the state concerned and 
have lasting ties therewith; second, they must "display distinctive ethnic, cultural, 
religious or linguistic characteristics" as distinct from the rest of the population of a 
state; third, they must have a common desire to preserve their identity. By setting 
both an objective and a subjective criteria, this definition clearly precludes from its 
ambit both migrant workers and those communities, although having the 
characteristics of a minority, are willing to assimilate into the dominant society. For 
the most part, the text restates what has already been adopted in other international 
instruments. However it also contains some new rights and advantages which are
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worth examining. Under Article 5, "Deliberate changes to the demographic 
composition of the region in which a national minority is settled, to the detriment of 
that minority, shall be prohibited". Article 6 states that "All persons belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to set up their own organisations, including 
political parties". The third paragraph of Article 7 states that "in the regions in which 
substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the persons belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to use their mother tongue in their contacts with 
the administrative authorities and in proceedings before the courts and legal 
authorities".
In comparison with the UN Declaration on the Protection of Minorities, the 
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe appears 
more detailed and systematic. Besides, it is more sensitive to the threats posed by 
government policies, such as transfer of populations, against the existence of national 
minorities. However, not unlike other international instruments, the Recommendation 
only speaks of "persons belonging to national minorities"; hence, it fails to guarantee 
group rights. By extension, the Recommendation fails to address the national 
minorities directly. Instead, it relies on the national governments for dispensing the 
rights contained in the Recommendation. Hence, in case of violations against the 
rights protected in this Recommendation, the remedy has to be sought in national 
courts (Article 9). Besides, the exercise of these rights and freedoms are subject to 
restrictions or conditions which may be imposed by national laws on numerous 
grounds : national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order, public 
health and so forth.
It has to be stated that Recommendation 1201 is not legally binding on the Member 
States of the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly, unlike national 
parliaments, is not a legislative body. It role is confined to making proposals to the 
Committee of Ministers which may or may not adopt a given recommendation. The 
Committee of Ministers, which is composed of individual government representatives, 
has not yet discussed the proposal. It is known that some Member States -including 
France- are reluctant to accept the concept of a legally binding text on minority 
rights. Only after its adoption by the Committee of Ministers by a two-thirds majority 
could this text become binding on Member States. Even before it becomes binding, 
this text is likely to constitute an essential reference by which to gauge the extent to 
which minorities are protected in individual Member States of the Council of Europe.
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Given its past record, it would indeed be overoptimistic to expect Turkey to sign the 
document. Perhaps, not unexpectedly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has repeatedly called on Turkey to recognize the Kurds as a minority and 
guarantee their rights accordingly (93). Although Turkey has taken some steps 
towards recognizing "the Kurdish reality", as the former Prime Minister, whose 
successor is from the same Party, had declared soon after taking office in the autumn 
of 1991, the situation in south-eastern Turkey still remains precarious. Repeated 
claims have been made, both by Turkish human rights activists and international 
observers, of large-scale human rights violations, such as torture, extra-judicial 
killings and unlawful detentions in south-eastern Turkey. The Council of Europe has 
been urging Turkey to respond to Kurdish terrorism within the rule of law. A major 
step in this direction, it is argued, could be the lifting of the state of emergency which 
has been in force in the south-eastern regions since 1987 (94).
Under Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, international treaties to which Turkey is 
a party are approved by the Turkish parliament by enactment of a law. Therefore 
international treaties rank equal to statutes and accordingly become enforceable after 
having been published in the Official Gazette. However, unlike other statutes, their 
constitutionality may not be challenged. This means that other parties to the treaties 
may rely on their validity once they become law (95). One implication of this 
procedure is that the European Convention of Human Rights can legitimately be 
resorted to by national courts. One Turkish scholar suggests that its provisions may 
also be invoked by national courts to give a broad interpretation to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Turkish Constitution (96). Other treaties to 
which Turkey is a party may also be resorted to by national courts. Cardinal among 
them is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It is 
interesting to note that when reviewing an expulsion order by the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs against a group of foreign journalists and camera crew, the Council 
of State (Danistay; Conseil d'Etat) considered, inter alia, the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 -with regard to its provisions relating to greater freedom of information and 
improved conditions for journalists from participating states- when accounting for 
the illegality of the expulsion order (97). Although, technically speaking, the Helsinki 
Final Act is not binding since it is not a treaty but a declaration of intent, a political 
programme to guide foreign policies of participant states, it can nonetheless be 
regarded as constituting part of customary international law, since it reaffirms some 
of the established principles of human rights (98). It may therefore be relied upon by 
Turkish courts when reviewing cases of human rights violations against the Kurdish 
minority in Turkey.
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The same also holds true for the recently adopted CSCE documents, to which Turkey 
is also attached, on the specific protection of minorities. Suffice it to note that the 
new Turkish coalition Government promised, among its "principles of declaration, 
that "the legal and practical shortcomings, obstacles and limitations our citizens are 
facing...in the protection and development of their ethnical, cultural and linguistic 
identity will be eliminated in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of Paris to 
which Turkey is a party" (99). In other words, Turkey recognizes the relevance of the 
CSCE process, not only in matters of security, but also in relation to human rights 
and minority protection. Therefore, one is tempted to hope that the high courts in 
Turkey will rely on the CSCE documents to enforce the specific rights and freedoms 
of the Kurdish minority -linguistic, educational and other cultural rights. Nonetheless, 
given that the language of CSCE documents is not forceful enough, this may well 
prove illusory.
There is a fundamental contradiction in the Turkish attitude towards the question of 
minorities when one recalls, for instance, its active posture over the fate of the 
Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. Indeed, it has rightly protested at the 
assimilationist pressures imposed on them by the Greek and Bulgarian governments 
(For a detailed analysis of this subject, see Chapter 7). However one could not help 
but to draw on the similarity between the plight of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
and that of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. As has been discussed, under international 
law, ethnic or linguistic groups, as distinct from the rest of the population, are 
entitled to minority protection too. The fact that the Turkish Constitution and legal 
codes regard this otherwise, cannot be justified under international law. There exists 
a set of rules and principles which seek to place both the individual and collective 
protection of minorities into the domain of international law.
Strictly speaking, Turkey is not under any international duty to recognize Kurds as a 
minority and guarantee their rights accordingly, since it is not party to any of the 
internationally binding instruments dealing with this question. Nonetheless it has a 
moral and political responsibility towards the international community. The method of 
its implementation, however, is a matter for Turkey. Thus far Turkey has sought to 
satisfy Kurdish demands by giving a broader interpretation to the principle of non­
discrimination, and by lifting restrictions on the Kurdish language. However even 
these limited measures are not always transformed into reality. Kurds in eastern 
Turkey still suffer human rights violations and economic poverty which further strain 
the already tense confrontation between Kurdish activists and the government
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Furthermore, even if the Kurds in Turkey were in effect treated equally with the rest 
of the population, this would still fall short of guaranteeing their rights as a distinct 
minority group.
It is presumably through international pressure that Turkey will succumb to these 
demands. Already the European Community (EC) has made it clear that Turkey's 
oppressive policy towards its Kurdish citizens is a stumbling block in the latteris 
attempts to gain membership of the EC. Indeed the EC Commission's report of 
December 1989 which considered the viability of Turkish application for membership 
(April 1987), noted that "within Turkey...minority rights still fell short of EC norms 
despite improvements" (100). This was probably one of the motives behind the 
Turkish move towards lifting the ban on the Kurdish language.
It is only to be hoped that the Turkish government will sooner or later take the 
courageous step of legally recognizing Kurds as a "minority". It is no more 
convincing to portray Kurdish demands as a "threat to national unity". Perhaps in the 
1920s and 30s the policy of forcible assimilation was the only solution for the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the country. However since then Turkey has 
made significant strides towards the creation of a national identity. Today there is 
ample evidence to suggest that non-Turkish ethnic groups, other than the Kurds, have 
already assimilated into the dominant society. Not surprisingly, the demand for 
minority recognition only comes from the Kurds. Therefore, both as an essential 
requirement of democracy and human rights to which Turkey subscribes, and as a 
matter of statecraft, Turkey is bound to recognize the Kurds as a "minority" and 
guarantee their rights accordingly.
As for Turkish fear of Kurdish irredentism, it does not easily reconcile with existing 
realities. It is not certain whether all Kurds share a sense of nationhood irrespective of 
the countries they live in. Although it is true that Kurds have their own language, the 
differences in dialect make it difficult for Kurds to understand one another. The 
Kurdish experience in each host country has greatly varied, which implies that the 
extent and intensity of Kurdish nationalism differs among them. The feeling of 
separate nationhood is also unevenly distributed among the members of the Kurdish 
community within same states. For instance, although the PKK advocates outright 
independence from Turkey, not many Kurds in Turkey share this vision. A majority of 
Turkey's Kurds live outside the predominately Kurdish provinces of the south-east. 
Istanbul has become the city with the largest Kurdish population anywhere in the 
world. Many of the Turkish Kurds do not harbour any hopes of union with their
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compatriots across the border. Moreover they are well aware that an independent 
Kurdistan is unlikely to present any considerable economic rewards in the short or 
medium-term. What the Kurds of Turkey really aspire for, is well put by The 
Economist : "...freedom from repression, a degree of devolution, the right to learn 
and read in Kurdish and to hear Kurdish on radio and television" (101).
Through recognizing them as a 'minority', Turkey is expected to grant the Kurds a 
number of cultural, educational and linguistic rights while enforcing existing laws in a 
non-discriminatory manner. This could possibly marginalize the secessionist factions 
within the Kurdish movement, hence allowing the government to 'contain' the Kurdish 
problem. Otherwise, a full-scale civil war cannot be ruled out
To be sure, these are minimal prerequisites for a democratic solution to the Kurdish 
problem, which nonetheless satisfy international law and moral standards. Of course 
one might also suggest the granting of autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish 
areas. This might bring about self-government for Kurds in various areas of public 
life, like cultural and religious autonomy; executive, legislative and judicial authority 
in internal matters; police powers; control over public finances and so forth. The 
delegation of limited powers to Kurds would not in any way infringe upon Turkey's 
territorial integrity. However, autonomy would presumably impose some limitation 
on Turkish sovereignty (102). Turkey is unlikely to accept Kurdish autonomy as a 
viable option, at least in the short term. Neither is it legally bound to do so, for 
"autonomy is not widely perceived as an obligation in general international law" 
(103).
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TURKEY AND THE ’PROGRESSIVE1 THEMES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW
The concept of sovereignty corresponds to no set of facts or behaviour given that 
states are a part of an increasingly interdependent world. The linkage of societies are 
manifested by activities like commerce, transportation and communication. Never 
before has the pace of communication among individuals and societies become so 
quick and penetrating. However classical international law, based on the absolute 
notion of sovereignty and a detached conception of inter-state relations, was not 
equipped with the required legal tools to impose positive obligations on states in 
tackling the complex network of global problems. The task of progressively 
developing international law has been undertaken by the United Nations. Indeed the 
UN has had to find ways of encouraging international co-operation which was 
designed to cope with certain economic, political and social problems which could 
not be resolved by individual nation-states alone. These problems are varied, and are 
subject to an evolutionary legal process. They range from human rights issues to the 
protection of the environment, from self-determination to the rights of women, from a 
search for a new international economic order to the rights of refugees and displaced 
persons, and so on. This section however deals with three of the outstanding issues 
which fall into the category of 'progressive' international law : a/decolonization and 
the principle of self-determination ; b/search for a new international economic order; 
c/human rights. The exclusion of other issues from analysis has two reasons : first, 
due to the lack of space; second, these three themes have had far more impact on the 
conduct of international relations than the others. Besides, there has been much 
controversy around these subjects since the foundation of the United Nations. This 
section accordingly tries to explore Turkey's distinct approach towards these 
questions within a chronological framework.
The main crux of the analysis made here centre around the UN General Assembly 
discussions over various resolutions, declarations and decisions. It is generally agreed 
that the voting behaviour in the General Assembly is a clear expression of a given 
state's foreign policy orientation. It indicates the way in which the ruling elites define 
the nation's goals and expectations, and reflects "its actual behaviour rather than its 
claims or pretensions" (1). However it is also generally agreed that the UN General 
Assembly resolutions are devoid of binding force. They carry political and moral
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force, and at most contribute, by their cumulative effect, to the crystallization of 
customary international law. But it is equally true that even those states which refrain 
from adopting a certain resolution are expected to avoid actions contradicting its 
fundamental purposes (2). It is often observed that states refer to the General 
Assembly resolutions to justify their international actions (3). Be that as it may, the 
main concern of this chapter is Turkey's understanding of progressive international 
norms and principles irrespective of their legal value. Besides, during the exposition 
of this section, reference will also be made to the conventions and treaties to which 
Turkey is a party.
The three themes that constitute the scope of this section are dealt with separately; 
that is, under separate headings. However, a general overview of the preceding issues 
will be made in the concluding section.
This chapter will start off with an analysis of the UN instruments relating to the 
process of decolonization. The principle of self-determination has been of cardinal 
importance in this process.
9.1.Decolonization and the Principle of Self-Determination
It was typical of the post-Second World War era that organized political groups in 
Africa, then Asia, began fighting on behalf of a whole 'people' against colonial 
powers. This struggle also included liberation movements, particularly in Africa, 
fighting against racist regimes and alien domination. Many of these movements 
eventually acquired statehood, while some others, like the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), are still struggling to achieve an independent state. The 
fundamental principle upon which these struggles are granted legitimacy is the right 
of peoples to self-determination. In the UN era, this principle was first enunciated 
under Article 1 of the United Nations Charter which declared that one of the principal 
purposes of this organization was "to develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". This 
reference was later invoked by certain non-westem states (including socialist states) 
on behalf of colonial peoples to speed up the process of decolonization. Accordingly, 
soon after the foundation of the United Nations, colonial issues began to be discussed 
in the UN General Assembly with increasing pace. What has been Turkish attitude in 
regard to self-determination?
257
To start off, Turkey remained neutral or voted in favour of the French position at the 
UN General Assembly regarding the independence of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco 
in the 1950s. In Turkey's view, France’s relations with these territories were a matter 
for France, and therefore they were not within the competence of the United Nations 
(4). Turkish scholars tend to attribute this approach to Turkey's close alignment with 
the western world after World War II (5). Turkish statesmen at the time believed that 
geographically and strategically, Turkey could not afford to become a part of the 
Non-Aligned movement Since the imperatives of Turkish security in a bipolar world 
was guaranteed by the western world, in Inonu's words, Turkey was not "inclined to 
seek political advantage through non-alignment" (6). Turkish foreign policy-makers 
had another immediate and specific concern however. Greece brought the question of 
Cyprus, which was then under British mandate, before the UN in General Assembly in 
1954. Greece argued that the people in Cyprus had the right to exercise their right to 
self-determination, and, accordingly, Cyprus should become an independent state (7). 
This was however an anathema to Turkey since the Greek majority of the island 
might then decide to unite with mainland Greece. Therefore in order avoid such an 
eventuality, Turkey argued in the General Assembly that this was a matter for Britain 
alone (8). When the discussion in the Assembly was suspended, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister expressed satisfaction. A former Turkish ambassador writes that the Turkish 
position had been prepared in close consultation with its western allies (9).
Indeed, throughout the 1950s, with few exceptions, (10) Turkey either sided with 
western countries or abstained on questions relating to Non-Self Governing 
Territories and the International Trusteeship System. The questions involved 
economic and social issues, transmission or examination of information, the future 
political status of these territories, etc. For instance, Turkey abstained when a 1952 
resolution, which called for the granting of independence to Non-Self Governing and 
Trust Territories, reaffirmed the principle of self-determination of "all peoples and 
nations" (11). This resolution was generally advocated by developing and communist 
states. Even in 1959, when decolonization was becoming a pressing issue in 
international relations, Turkey abstained when some Asian and African states 
proposed the question of Algeria, which was at the time a French colony, to be 
included in the agenda of the General Assembly (12).
The process of decolonization, it is argued, helped relieve pressure coming from 
strong countries over the voting behaviour of already independent small nation-states. 
The influx of new states enhanced the freedom of action enjoyed by small countries 
(13). This factor may in part account for Turkey's cautious co-operation with non­
258
western countries on decolonization after the 1960s. For instance, Turkey was a co­
sponsor to the celebrated UN General Assembly resolution no. 1514, adopted in 1960 
and entitled the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples". This declaration was adopted on 14 December 1960 by a vote of 89 to 
0, with 9 abstentions (14). This change of heart was partly a by-product of regime 
change in Turkey, when the army overthrew the pro-American right-wing 
government on 27 May 1960. The same year, Turkey voted in favour of Resolution 
1573(XV) which called on France to ensure the effective implementation of the 
principle of self-determination in Algeria. This resolution, adopted on 19 December 
1960, was voted by 63 to 8 with 27 abstentions (15).
However, despite growing rapprochement between the non-westem world and 
Turkey on the question of decolonization after the 1960s, the Turkish approach 
towards the principle of self-determination continued to be determined by political 
considerations. In accordance with Turkey’s perceived interests, this principle was 
given conflicting interpretations in different situations. This unprincipled approach 
occasionally amounted to undermining the Turkish position over Cyprus. For 
instance, Turkey supported the implementation of the principle of self-determination 
for the overwhelmingly Muslim province of Kashmir which was part of India, in 
order to show its support for Pakistan and to strengthen the CENTO links with this 
country (16), although it opposed the implementation of this principle in the 
determination of the future status of Cyprus (17).
On questions regarding the granting of independence to colonial peoples, Turkey has 
voted favourably unless the resolutions specifically condemned some western 
governments, particularly the USA with which Turkey had established close military, 
political and economic ties after its inclusion among the European beneficiaries of 
Marshall Aid in 1948. Indeed during the 1960s, Turkey generally voted in favour of 
granting of independence to colonies in southern Africa, Fiji, Spanish Sahara, 
Namibia, territories under Portuguese domination -Angola, Mozambique and Guinea 
[Bissau] and some other territories-, as well as to Non-Self Governing Territories. By 
the same token, Turkey did not hesitate to join in a 1971 resolution which condemned 
Portugal and its NATO allies for "waging war against the national liberation 
movements of the colonies and against certain independent States of Africa and 
Asia". The resolution also confirmed :
"...the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-
determination and liberation from colonial and foreign
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domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern 
Africa and in particular that of the peoples of 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea 
[Bissau], as well as of the Palestinian people by all 
available means consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations" (18).
Over the years, Turkey has retained its posture favouring self-determination of 
peoples living under colonial, alien or racist domination.
The question of the apartheid regime in South Africa has frequently entered the 
agenda of the UN General Assembly over the years. Although Turkey consistently 
voted in favour of resolutions condemning the racist regimes in southern Africa 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when it came to condemning specific group of 
countries -certain western governments- for continuing to collaborate with these 
racist minority regimes, the Turkish posture was not as clear-cut. This was the case 
when Turkey abstained in the face of a resolution which specifically criticised the 
three permanent members of the UN Security Council for vetoing proposals intended 
to impose effective sanctions against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia -France, 
the UK, and the US (19). Again Turkey abstained when a similar resolution, 
condemning western governments as well as Israel and Japan, was adopted in 1977 
(20). Meanwhile, Turkey abstained when a 1973 resolution, inter alia, declared that 
the armed struggle of a people against colonial or alien domination must be regarded 
as international conflict in the sense of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (21). Here 
one can see the traces of Turkey's attachment to 'classical' international law which 
sees states as the supreme sovereign in their territory, and, accordingly, perceives 
them as the main subject of international society.
Turkey's politically motivated voting pattern was most clear in the case of East 
Timor. Turkey has since 1975 voted against, and occasionally abstained from, 
resolutions which condemned Indonesia's occupation of East Timor (soon after the 
Portuguese left the island in 1975), and called on respect for the right of the East 
Timorese people to self-determination (22). The Turkish action was clearly a political 
one, in that both Turkey and Indonesia were close allies of the US, and the US also 
opposed these resolutions.
Turkey's policy towards the Palestine question, an ever-present dish alongside South 
Africa on the menu of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, had been
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another captive of Turkey’s redoubtable pro-western voting in the 1950s. Although 
Turkey had voted against the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab 
state in the General Assembly in 1947 which was in tune with the position of the 
Arabs, it later became the first Muslim country to formally recognize Israel in 1949. 
Turkey declined to take an active stance on the rights of Palestinians and on the 
Palestinian refugees which had been expelled or were forced to flee from their lands 
after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Even in 1965, when Turkish diplomats had claimed 
to have launched a multidimensional and active foreign policy which would have 
been more in tune with the aspirations of the developing world and the Islamic 
countries, Turkey abstained when Pakistan and Somalia submitted amendments to 
the United States’ draft resolution on Palestinian refugees. The amendments included 
the recognition and restoration of full Palestinian rights, as well as the right of the 
refugees to return to their homes (23).
Indeed, until the 1970s, Turkey refrained from mentioning the right of Palestinians to 
self-determination and independence. Instead the Turkish official line was limited to 
declaring occasional sympathy for 'the refugees of Palestine’ which was intended to 
alleviate their plight "in accordance with law and justice" (24). On the Palestinian 
issue, the Turkish posture was aligned to that of the western governments to such an 
extent that it did not hesitate to abstain when a 1966 resolution criticised the 
inadequacy of the previous relief efforts regarding Palestinian refugees, and called for 
greater efforts to remedy the situation (25).
However, after the 1967 war, which ended with a complete defeat of the Arabs, 
Turkish policy underwent a radical shift in favour of the Palestinians. For instance, in 
1968, Turkey voted for a resolution which condemned the violation of human rights 
in the Arab territories captured by Israel in the 1967 War. The resolution also 
reaffirmed the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes and recover their 
property in territories occupied by Israel (26). The following year, a more significant 
resolution was passed by the Assembly which referred to the Palestinians as a 
'people', and received Turkish approval. This resolution condemned Israel's 
oppressive policies in the Occupied Territories, and reaffirmed "the inalienable rights 
of the people of Palestine" (27). Some years later, in 1975, Turkey voted in favour of 
a resolution which declared that Zionism was a form of racism and racial 
discrimination (28). In this case, the western bloc of countries declined to endorse the 
resolution which was indicative of Turkey's adoption of a more independent and 
assertive approach to the Palestinian issue. Turkey has since voted in favour of all 
resolutions condemning Israel and endorsing the right of the Palestinian people to
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self-determination and independence. It must however be said that Turkey's 
consistent pro-Palestinian stance is partially an outcome of growing public pressure, 
as well as its foreign policy interests and historical and cultural identity as a Muslim 
and Middle Eastern country. This is not to deny that Turkey has been an advocate of 
the right of peoples to self-determination for over two decades. However, this 
statement is made with two qualifications : first, even when Turkey supported the 
resolutions advocating the right to self-determination, its ambivalent posture was still 
in evidence. Indeed the specification of a western group of countries for criticism has 
frequently prompted Turkey to abstain from, and occasionally vote against, 
resolutions calling for speedier implementation of decolonization. This conflict of 
loyalties has remained a major dilemma of Turkey's voting behaviour in the UN over 
progressive issues of international law. Second, Turkey has supported the principle of 
self-determination insofar as it applied to colonial, racist or alien (foreign occupation) 
regimes. Any situation outside this framework was not recognized by Turkey as 
relevant to self-determination in the sense of independence, excepting of course 
Turkey's support for the self-determination claims in northern Cyprus and Kashmir 
which are a matter of political expediency.
The Turkish attitude regarding self-determination is not uncommon however. As 
discussed earlier, self-determination outside the colonial context is a controversial 
matter. It is generally agreed that the right to self-determination as was enunciated, 
for instance, in Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the same 
Article is also contained in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - 
both adopted in 1966) also applies to situations outside the colonial context (29). 
But a major problem is that colonial self-determination since 1945 naturally gave an 
impression of independence as the usual outcome of self-determination. This is the 
major obstacle to a wider view of self-determination (30). Scholars generally agree 
that self-determination has two dimensions. 'External' self-determination concerns the 
international status of a people as an independent political unit 'Internal' self- 
determination relates to the freedom of choosing the desired form of government 
(31). 'External' self-determination has remained the main focus of Third World 
strategies in the United Nations, while 'internal' self-determination has been 
downplayed by most states for fear of secessionary demands from disaffected 
minorities. They have generally maintained that the new states emerging out of 
colonialism must have a right to territorial integrity, and that the form of its political 
regime and its human rights record are not central to the principle of self- 
determination (32). As has been seen in the preceding section, Turkey has generally
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subscribed to this thesis by denying the relevance of self-determination to groups 
within well-established nation-states.
Turkey's posture on the question of self-determination generally remained unchanged 
in the 1980s. Turkey continued to advocate the self-determination of peoples living 
under colonial, racist or alien domination. Accordingly, it joined in the condemnation 
of South Africa and Israel, and agreed on the necessity to impose sanctions against 
them. However, in cases which involved the condemnation of western collaboration 
with South Africa, the Turkish position became ambivalent Three such cases from 
1987 are illuminating, and show the extent to which Turkey's global approach differs 
from most of the other non-western countries. Case one : Turkey abstained when a 
resolution called for the prohibition of mercenaries whose activities violated human 
rights and impeded the right of peoples to self-determination (33). Case two : Turkey 
abstained again when a resolution, inter alia, urged for the halting of relations 
between the UN agencies, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
and the South African government. The Turkish delegate objected to such reference, 
on the grounds that it infringed upon the autonomy of these international institutions 
and the principle of universality of their membership (34). Case three : Turkey voted 
in favour of a resolution which called for a cessation of the occupation of foreign 
economic interests which were believed to impede the independence of Namibia and 
all other Territories under colonial domination. The Turkish delegate argued, 
however, that the draft resolution failed to recognize that some of these activities 
could be beneficial to the people living in these territories. He also objected to the 
singling out of certain western states for condemnation and criticism (35). In all these 
cases, Turkey was among the very few countries which advocated the position taken 
by most of the western group of states (countries in western Europe, the USA, 
Canada, Australia etc.) which favoured the continuation of economic relations with 
South Africa. On the other hand, although it was well-known that foreign 
mercenaries, particularly from South Africa, were disrupting the political and 
economic stability in some newly independent countries in southern Africa, Turkey 
declined to endorse the resolutions, mentioned in cases 1 and 3, alongside western 
states. Even when endorsing resolutions on decolonization, Turkey did not cease to 
object to the "continued selective criticism of western countries".
Turkey's ambivalent attitude towards the adoption of concrete measures designed to 
bring about the self-determination of peoples under colonial or racist rule, or foreign 
occupation, was still in evidence during the 1991 session of the UN General Assembly 
discussions. While supporting the General Assembly resolution calling for an oil
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embargo against South Africa (36), as well as the resolution which condemned those 
states which continued to violate the mandatory arms embargo and collaborated with 
South Africa (37), Turkey abstained when a resolution specifically condemned Israel 
for engaging in military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa and, accordingly, 
requested the Security Council to take ’appropriate measures’ against Israel (38). 
Similarly, Turkey abstained when a General Assembly Resolution drew attention to 
the linkage between the right of peoples to self-determination and the effective 
protection of human rights. The resolution specifically reaffirmed the right of 
Palestinian people to self-determination, condemned Israel for its acts of aggression 
against Lebanon, and called on the international community to support the transition 
to a non-racial and democratic South Africa. The resolution, inter alia, called for an 
end to the practice of using mercenaries against sovereign states and national 
liberation movements. An overwhelming majority of non-western states supported the 
motion (39).
9.2.The Search for a New International Economic Order
The gradual dissolution of colonial empires in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, which unveiled the real conditions of colonial territories, highlighted the urgent 
need of the latter for comprehensive assistance. These newly independent countries, 
as well as other underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, were 
characterized by low living standards and relatively low levels of labour productivity 
due to the shortage of capital, machinery, managerial competence etc., and high 
levels of unemployment and underemployment This meant that they depended on 
developed countries for flows of foreign exchange in the form of export earnings, 
foreign loans, and foreign aid, which made them vulnerable (40). Their backwardness 
was partially the result of European colonialism and the de facto economic 
domination of industrialized countries.
As a result, the developing countries, which are also described as the Third World, 
evolved an increasing awareness of their moral right to achieve better living 
conditions and greater say in international relations. Accordingly, they have 
developed a pattern of international solidarity, and sought to gear international legal 
institutions to the needs of development. Not surprisingly, therefore, these countries 
have been at the forefront of demands for a new international economic order 
(hereinafter referred to as NIEO). In this context, they have used the UN platform, as
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well as other multinational forums, to press for the elaboration of new legal norms 
which would be responsive to the acute problems faced by their backward economies.
However, over the years, it has become clear that the western group of states and 
Japan, which are the main addressees of these demands, have been reluctant to accept 
any radical shift in this direction. They have argued that these attempts are neither 
desirable nor possible since it is premature to try to codify this topic, while the 
international community has not agreed on the main principles applicable in this area. 
In their view, this field of international law has not been sufficiently identified or 
accepted to be codified. Therefore, they argue, the existence of political agreement is 
a prerequisite for any progressive development of the principles relating to the NIEO. 
As a result of this disagreement over the desirability or the credibility of standard- 
setting for a NIEO, it is difficult to speak of an 'international development law' as a 
separate legal discipline. At most, one can speak of the existence of 'soft' law, 
composed mainly of international resolutions, charters and declarations. Therefore the 
focus of this section will generally be directed at the legal instruments adopted within 
the UN General Assembly, with special reference to Turkey's voting behaviour 
therein.
Due to the numerical weakness of non-westem states in the UN during the 1950s and 
to the immediate concerns of decolonization until the 1970s, the discussions on NIEO 
were at their incipient stage in the first two decades of the UN era. Before the 1960s, 
leaving aside the economic issues relating to Non-Self Governing Territories and the 
International Trusteeship System, General Assembly resolutions focused on the 
question of financial and technical aid from the rich to the poorer countries, as well as 
on the need to give due consideration to the terms of trade in primary products of 
developing countries the price of which was subject to fluctuations in the market. In 
the 1950s, many of the resolutions on economic and social questions were adopted 
without objection, due mainly to the essentially unspecified and abstract nature of the 
adopted texts. When the resolutions imposed a concrete set of legal obligations, the 
Turkish position was generally in tune with that of western states (41). Turkish 
delegates at the time were too careful to avoid any confrontation with western 
powers, particularly, with the US. When, in 1954, an amendment made by Brazil, 
Peru and the US to a proposed resolution on self-determination and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, requested the Commission on Human Rights to 
have due regard to "the rights and duties of states under international law", Turkey 
voted for this resolution which was finally adopted, despite a large number of 
abstentions and some opposition from communist and Afro-Asian countries (42).
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This amendment in fact diluted the real significance of the resolution, by reaffirming 
one of the very principles against which the resolution was launched in the first place.
From the early 1960s to 1973, the focus of Third World strategies shifted from 
financial and technical aid to issues of trade. Three developments were conclusive in 
this new approach : first, it became clear that the existing international machinery and 
standards were inadequate for coping with the far-reaching problems of developing 
countries; secondly, the prices of the primary commodities were steadily declining in 
the face of steady increase in the price of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. 
This worsened the balance of payments deficit in developing countries. It became 
necessary to reconsider the whole international economic system, and propose 
substantive remedies accordingly; thirdly, many African and Asian countries gained 
political independence in the 1950s and 60s which increased the self-confidence of the 
Third World groupings. All these factors contributed to "the emergence of a 
wholesale 'doctrine' of development, a doctrine which poor nations soon endeavoured 
to translate into international standards and institutions" (43).
Among the main principles of the new development strategy were the following : 
a/Development of less advanced countries should be the concern of the whole 
international society. These countries were entitled to international help, particularly 
from industrialized countries; b/Existing trade barriers against primary commodities 
originating in the developing countries had to be eliminated by developed countries; 
c/Developing countries requested to enjoy the most-favoured-nation treatment in 
their commercial dealings with developed countries. However this ought not be 
reciprocal on the part of the developing countries. Developed countries were also 
asked to make preferential concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, to developing 
countries. These principles clearly represented a departure from the basic principles of 
classical international law, such as the sovereign equality of states and the principle of 
reciprocity, since they were premised upon 'positive discrimination' in favour of the 
less developed countries (44).
In the 1960s, the Turkish position shifted towards supporting the resolutions which 
sanctioned positive discrimination in favour of developing countries. For instance, 
Turkey voted for the General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVTI) of 14 December 
1962, on 'Permanent sovereignty over natural resources' (45). The same year Turkey 
voted in favour of a resolution which incorporated "The Cairo Declaration of 
Developing Countries". This declaration spoke of the ways in which to realize speedy 
economic progress in developing countries (46). Similarly Turkey voted for a
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proposed draft of the Economic and Social Committee in 1969 which stated, inter 
alia, that "the concept of reciprocity.. . is not equally valid where contracting states 
are at greatly different stages of economic development" (47). Finally, Turkey did not 
hesitate to vote for the readjustment of the International Monetary Fund so as to give 
the developing countries a larger share in its total quotas, despite opposition from 
western and communist countries (48).
As is well-known, during the 1970s, having achieved their independence and striving 
to exert greater influence in the conduct of international politics, the Third World 
countries turned their attention towards the establishment of a NIEO. The new 
strategy that had been adopted in the 1960s was later expounded in 1973-74 to cover 
not only a specific sector (international trade) but a whole group of existing economic 
relations between North and South. This new 'normative' framework came about as a 
result of a complex set of factors. To start with, the Arab oil boycott which was 
mainly directed at the industrialized world in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war, was very effective. This encouraged other developing countries to put forward 
more radical proposals in the reshaping of international economic relations. On the 
other hand, the relaxing of international tensions arising out of the Cold War allowed 
the Third World countries to play a more assertive role in international relations. 
Finally, by 1973, traditional colonialism had nearly come to an end, which encouraged 
the developing countries to turn their attention to neo-colonialism (49).
A major step in this direction was taken when the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned 
Countries of September 1973, inter alia, drew on the significance of the association 
of oil-exporting countries (OPEC) as a model for concerted action in other products. 
In their view, such an association held vital significance in "the establishment of a new 
international economic order which would meet the requirements of genuine 
democracy" (50). The following year, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions 
which formulated the basic principles of a NIEO. Resolution 3201-S. VI, of 9 May 
1974 containing a Declaration on the Establishment of NIEO, and Resolution 3202-S. 
VI, of 16 May 1974 containing a Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
NIEO were adopted by consensus, despite serious misgivings expressed by western 
countries. However these two texts were loosely formulated and contained general 
guidelines and objectives for future action. It was with the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1974 
(51), that these guidelines were turned into specific obligations. Although not 
claiming to be binding, the language of this text was more akin to legislation (52).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, this Charter aroused intense opposition from western 
industrialized countries and Japan.
As far as the main tenets of the NIEO are concerned, the proposals specifically 
affirmed the need to gain permanent sovereignty over natural resources by regulating 
and controlling the activities of multinational corporations and/or by naturalizing or 
expropriating foreign property upon the payment of equitable compensation. Another 
main tenet of the NIEO was the concern with achieving more equitable conditions of 
trade that favoured developing countries. This new strategy did not however do away 
with earlier practices in that the resolutions reiterated the need to continue with 
'traditional' economic and technical assistance from the industrialized countries (53). 
All these deliberations make up a set of standards which have political and moral, if 
not legal, value as regards the process leading to the NIEO.
As far as Turkey was concerned, it was well aware that there existed striking 
similarities between its interests and aspirations, and those of the countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. In spite of its commitment to the western alliance, the 
extent of Turkey’s economic problems and domestic public pressure prompted it to 
join this novel process (54). Indeed Turkey has since supported resolutions on trade 
and development which were often proposed by Third World and communist states, 
and adopted with an overwhelming majority. However it was then clear that when 
the duties of rich countries were specified within a resolution concerning the 
questions of social and economic development, Turkey tended to take a more 
guarded approach, like abstaining or voting against such resolutions.
To start with, Turkey was not a co-sponsor of the 1974 "Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order", proposed by the Non- 
Aligned bloc of countries, and adopted unanimously. Meanwhile, it voted in favour of 
the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States", the principal purpose of 
which was to establish an improved system of international economic relations with 
due consideration to the development needs of poor countries. The following year, 
Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which called on states to take appropriate 
measures for implementing the aims laid down in the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States. Those abstaining or voting against belonged to the western bloc of 
states (55).
Continuous attempts have been made by developing countries to turn the postulates 
of the NIEO into legally binding rules through adoption of a multilateral convention.
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However, they have aroused vigorous opposition, particularly from western 
governments. This has equally been true of the General Assembly resolutions 
intended to codify the norms relating to the NIEO. All along, the Turkish posture 
regarding codification has been an ambivalent one. In 1980, Turkey abstained when a 
resolution called on the UN bodies to prepare a study of existing and evolving 
international norms and principles for the progressive development of international 
economic law (56). However Turkey voted for identical resolutions in 1982 and 
1985, while abstaining once again a few years later (57).
Turkey has equally been ambiguous regarding initiatives intended to link economic 
issues with other global questions, like disarmament Indeed Turkey abstained when 
a resolution, adopted in 1981, declared that scientific and technological progress 
should be used for the peace and benefit of mankind, and called on all states to make 
use of science and technology in such a way as to promote peaceful social, economic 
and cultural development (58). However Turkey supported the two General 
Assembly resolutions in 1982 and 1983, the first of which called for a halt to the 
arms race, while both resolutions urged for measures to ensure that the results of 
scientific and technological progress are used for peaceful purposes, such as social, 
economic and cultural progress (59). Turkish policy was reversed once again in 1984 
when Turkey abstained in the face of a resolution calling for an end to the arms race. 
The resolution further stressed that the additional resources released by disarmament 
should be utilized for social and economic development, particularly for the benefit of 
the developing countries (60).
All along, Turkey has been reluctant to endorse any resolutions which implicated 
western governments for criticism or singled them out for specific action, as well as 
those which seemed to refer to politically sensitive issues. The problem of economic 
coercion against weaker countries is a case in point. In 1984, Turkey voted against a 
resolution which reaffirmed Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States, by declaring that no state could exercise coercive economic measures 
against other states. As a result, the resolution called on the developed countries to 
refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, blockades, embargoes and 
other economic sanctions against developing countries as a form of political and 
economic coercion which would be inimical to their economic, political and social 
development. Turkey was among the few non-western countries not to have voted in 
the affirmative (61). In the face of similarly worded resolutions adopted between 
1985-1991, Turkey either voted against, or abstained (62). Meanwhile, in 1984, 
Turkey abstained when a resolution, entitled "Confidence building in international
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economic relations", called, inter alia, "on structural adjustments in the international 
financial and trading system" which was declared as a necessary step for the 
improvement in the economic situation of the developing countries. Turkey was one 
of the few non-western countries to abstain (63).
However in cases which involved abstractly worded guidelines for prospective action, 
Turkey has taken a more positive attitude, even if they were opposed by western 
governments. For instance, Turkey voted in favour of a 1984 resolution which 
stressed the need to promote the access of the developing countries to information. In 
this context, the resolution stressed the demand for the development of 
communication capacities in developing countries as a major step towards the 
establishment of a new world information and communication order. Western states 
declined to vote in favour of the resolution (64). The same year, Turkey voted for 
greater industrial development co-operation between developed and developing 
countries. In this context, the resolution emphasized the importance of facilitating the 
transfer of technology to developing countries (65). In 1986, Turkey voted in favour 
of a resolution which reaffirmed the urgent need to halt the net transfer of resources 
from developing to developed countries (66).
Turkey has also advocated the principle of the 'right to development1 which, as a 
legal concept, emerged in the beginning of 1970s, and since has been embodied in a 
number of resolutions. It did not, for instance, hesitate to vote for a 1986 resolution 
entitled "Declaration on the right to development". The resolution stressed that all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms were indivisible and interdependent 
Accordingly, equal attention should be given to the protection of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. The resolution declared that the right to 
development was an inalienable human right, and that the funds released by 
disarmament should be used for comprehensive development, in particular that of the 
developing countries. States were also asked to take all necessary measures to realize 
the right to development for every individual on their territory (67).
In concluding this section, the Turkish attitude towards matters relating to the NIEO 
may be described as one of 'unprincipled sympathy’ for the long fought struggle of the 
Third World nations towards a fairer share of world economic resources. Excepting 
the 1950s, Turkey has generally sided with non-westem countries on the question of 
the NIEO, unless the resolutions in question did not fundamentally undermine the 
confines of its pro-western foreign policy. However Turkey has not been actively 
involved in the North-South dialogue : it has hardly co-sponsored any resolutions
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calling for the establishment of a NIEO. Besides, it has often sided with the western 
bloc of countries when the latter pursued a strategy of playing down substantial 
issues and preferred to question the validity of UN resolutions as legal instruments. 
Turkey is not a member of the G77 group of countries. Instead it has been a part of 
the OECD since its foundation in 1948. This may have played some part in Turkey's 
apparent conflict of loyalties, and its frequent change of heart regarding the search for 
a NIEO. Turkey's position becomes all the more dubious when one recalls that most 
of these resolutions have been adopted by an overwhelming majority of non-western 
states. It may be predicted that this ambivalence will continue to prevail in the 
foreseeable future unless Turkish foreign policy undergoes a dramatic change.
93.Human Rights
The classical formulation of human rights standards suggests that group rights would 
be duly protected by guaranteeing the rights of individuals. This is for instance the 
idea behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the two human 
rights Covenants of 1966. They provide for two sets of human rights : civil and 
political rights; and economic, social and cultural rights. However due to social, 
political and historical reasons, collective categories like 'people' and 'minorities' are 
also accorded certain rights under international law. Meanwhile non-westem states 
insist that the right to development is an essential part of human rights. However this 
view is generally rejected by western states. Since collective human rights have 
already been discussed in the preceding sections, the main focus of this section will be 
on individual human rights, although occasional reference will also be made to other 
aspects of human rights.
As far as Turkey is concerned, civil and political rights, as well as the economic, 
social and cultural rights -albeit within the confines of available public funds-, and the 
principle of non-discrimination towards individual citizens are expressly enunciated in 
the Turkish Constitution. It has also been a signatory to various multinational 
conventions and UN resolutions which aim to protect aspects of human rights and/or 
prohibit any discrimination by states against their citizens on the basis of race, 
language, religion, and so forth. Among them are the following instruments : 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 
December 1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948); 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951); United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (20 November
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1963); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (21 December 1965); Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (10 December 1984). Turkey has 
also endorsed a UN General Assembly decision of 1984 which called on states to 
abolish the death penalty (68), although the death penalty was not, and, still, is not, 
proscribed under Turkish laws.
However, Turkey has thus far declined to adopt internationally binding instruments 
which, inter alia, include the rights of peoples to self-determination and/or reaffirm 
the rights of minorities as a distinct legal category. Among them are the following : 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (14 December 1960); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966); Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 
1966). Since, as has been seen, minorities are not recognized under the Turkish 
Constitution (of course with the exception of the Christians and Jews whose rights 
are guaranteed under international treaties), Turkey's reluctance to accede to these 
documents is understandable. However Turkey has also failed to endorse some 
international human rights instruments which are of utmost significance for the 
protection of civil and political rights. They are : Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons (23 September 1954); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners (30 August 1955); Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (30 
August 1961). In the absence of any formal declaration regarding Turkish motives, it 
is thought that Turkey’s failure to endorse these instruments can be attributed to the 
frequency of internal political strife there. Particularly at times of interim military 
regimes, many individuals have been convicted on grounds of political subversion. 
Many of those who were convicted fled the country, and eventually lost their 
citizenship under various decrees. The Turkish governments might have been 
reluctant to accept international obligations to restore their citizenship. As far as the 
treatment of prisoners is concerned, Turkey's record in this area is, in most 
probability, below international standards. However given that Turkey finally signed 
the 1984 Convention against Torture, it may soon be expected to join in the 
document on the Treatment of Prisoners.
Another prominent human rights document which has not yet been adopted by 
Turkey is the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (30 November 1973). It is interesting to note that, in 1979, 
Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which condemned those governments which
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continued to collaborate with the South African regime, and which invited all member 
states to accede to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid (69). Turkish reluctance to sign the Convention was based 
on its reservations on some 'legal problems" relating to the Convention (70). It is 
presumably due to the fact that this Convention, inter alia, condemned the continued 
collaboration of certain western states with the racist minority regime in South Africa. 
The fact of its binding character might have made it a more compelling case for 
refusal.
It is now time to examine the Turkish attitude towards the UN General Assembly 
resolutions concerning human rights. This topic had, until the 1970s, mostly been 
discussed in colonial contexts. Outside the colonial context, resolutions on human 
rights were generally adopted without any objection since they imposed no clearly 
defined obligations, excepting those conventions which have already been referred to. 
However in those cases which involved opposition -through abstention or negative 
voting- from western governments, Turkey did not hesitate to endorse resolutions on 
human rights. This was the case when Turkey endorsed a resolution which 
condemned the apartheid regime in South Africa, and called for the elimination of 
racial discrimination wherever it occurred (71). Similarly Turkey voted for a 1970 
resolution which affirmed that members of national liberation movements should be 
treated as prisoners of war in case of their arrest The resolution also reaffirmed the 
prohibition of air bombardments against civilians, and of chemical and biological 
weapons in times of war (72).
In the 1970s, the violation of human rights, particularly in certain non-western 
countries, became an international concern, and received growing attention in UN 
bodies. To start with, in 1970, Turkey voted in favour of a resolution which urged 
member states to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination in their territory (73). On 
the other hand, during the period between 1974 and 1980, Turkey consistently 
participated in resolutions which condemned gross and systematic violations of 
human rights in Chile, and called on the Chilean government to restore and guarantee 
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms (74). It must be pointed out that the 
USA voted in the same way during the adoption of these resolutions. It is also worth 
noting that, although in November 1978, Turkey joined in the condemnation of gross 
human rights violations in Chile (75) despite large-scale opposition or abstention from 
other parties, it abstained when a resolution welcomed the founding of an Ad Hoc 
Working Group which had been set up to investigate, on the spot, the human rights 
situation in Chile (76). This posture may be attributed to Turkey's fear that human
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rights issues might gradually lead to wide-ranging derogations from its sovereignty, 
and that they might justify external intervention in the domestic affairs of countries 
like itself. Granting that Turkey's human rights record has been problematic all along, 
Turkey's cautious handling of international 'supervision' is understandable.
In the 1980s, Turkey frequendy declined to vote in favour of resolutions which took 
issue with human rights abuses in various countries. To start with, Turkey failed to 
condemn the continuing human rights violations in Chile by abstaining from a 1981 
resolution (77). Similarly Turkey voted against a resolution which condemned human 
rights violations in El Salvador and invited the Government of El Salvador to ensure 
full respect for human rights in its territory (78). Turkey also voted against a 
resolution which invited the Government of Guatemala to co-operate with the 
Secretary-General of the UN for the improvement of human rights in this country 
(79). This new posture may be attributed to the military take-over in September 1980, 
and the pro-American orientation of the new Turkish regime whose human rights 
record turned from bad to worse. At the time, Turkey happily signed the NATO 
documents which condemned the human rights abuses in communist Poland, while 
angrily reacting to Norway's criticism of the human rights violations in Turkey (80).
Although free elections were held and multi-party democracy was restored in 1983, 
the Turkish position regarding the human rights situations in Chile, El Salvador and 
Guatemala remained the same. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, Turkey consistently 
abstained regarding resolutions condemning the gross and systematic human rights 
violations in these countries (81). In all these cases, the USA voted against the 
resolutions or abstained.
The Turkish perception of human rights, as far as their content is concerned, has 
generally been more akin to the 'individualistic' western position than the 'collectivist' 
and 'multidimensional' approach adopted by many developing countries and the ex- 
communist countries in eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union. This Turkish 
position could be highlighted when regard is made to some UN General Assembly 
resolutions in the 1980s. For instance, in 1982, Turkey abstained when a resolution 
(No.37/199), inter alia, reaffirmed that the right to development was an inalienable 
human right, while calling for greater disarmament as an essential element for the 
realization of human rights (82). The same day, a group of western states drafted a 
resolution whose content was identical to Resolution 37/199, with the exception that 
while Resolution 37/199 focused on the "collective" aspects of human rights, this 
resolution (No.37/200) emphasized the "individual" protection of human rights (83).
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During discussions in the General Assembly, the Turkish representative expressed the 
view that Resolution 37/199 failed to provide a balance between individual and 
collective aspects of human rights. He stressed that Resolution 37/199 should have 
emphasized the independence of human rights from all other issues. As a result, 
Turkey voted in favour of the western-sponsored Resolution 37/200 on grounds that 
it maintained a balance between individual and collective rights, i.e. civil and political 
rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the other (84). The 
following year, Turkey abstained once again when another resolution similarly 
emphasized collective human rights and the relevance of peace and the establishment 
of a new international economic order for the furtherance of human rights (85). 
Finally, in 1987, Turkey declined to endorse a resolution which emphasized the need 
for greater international efforts to advance economic, social and cultural rights. It is 
meaningful to note that, together with Chile which was a client of the US, Turkey 
was the only non-western state to have abstained (86).
It is likely that this Turkish position will remain consistent in the 1990s. A 1991 
resolution may be referred to as an indication of this trend. Indeed Turkey abstained 
when a resolution reaffirmed that human rights are indivisible, and that equal 
consideration should be given to the protection of civil and political rights on the one 
hand, and of economic, social and cultural rights on the other (87).
9.4.ConcIusion
It can be asserted that Turkey has not been an active participant of international 
attempts aimed at transforming international law with a view to creating and 
elaborating international norms to assist in the establishment of a more peaceful and 
equitable international system. Turkey has generally remained inactive towards 
'progressive' issues like human rights, the protection of minorities, the principle of 
self-determination and demands for a NIEO. It is however also true that Turkey has 
generally sided with other developing countries on the question of self-determination 
and NIEO, albeit not with much enthusiasm. Turkey is outside the Non-Aligned 
group of nations, frequently the sponsors of draft proposals on these two topics, 
which has inevitably set it apart from other developing nations. However its status 
within the western bloc of countries has equally been dubious. Human rights 
standards in Turkey have been far below than those of any other country in western 
Europe. Besides, it is economically poorer than any of the countries that are 
categorized as being part of the 'western world'. Therefore, not surprisingly, the way 
Turkey perceives the rules and principles of the 'progressive' international law has 
oscillated between western and non-westem approaches.
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This study has been an attempt to show that international law should not be seen as a 
consistent, all-comprising and absolutist system of law which has the merit of being 
,scientific, and 'objective1. States themselves define the way in which they perceive 
general rules and principles of international law and their application into concrete 
situations. Carty is right in arguing that:
"...the very multiplicity of effective actors in 
international society makes it all the more necessary for 
doctrine to accept a subjective, personal and relative 
role for itself, where the authority it enjoys rests upon 
the quality of its argument rather than upon a pseudo­
objective professionalism" (1).
For their part, the Turkish-Greek disputes testify to the significance of the subjective 
context in which a particular legal discourse takes place. The historical animosity 
between these two nations is perpetuated by their conflicting views of the legal issues 
involved in the Cyprus dispute or the disputes concerning the delimitation of the 
Aegean. Each of these states perceives the other as a 'national enemy', and draws its 
conclusions and impending strategies accordingly. The arguments put forward by 
each party, in their own context, appear perfectly legitimate and convincing. From a 
Turkish point of view, the dispute over Cyprus can only be resolved on the basis of 
the recognition of the Turidsh-Cypriots as a separate 'nation' with corresponding 
rights. This is the starting point for the establishment of a bizonal and bicommunal 
federation in Cyprus. Turkish 'intervention' in Cyprus, the argument goes, was not 
'illegal' in view of the fact that it relied on the Treaty of Guarantee which authorized 
such a move under Article 4. In contrast, Greece asserts that the Cyprus crisis was 
caused by Turkey's 'illegal occupation', and the following de facto partition, of the 
island.
Similarly, the contending parties have conflicting views over the legal issues involved 
in the Aegean dispute. Since both sides perceive the Aegean dispute predominantly 
from a 'national security' perspective, apparently trivial matters, like the control of the 
FIR line, frequently escalate into military confrontation. Here too it is difficult to take
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an 'impartial' and 'definitive' position with regard to their respective claims. In the 
Turkish view, the Aegean is a 'semi-enclosed sea' which, granting the sheer number of 
Greek islands many of which are situated a few miles from the Turkish coast, warrant 
an equitable demarcation of the maritime areas in question. Greek claims for 
extended territorial waters and continental shelf are, as Turkey sees it, a testimony to 
Greek 'expansionism'. Conversely, for Greece, Turkish 'intransigence' cannot be 
justified in the light of the rights accorded to the coastal states under the new law of 
the sea.
As the Greco-Turkish disputes reveal, often, beyond seemingly perfect, would-be- 
universalistic rules and principles of international law, lies a multiplicity of 
approaches, in regard to their interpretation and/or application, among states. The 
absence of a supranational system of law and a world court which could serve as 
supreme arbiters among disputing states is, moreover, a testimony to this crude 
reality. However liberal jurists pretend that there are always universally applicable and 
valid positive standards in stock to which recourse can be made to remedy the 
'anomaly* of legal disagreements or disputes. As for the subjective context which 
prompt the disputants to behave the way they do, in their view, they can simply be 
dismissed as 'irrelevant'.
It has to be accepted that states have their own views of what international law ought 
to be and how it should be applied. This is often a function of their notion of 
themselves, and not of an extrinsic legal or moral imperative which is of a higher 
order than their own. It is the contention of this thesis that Turkey's handling of the 
questions relating to the law of the sea, minority rights or the principle of self- 
determination testifies to the fragmentary nature of the present system of international 
law. Nations have a particular vision of international society and of its legal 
framework derived from their peculiar political and legal culture. In this sense, 
international society is still composed of a relatively closed systems of self-referential 
nation-states in spite of the encroachments of globalization. International law is but a 
reflection of this state of affairs; and this has to be taken on board before making any 
critique of international law.
It is hoped that the preceding arguments adequately convey the rationale behind the 
adoption of a subjectivist approach in expounding and explaining Turkey's conception 
and practice of international law in this study. To that end, Turkish nationalism and 
national identity have been deployed as frames of reference for Turkey's behavioural 
strategy. It has been argued that the nationalist ideology often requires the existence
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of an 'other', or 'others', against which it defines and legitimates itself. The resort to a 
nationalist language serves as a useful device to cohere the members of the 'nation', 
which is often composed of various nationalities, around a common and uniform 
identity. The process of nation-building is never complete, since, first, the internal 
and external economic and political constraints in which the nation-state operates is in 
constant flux, secondly, the impact of these changes on the members of the nation 
are difficult to predict Not unexpectedly, then, governments are tempted to mobilize 
'national identity dynamic' in cases -mostly international disputes- which are perceived 
to involve the 'national interests' or 'prestige' of the nation.
It is thought that this broad frame of analysis applies to Turkey par excellence, as the 
Turkish-Greek disputes reveal. As discussed in Chapter 3, Turkey's painful transition 
from an Islamic empire to a secular nation-state has been a relatively late phenomenon 
-in the aftermath of the First World War. The new Turkish' state has sought to 
construct a 'national' identity among various ethnic groups on the basis of the 
language, culture and ideals of the majority 'Turks'. To that end, the Turkish state, 
built around the Jacobin traditions of authoritarianism, elitism and paternalism, has 
pursued a policy of assimilation since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. 
Turkey's authoritarian notion of itself and its fear of heterogeneity has left little scope 
in which, say, the Kurdish community could freely express its own identity and 
culture. Indeed, from the outset, as Turkish nationalist leadership saw it, the integrity 
and welfare of the state was the main raison d'etre of the ‘sovereignty of the 
people’. Since one of the fundamental premises of the classical doctrine on the law of 
territory was -and still is, for the most part- the absolute sovereignty of states over 
their territory, the relationship between the Turkish state and the people was a matter 
for domestic law.
Turkish nationalism defined itself not only in terms of its liberationist and 
developmentalist mission, but also in contradistinction to various external and 
internal 'enemies'. First, there were the foreign invaders who had sought to force the 
'Turkish nation' into submission in the aftermath of the First World War. The 
'invaders' included quite a few countries and/or minority movements in search of 
statehood, including the Greeks, the European imperial powers like Britain and 
France, and Armenians. The abundance of those which could be categorized as 
'external enemies' has, in the hands of the Turkish political establishment, become a 
flexible source of mobilizing 'national identity dynamic’ at times of internal and 
external crisis. Secondly, there were the 'internal enemies' who had either sought to 
undermine the territorial integrity of the 'homeland', namely the Kurdish
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separationists, or wanted to destroy the secular foundations of the new state, namely 
the Islamic movement, or opposed the ideological and economic programme of the 
new state, namely the communists, who were, moreover, perceived as agents of 
Turkey's historic arch-enemy, the Russians.
The broad framework of Turkish nationalism, as defined by Ataturk, the first 
President and founder of the Turkish Republic in 1923, still marks the contours of the 
official ideology in contemporary Turkey. First, the state is still fearful and intolerant 
of -though to a lesser extent- discordant elements within the social and political fabric 
of the system -Kurdish activists, Islamic and radical left-wing groups, human rights 
campaigners, peace movements, critics of the army and so forth. Secondly, Turkish 
ruling elites still define 'national interests' predominantly from the perspective of the 
state. In other words, 'national interest' is equated with the 'interest of the state'. 
Finally, the primary external objective of Turkish nationalism is still perceived by the 
ruling elites to be Turkey's co-option into western standards of civilisation. Turkey's 
membership in various Western political, military, economic and cultural 
organizations in the post-Second World War era is presented by the same group of 
people as a logical corollary of Ataturk’s vision of a modem and secular Turkey: 
capitalist economic strategy -although diluted with etatism- as the basis for economic 
development; modernism and liberalism as the basis for progress; secularism as the 
basis for identity; and humanism as the basis for ethics and morality.
This, as is believed, is the starting point for an understanding of the rationale behind 
Turkish behaviour in international society. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the 
Turkish image of the world order is still afflicted by a frame of mind which perceives 
Turkey as struggling to survive in a hostile environment Indeed, one of the main 
recurring themes of Turkish foreign policy discourse is the belief -almost a mythical 
one- that Turkey is surrounded by hostile countries which incessantly try to 
undermine the country's national unity, territorial integrity and, ultimately, its 
political sovereignty. This perception may partially be attributed to Turkey's strategic 
location between two continents and important waterways. However it should also be 
related to the fact that the Turkish army wields undue power in foreign policy 
decision-making which tends to highlight the 'security' dimensions of international 
relations at the expense of other considerations. Turkey's xenophobic view of the 
outside world tends to reproduce itself in cases when, for instance, it is criticised for 
violating international law, as in the case of Cyprus. In the present author’s view, part 
of the problem lies in Turkey's problematic identity -as defined by the official ideology 
in relation to the external world.
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Indeed, the Turkish sense of insecurity can partially be attributed to the absence of an 
international constituency with which Turkey can identify. Although aspiring to 
become a full member of the European Union, it is frequently blamed for deviating 
from its standards of behaviour -human rights, rule of law, minority recognition. In 
any case, geographically in the margins of Europe, and with a distinct history and 
culture of its own, Turkey is hardly regarded -by European observers and public 
opinion alike- as an integral part of the western world. Indeed, most Turks are 
convinced that 'the west1 does not perceive Turkey as one of 'them1. The Turkish 
paradox is further complicated by the simple fact that it "is in reality a developing 
country yet is also closely associated with the industrialized West" (2). Turkey's 
relations with the Islamic countries are not less problematic. For most of the Muslim 
countries, Turkey has betrayed the Islamic cause by adopting a Western secular 
model which was, as it were, a clear indication of its abandonment of its Islamic 
heritage. Therefore, in their eyes, Turkey is not really 'Muslim'. As a well-known 
Turkish academic puts it, "although Turkey has pursued a more 'Islamic' foreign 
policies since the 1960s and supported the Arabs in their struggle with Israel, the 
Arab perception of the Turks has not changed much" (3). On the other hand, in the 
eyes of the Third World nations, Turkey is not a part of the anti-colonialist, anti­
imperialist struggle, because it has aspired to align itself with the very nations against 
which the Third World movement is essentially directed. Turkey is part of NATO, 
OECD, and has close military and political ties with the USA, none of which help to 
enhance Turkey's image for Third World countries. Furthermore, the fact that Turkey 
acted like a mouth-piece of the West in the Bandung Conference in 1955, which 
brought together many Asian, African and Latin American countries as a political 
grouping for the first time, has barely been forgotten by the Non-Aligned countries 
(4). Conversely, for Turkey, the struggle of the Third World countries to establish a 
New International Economic Order does not necessarily coincide with its own 
priorities, since the language of decolonization is not particularly appealing to 
Turkey's sense of 'greatness' -due to its imperial past- and to the Western orientation 
of its foreign policy. Turkey's lack of interest in this respect can also be attributed to 
the absence of expected economic gains from the largely underdeveloped Third 
World countries, excepting the OPEC countries with which Turkey has extensive 
economic and political ties. The Turkish dilemma which has been considered here was 
well expressed by a former Turkish President in 1989 : "Turkey is bound to be 
strong, for it has very few friends" (5).
287
Turkey's isolationist view of international society has also its roots in Turkey's 
perception of itself. As Robins rightly points out, there is a mystical belief in 
'Turkishness' and the Turkish army, among the elite and the masses alike (6). This 
self-reliance is underpinned by the fact that despite its NATO membership, Turkey 
has not relinquished its own ability to defend the country by maintaining a large, 
labour-intensive, conscript army reminiscent of the days of the war of independence 
(7). Besides, the grandeur of the pre-Islamic Turkic states in Central Asia and of the 
Ottoman Empire still lives in the collective memory of the people, which makes it 
difficult for Turkish diplomacy to adjust itself to a 'second-rate power position’ (8).
In line with its suspicion of the outside world, Turkey has been reluctant to accept 
restrictions on its sovereignty arising out of international law. As expressed by 
Turkey's official representatives to various international organizations and 
conferences, the Turkish view is that states are not legally bound by treaties and 
other international instruments unless they consent to them. Even within the 
European fora, which is the gravitational centre of Turkish foreign policy, it has been 
reluctant to accept the delegation of part of its sovereignty to the European Union or 
to the Council of Europe. By the same token, as the Greco-Turkish disputes testify, 
Turkey's strategy of resolving international disputes is based primarily on direct 
negotiations, rather than third-party involvement Turkey's apparent preoccupation 
with sovereignty has a lot to do with its past grievances. Indeed, Turkish political 
elites are still profoundly affected by memories of the semicolonial period which 
preceded the emergence of Turkish national state. The humiliating infringements 
imposed on Ottoman sovereignty by the colonial powers in Europe, particularly 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are still fresh in the minds of the 
decision-makers.
As the objectives of Turkish foreign policy are generally defined within a negative 
framework, such as the preservation of its territorial integrity and political 
independence, and non-intervention in the affairs of other states, Turkish foreign 
policy has all along lacked a sense of purpose and dynamism required for a 
constructive role in the larger international community. It has, for instance, failed to 
come to terms with the massive political, social and intellectual changes that have 
irreversibly altered the nature of international relations in the post-Second World War 
era. As a result, Ataturk's dictum "Peace at home; peace in the world" has fossilized 
into reactive legal formalism. Turkey has hardly taken any initiative in international 
affairs, excluding matters pertaining to military and security co-operation. This 
'bureaucratic foreign policy', as Gonlubol puts it, fails to respond appropriately to
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changes in the international system. This Turkish inertia was clearly witnessed during 
the historic changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union following 
the demise of the communist regimes when Turkey passively watched the events as 
an 'outsider' (9). It is only natural that when international society is viewed from the 
rigid spectrum of 'security considerations', other aspects of international relations - 
economic, social, cultural, intellectual and so forth- are ultimately subordinated to 
them. Within such a frame of mind, the external world can easily be presented as 
'threatening'. This, in turn, justifies the belief that the conduct of foreign policy should 
solely be left to professional diplomats and military strategists.
Perhaps, in the light of the preceding discussions, it should not come as a surprise to 
observe that Turkish multilateral diplomacy has concentrated more on the established 
norms and principles of international law such as the sovereign equality of states, the 
right to collective self-defence, and the principle of non-intervention, rather than on 
the creation of new norms and structures in the evolving process of a new 
international legal order. Indeed, it has been a party to only a fraction of the 
multilateral treaties conceived under UN auspices dealing with progressive issues of 
international law. In Chapter 9, it was argued that, contrary to an overwhelming 
majority of states, particularly those belonging to the Third World, Turkey has rarely 
contributed to legal endeavours pertaining to the codification or the progressive 
evolution of matters relating to 'human rights', 'the principle of self-determination', 
'the establishment of a New International Economic Order' and so forth. Indeed, the 
Turkish foreign policy establishment is inclined to see the United Nations as a forum 
for defending Turkish national interests rather than, inter alia, a vehicle for norm- 
creation. It can therefore be asserted that Turkey is yet to fully accept that the United 
Nations system in general and the General Assembly in particular are not merely 
designed to preserve international peace and security as defined in military terms, but 
they are equally entrusted with the task of mobilizing world public opinion on major 
issues of global concern, such as underdevelopment, food, human rights, 
disarmament, technology, law of the sea, and the distribution of culture and 
information.
As suggested earlier, a main conceptual and normative barrier in this respect lies in 
Turkey's official identification with the western group of countries (This is discussed 
in pp.92-93). Indeed, the westem-orientation of Turkish foreign policy dictates that 
Turkey follow suit only after a near-consensus among states has been reached on a 
particular international question -mostly with the participation of the western group 
of countries-. For instance, Turkey did not hesitate to join the international sanctions
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imposed against South Africa in the 1980s for its systematic practice of racist 
policies or the sanctions against Iraq after the latter invaded Kuwait in August 1990. 
Similarly, it was active in supporting the independence of Namibia, which it gained in 
1990, over which there existed a universal consensus. Meanwhile, Turkey has 
consistently drawn on the UN resolutions No.242 and 243 as the legal basis upon 
which the Palestinian problem should be resolved -which is also the posture of the 
western countries. Finally, Turkey discreetly chose to follow the posture taken by the 
United States before recognizing Peoples Republic of China in the 1970s.
Turkey's status-quo oriented approach to the international legal order must also be 
linked to its fear of upsetting the military and strategic equilibrium established 
between Greece and Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Under this treaty, 
Turkey's present boundaries were drawn, and, with few exceptions, its past disputes 
with Greece were resolved, largely to its satisfaction. Under the Lausanne 
arrangement, the Greek islands close to the Turkish coasts were demilitarised. As far 
as Cyprus was concerned, Turkey legally recognized the British sovereignty over the 
island which had been effectively mled by Britain since 1878. Turkey was not 
necessarily disgruntled with this arrangement, since at least it denied any Greek 
presence in the Mediterranean. The equilibrium established by the Treaty of Lausanne 
has since become a major frame of reference for Turkish diplomats. It can be argued 
that, their fear that new developments in international law might upset the Lausanne 
balance, has played a major role in Turkey's reluctance to come to terms with the 
'progressive' issues of international law.
Indeed, to Turkey's dismay, various developments in international law since the end 
of the Second World War have seriously undermined the Lausanne equilibrium. First, 
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea extended the sovereignty of 
coastal states, both in respect of their land territory and of their islands, over the 
adjacent maritime areas and their sea beds. Some twenty five years after their 
adoption, the new Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 provided the coastal 
states with a 12-mile limit for territorial seas, including those of the islands. In 
addition, the islands were included in the delimitation of the continental shelf. These 
developments, of which Greece wants to make full use, have led to the emergence of 
the Aegean conflict Turkey, for its part, has all along objected to an uncritical 
application of these rules to 'semi-enclosed seas', such as the Aegean, which, in its 
view, would be tantamount to declaring the Aegean as a Greek 'lake'. Not 
unexpectedly, Turkey is not a signatory to either of the conventions.
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Secondly, the emergence of the principle of self-determination which precipitated the 
process of decolonization has irreversibly upset the balance in Cyprus. The British 
colonial rule over the island was eventually replaced by the independent Republic of 
Cyprus in 1960. However, the new status of the island also carried the seeds of 
friction between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus. The fact that under 
present international law, sovereignty is exercised by the numerical 'majority' of a 
particular territory irrespective of its human topography, meant that the Greek 
majority of the island could either force the Turkish 'minority' into submission and/or 
seek a union with Greece. Indeed, the alienation of the Turkish- Cypriot community 
from the political, legal and administrative apparatuses of the new state due, in the 
Turkish view, to coercive tactics used by the Greek-Cypriot leadership culminated in 
a pro-enosis (union with Greece) military coup in 1974. This prompted Turkey to 
launch a military intervention which has led to the de facto partition of the island. 
The Turkish action has been condemned by the world community, and strained 
Turkey's relations with the United States and the European Community.
Thirdly, the adoption of various conventions and resolutions towards the international 
protection of minority rights from the mid-1960s onwards, mostly under the auspices 
of the UN, has undermined the assimilationist policies pursued by Turkey towards its 
Muslim minorities -prime among them are the Kurds. As in most other areas, the 
Lausanne arrangement had confirmed the Turkish position vis-d-vis minority 
questions. This Treaty guaranteed the rights and freedoms of the Turkish minority in 
Greece, and precluded any domestic laws or administrative measures which 
contravened Greece's international obligations -of course the same rights were also 
accorded to the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey. Similar guarantees were also 
provided for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, mostly through Turirish-Bulgarian 
treaties signed before the First World War. Under the Lausanne arrangement, to 
Turkey's satisfaction, the ethnically non-Turkish Muslims of Turkey were merely 
accorded linguistic rights under the third paragraph of Article 39 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, which was later ignored by Turkey and other signatories to the Treaty.
Hence, Turkey was content with the international arrangements regarding minority 
issues. However, the gradual incorporation of minority issues into the ambit of 
international law in the aftermath of the Second World War has undermined that 
balance. Indeed the protective measures brought about for minority groups under the 
UN system, while bringing no extra benefits for Turkish minorities in Greece and 
Bulgaria, has fundamentally challenged Turkey's assimilationist policies towards the 
Kurdish minority in Turkey. For instance, Turkey has long been accused -by the EC,
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Council of Europe, Amnesty International and various individual states- of 
suppressing and denying the linguistic, cultural and political rights of the ’Kurdish 
minority'. Moreover, some sections of the Kurdish community have claimed that they 
constitute a separate 'people' as distinct from the 'Turks’, and therefore, qualify for 
self-determination as sanctioned by international law. Hence it is clear that the 
'progressive' concepts and principles on self-determination and minority rights have 
undermined the ideological basis of the Turkish state, as well as its claim that these 
matters are purely questions of domestic jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, then, Turkey's lack of assertiveness in international society is also an 
outcome of the contradictions involved in its position on various disputes in which it 
has been involved. While, on the one hand, it advocates self-determination of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus, it denies any such claim to the Kurds of Turkey. The 
same contradictory position also prevails on minority disputes with Greece and 
Bulgaria: although refusing to grant minority status to the Kurds, Turkey has 
continuously called the neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece to respect the minority 
rights of Turkish community there. Therefore, not unexpectedly, Turkey has often 
been accused of double standards in its approach to human rights questions. This 
accusation is most frequently made by the European Union -of which Turkey aspires 
to become a full member- and the Council of Europe. These contradictions have 
inevitably compelled Turkish diplomacy to keep a low profile in multilateral forums 
where human rights questions are discussed.
The preceding arguments sought to locate the Turkish image of the outside world in 
the context of the specific political and legal culture in Turkey. Accordingly, it was 
shown that Turkey's self-perception and its conceptions of the outside world are 
largely 'constructed' by the political elites on the basis of subjective considerations 
which are often shaped by the prevailing discourse of which these elites themselves 
are also a part. These considerations, among others, include notions like 'national 
interests', 'national objectives', 'national prestige', 'historic rights of the nation', 
'threats', and so forth. In this scheme of things, the intellectual background and the 
social psychology of decision-makers also play a decisive role. Indeed, as has been 
argued in Chapter 3, Turkish ruling elites tend to identify with their counterparts in 
the west. They have internalized the values and the ideology of an expanding 
international middle class with their belief in liberal capitalism and its modernist 
project as a universally applicable model. The intellectual and cultural orientation of 
these elites are very much rooted in the traditions of the western enlightenment
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Their links with the indigenous culture and the common folk, meanwhile, are 
extremely tenuous.
These observations also apply to the members of the academic elite whose views 
reinforce the prevailing discourse with regard to Turkey's place in the larger 
international society. Indeed, in Chapter 4, it was argued that the substance and the 
methodological structure of studies in the field of international law and relations have 
by and large themselves been restrained by the limitations of Turkish foreign policy 
and the Turkish conceptions of international law. Turkish scholars of international 
relations tend to overrate the security and economic dimensions of international 
relations at the expense of social, cultural and humanitarian issues. Besides, since a 
state-centric perspective pervades legal and political analyses, other subjects of 
international law, like international organizations, multinational companies, and 
various collective groups within states, are treated marginally, if not as non-existent 
Besides, evolving issues of global concern, such as ecology, human rights, demands 
for a new international economic, legal, political and cultural order, are largely by­
passed as 'irrelevant'. The dominant trend within the Turkish school of international 
law and relations, then, is towards describing existing set of relations and legal norms 
as 'they are'; hence largely denying the possibility of re-defining -outside the realms of 
official ideology- the Turkish approach to the outside world which could be the 
starting point for proposing new directions in that respect. Just as the Turkish 
diplomats have conventionally evaluated international society through the spectacle 
of western conceptions, so have the Turkish scholars been overwhelmed by prevalent 
western analytical attitudes -often their conservative brand. The link between power 
and discourse (of which the academic establishment is only one of a large array of 
pressure and interest groups like the media and the press, business circles and others 
which influence the 'dominant' discourse), then, is clearly visible in the specific 
context of Turkish conceptions of international society and its legal framework.
The methodological approach employed in this thesis suggests that international 
disputes, often perceived by positivistic scholars simply as legal disagreements over 
particular issues, cannot possibly be resolved by unique formulae which are there to 
be 'discovered'. Instead, the mutual perceptions of the contending parties of one 
another as well as their conceptions of the dispute in question should be linked to 
legal analyses. Indeed, inter-state disputes often involve the kind of issues and 
considerations that are too complex and varied to be delineated in clear and precise 
legal language. This requires that legal jurists should seek to understand the 
hermeneutics of the legal, political and cultural contexts of each disputant. It is only
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on the basis of such a methodological and analytical framework that legal jurists could 
afford to propose solutions. As the Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the 
Aegean, as well as the confrontation between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
activists testify, positive international law is not sufficiently clear and precise to 
warrant a uniform interpretation of its rules. Besides, states have their own peculiar 
view of international norms and of the modality of their application to practical cases. 
These two considerations should suffice to caution us from suggesting 'correct' legal 
remedies on the basis of the 'objective' rules of international law.
This study has sought to test the validity of a particular method of looking at 
international law -hermeneutical method- in the context of the Turkish conceptions 
and practices of international law. Accordingly, such methodology was informed by a 
concern to understand the behaviour of Turkey from within, i.e. by focusing on 
Turkey's peculiar culture and identity. To that end, various case studies have been 
undertaken to disclose the variety of motives which underlie the legal strategy 
adopted by Turkey, in regard to various disputes, problems and themes of 
international law. The findings have shown that international legal norms become less 
relevant when high political interests of states are at stake. This has been discussed in 
the context of Turkey's major disputes with Greece. This research has shown that 
both Turkey and Greece perceive and define the facts relating to the Cyprus dispute 
and to the question of the delimitation of the Aegean sea from the prism of their 
peculiar history and political culture. These perceived facts provide the material input 
of their legal reasoning which is based on their distinctive interpretation of relevant 
rules of international law. Such a critical hermeneutical approach, which attempts to 
examine international law in terms of how individual states, rather than international 
jurists, see it, opens the possibility of integrating law with other social disciplines. 
This approach also presents a realistic picture of international law as it is perceived 
and applied by states, and thus contributes to a clearer understanding of its limits and 
possibilities.
The empirical investigations made in this study are also intended to provide a clearer 
picture of some of the theoretical problems in international law. The critical 
hermeneutical position adopted here opens the possibility of a fruitful integration of 
different theoretical approaches to international law. This is necessary because, as the 
following discussion illustrates, no single theory, ranging from positivism to 
postmodernism, is capable of providing answers to all conceivable questions of 
international law.
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This thesis has demonstrated that, contrary to what the positivists suggest, 
international law is not a complete and coherent system of law providing answers to 
all conceivable legal problems. The failure of international law in resolving the Cyprus 
and Aegean problems, referred to above, largely derives from the ambiguous and 
often inconsistent character of international rules on sovereignty, treaty law, law of 
the sea and so forth. Positivistic presupposition that it is exclusively the consent of 
states that is the material source of international law is similarly problematic. To begin 
with, it fails to grasp some of the fundamental changes in international law. There is 
an emerging view which emphasizes international solidarity as a potential source. 
Some scholars, like Richard Falk, emphasize the fact that consensus, in the sense of 
an overwhelming majority, in place of consent, is becoming the basis of international 
legal obligations (10). As has been examined in Chapter 9, most of the resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly, in regard to human rights, self-determination and the 
international law of development, have been adopted by an overwhelming majority of 
states. Although these resolutions do not become binding at the time they are 
adopted, since they are merely recommendations, one should not preclude the 
possibility that they might gradually crystallize into binding norms (This theme is 
discussed at greater length in chapters 4 and 9). That the practice of states is not the 
only source of international law, is also evidenced by the fact that peremptory norms 
(jus cogens) of international law, as has been enshrined in Articles 53 and 64 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, transcend the sovereign will of 
individual states. These peremptory norms, which are generally deemed to include 
principles such as the prohibition of the use of force, respect for human rights, the 
principle of non-intervention, and pacific settlement of disputes, render null and void 
any international treaty contrary to them. Finally, positivistic conception of 
international law does not recognize the relevance of natural law as an actual or 
potential source of international law. This too can be contested. It can be observed 
that natural concepts of justice, equality, natural rights and fairness frequently inform 
the normative underpinnings of legal endeavours pertaining to the codification and 
progressive development of international law. That certain legal developments derive 
from natural law ideals, irrespective of the practice of states, is demonstrated by the 
existence of international standards such as the international protection of human 
rights, the principle of good faith, the principle of self-determination, the principle of 
international co-operation, and the emerging law of development. Therefore, it can be 
tentatively argued that natural law has recently been revitalized as a potential source 
of international law.
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While this study confirms the views of critical legal scholars that international law is 
an incomplete and fragmented system of law, it takes issue with those who accord 
international law only a marginal role in international relations. Postmodernists, not 
unlike positivists, take a simplistic view of international law. Postmodernists claim 
that since social reality and experience is fragmented, there can be no universal 
values. As a result, they favour decentralised solutions to local problems to the
extent of denying the actual or potential role played by international law in the
international community. Since, as discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical and 
methodological posture adopted in this thesis largely derives from the works of Carty, 
his particular postmodernist position needs to be reassessed. Although an ardent critic 
of the positivist theory of international law, paradoxically, Carty, like positivists, 
locates the development of international law in the practice of states as a matter of 
fact. Since states do not seem to agree on a uniform interpretation of international 
rules and principles, the argument goes, the system of international law is more a 
myth than a reality.
The crucial question here is the extent to which critical international lawyers are 
prepared to accept the authority of international law if the position of social agents 
are appreciated in terms of their own perceptions. Postmodernists, like Carty, decline 
to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. One lesson that can be drawn from 
this study is that international law cannot be adequately understood by approaching it 
solely from the perspective of a single legal theory. Although, as has been argued 
throughout, the system of international law is indeed beset by certain fundamental 
contradictions and ambiguities, this does not justify the denial of its usefulness in co­
ordinating international relations or of its instrumental role in promoting international 
co-operation. Indeed without the existence of a set of minimum rules of co-existence 
and co-operation, arbitrariness and injustice would almost certainly become a 
dominant feature of international politics. Moreover, international law and
institutions provide the conditions for a rational discourse by providing the 
participants with equality of status. Through such non-coercive discourse can the 
merits of different claims be decided. In addition, to argue that international law, as 
an all-embracing and absolute category, is beset by various theoretical and
institutional defects, does not necessarily require the denial of the effectiveness of a 
great number of international rules and principles. Those who attack international law 
on grounds of theoretical inconsistency or structural inadequacy tend similarly to 
ignore law as a dynamic process, as well as a transnational discourse which influences 
the political and cultural traditions of states. This is the background to the arguments 
presented below.
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It can hardly be denied that, for a variety of reasons, states, more often than not, try 
to conform to international law. First, they are conditioned to operate within the 
framework of established international principles. International law is a normative 
order which puts restraint on the behaviour of states, not only through the application 
of its rules, but also through its psychological impact and through the influence of 
international organizations whose activities include the supervision of the 
performance of states in particular areas and the publication of country reports. As 
has been seen in Chapter 8, Turkey's recognition of the linguistic rights of the Kurds 
was largely due to international pressure. The force of this pressure largely derived its 
legitimacy from various international instruments dealing with minority rights, 
although Turkey has not been a party to any of these instruments. States' obedience 
to international law also derives from a conviction that, apart from its legality, the 
action is valuable or mandatory in itself. Finally, such action may also be evoked by a 
sense of reciprocity with other states. According to Bull, actions evoked by 
reciprocity are exemplified by principles, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, 
pacta sunt servanda, and the laws of war (11). These considerations largely explain 
why, although international law is not the only commanding value in international 
society, states tend to justify their international behaviour more through legal 
justifications rather than those based on morality, ideology, national security, or the 
balance of power.
While the heterogeneity of the international community cannot be denied, this fact 
cannot, in itself, preclude the possibility of consent. It has already been argued that 
there are certain fundamental rules and principles which are recognized by virtually 
every state. Although they are not interpreted and applied uniformly by all states, 
which is only to be expected, their very recognition invalidates the postmodernist 
rationale. While states may perceive these universal norms differently, this is not to 
say that they do not observe these norms. Also, it would be too simplistic to dismiss 
technically non-binding norms as irrelevant to the behaviour of states. The cumulative 
effect of non-binding UN resolutions has already been referred to. Moreover, given 
that the rule of law and the separation of powers have become a prominent feature of 
most of the world's legal systems, the potential role played by independent judiciary in 
enforcing international norms cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 8, 
national courts can resort to international norms in their legal reasoning, as was the 
case when the Turkish Council of State (Conceil d'Etat) repealed an expulsion order 
against foreign journalists in 1978 on grounds, inter alia, that this was a 
contravention of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of which Turkey was also a part. It
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should be noted that the Helsinki Accords can be defined as ’soft law' in the sense that 
they do not qualify as law in the strict sense. They are instead a series of political 
statements which produce legal effects. This example shows that the traditional 
distinction between 'binding laws’ and 'non-binding laws' has become increasingly 
problematic.
Having thus disclosed the weaknesses of positivistic and postmodernist approaches to 
law, it can be suggested that a variety of approaches are needed to present a fuller 
picture of international law. Indeed rather than operating at the level of generalities, 
which a priori exclude other possible approaches, the scholars of international law 
should strive to evaluate legal situations and problems in their own particular 
contexts. The Habermasian paradigm adopted here attempts to resolve this dilemma 
by drawing on different aspects of international law, as well as its dynamics. This is 
the context in which the subjectivistic understanding of states becomes meaningful.
In so far as the fundamental weaknesses of present international law are concerned, 
international lawyers are well advised to start with challenging the primacy of states in 
present international society. One of the most promising areas of such a critical 
posture relates to the broad areas which may be called 'human rights'. Indeed, 
international jurists could make a 'progressive' interpretation of international 
instruments on issues like human rights, minority rights and the principle of self- 
determination. Besides, they should strive to challenge the positivist legal theory by 
adopting a multi-disciplinary approach so as to come to grips with the complexity of 
international relations. Otherwise, these scholars will confine themselves to a mythic 
legality which does not necessarily coincide with the real world. The 'external world' 
is not simply a totality of objective facts on the basis of which states take 'rational' 
decisions. On the contrary, states perceive the external world from the prism of their 
own peculiar history, official ideology and cultural identity. The way in which external 
events are presented to the general public -by the media, diplomats, politicians and so 
forth- are often a function of the combination of these factors, and so is the response 
which they evoke from states. While, for instance, positivist legal scholars have 
hardly anything to say about a concept like 'national identity dynamic', in reality, it 
plays a central role with regard to matters which are perceived to involve the 'high 
interests' of the 'nation'. Therefore, the primacy of states, both as subjects of 
international law and as locus for legal analyses, has to be challenged before making 
any meaningful critique of international law.
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This unorthodox position also necessitates an awareness of the evolving nature of 
states as political models. Having surveyed the nature of international order since the 
Vienna Congress of 1815, Clark concludes that its tendency to reform is far more 
limited than the scope of intellectual speculation suggests. Besides, the theory of 
inter-state relationships has largely remained static, despite many changes within the 
state itself (12). As Hinsley observes, the nature and history of nationalism have not 
simply been influenced by, but significantly contributed to, the developments in the 
international system (13). Therefore, as asserted by Clark, theories of international 
order must elaborate on the evolving nature of states, rather than states as static 
models. Just as international relations emerged as a by-product of the modem nation- 
state, any restructuring of the international order is contingent on the changes in the 
state units themselves (14).
The views expressed by Clark are relevant to the critique of the behavioural 
dimensions of Turkey's interaction with the outside world. Indeed a major proposition 
of this study is that a radical revaluation of Turkey's role within the larger 
international society is contingent upon a redefinition of Turkish national identity and 
a democratization of its political and legal structures. To that end, the decision­
making process should cease to be an exclusive preserve of a few institutions and 
interest groups, like the army, the executive, the diplomatic establishment, and 
business circles. Instead, it should be accessible to a wider section of Turkish society : 
trade unions, professional associations, farmers' unions, members of parliament, 
members of the press, members of minority groups and so forth. The practical 
realization of 'popular sovereignty' also requires that the excessively centralized 
political and administrative system in Turkey give way to greater decentralisation. In 
addition, the official ideology should cease to define national identity exclusively from 
a 'Turco-centric' perspective. Those living in Turkey are too heterogeneous and 
varied to be pigeon-holed as simply 'Turks'. Besides, Turkish society has sufficiently 
matured in co-habitation so that it is no longer necessary to be clustered under a 
uniform and static identity. Society, as distinct from the state, should be allowed to 
evolve within its own dynamics, rather than, as has hitherto been the case, being 
subjected to a programme of 'social engineering’ by the self-appointed 'guardians of 
the nation'. Otherwise, the existing gulf between the state and the people might 
become unbridgeable.
Finally, the Turkish political establishment should cease to pretend that Turkey is 
essentially a European nation, and that its interests coincide with those of European 
countries. Identities, particularly when it comes to the enormously complex reality of
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nation-states, cannot be reduced to ’one' at the expense of others. This is particularly 
true of a country like Turkey which is at the cross-roads of two distinct civilisations - 
western and Islamic-, and whose history is shaped by an irreducible interplay of 
religious, ethnic and liberal ideological currents. If a label has to be used, there is no 
denying that Turkey is more a part of the Middle Eastern subsystem than that of 
Europe, in terms of geography, history and culture. It is, economically speaking, 
also a developing society with a per capita income of less than $2500 (1993). 
Therefore its economic prospects may be more intimately linked to those in the Third 
World than the Turkish political establishment are prepared to admit. Therefore, 
Turkey is, sooner or later, bound to come to terms with its specific history, 
geographical location and economic conditions which warrant a rethinking of its 
exclusive dependence on the western world.
Meanwhile, Turkey's transition from a sovereignty-centred, authoritarian and 
ethnoculturally-defined territorial unit to a grassroots democracy which accords equal 
recognition to diverse cultures, identities and ideologies will also remove a major 
conceptual obstacle to Turkey's problematic attitude to questions of human rights and 
minority rights. For instance, under such circumstances, Turkish political elites could, 
without much inhibition, digest the idea of officially recognizing the Kurds as a 
'minority'. A more democratic and less ethno-centric Turkey would, furthermore, be 
less likely to manipulate external disputes in order to mobilize 'national identity 
dynamic'. Therefore, a healthy and democratic Turkey which is at ease with its past 
and present alike is a sine quo non for an unproblematic posture and constructive role 
which it might develop vis-d-vis international society in the years to come.
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